

This interview is being conducted on behalf of the Oral History Project of the District of Columbia Circuit. The interviewee is David Ginsburg. The interviewer is Jeffrey F. Liss. This session took place on the 22nd day of April 1998 at 10:45 a.m.

Mr. Liss: David, where we left off, you had been describing the teas you attended with Justice Brandeis, and you mentioned that you also had come into contact with Justices Black and Frankfurter, and I thought maybe we could talk about them a little bit. At law school, did Frankfurter ever speak of his ambition to be on the Court?

Mr. Ginsburg: He never spoke of it. I never heard him in any way refer to anything about the Supreme Court other than whether, for example, certiorari should have been granted or should not have been granted in this or that case, or the analysis of the case. But everyone around him, including the faculty, assumed that one day, with Roosevelt in office, the odds were that Frankfurter would arrive at the Supreme Court. I was in Washington when his name came up. The question was what problems would there be? I remember Ben, Tom, myself and others—Jerry Frank—all joined in preparing memos for him, materials that might be helpful in preparation for the confirmation hearing. There was some opposition, but it wasn't serious; he was confirmed without too much trouble.

Mr. Liss: Do you know if Ben Cohen was in on the discussions with the President when the President decided to nominate him?

Mr. Ginsburg: I don't know that. And I doubt it very much. Action would have been taken in the first instance—I'd guess the President would have received some recommendations from Cummings, who was then the Attorney General. It's unlikely, I think that the President ever spoke to anyone other than Cummings about that. For example, when the court packing plan came up in '37, Cohen and Corcoran told Joe Rauh and me that they had no knowledge of the plan. It originated with Cummings and came as a surprise.

Mr. Liss: How did you meet Justice Black?

Mr. Ginsburg: Justice Black I first met when he was a Senator, in connection with the Public Utility Holding Company Act. He was Chairman of the Committee considering the proposed law. Sometime after the Act was passed, Tom sent me up with a memo for him. I remember the meeting. Controlled, not loquacious, businesslike, clearly a Southerner. He seemed very self-assured. In no way unpleasant, indeed, likable. I came to know him and later played tennis with him, on the tennis court at his home in Alexandria. He was not a man who showed emotion, either of affection or hostility. He was reserved, controlled. Although good humored, he seemed to lack warmth. And for me, he did. But he was hardworking and a good Justice. Later when I clerked for Douglas, I came to see more of him on the Supreme Court, and came to like him more as I came to know him better. But he was a man who was uncomfortable, I think, with emotion, affection, even hostility. He had one set of attitudes, not too much laughter, just enough. Some enthusiasm, not too much. He simply sought to maintain stability and control, not only within himself, but when possible with those around him.

Mr. Liss: Did you know his clerks when you clerked for Douglas?

Mr. Ginsburg: I knew some of his first clerks and later, on a couple of occasions, I opened my home to his clerks who held a reunion there. They included many distinguished people, able people, first-rate lawyers.

Mr. Liss: How did the Douglas clerkship come your way?

Mr. Ginsburg: Well, I was based at the SEC throughout this entire period--

Mr. Liss: Although assigned over to Interior.

Mr. Ginsburg: Although assigned, not to the Interior Department, but assigned to Ben and to Tom personally. They happened to maintain their offices at that time in the Interior Department as the National Power Policy Committee. I suppose that was set up for purposes of

organizing the defense of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. When work lagged, and that wasn't often, I returned to the SEC. At one point I came to know Leon Henderson, who was a Commissioner at the SEC, one of five. Douglas was Chairman. Henderson was an economist, had been the economist for the Democratic National Committee. Able man, thoughtful and energetic, sometimes boisterous, always hard-driving. He needed help; I served for a while as Henderson's assistant. Then, from time to time, I would return to help when Ben called.

Ultimately, I returned to the SEC. This was after the Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitutional validity of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. Douglas asked me to serve as his assistant, and I did. I worked closely with him on opinions and the work of the Commission, including assisting other Commissioners as they needed help. Around that time, a new biography had been written about Teddy Roosevelt, who was one of Douglas' heroes. Jerome Frank, another Commissioner, close to Douglas, came into my office with the book in his hand, opened to a page and said, "Listen to this." He read a paragraph or two from the book. Then he said, "Work it into my opinion." He ripped the page from the book. I have a passion for books and respect them. The notion of just ripping a page out of a book and simply handing it to me—I was shocked. He had written the opinion in the Consumer Power Company case that first required competitive bidding for municipal bonds. Before that, those bonds had been sold and distributed on a friendly basis to cooperative brokers and dealers. The opinion was inordinately long and Douglas had asked me to find a way to reduce the size of the opinion. It would be too much for the brokers and dealers dealing with municipalities around the country. I took a shot at it and finally got the opinion down to twenty pages. It was a major effort that took weeks. I brought it in to Jerome Frank and said, "I think I've got it for you. The chairman was trying to find a way to get it into a form that could be more widely understood." He stopped, read it, thought it was good, and said, "I'll tell you what we'll do. We will use it as a summary of the case at the end." It

was in that summary that I tried to work in something about Teddy Roosevelt's life.

Douglas had been on the Commission for some years already; he and Abe Fortas had come from Yale (Abe first served as an assistant to Jerome Frank at Agriculture) to work on matters dealing with the New York Stock Exchange, the '34 Stock Exchange Act, and investigations that took place about that time. When Brandeis resigned early in '39, the question was who would replace him. Frankfurter and Black were there. The old men now on the Court were fewer than nine.

Mr. Liss: Right.

Mr. Ginsburg: There was an immediate feeling among the people I knew that the man who should replace Brandeis was Douglas. He was young, 39, and experienced. An effort would have to be organized to get the nomination through. In particular, there was a feeling on the Hill that geographic diversification was needed on the Court—in particular, for a Westerner. Douglas was known as a professor from Yale. In fact, he had, as a young man, been reared in the State of Washington. Yakima was the town. But he had spent most of his life as an adult in the East, teaching at Columbia and Yale and, for some time, in private practice. Tom and Ben worked with Senator Borah, and Borah finally spoke and endorsed Douglas as a man of the West. Since Borah himself was a symbol of the West, it all worked out. Douglas took his place on the Court.

Mr. Liss: Was there any concern about his age, about how young he was?

Mr. Ginsburg: There was talk that he was the youngest, at least in recent years, but that was not the basis for opposition. The opposition attacked his liberalism. I don't recall any serious opposition after Borah's speech. Douglas spoke with me during this period, assuming that he would be nominated by the President and supported by the Senate; he asked me to go with him as his first law clerk. I agreed.

Mr. Liss: At this time did the justices have just one law clerk?

Mr. Ginsburg: Just one law clerk. And, indeed, we had to work very hard. There was no thought of more clerks. The Justice, his secretary and I had a picture taken at the Court on April 20, which happened to be my birthday.

Mr. Liss: What year?

Mr. Ginsburg: This was in '39. I was older than most of the clerks; I was 27. I spent the rest of the term and the summer with him on one of the islands in the St. Lawrence Seaway, at a home that Douglas borrowed from a friend who was then, I think, the Secretary of Commerce. It was a thrilling experience for me. Stone was Chief for part of the time and Hughes was Chief before Stone. Stone had been the Dean of the law school at Columbia, and Hughes was the Chief when Douglas was appointed to take Brandeis' place.

Mr. Liss: Did you spend time over the summer looking at cert. petitions?

Mr. Ginsburg: Yes, working on cert. petitions that had been sent to us in Canada. I worked with a portable typewriter that I had brought with me, reading (sometimes in a boat as he fished), and we'd talk about some of the petitions. It may sound like a pleasant, easy vacation, but it was tough. Remember, this was '39. Hitler was moving fast in Europe. As the summer drew to a close, Thurman Arnold and his wife came for a visit. Douglas and he had been together at Yale and were very close. I knew Thurman and his wife quite well; we were all sitting around the fire together one night. Suddenly Mildred, Douglas' wife, came running out of the house saying that the Germans had attacked Poland. It was war. I remember the jolt that came through me. I felt certain from that moment that we would be in the war; we had all heard too many frightening details about the nature of the German rearmament, weaponry and war preparations to feel that Hitler could easily be stopped. Douglas had asked me to spend another year with him and I had agreed. The day after we heard the news, I told him that if it wouldn't

cause trouble, I would prefer to go back to Washington and begin work on what I was sure would be a vastly enhanced, much stronger rearmament program. He agreed.

Mr. Liss: Did you have an idea then as to where you would go to work on that program?

Mr. Ginsburg: I thought that what would have to happen first, and in fact it did so happen, is that hearings would be held on the Hill and a program would have to be developed. The TNEC was then in session—the Temporary National Economic Commission—which had been established to consider antitrust policy. Business, organized against FDR, had engaged in unlawful cooperation. However, TNEC was an economic inquiry. Leon Henderson was a member of that commission. I remember talking with Leon about the possible desirability of converting the TNEC to a Commission on rearmament. He agreed. Later, Leon went to New York to meet with Bernard Baruch, who had handled industrial mobilization during World War I. It was then that Baruch began his almost weekly visits to Washington consulting and offering guidance on these matters. I was assigned by Henderson, a member of the TNEC, to dig out as much as was available about how rearmament and economic mobilization had been done in World War I. I remember going down into the bowels of Archives, and visiting the Library of Congress to locate whatever was available in as much detail as possible. How had they accomplished it? And then a man named Leo Cherne—and Bill, who was later the head of the CIA—Bill—

Mr. Liss: Not Colby?

Mr. Ginsburg: No. Before him.

Mr. Liss: Before that.

Mr. Ginsburg: He was with Reagan. His name will come to me in a moment. It's well known [William Casey]. The three of us were assigned to do a draft of a mobilization law.

And over a period of months, we drafted, with help from others, the Industrial Mobilization Act of 1939.

Mr. Liss: Is this the act that established the War Production Board?

Mr. Ginsburg: No. That came later under an Executive Order. FDR acknowledged the existence of our draft, but decided to rely on an old World War I statute still on the books with which he was familiar. He set up a series of groups—one to deal with price control, one to deal with consumer interests, one to work on war production, one to deal with raw materials, another with labor, and so on.

Mr. Liss: All under an existing statute.

Mr. Ginsburg: All under an existing World War I statute.

Mr. Liss: Right. Which was still in effect?

Mr. Ginsburg: Which was still in effect, still on the books. How he remembered it I have no idea, but it was there. It hadn't been repealed and he just turned to it.

Mr. Liss: Wasn't he an Assistant Secretary—

Mr. Ginsburg: Of the Navy.

Mr. Liss: During the War?

Mr. Ginsburg: During the War.

Mr. Liss: That's probably how he remembered it.

Mr. Ginsburg: Yes. No doubt about that. But this law was enacted, I think, it was 1917. We are talking now about 1940. Well, Leon Henderson became head of the Office of Price Administration, set up by Executive Order. I had worked with him at the SEC and the TNEC and we got along well together. He asked me to become his General Counsel and I did. I was then 27. We worked together until I went into the Army at the end of '42.

Mr. Liss: What type of work did you do as General Counsel?

Mr. Ginsburg: When I left OPA, we had some 2,500 lawyers and about 7,500 investigators. We had a multi-million dollar budget. We had regional offices in each of the Federal Reserve districts of the country. We had smaller offices in all of the major cities of the United States. We prepared legislation and regulations to control prices and to enable us, if necessary, to ration. When Pearl Harbor came, all of this proved essential.

Mr. Liss: And it was in place by the time Pearl Harbor came?

Mr. Ginsburg: Shortly after. The Congress delayed the legislation, but after the attack, it was quickly passed and we went to work. Our first offices were in the Federal Reserve building.

Mr. Liss: Where was that at the time?

Mr. Ginsburg: On Constitution Avenue, where it is now. Later, we moved to a building on Massachusetts Avenue, a small building that had been a private home. We could no longer stay at the Federal Reserve Building because they were also growing to meet war needs. Our first effort was to get legislative authority because Pearl Harbor hit us before we had any legislation. We began with an Executive Order that created an Office of Price Administration, with the limited authority of an Executive Order. We obtained legislation in the spring of '42. I stayed with OPA until the fall in order to get legislation enacted to correct errors in the initial bill, particularly as the bill impacted agricultural commodities. The key opposition to us was headed in the Senate by Albert Gore, Sr., the father of Vice President Gore, who was working very closely with Bernard Baruch. But we managed to get the legislation through.

Mr. Liss: What was the basis for Senator Gore's opposition?

Mr. Ginsburg: He had accepted Baruch's thesis that all prices, wages, interest rates, everything that affected the level of inflation in the country, should be frozen as of a single date. Henderson felt, and those of us who worked with him were in full agreement, that the

prices of agricultural products were too low. We might not be able to grow the volume of food needed to support an army or armies and the civilian population if prices were kept at the levels that existed at the time. We opposed the freeze on agricultural prices. The House had enacted legislation that precluded control of farm prices until they reached 110 percent of parity. This simply meant that there would be an escalating upward spiral. When prices reached 110 percent, the cost of living would have risen and the parity price on farm prices would thus also rise. In fact, that's the way it worked. That was in the original bill—110 percent of parity. I remember working very closely with Kenneth Galbraith, who headed the Price Division as I served the Legal Division. By the end of the year—'42 toward fall—we got legislation through which amended the provision and enabled us to hold prices at parity and enabled us also to adjust agricultural prices as needed in order to produce the volume of food that was required. These were tough days. When Pearl Harbor hit, I remember going to my office in Tempo D on the Mall—temporary office buildings that had been built for war purposes—and remaining there through two nights.

Mr. Liss: These were built during World War I or built for World War II?

Mr. Ginsburg: World War II.

Mr. Liss: Because there were some that were there and then taken away, I guess.

Mr. Ginsburg: That's right. But the ones you're talking about were World War I, quite substantial buildings that after some 25 years were still standing. The Navy and others occupied them. The new ones I am referring to were at the other end of the Mall, near the Smithsonian. Temporary buildings were built not only for government occupancy but also for use by the young women and others who flocked to the city for the jobs as secretaries. We were planning to create a massive army—ultimately 14 million people. Many support staff and secretaries lived in the barracks built on the Mall. I remember going down when Pearl Harbor hit

to Tempo D—rushing down because our first concern was, what did the Far East provide that we would need for war mobilization.

Mr. Liss: I assume rubber was a key concern?

Mr. Ginsburg: Right. We had imported rubber from the Far East and obviously it was no longer going to be available. Many people in the country were rushing to buy tires, so we had to take control of the supply and ration tires. By this time, we had our legislation, we had the authority and we acted promptly. We set up ration offices and instrumentalities for rationing with ration cards. Teachers and schools throughout the country did the job and served us well. Gasoline also would be in short supply. We would need vast quantities of gasoline for trucks, planes and tanks essential for the war. We had to take control. I remember myself getting an A Card. An A Card entitled me to three gallons of gasoline a week, which effectively meant that I would take the bus, if there was one, and that was that. I spent the first three days at the office.

Mr. Liss: After Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Ginsburg: Immediately after Pearl Harbor. Trying to think through, what first had to be done? What were the priorities? Henderson was there, John Hamm, his deputy, Ken Galbraith, who headed price, and also the head of rationing. We worked out the systems for going forward.

Mr. Liss: How would you compare the activity, excitement and general atmosphere of the wartime effort to the atmosphere during the New Deal? Two very different challenges, but how were they similar and how were they different in Washington?

Mr. Ginsburg: In the late '30s, as part of the New Deal, or in the '30s, after FDR came in, there was a sense of desperation, a need for original and different thinking, because the thinking that had prevailed before under Hoover was simply not adequate to cope with the problem. It was in part an intellectual effort. What could we do to solve this problem? What

would get purchasing power into the hands of people that would enable them to buy, utilize reserves, require the production of other materials that put people to work, and so on? One sat back and thought, put ideas on paper, and tried to have them tested. In wartime, an enemy was attacking, and by this time we were fighting a war on two fronts. Germany had declared war on us. And of course the Japanese had attacked. I had spent a lot of time in previous months working on how we had responded in World War I. Many others, of course, were doing much the same thing, and beginning to put in place the processes and institutions needed for mobilization. Our big problem: how do you mobilize without inflation? That was our problem—how do you recruit, equip, send abroad a massive army without inflation at home? We knew the experience of Germany after World War I, Italy after World War I, books had been written on the subject, many had thought about it. We had to provide economic controls. The Federal Reserve was, of course, worrying about the same problem, and the Treasury Department, too, was at work and involved. But the instruments needed to effect control of prices and indirectly wages were the OPA and other instruments that had been created by FDR under the World War I statute. Our job was to work with Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board to prevent inflation. Others were cooperating. At OPA we did not have direct control of labor's wages. Others had to deal with that. But we had control of prices and rationing, and these were the key controls in use during the war. I won't go into the details, but we had individual price controls on particular commodities, and we also had a general price regulation that controlled almost everything else (there were of course some exclusions). We controlled rationing. We had rent control because that was a critical element in the cost of living. Baruch was right that in wartime you had to control everything; if some items began to move up, the cost of living would go up. Living standards would drop if you couldn't pay more and if you couldn't increase your income. This was a period of turmoil and testing. It was relatively easy to recruit able lawyers.

We had at the Office of Price Administration I think the greatest aggregation of the ablest lawyers that this country has ever seen.

Mr. Liss: Where did these lawyers come from?

Mr. Ginsburg: Many came from the faculties of the law schools because they no longer had students. They were headed for the Army. I had on my staff David Cavers, Henry Hart and Jim McLaughlin from Harvard, all of whom had been full professors.

Mr. Liss: Did you have any of your former teachers?

Mr. Ginsburg: They were former teachers.

Mr. Liss: Of yours?

Mr. Ginsburg: McLaughlin, yes; I knew them all while in school.

Mr. Liss: Right.

Mr. Ginsburg: There were many others. Nat Nathanson of Northwestern, others from Columbia, Yale and elsewhere. We had a very large staff although relatively few in Washington. I doubt that we had more than five or seven hundred in Washington. They were mostly stationed around the country, in district and regional offices.

Mr. Liss: Wasn't Bernard Meltzer part of the effort?

Mr. Ginsburg: Bernie Meltzer? Yes, he was—he later went to Chicago, teaching there.

Mr. Liss: Right.

Mr. Ginsburg: For a long time. I knew him at the SEC. I think he was with us at the OPA. I don't have a very clear recollection. I was spending most of my time trying to organize and deal with the necessary legislation, set up the structure, recruit, prepare a training manual—we published a loose-leaf service. We distributed our regulations much the way CCH, Prentice Hall and others do now. Each week I would communicate with our lawyers through the

service. These details were each major efforts. To organize a loose-leaf service for several hundred offices was not easy. And these matters were important; when prices are controlled effectively, profits are affected. If costs increase and prices are rigid, it becomes tough to do business. Most people understood that there were no real alternatives but, understandably there was opposition. I met LBJ, later President Johnson, when he was a young man serving on the Hill, with the head of the King Ranch, a Congressman from Texas. Later while in Congress, he came to me about price adjustments for people within the district. They couldn't be granted but I got to know him better then, and later worked with him.

Mr. Liss: Could you imagine that we could possibly organize such an effort to control the economy today, or is the experience you had something that simply cannot even be fathomed in today's economy?

Mr. Ginsburg: Our government responds most effectively only to the threat of catastrophe. Remember, there had been a Pearl Harbor and we had lost most of our Navy! The country understood it, and the Congress understood it. Now, of course, conditions are different; politicization is endemic and the economic and other threats are limited. If dangers and risks are sufficiently apparent and dramatic, the country and the Congress I think will respond fully and quickly to overcome whatever alternatives the politics might suggest.

Mr. Liss: Now, I interrupted you some time ago when you were about to relate that you entered the service.

Mr. Ginsburg: Oh. In the fall of '42, I was, as I pointed out, a young man. By then married, without children, in a position of considerable authority. You must remember the times. In race relations, the blacks suffered, but so too did the Jews. There was a good deal of anti-Semitism. In New Jersey, there were groups of Nazis, who called themselves Nazis. Throughout the country there was a great drift to isolation. "We don't want any part of this. . .

This war is their war, not our war." After the draft had been in effect for one year, it had to be extended. As the war began, the administration ultimately won—continuation of the draft was absolutely essential for defense—by one vote in the Senate. These are facts one never forgets. I was myself attacked as a Jew by some Congressman, I think, from Virginia. I was emotionally exhausted. We were working 18 hours every day. There was no day of the week, including Sundays, when we weren't doing something having to do with work. There was no relief, and I felt shaky. So I volunteered and went into the Army as a private; I was certain that I would be taken in the draft in any event. Bob Nathan, a distinguished economist in Washington and a personal friend, and I went in at the same time. We reported, traveled on the same bus to the same place, at that time called Camp Lee, not far from Richmond. When we got there a newspaper clipping with pictures of both of us had been pinned on the bulletin board, and underneath, handwritten: "These two sons of bitches arrive today." It was by no means a terrible experience, and in many ways, it was an enriching one. Bob was not in the best of health, and ultimately he was released. I was healthy enough and went through basic training, and the rest of it. I did everything from driving trucks to other less outdoor duties, and ultimately went to officers' training camp, and emerged as a Second Lieutenant. I was sent to England. There was need for Second Lieutenants because we were losing a lot of them in North Africa. And so, ultimately, I served in various places—supply, plans and training, other things.

Mr. Liss: How long did your service last?

Mr. Ginsburg: Nearly four years. I remained in the Army until toward summer of '46. Not quite four years. I came home once as the war was coming to an end in Europe. There was a need to allocate supplies between the European armies and the Far Eastern armies, and the General with whom I was working at the time and I came back. The plane was a four-motored one, the first I had seen. It landed in New York somewhere, and I agreed to meet him in

Washington since I wanted to see the man in New York with whom I had worked so closely, John Hamm, Leon Henderson's deputy. I got in a cab to go to his apartment, the cab drove off, and in a few minutes, I saw the driver, head down, shaking. I leaned over, he was crying and I said, "What's wrong?" He replied, "FDR died." I cried too. I visited John, and we talked about what had happened. That afternoon, late, I went on to Washington and did the work there that I had to do. Then back to Europe. This was April '45; shortly after I got back, I had a call from General Clay, Lucius Clay, whom I had known in Washington in the Office of Price Administration. Price control affected items that the Army bought so we had to maintain a relationship with the military in administering price control. I don't mean that we tried to price munitions, but the Army did buy many goods subject to price controls. Clay asked me to come with him to Berlin. What had happened in Germany after World War I—a terrible inflation that ultimately led to the destruction of so much wealth and human resources that many historians believe led quite directly to Hitler—we wished to avoid this time. He wanted help from someone involved with price stabilization, inflation control, in Europe with him. I thought it was necessary and agreed to come.

Mr. Liss: Now this was just before Germany surrendered.

Mr. Ginsburg: Yes.

Mr. Liss: But he was anticipating the need.

Mr. Ginsburg: Oh yes. He was scheduled to take over in Berlin, but he was still in Paris. Yes. I met with him and we talked about his concerns. I thought he was right, and got in touch with ex-OPA people who were in the Army. Carl Auerbach and Tom Harris, and a half a dozen or so others, and recruited them. We had worked together before. Henry Reuss, who later was elected to Congress and became Chairman of the Commerce Committee, joined us and a number of others. We gathered in Frankfurt before the war ended. Fighting was going on in

southeastern Germany. We set up offices in the I.G. Farben Building, and later the Economics Division, of which I was part, broke up I.G. Farben and made what's now three enormous chemical companies in Germany from that one. Months later I went with Clay to Berlin. Before we went to Berlin, in July, I had driven from community to community to set up rationing and price controls, and to recruit as many local people to do that job as we could find; some were, of course, Nazis. For this purpose, we had to use what we could find. And we did. In Berlin afterwards, we worked with the Russians, the French and the British. My job was to work on the Level of Industry for Germany. What industrial resources should be left with Germany? The Morgenthau Plan would have made out of Germany a pastoral country, an agricultural country. To me it was wrong and dangerous. To destroy the capacity for making goods on a continent that so desperately needed goods would be destructive. Many of us felt that way and ultimately Morgenthau's approach was rejected. But setting the initial levels of industry was tough because the French had one view, the Russians another and the British a third. We were ourselves trying to provide what Germany genuinely required. The first serious argument was over the level of the steel industry—how much productive capacity was really required. Now, the level seems laughable, but at the time, we sought the highest level that we could get. I think seven or eight million tons a year. Now they're producing 6 to 8 times that and more. We approached these matters with the hope that it would be possible to make of Germany a genuine ally. All of us had the experience of World War I very much in mind. Then the allies had created desperation. We had imposed on the Germans so many burdens and requirements that some historians tell us many later turned to “National Socialism” out of desperation and fear. We didn't want to risk that again, but hostilities were deep, and as the Holocaust “camps” opened we learned what really had happened under the Nazis. It was not only the 6 million Jews that had been slaughtered, but gypsies, the infirm, Catholics, intellectuals generally, and others. Opponents to

the Nazis were destroyed. I visited two of the camps; shock isn't quite the word that comes to mind. We were numbed by what we saw. But let's call it a day. The recollection saddens and burdens me.

*This concludes the interview held April 22, 1998.*