

**ORAL HISTORY OF  
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR. - FOURTEENTH INTERVIEW  
JUNE 3, 2003**

This will be the last day of this series of interviews of Harry McPherson. Today is rainy, cold June 3<sup>rd</sup> in Washington.

Mr. Vanderstar: We talked before we turned on the tape about the fact that Harry's own book, *A Political Education*, leaves off in 1969 and that there are a number of themes that come up in the epilogue that was written after the original writing. We also talked about Charlie Horsky's book, *A Washington Lawyer*. It was written in 1952 and had been a series of lectures which Charlie gave at Northwestern, Harry, you've looked at that and are ready to react to some of the things that Charlie talked about. So let's start with that. And in full disclosure, of course, Charlie was a partner at Covington & Burling, which was my firm for 39 years.

Mr. McPherson: Yes, and a colleague of mine in the Johnson White House and a friend of mine, which whom I spent a week in the Montana wilderness one time.

I should comment about one aspect of the epilogue that I wrote in 1994 for publication in *A Political Education*. None of the publishers over the years who did this book—there were two publishers after the first one—would let me change the book for economic reasons. It costs money to do that, to amend it, so instead they let me add prefaces, prologues, epilogues and so on to it. In writing this one, I made a colossal boner, as it turned out. I wrote about the Senate in 1994 and compared it with the Senate that I had worked in. In 1994 George Mitchell was the majority leader, and it was extremely interesting to compare his time and conditions of leadership with LBJ's. What I never imagined happening did, after I had

sent in the text of my epilogue. Newt Gingrich and his pals, including my new colleague Dick Armey, just cleaned the Democratic clock in the 1994 election, and so many of the themes that appear in that epilogue don't make any sense in the context of a Republican Congress. I talk about all these senators being chairmen of committees, but they were not chairmen after the vote in November 1994.

Let me just say a few things about some of the themes in Charlie Horsky's book, *A Washington Lawyer*, which is just as clear-headed and sagacious as Charlie was. One of them is its generosity toward those of us who have made our careers as "Washington lawyers," that is, people who deal as lobbyists, as representatives and advocates for clients in the executive branch and various agencies of the government in rule-making proceedings and in a wide range of activities that are influenced by political ties.

One of the things that is fundamentally different, not always specifically different, but fundamentally different between the practice of law before courts and in formal administrative proceedings, and the practice of representing clients before members of Congress and executives in the executive departments is politics. Success in the latter practice is often influenced one way or another by political ties. That is, when you go to Capitol Hill to talk to members about an issue that has political lightning in it, there is a real political spin where the very mention of the issue or the mention of people involved with the issue creates an immediate reaction in the listener that may influence what success you have. As a result, you would be a fool to go and see people who are absolutely, furiously opposed to your client's position. They might not necessarily know a lot about the client, but they do know the industry that the client is in. They probably know that the client or the predecessor executives of the client were huge donors to the opposition's political party, or perhaps that they underwrote a think tank that

produced savage attacks on this member. So you would think twice about taking your client up to see that member or going yourself. In effect, you're forum shopping, and the fora are members, various offices with whom the practitioner, the lobbyist/lawyer may have his own long-time relationships.

I think I described a very uncomfortable session before about eight or nine Democratic senators who invited me to make the best case I could on behalf of the tobacco settlement. This was in a rather early period before anybody except its defenders had seriously thought that you could deal with this nefarious industry. And I looked at these people and I realized that I knew them all, I had had lunch with them, I had had two or three of them to my house for Christmas brunch; they were friends and people that I enjoyed. At the outset they regarded me warmly, as they always had. I'd been around a long time and they thought of me as a kind of agreeable veteran of the Hill, as I did them. So here I was representing this presumptively corrupt and evil industry, killer of hundreds of thousands of people, and I was speaking on behalf of a deal that it and the states and the trial lawyers had cooked up and were trying to get the government to approve.

Mr. Vanderstar: That example, I guess, is in the classification of the so-called "third rail" that nobody wanted to touch.

Mr. McPherson: Exactly.

Mr. Vanderstar: Unlike the situation of someone who has donated heavily to the member's opponent. I suspect there wasn't anybody on Capitol Hill who even had an open mind about the tobacco issue.

Mr. McPherson: Tobacco's only reliable supporters were people from Kentucky and North Carolina. One of them was a good friend of mine, Wendell Ford. As much as I liked

Wendell—he was the Democratic whip in the Senate, he was very successful and very well liked by many people—I didn't want to be tied to Wendell, who was the spokesman for the industry on all of the issues that were associated with tobacco and that had earned the distaste of many members for years. The other was Jesse Helms of North Carolina, who would always go to bat for the industry.

Actually this whole idea of cranking up a settlement, if it didn't originate with Jim Hunt, the governor of North Carolina, certainly found in him an early advocate—someone who could talk to Bill Clinton about the desirability of a settlement that would pay a lot of money and change a lot of behavior on the part of the tobacco companies and keep this issue out of the political scene. Clinton said to Jim Hunt, “I want to see a change. I don't want to lose the North Carolina vote before I even get started by being on the wrong side of tobacco, so let's get it settled.” That's what he said at first. Clinton was behind it but would not say a word or allow Bruce Lindsey in the Clinton White House, who had been charged with dealing with it, to say a word in its favor.

Mr. Vanderstar: But you're saying that, except for a few tobacco state senators, the senators considered this industry to be so evil that they didn't even want to arrive at a solution that would involve the industry, as you say: (a) forking over a whole lot of money, a sum that nobody had ever imagined before; and (b) changing a lot of behavior, consenting to FDA jurisdiction, that sort of thing.

Mr. McPherson: Also advertising.

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes. Why was that so unattractive to the political people in Congress?

Mr. McPherson: That is a subject that has interested me a lot, and I don't know

how to answer it. Some issues, and you've used the "third-rail" term advisedly, some issues are answered in the politician's mind when he hears the fateful words—when you say "Tobacco Industry Settlement" or "Dealing with Tobacco Industry." That means you might be thought to be selling out to the tobacco industry in some way, letting them off the hook when they ought to pay through the nose. This was at a time when the trial lawyers were filing class action suits and the industry was looking at a combination of those suits and of state suits brought to recover Medicaid costs that the states had had to pay out to people who were unhealthy because of smoking. The subject just seemed to terrify members. They just found it very hard to even think about it. I did have some good conversations with people like Joe Lieberman and Chris Dodd, people who would sit and listen, ask some questions about it, who were interested. But most members, even though I knew them, looked at me with what seemed to be suspicion.

There was a giant book, you probably read it, by Kluger. After having bashed the industry and all of its behavior and its advertising for 700 or 800 pages, Kluger ends by saying it would be foolish to think you can terminate all smoking in this country. If you made the manufacture of cigarettes illegal in America, they would be manufactured in a hundred countries around the world and gotten into America. You can't stop it that way and you lose control of it. You need to work out a deal very much like the one I was trying to describe.

In any event, I was using tobacco as an example of a politically-charged issue. Often the job of the lobbyist is to deal in such a charged atmosphere in which he is representing somebody who is perceived from the outside to be taking the wrong side. One way or the other, there is an almost immediate reaction on the part of many people.

Take the decision yesterday by the FCC. That's going to go to Congress.

Mr. Vanderstar: For the record, briefly, that was a decision on multiple

ownership of television, radio stations, newspapers and various other media outlets. That's the basic issue you're talking about.

Mr. McPherson: Yes. Yesterday, Byron Dorgan, Fritz Hollings and Trent Lott, a very interesting trio, were on C-Span saying that they were going to be looking for a legislative route to undo this. Trent Lott said, "If we fail in every other way, we'll have to look at appropriations." Hello? Meaning, would have to consider conditioning appropriations to the Federal Communications Commission on their willingness to change the rule they adopted yesterday. That's pretty extreme.

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes.

Mr. McPherson: In any event, if you take that issue, if you were representing one of the networks or one of the big media companies, a big newspaper owner who had in mind buying a television station in his own town where he had the paper, you would get to the Hill in an environment in which a number of people, probably largely Republican, would be in favor of taking the shackles off the media.

Mr. Vanderstar: And supporting the FCC.

Mr. McPherson: And supporting the FCC, people who traditionally agree with the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial policy. On the other side people who feel that what the FCC has done is an invitation to a concentration of media power that is very much not in the public interest. So if you were hired by a network that wants to own more, wants to go from a 35 percent reach of viewers in the country to 45 percent, as the new rule allows, you'd have to go up and see people who would immediately regard you as a flunky voice for Murdock and Disney and Michael Eisner and these guys who want to own everything in their own tight little box.

So you are often involved in a heated ideological environment. When you're

trying cases, you certainly look for a judge, if you have any choice, you want to try to find a judge whose record is reasonably tolerant of your point of view. It's not as if there was a totally 180 degree distinction, but it's more political on the Hill and in the agencies and in the policy-making parts of the departments.

Most of Charlie's writing, appropriately, is about rule-making proceedings and adjudicatory proceedings in agencies. You sometimes have the problem of the bureaucrat who has always felt a certain way. I have always heard that Stanley Sporkin at the SEC was going to have a view on some corporate governance issue that was against you when you went in to see him. You just know he was going to look scornfully at you and scowl and give you a very hard time. You could count on that. But for the most part I've found that officials and counsel in regulatory agencies and departments try to function in a just way that carries out a reasonable interpretation of the statute that they are administering.

When you get a step up or get into the appointed policy makers in the departments, when you get into the assistant secretaries and under-secretaries in the cabinet offices, people who may have, in today's world, Karl Rove on their Rolodex, you deal with officials who can be presumed to have pretty strong Republican conservative views. In the Johnson years, and in Carter's and Clinton's, people in those jobs would have pretty liberal views of the laws that they were administering. So when you went to see one of them hoping to get a ruling or an agreement within the department that the department would provide funds for a certain program that you were espousing, they would write to members of the Congress that they supported a certain program that your client was interested in. If you went today, you would expect to find moderate-to-extremely-conservative Republicans in those positions, and it would probably be best if you went with somebody like Armev, when he can do that, can go to the

executive branch, although he cannot lobby on the Hill. If he could just make a call to someone and say, "This guy is a Democrat but he's a respectable person and I'd be grateful if you'd see him." Very often that's enough at least to get you in the door. You may not get the result you want, but you can at least have a shot at it. If you have a large firm like Covington or like Piper Rudnick you can send an e-mail around and ask if and ask if anybody knows or ever had any experience with anybody who administers Title 405 of the Housing Act, and you hope that somebody, there among the hundreds of lawyers in the firm, would have had some such experience, and they can give you some help.

Mr. Vanderstar: The business of going to a basically political person or agency which may set some boundaries before you even get in the door means that you would always try to match up with people whose political instincts already favor the position you are trying to advance if you can find them.

Mr. McPherson: If you can find them.

Mr. Vanderstar: In Congress.

Mr. McPherson: Yes.

Mr. Vanderstar: In an administrative agency, if the chair of the agency has been appointed by the incumbent president, then you know what you're up against.

Mr. McPherson: Right.

Mr. Vanderstar: So, is the problem getting in the door or, maybe more generalized, does the problem go deeper than that, putting aside the tobacco industry type of problem, in that there are just a very few persuasive arguments you can make when you are up against political opposition?

Mr. McPherson: Well, that's where we would get to a wider representation than

Charlie was talking about in 1952. Two things, you looked in two places. One is okay; the other one has never made me feel very comfortable.

The one that's okay is media. If you've got an issue with a substantial aura or glow in the public scene, that is, in other words, people think about it, the news shows have the occasional comment on it, the *Lehrer* program interviews a couple of people about it, there's an editorial in the *Post*, the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, in other words, it's in the currency of the political scene. You think you've got a pretty good case but you also think it's going to be tough to get it through the executive department that administers it. So what you might want to suggest to your client is that the client hire a public relations firm to develop a strategy for bringing the client's position to public attention. If the client doesn't want to spend a lot of money on that then you go to someone on the editorial board of the *Post* or the *Times* or one of their reporters—after being in the town 45 years it's likely that you know a few of them—you approach them and try to get them to listen to your case. My success rate in actually producing results in such matters—that is, an editorial or a story that I could really feel helped my client—is about one out of eight. It used to be better, but so many people have adopted the tactic that the *Post* and the *Times*, if they haven't totally shut their doors, have certainly made it harder to get in.

My relationships with a number of media people are such that they can tolerate my raising an issue with them from time to time. I don't make a big deal of it, I don't make it seem as if it's the end of the world; essentially I offer it as an interesting view and say, "You might take a look at this side of the question." Anyway, in some cases approaching the media occasionally helps. You can imagine when we get on to pharmaceuticals, to the issue of how it provides drugs for Medicare and Medicaid, imagine the amount of money that will be spent on

newspaper and magazine and television advertising.

Mr. Vanderstar: Sure. It will be vast.

Mr. McPherson: Well, we saw it when Hilary Clinton came out with her bill in 1994. It was the subject of a gigantic and very successful counter-campaign.

The other thing that you do, the thing that I don't like, is rely on campaign contributions. Our **firm** has a large political action committee. It had a large one even when we were Vemer Liipfert. Now that we are Piper Rudnick, my estimable young partner, John Merrigan, who runs it and is a very successful fund raiser politically, went around to all the offices in the **firm**, every one of them, and talked to what must have been a fairly cold-faced collection of real estate lawyers and litigators and deal lawyers about why they ought to contribute very substantially personally to the political action committee, and he's been very successful. We've had a very good response. There was tremendous leadership in the effort by the people at the top of the **firm** who didn't hammer partners but did say, "We now have a section of the **firm** that works in the political arena so it would be very good if you all could help."

That is something I don't like a hell of a lot, I've never liked campaign contributions as a way of making my case, but they are part of the ergs of power that open doors, They don't get you success. I'm sure they haven't gotten me success. But at least you get in the door by virtue of somebody in your **firm** having made campaign contributions.

Mr. Vanderstar: If you got more than that, wouldn't you then start to run **risks** of crossing the line of kosherness?

Mr. McPherson: You would.

Mr. Vanderstar: Your story in your book about one member, I don't remember

who it was, who made a speech about campaign contributions linked to his position was quite dramatic and the effect it had on the legislation.

Mr. McPherson: Yes, the Natural Gas Bill in 1956, Senator Case.

Mr. Vanderstar: So, as I say, you really have to be very, very careful.

Mr. McPherson: Yes, and I have never asked anybody to do anything because I have reminded them that I made a contribution or someone in the firm made a contribution to them. But contributions are just a fact of life in today's Washington.

Mr. Vanderstar: But even if you don't ask, there's always the risk that a contribution leads to access and it results, because of your persuasiveness, in favorable action. And so there's a risk of a perception that the favorable action was, to be blunt, bought. How in the world do you guard against that?

Mr. McPherson: I really feel like a penny ante player. The firm was just out in Las Vegas for its firm retreat. In walking through the casinos, an hour of the day or night. You've been out there to see.

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes. People with nickels in paper cups.

Mr. McPherson: Paper cups.

Mr. Vanderstar: Silver dollars or whatever.

Mr. McPherson: Yes, yes. They put them in there. I feel like the guy playing the 25-cent machine compared to huge companies whose Washington vice presidents take members even now to golf vacations and things like that and develop great friendships and clearly have a huge advantage when it comes to talking to that member about an issue.

Most members that I have seen, I believe, retain a degree of independence when it comes to their vote or their actions being influenced by campaign contributions. I think most of

them see an open door, a willingness to meet with the donor or his counsel, as the limit of their obligation. There are always people, there always have been people who felt they needed to go beyond that.

Mr. Vanderstar: I guess what I'm asking is, isn't there always the risk that the public, if it knew, would see contributions from such-and-such an interest and a vote in favor of legislation that favored that interest and make the connection that that vote was bought, even if that was not true? I just don't see how you can possibly avoid that risk always arising when there are contributions and access.

Mr. McPherson: That's true. Well, take the typical fund raiser, the six to eight in the evening fund raiser at the Democratic National Club or the Republican Club. There will be a lot of lawyers there and a lot of vice presidents of corporations, people who are based here in Washington, and the lawyers will represent every side of almost every issue. In other words, Tommy Boggs may be there. He represents the trial lawyers and has for years; his firm is counsel for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. We may be there. We are representing one of the biggest re-insurers in the world on asbestos. It is in our interest, our client's desperate interest to find a way to resolve the asbestos conundrum in a way that will not break it. Everybody is jumping in as well as every other insurance company. Trial lawyers are mixed; a few of them represent truly sick people and people with mesothelioma who are not getting any relief because they are just put into huge classes and the courts are choked with these vast classes including, for the most part, people who have been exposed to asbestos but have shown no signs of illness. Well, Tommy's got to represent those latter trial lawyers as well, the people who don't want the kind of resolution that the re-insurer does. So, I suppose one answer to your question, John, is that a practical protection against the assumption that a member has

been “bought” on an issue is that the member’s taking money from all sides so it would be hard to figure the influence of one contribution.

Mr. Vanderstar: Well, that would be a good solution but is that always the case?

Mr. McPherson: I’m sure it’s not always the case. Members very often have their positions just handed to them by fate. Norman Dix is a very good congressman. He’s from Seattle/Everett, Washington. Does he stand on his head for Boeing? Of course he does. Everybody in his district works for Boeing. And he is on the Armed Services Committee. He just persuaded the Pentagon to enter into that lease deal with Boeing. Here is a centrist, an excellent member of Congress, very well regarded by everyone, but he doesn’t have two views on whether the lease deal with Boeing is a good idea for the public interest or not. You and I may, but he doesn’t.

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes, but again that’s an easy case. He is known to represent the district that includes Boeing workers, so I don’t think it would occur to very many people to be critical of him for representing the interests of his constituents. After all, that’s supposedly why he got into office.

Mr. McPherson: You’re asking whether the guy who doesn’t have any of that constituency backing, no particular reason to take the position he does, is given a substantial campaign contribution and then votes for the interest of that. Well, it happens and it probably happens a lot. I guess what I was in a way suggesting is a certain surprise that it doesn’t happen all the time. In fact, most of the guys who survive and are well regarded by their colleagues give you the courtesy of a meeting, the courtesy of paying at least apparent attention to what you say to the point of asking question and so on, and then say, “Let me think about that. I think you

make a very good point.” I’ve had members call me and say, “I thought your case was a good one. I didn’t vote for you, and let me tell you why.” And it’s because someone to whom they owed a lot, some member, asked this person to stay with him.

There are all kinds of reasons why politicians do things. One time I was talking to Senator Lawton Childs of Florida, and I asked him if he could support us on something. He said, “I don’t know because I don’t know how”—I can’t recall who it was, another southern member —“I don’t know how he’s going to come out on this, and I like to stay with him if I can.” And I took that as just maybe they were two friends. The he said, “There are six of us in a twice weekly Bible breakfast.” Six of them. “A mix of Democrats and Republicans devoted to the Bible and to the friendship that they have developed among themselves and, of course, we study the Bible.” (Every now and then a wonderful woman named Naomi Rosenblat, she’s a *sabra*, born in Israel, would go up and meet with this group. She is a scholar of the Old Testament.) The friendship that came out of that was so tight that it caused Childs to say, “I want to ask so-and-so if he thought it would be all right if I vote your way.” In other words, he knew that that man had an interest in this issue, and he wanted to be sure that it was all right for him to go my way.

So one answer, and maybe the answer, to the question I’ve been pressing is that life is so complicated and so nuanced that it’s awfully hard to draw the inference that the contribution led to the vote and that the vote wouldn’t have been there in the absence of the contribution. The things that you remember, the trials that you remember in John Vanderstar’s career, the successes you had, and as I remember mine, don’t have to do with getting a guy to take a couple thousand dollars for a contribution. During the couple of years when I was a member of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, I was asked by a wonderful lawyer there who’s remained

a friend all these years, Bob Sisk, a wonderful trial lawyer, who represented the Pepsi Cola Bottlers Association, if I could help out a little in Congress. They were seeking a bill that would in effect approve the territorial franchise system of the bottlers. Very interesting antitrust issue. Well, the chairman of the Antitrust Committee was Phil Hart of Michigan. When Phil came to work as a senator, he was put on the Calendar Committee, of which I was counsel, and we remained friends, real friends, for as long as he lived. I don't think there was anybody I admired or liked any more than Phil ~~Hart~~.

Mr. Vanderstar: You and a lot of other folks.

Mr. McPherson: Like everybody. He, being Phil Hart and being generous, arranged to see me and Bob Sisk and set aside two hours—a lot of time—and brought in his two counsels on the committee and Sisk and me. I had spent about three days here, the two of us working together until I knew enough not to be an embarrassment. Bob was a fine anti-trust litigator who really knew the issue. The two of us when to see Phil and his counsels. When we walked out, Phil said, “Let me talk with my counsels and I'll call you about what I will do.” The atmosphere was so fine, it was everything you'd ever want in an atmosphere. We were challenged, there was no turning aside or passivity on the part of these counsel because they knew that Phil and I were friends, not the slightest. And he was firm and steady, while remaining just as friendly as could be.

We walked out and Bob Sisk said, “I can't tell you, I'm overwhelmed by this experience. I never thought there would be anything like this in Congress. I didn't know you could have something like that in Congress.” It would have been like having, if you could have an *ex parte* meeting with Learned Hand or somebody like that. As a litigator, you could have that time.

And Phil called me the next morning and said “I think I’m going to support you on that legislation.” Well, I called Bob Sisk in New York and he was absolutely ecstatic. I’m sure I never gave Phil Hart a dime in campaign contributions, even in the days before PAC contributions. What he chose to do was based on the merits, on trust.

Mr. Vanderstar: That’s of course the other coin of the realm, which is personal relations and personal friendships. Just to ask a leading question, surely you would say that members do not cast votes that they might not have otherwise cast because of friends of theirs—a Harry McPherson or whoever—asked them to.

Mr. McPherson: That’s true.

Mr. Vanderstar: It really comes down to recognizing the nuances and complexities of life instead of drawing an inference from two facts: (1) a contribution or a friendship; and (2) a vote.

Mr. McPherson: I think that’s true. There are 535 of these people up there, and almost all want to be reelected.

I was talking to one of my colleagues, one of my political colleagues, today about someone in Congress, and he said, “Oh, she’s a crook, an absolute crook, has been for a long time, and her husband’s a crook, and this guy is not a crook, this man here, and he knows this situation extremely well.” There are plenty of people up there who you wouldn’t want to say were not influenced by campaign contributions. There certainly are. And the bigger they are, the more awash the system is with money, obviously, you run the risk of a lot of those outcomes being directed by contributions.

Mr. Vanderstar: Were you or your firm involved in the campaign finance, the McCain-Feingold Bill?

Mr. McPherson: No, or the litigation that challenged it.

Mr. Vanderstar: Covington was in the latter at least so I can ask you, in a handful of words, what do you think about McCain-Feingold?

Mr. McPherson: I think there are certainly flaws in it, but anything that will put the brakes on soft money contributions has got my vote. It seemed to me that the tolerance of soft-money giving was a fatal mistake on the part of the FEC. Then it became possible for the corporations to write a giant checks.

Mr. Vanderstar: You don't think disclosure is enough of a disinfectant, to quote Louis Brandeis?

Mr. McPherson: It certainly should be, and obviously a lot of the system is based on that, but I'm beginning to be in a rather skeptical mood about our political system right now. It seems to be that there's an awful lot of lying going on by this administration. If people aren't really challenging them or aren't very successful, people are saying things that aren't so, starting with weapons of mass destruction. I just have a feeling that even knowledge or availability of knowledge of campaign contributions by the public is not adequate. I think you have to stop the soft money.

Mr. Vanderstar: That brings up a point I wanted to ask you about independently so let me bring it in now, and that is, the whole business of the development of cable television and 24-hour news shows and so on, as witnessed the recent *New York Times* problem with Jason Blair, the great pressure to get the story and get the story out, which most people think is negative because it puts the wrong kind of pressures on folks. But, if there is full disclosure of even soft money contributions and all the rest of it with this aggressive media we have in this country these days, doesn't that make disclosure an even more effective tool to control that or

prevent that?

Mr. McPherson: Well, theoretically, yes, theoretically.

Mr. Vanderstar: Okay. I thought I saw that answer before you opened your mouth. (laughter) Theoretically it should, but you don't think it's adequate?

McPherson: I don't know. Maybe some people think so, perhaps it does. Most people I think, even when they see it, even when it appears in newspaper stories, tend to shrug their shoulders and think, "Politicians — that's the way people operate. The rich give huge sums and that's the way it's always going to be."

Mr. Vanderstar: And you don't think that being called to account by an opponent in the next election is enough of a deterrent?

Mr. McPherson: I think in some places it is. The United States is different in different parts of the country. There are some states, some districts where doing something like that, taking a large campaign contribution and then voting in a way that clearly seemed to be influenced by it would defeat a candidate.

I read *Roll Call* and the *Hill*, the two newspapers that cover the Congress, and just looking through it from time to time I see cases in which somebody has that trouble because his opponent had been using his vote and campaign contribution, tying those together.

One other thing has to do with Charlie and lawyering in the context of Congress or, for that matter, of, say, a senior appointed official in the executive branch. We used the word "trust" earlier. Since one is operating in my world most of the time *ex parte*, it becomes, curiously, more important that the lawyer in that situation not only be honest with the person he is seeking to influence, but that he actually tell that person that there are disputes about this matter. He doesn't have to make a brilliant argument on behalf of the other side, but I've

normally tried to say, “This is not a slam dunk and there are those who feel strongly that such-and-such” and sometimes, “Their argument is so-and-so. We think,” and then give our answer. I want the person to feel that while this is a monologue, it’s not one that is seeking to twist arms or to cause that person to walk the plank, with a danger of getting hurt thinking that yours is the only side of the case.

Mr. Vanderstar: You’ll be comforted to know that litigators have the same problem in credibility with a tribunal, especially an appellate tribunal, and also in preparing for witnesses to testify and saying, “For heavens sake, don’t get up there and pretend that there is no other side to the issue that you are going to testify about.” You would expect to explain why your side is better.

Mr. McPherson: Right. I was describing this problem to distinguish it from one which was adversarial. Yes, I understand that there is an adversary who could point out the shortcomings of your position.

Mr. Vanderstar: And that’s one of the reasons you want to reveal that you don’t have all the truth on your side, just to avoid that kind of attack. There are similarities between our two kinds of work.

Let me ask you about some things—this is a change of tone, perhaps, but I wanted to be sure to ask you about some things that arose from reading the post scripts and so forth in your book, and one of them is the whole business of a person being elected president who has, on one hand, served the public only by being a member of Congress, typically a senator, or, on the other hand, a person who has at least had some executive branch experience, a vice president or a governor of a state. We talked about that a little bit before we started the tape and I want to go back to that because I just think it’s, especially right now for the record nine,

eight men and one woman are vying for the Democratic presidential nomination and one of them is the governor of a small state, happens to be in New England, not in the South, but a small state and all the other are or have been senators. Is that right?

Mr. McPherson: Well, not Al Sharpton.

Mr. Vanderstar: No, not Al Sharpton. Of the ones who have government experience, all are present or former senators plus one former governor.

Mr. McPherson: Yes. I think that's right.

Mr. Vanderstar: You make a point in your book about President Carter and contrast him with President Johnson on a number of points but notably on President Carter's seeming unwillingness or inability to become a political person and to trade and to do deals and instead his emphasis on kind of the moral issue and the answer that the morality produces. So there's a case where you had a president, namely, Johnson, who's primary experience had been in the Congress, in the Senate—he had only been vice president for a few years—being successful, and a president who's government experience had been as a governor being unsuccessful. Could you talk about that?

Mr. McPherson: Yes, I will. Johnson's great success—I think it would be widely agreed—was as a legislative leader, in the White House just as he had been on the Hill. What Johnson did was to find ways using the presidential office and the reach it gave him to bring about the passage of a vast legislative agenda that had been building up for 20 or 30 or 40 years. He was the guy who could make that happen because of his knowledge of the Congress, his relationships in the Congress and his new scope as president. He brought in to his office leaders of business, labor leaders, civil rights leaders, mayors, everybody. It's a great place if you know how to use it and are willing to use it. Everybody wants to go see you and offer to

help and if you get on the phone with them enough after they've been there, they'll just do all sorts of great things for you and the country. Johnson was made for that.

His tragedy was associated with his executive branch role of Commander-in-Chief. That is obviously something we could spend a couple of tapes on. Carter had been a not very successful governor in the sense that he angered most of the legislature in Georgia. I remember one day I was lobbying a very bright man, decent man, Congressman Barber Conable from upstate New York, Republican. I had a date to see him at 11:30 one morning on some tax matter, I think. He didn't get there until 12:30, and he apologized profusely because he'd been to the White House and Jimmy Carter had laid out his energy program. Barber said, "It was amazing." He said, "He didn't use a note. He didn't call on anybody to help him, the secretary of the interior or the secretary of commerce or the secretary of defense, didn't do any of that. He talked about the National Petroleum Reserve, he talked about prices, the Middle East. It was just remarkable." I was really quite taken aback, this Republican saying this Democratic president was quite impressive. I said, "Is he going to get his program through?" And he said, "Oh, I don't know. You know, he's got no friends up here."

Doesn't have any friends! Hell, when Nixon had his back to the wall shortly before the House committee voted the Articles of Impeachment, he still had friends from the Chowder and Marching Society. They were all on his side. I heard that pathetic man, Nixon, the other day, they're playing his tapes occasionally. He was being interviewed by an old staffer of his, Frank Gannon. I listened, I didn't get out of the car, this last weekend, I just listened to this hallucinatory talk about the last few weeks as president leading up to the resignation. Even then he was talking about how he might be able to duck the vote of impeachment in committee if he could just get the southern Democrats. He mentioned Joe Waggoner of Louisiana—I think he

was Ways and Means, and he was the leader of the conservative, smart Democrats, southern Democrats, who had ties to Nixon. And Nixon was saying, "I talked to Joe Waggoner and he said, 'I think I can get, if I can get just one then I'll get the other two and you'll have three southern Democrats voting with you and that will block the vote.'"

Mr. Vanderstar: Wow.

Mr. McPherson: This is at the very end. It didn't happen; Joe couldn't get them. But Nixon still had a southern Democratic Conservative friend trying to help him. It was quite stunning.

Mr. Vanderstar: I guess what I'm finding so fascinating here is the conventional wisdom that, if you're a governor or a former governor you have a good chance of winning the Presidency but if you're a senator, you don't. And here you've got two Democratic presidents whose successes and failures completely refute that conventional wisdom. Now, in the context of today's Democratic presidential race, where does it leave us? Do we have senators who might have a good shot at winning the Presidency and being successful because of the Lyndon Johnson experience, or is the conventional wisdom more likely to apply here?

Mr. McPherson: You know, I don't know anyone who feels much confidence about the outcome on the Democratic side. One guy we left out is the House member, Gephardt. In a way he had more responsibility of a presidential nature, by way of being a Democratic leader in the House. He may turn out to be a strong candidate. The whole political situation is to me baffling right now. George W. Bush still has over 50 percent approval, when what is happening is that he is taking natural advantage of a situation.

This again is an example of the **role** of fate in political life. Ronald Reagan had an approval rating in the twenties when he was shot. His manly behavior after that, his John

Wayne-Jimmy Stewart kind of behavior, was followed by a really genuine policy decision for which he ought to get a lot of credit, facing down the air traffic controllers. That fateful shooting started his recovery in the public eye, just as 9/11 started George W. Bush's, which was in the 20s, not doing well at all and would have been road kill, I think, in 2004 if it had not been for this extraordinary environment that we are in and will be in, I imagine, at the time of the election and long after.

In any event, I've just finished reading a biography of Cicero. Cicero was too canny to believe in auguries, so was Caesar, but many Romans did. Entrails and various signs of birds and natural phenomena were real markers for what was to come, they thought. These sudden calamities that befell the United States in Bush's time had a huge effect. Whether that will completely wipe out more knowledgeable people in 2004, as a Democrat, I really don't know. What Bush is playing now, in addition to the card of "threat," is the card of "powerful response." He is sitting at the controls of unprecedented military power. There has never been anything like this, except maybe in Napoleon's early campaigns, Hitler's early campaigns when he was thrashing everybody in Europe and then began to run into winter and Russian resistance, and the advent of America entering the war. I don't know what will be, what will turn this around for the United States and Bush, if anything will. Right now we are riding this stallion of military prowess, and Bush is in command on the stallion, just as Napoleon was in France.

Mr. Vanderstar: And governors have little or no experience with such things.

Mr. McPherson: True.

Mr. Vanderstar: It gets back to the conventional wisdom of how accurate it might be.

Mr. McPherson: Well, there are too many Democratic contenders now to

handicap any one of them with any comfort, so I think it's probably not worth trying to pursue that. And it's also, curiously, a time of unimpressive candidates.

In 1960, I think I mentioned this in an earlier tape, there were five Democratic candidates for the nomination: Lyndon Johnson, the majority leader and described in *Time* magazine as the second-most powerful man in America after Ike; Hubert Humphrey, the voice of liberalism; Stuart Symington, extremely well-known, experienced man, had run several big government agencies, Air Force, RFC; Adlai Stevenson, twice a nominee, familiar to everybody and an eloquent spokesman for Democratic principles; and the least consequential of them all, in terms of achievement, John F. Kennedy. Yet Kennedy was the only one who understood or was caused to understand how to run for the nomination in modern times, how to use public relations and connections that his father's money made possible, his own attractiveness, his own personality, a handsome, witty, appealing figure in terms of the public's perception of him. He was always interesting. I remember, and perhaps you do, rearranging my schedule so I could watch his press conference at night. It was the best stuff on the air.

But you could see he was very different from others, and the gap was huge between him and Johnson out in Los Angeles, in that ability to be clever and attractive and funny, to be good "watching" on television. The gap between Kennedy and LBJ in public appreciation was rather like that between FDR and Truman. When Truman started speaking in the weeks after Roosevelt's death, your spirits just *sank*. You had this magnificent man, FDR, this leader with a cape around his shoulders, standing at the rail with Churchill and speaking in his wonderful booming voice. Then you get Truman's midwestern twang. There was a great falling off in the appeal of the president to the people.

Anyway, politicians get nominated by both parties, even if they've only had one

short term as governor of Texas, as George W. did.

What is fascinating to me is the determination and ability of the Bush administration to govern as if they had won a landslide. My instinct, if I were president, or counsel to this president, would be to be looking for Democratic allies, trying to fashion moderate compromises that could attract a big Democratic vote. I would be sending moderate to conservative judges instead of hard-over nominees to the Senate. Not this crowd. If they did not win the popular vote by 500,000 votes, they won the electoral vote by a hair. Their tax bill that loots the Treasury for wealthy people passes the Senate 50-50 on the vote of Dick Cheney. And they just gave Rupert Murdoch his choice of properties around the country by a vote of three to two. So, they do these things by the narrowest of margins.

I shouldn't complain, I guess, because I've worked for and am sitting across from you because of a man who won by 87 votes out of 1,400,000, if he won at all.

Mr. Vanderstar: If he won, yes.

You mentioned, this is going to be another radical shift, you mentioned in passing a few minutes ago the impeachment vote on Nixon. Let me ask you to talk a little about the impeachment vote that went forward to a trial.

Mr. McPherson: Let me tell you a funny experience, I hope I haven't already done this, about Muskie?

Mr. Vanderstar: You mentioned Muskie any number of times, which is no surprise.

Mr. McPherson: I got home on Saturday night, the night of the massacre, the night Elliot Richardson and Bill Ruckelshaus had been fired and Bork had come in to fire Archie Cox. I arrived at my house in Chevy Chase at about seven o'clock, and this was going on and I

watched it with mouth open. I thought we were headed for some kind of dictatorship, certainly something in which the power of the Presidency would have become, if not unlawful, at least without any moral foundation—to backhand the independent counsel and then to fire the attorney general and the deputy attorney general, who would not fire him. I called my partner, Berl Bemhard, and I said, “We’ve got to get Muskie to call for impeachment.” He said, “Let me get him; I’ll get him on the phone.” And he called me back in about 15 minutes and said, “He’s got a houseful of Mainers—people from Maine—friends at a dinner party but he said to come on over. But he said, ‘Get Clark’.” So I called Clark Clifford at his home and said, “Will you meet me and Berl at Muskie’s house at nine o’clock?” Clark said, “I would be privileged to be there.”

Mr. Vanderstar: You told him what the point of the meeting was?

Mr. McPherson: Yes, yes. We arrived at Muskie’s house and in that area—you know American Plant Food on River Road?

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes.

Mr. McPherson: Behind it in that westwood neighborhood, that’s where he lived. So we arrived over there and went in and here was Ed with a bunch of great friends from Maine and they’re just the kind you expect from Maine, plain, funny. They were all half in the bag when we got there. Muskie said, “You all go on back to the back and talk and I’ll come back and join you.”

We go back and I launch into my program, that is, to get Muskie to call for an inquiry by the Judiciary Committee or a special committee into whether the president should be impeached. Muskie comes in and he’s in great spirits. I’m extremely serious, and I’m trying to get him to be serious and I start talking about how this is a threat to the Republic, this is a threat

to the government of laws, we cannot have this and YOU have a responsibility as one of the leaders of this party to stand up against it.

Muskie went over and got a three-cornered hat that somebody had given him and put it on and he got a long ceremonial sword, and he started walking around waving the sword, repeating what I had just said. "This is McPherson, Admiral McPherson saying what I must do." "Well," he said, "write something up." Then he went back to his dinner party. We spent an hour writing three sentences. He came back and read it and said, "Well, okay, all right." I was expecting another hour of argument, but he said, "Okay."

Well, the one thing that these three lawyers did not know how to do was whatever came next, how you get it into the press. So I called Associated Press and I got some tough guy, kind of a "Front page" type, on the phone. "What?" I said, "My name is Harry McPherson." "Yeah." I said, "I'm calling from the home of Senator Edmund Muskie." "What?" I said, "Yes, and Senator Muskie has a statement." "Are you his press secretary?" "No. I'm just a lawyer, a friend of his, but he has a statement that he wants to put in." He said, "What's the number? What's his telephone number, so I can call you back." "You want to check and see if I'm legitimate?" "Sure." So, I give him the number.

In a couple of minutes he calls back. "Okay, let me have the statement. What's your name again?" And I tell him. I said, "I'm here with Mr. Clark Clifford who was the secretary of defense." "Oh, all right." I hear this thing being tapped out on a typewriter. About 11:30 the party is winding up in front, but still going on. We ~~turn~~ on the TV in the den. There's suddenly a show with, I forget who the journalist was, but the subject, the guest on the show was Mac Mathias, former Senator Mathias, a wonderful liberal Republican from Maryland. And Mac was speaking very seriously about what had just happened. He was a great friend of Elliot

Richardson's. He hadn't quite used the magic words. I ran out and got Muskie to come back to sit down with us, saying "Let's watch this." We're in this tiny dark room with the set, Clifford, Berl, me and Muskie, and after about another five minutes some guy hands a piece of paper over the journalist's shoulder, and the journalist says "Oh, Senator Mathias. Let me just read you what's come over the Associated Press. 'Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine tonight called for a Senate Judiciary Committee or for a special committee to look into the issue of the impeachment of Richard Nixon for crimes against the United States.'" And I forget what he said about the legal process, but here we were, sitting there, and I looked and said, "Ed!"—and Muskie was sound asleep.

Mr. Vanderstar: Oh, no! (laughter)

Mr. McPherson: His head was down and I shook him and said, "They just ran it!"

So that was my one glorious experience in the impeachment business of Richard Nixon. Everybody had to do what you could.

Watching that House inquiry was just one of the most riveting things I've ever seen. I knew Paul Sarbanes, and he was on it; so was Barbara Jordan, an unforgettable person. There was a guy that I really thought the world of, never even met him before, named Jim Mann, James Mann from South Carolina. He was great. Several people just kind of emerged, just came forward at that time.

Mr. Vanderstar: What about the impeachment of William Clinton?

Mr. McPherson: Sidney Blumenthal's new book, *The Clinton Wars*, almost certainly contains Clinton's view of all this, his and hers. I know Sidney very well, and I was appalled by Clinton and appalled by Sidney, frankly, for telling me on a couple of occasions that

this was all a contrived situation in which Lewinsky had thrown herself at Clinton and he was trying to placate her. It was the kind of thing that can only be believed by someone who was determined to believe it no matter what, and Sidney believed it. We had lunch one day right in the middle of it and I said, "Sidney, you can't believe this." And he just got up and said, "I have to leave" and left the Hay-Adams and went back to the White House. When Clinton finally fessed up, Anne Richards and I and another lawyer called Sidney and invited him to lunch. He said, "I think I'm going into 'river therapy.'"

Mr. Vanderstar: River therapy?

Mr. McPherson: River therapy. I said, "What's that?" He said, "You know, the study of de-Nile." (laughter)

Mr. Vanderstar: Oh, good.

Mr. McPherson: Clinton was always a problem for me as far as committing to him. I had huge regard for his brains and his appeal, and I was stunned by his ability as a vote-getting and opinion-molding politician. He was really just extraordinary.

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes.

Mr. McPherson: But I never felt that I could rely on him in some fundamental way. I thought he was, in many ways, like Johnson in his huge capacity for political information, huge interest in it, huge appetite for it. He wasn't as good as Johnson in putting factions together, but he was awfully good. And yet his great attraction was for Kennedy. He, Clinton, was attracted particularly to Kennedy and not to Johnson.

Mr. Vanderstar: And your 1995 preface to your book concludes by saying, Clinton can learn much from Johnson's failures and shortcomings, et cetera, but you were critical of Clinton for seeking to emulate Kennedy rather than Johnson in his domestic goals.

Now, if you wrote that three years later, would you say the same thing?

Mr. McPherson: Yes, I think, Clinton's a special case. His behavioral weakness, to put it in a euphemism, was enormous and so was Kennedy's, but Clinton had even less simple caution than Kennedy did.

Mr. Vanderstar: Well, you mentioned earlier and you mentioned in your book that the role that fate played. But for the Paula Jones suit you wouldn't have had the deposition, and et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. McPherson: Right. Exactly.

Mr. Vanderstar: Because that deposition gave Clinton's adversaries something to work from.

Mr. McPherson: Right.

Mr. Vanderstar: Without that they would have had very little.

Mr. McPherson: That's right.

Mr. Vanderstar: The whole business of sexual behavior and not admitting it is so endemic, I think, in our society that I think a lot of people sympathized with Clinton, even if they thought he was lying. Do you agree with that?

Mr. McPherson: Yes. Many successful as well as failed politicians have had affairs outside marriage. Years ago when I was doing some work for the Norfolk Southern Railroad, I would be invited down to the old Pullman car that sits on a siding in Union Station. It's owned by Norfolk Southern and it is one of the two cars that FDR used for campaigning. One evening I was in there for dinner. Usually six or eight people could get around the table, and the meal was invariably steak and potatoes made by wonderful elderly Black men who had been doing this for many years. One of them was on the train when Roosevelt used it in 1940

and '44, and that car, I was told by my host, had been many times pulled up on a spur on its way to Hyde Park, a spur in New Jersey near the home of Lucy Mercer Rutherford.

One evening, a couple of drinks in me and feeling a little interested in scandal, I said to this nice old Black man, "Could you show me where Mrs. Rutherford would stay?" And he said, "I don't speak about things like that." This was 35 years later, and you might have thought he would have told a few stories about FDR and Lucy, just to be entertaining. But he wouldn't tell them. I have the greatest respect for that.

Mr. Vanderstar: It sounds like a George Marshall kind of person, to go back to your story about your conversation with General Marshall.

Mr. McPherson: Right.

Mr. Vanderstar: I guess I'll make the assumption that you think that impeachment and trial of Bill Clinton was not good use of our national resources.

Mr. McPherson: Oh, no. In fact, there is an extremely readable book that—I loaned it to someone but when I get it back I'll send it to you—by former Senator Dale Bumpers. It's his autobiography. It's terrific. It's absolutely and unmistakably Dale, and not Dale "with" anybody. It's called *The Best Lawyer in a One-Lawyer Town* and it's about his start in Arkansas. It's just a delightful book. At the very end he prints his speech in defense of Clinton, which I thought was one of the best speeches I ever heard made in Congress. He put the question to the Congress: "Why have you got this man against the wall?"

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes. And the action of the House knowing that the Democrats controlled the Senate and were virtually certain to turn down the Articles makes it even more startling. And one of the prosecutors is now the junior senator from South Carolina.

Mr. McPherson: Yes, Lindsay Graham. And the guy who was the main

motivator, Tom DeLay, is now the majority leader.

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes. For Democrats, it's a scary business.

Mr. McPherson: Well, yes.

Mr. Vanderstar: Let me sort of move toward a close by going back to Charlie Horsky's book for a minute. You started out talking about his generosity to people he characterized as "Washington Lawyers," which you certainly are. One of the things he says in there is that he thinks Washington lawyers help make the government function well. "Generosity" is a very good description of that.

Mr. McPherson: I think that's true. Many members have said this. "I appreciate people coming in to talk to me about these issues; otherwise, I'd never know." It's sometimes meant to flatter, but it's true. Staffs are much bigger than they used to be, but for the most part the best lawyers in this city are in private practice, and they're more likely to have had the time and the focus, the assistance and associates digging in the library, to prepare their case well, to make it with effectiveness and to bring matters to the attention of the members that the members wouldn't get normally. So, in that sense, people are educated by lawyers coming in to do it, and certainly in rulemaking proceedings they play an invaluable role. Your submissions to a rulemaking are what the agency has got to work with.

Mr. Vanderstar: And I think that's the way Charlie was characterizing it too—if you are helping government function by providing information to decision makers that they might not otherwise have, then that helps make the ultimate outcome more reasonable. And, of course, the problem people talk about all the time is that, on a lot of issues only one side has the access. You talked about Tommy Boggs representing the Trial Lawyers Association. There is a match for you. And you also told a story once about Jack Valenti and you making presentations

on opposite sides. And those are, of course, common situations. But there is always a worry in the public's mind that there are situations in which only one side, the business side if you will, is getting access and the opportunity and the consumer, the ordinary citizen, however one characterizes the other side, is not getting the access. I guess that's a problem for which there's no real solution.

Mr. McPherson: Yes. If you looked at the whole range of matters that members deal with in the course of a couple of years, the things that get a lot of tongue-clucking comment, that is, in which the journalists write about lawyers or interest groups getting a special deal in a tax bill, that sort of thing, those are actually pretty infrequent, a pretty small part of what Congress does. Ninety percent of what Congress does is probably—and I have no basis for this other than just surmise—but I would think that 90 percent of what Congress does is not lobbied by lawyers hired from Washington firms or firms anywhere. It's got to do, let's say, with the education program, "No Child Left Behind." What are we going to do about that? How are we going to handle the reading of four year olds? I was watching *Lehrer* last night. A part of the problem with the Act has to do with the reluctance of a number of school districts to take part, to take any money from the federal government because they don't want to be told how to teach children to read. They thought they had a better idea of how to do that. Well, that's nothing anybody would hire a Washington lawyer to say. It may be the NEA, National Education Association, the AFT, certainly the Department of Education and maybe someone like the late Marge McNamara, Bob McNamara's wife, who was one of the founders of Reading Is FUNDamental. People like that would probably go up and see friends of theirs, members, and talk to them about how important it was to do a certain thing about reading, and when the member went on the floor his head wouldn't be filled with data from a lawyer like McPherson; it

would be filled with the argument that his friend Marge McNamara had just made, or some other woman. For all I know, Laura Bush may have, seems to be interested in reading.

Mr. Vanderstar: Or Marian Wright Edelman.

Mr. McPherson: Marian Wright Edelman. Exactly. A lot of, most of what Congress does is in that area that is not normally the subject of compensated lawyer lobbying.

Mr. Vanderstar: In the course of this last few minutes of discussion, both my comments and yours, we've started to identify public interest lawyers, lobbyists, what have you, so that there's been a growth, I guess, certainly since you left the White House, an enormous growth in a number of citizen groups, consumer groups, feminists, what have you, that have the kind of access that you're talking about. So that the balance is probably a lot more even than people think it is.

Mr. McPherson: Well, they certainly are. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, People for the American Way, organizations like that have been enormously active. Here's John Gardner, a single individual, who writes a letter with no famous names on the left or the right of the letter to, I don't know, maybe a million people asking them to send him 15 dollars and to help him start Common Cause. I know several hundred thousand people did.

Mr. Vanderstar: Oh, sure.

Mr. McPherson: And the letter was not a page and a half bullet-point kind of thing. It was about a 15-page letter in which John talked about all the things that troubled him about our society and how we citizens really ought to be together trying to do something about them. An amazing thing.

Mr. Vanderstar: Yes, yes. That's a good story, a good place to kind of wind up the discussion because you've now spent, how many years since you first came to Washington?

Mr. McPherson: '56 to '03, so 47 years.

Mr. Vanderstar: And you've seen pretty much everything that goes on from a big point of view.

Mr. McPherson: It's amazing how much I learn every week, significant things, that I'd never known.

Mr. Vanderstar: You mean, even now.

Mr. McPherson: Oh, all the time. Almost every day someone says, "You didn't know that?" (laughter)

Mr. Vanderstar: Good. I think we'll close this, and I just want to say how grateful I am to you on behalf the Oral History Project and, to a large degree, on my personal behalf, for your time and your attention and your wonderful stories and your willingness to talk about some things that I wasn't sure you'd be willing to talk about, like your mother's death, and race in Tyler, Texas, and lots of other things even today. So, I just wanted to express my appreciation

Mr. McPherson: It's just been a wonderful privilege to talk with you about it. I mean, these are matters that will always interest me, but to have somebody who is also interested in them and who evokes some ideas and thoughts from me has been great. Mainly, I'm just glad to have made a friend and look forward very much to having you all to dinner when you get off the mountain in North Carolina.