ENVIRON1\1ENTAL, PRESERVATION, LAND-USE, AND ZONING MATTERS HANDLED BY TERRIS, PRA VLIK & MILLIAN, LLP RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTES We have represented citizens in suits under the Resource Conversation and Recovery Act (RCRA) designed to require the remediation of properties contaminated with hazardous waste that presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and/or the environment. In Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell International, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 796 (D.N.J. 2003), affirmed, 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.), certiorari denied, 125 S.Ct. 2951 (2005), we represent the Interfaith Community Organization, the Hackensack Riverkeeper, and several individual plaintiffs in a citizen suit brought under RCR that is resulting in the excavation and removal of 1.5 million tons of toxic hexavalent chromium residue from a 34-acre site in Jersey City, New Jersey (know as the Roosevelt Drive-In Site or Study Area 7), and a clean-up of the deep ground water and sediments in the Hackensack River. The District Court for the District of New Jersey ordered the excavation after finding, among other things, that ( 1) the plaintiffs, some of whom live within a mile of the site, had standing to bring suit; (2) the site represents an “imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment” under RCRA; and (3) the necessary permanent remedy for those endangerments is total excavation of the waste and remediation of contaminated sediment and deep groundwater. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction, noting that the citizen-plaintiffs had met a higher than necessary standard in proving Honeywell’s liability and that “the time for a clean-up has come.” The firm continues to represent the plaintiffs in proceedings before Special Master Robert G. Torricelli, appointed to oversee the implementation of the injunction. The excavation is scheduled to be completed in 2009. Other remedial efforts will continue beyond that time. In January 2006, in an effort to expand the relief obtained with regard to Study Area 7, we brought another RCRA citizen suit against Honeywell, Hackensack Riverkeeper v. Honeywell International, Inc., D.N .J ., Civ. No. 06-022 (DMC), seeking remediation of chromium contamination to soils, groundwater, surface waters, and sediments associated with the properties adjoining Study Area 7. These properties are designated by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) as Study Areas 5 and 6. The case is consolidated with Jersey City Municipal Utilities Authority v. Honeywell International Inc., D.N.J., Civ. No. 05-5955 (DMC) and Jersey City Incinerator Authorityv. Honeywellinternationallnc., D.N.J., Civ. No. 05-5993 (DMC). In an effort to remediate and redevelop Study Areas 6 and 7, which together comprise 100 acres along the Hackensack River, Honeywell and the City of Jersey City have proposed a redevelopment plan that is designed to transform this contaminated area into a live-where-you-work neighborhood. Our client, Hackensack Riverkeeper has worked with them to ensure that the remediation that precedes this transformation is protective of human health and the environment. To that end, the consent decrees agreed to by the parties include rigorous financial assurance requirements and multiple layers of institutional controls. We represented a citizens group in Buckingham County, Virginia, before the county Planning Board on issues concerning the continued operation and expansion of an existing toxic waste disposal facility and the potential construction of other such facilities in the county. We have advised and represented the Province of Ontario on toxic waste issues involving the area near the Niagara River. WATER QUALITY We have represented Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, the American Canoe Association, the Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, the North Carolina Conservation Council, the Professional Paddlesports Association, the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, Florida Public Interest Research Group, Pennsylvania Public Interest Research Group, New York Public Interest Research Group, Trout Unlimited, the Foundation for Global Sustainability, and the Atlantic States Legal Foundation and other individuals and groups in over l 00 citizen suits brought under the Clean Water Act to enforce discharge permits in Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York. North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia. Under the Act, permittees must monitor and report their discharges on a regular basis and are strictly liable for any violations of discharge limits and monitoring and reporting requirements. The suits request civil penalties for past permit violations and injunctive relief to ensure future compliance. The defendants in the suits have been municipal treatment plants and industries, which discharge directly to navigable waters and which discharge indirectly to such waters through municipal treatment plants. We succeeded in reversing the trend of barring citizens access to the federal courts through the concept of standing as a result of our victory before the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167 (2000). The Court held that the citizens could sue to enforce the NPDES permit issued to Laidlaw without establishing harm to the waterway. They only needed to show harm to their interests in the waterway. We have obtained court decisions on a number of issues of first impression in citizen suits under the Act, including: (1) the first decision awarding summary judgment on liability issues (SPIRG v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985)); (2) the first decision upholding the constitutionality of the citizen suit provisions oftheAct(SPIRGv. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474 (D.N.J. 1985)); (3) the first decision holding that only judicial, not administrative, actions by government agencies can preclude a citizen suit for the same violations (Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985)); (4) the first decision granting a prelimmary injunction against further permit violations (PIRG v. Top Notch Metal Finishing Co., 26 ERC 2012 (D.N.J. 1987)); (5) the first decisions imposing the then statutory maximum civil penalty of $10,000 per violation (SPIRO v. Monsanto Co., 29 ERC 1988 (D.N.J. 1988), SPIRG v. Hercules, Inc., 29 ERC 1417 (D.N.J. 1989),PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158 (D.N.J. 1989), affirmed, 913 F .2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), certiorari denied, 498 U.S. 1109 ( 1991 ); ( 6) the first decision imposing contempt penalties for violation of a consent decree (PIRG v. Ferro Merchandising Corp., 26 ERC 1362 (D.N.J. 1987)); (7) the first injunction obtained by citizens against a federal facility for violations of the Act (PIRG v. Rice, 774 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1991)); and (8) the first decision requiring a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) to apply for an NPDES permit (ACA v. Murphy Farms, Nos. 7:98-CV-4-F(l); 7:98-CV-10-F(l); 5:98-CV-209-F(l), E.D.N. C., slip op., December 22, 1998 . We have been successful in obtaining relief against federal, state, and municipal facilities as well as private facilities. In addition to obtaining an injunction requiring compliance with the Act at McGuire Air Force Base (PIRG v. Rice, supra), we have secured consent decrees ensuring permit compliance at two Army facilities and four state facilities. We have also litigated cases involving six additional government facilities, including three facilities at the federal government’s massive nuclear research complex at Oak Ridge National Laboratories in Tennessee. On behalf of the American Canoe Association, we entered into Consent Agreements with five municipalities in West Virginia and four in North Carolina which provided for injunctive relief to prevent further violations and civil penalties which for violating their NPDES permits. Judgments for civil penalties and settlement payments in our cases amount to over $40 million. These include the highest settlement in a citizen suit, PIRG v. Witco Chemical Corp. ($10,000,000), and, at the time of imposition, the two highest civil penalties ever imposed by a court in citizen suits (PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., supra ($4,085,000 after remand); SPIRG v. Hercules, Inc., supra ($1,680,000)). In SPIRG v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 842 F .2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1988), the court held that the community market rate, rather than the firm’s actual billing rate, was the proper measure of attorneys’ fees in such citizen suits. The court found that the firm “performed excellent work,” commended the “superb advocacy skills of plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Terris” and found that the firm’s billing rates fell “far short of what the Terris firm could command in the marketplace.” Id. at 1442, 1445. In Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4 th Cir. 2000)(en bane), the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff environmental groups bad standing to proceed with their suit under the Clean Water Act. On remand, the district court entered an judgment of liability in July 2003 concluding that the defendant was required to pay a civil penalty of $2.34 million. The case is currently awaiting further decisions regarding standing in the district court and the Fourth Circuit. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. United States, we represented citizens organizations which challenged the granting of a state-issued NPDES permit for a refinery in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. The grounds included the failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, to assure that water quality standards would be met, and to comply with procedural requirements of the Clean Water Act. The district court held that an environmental impact statement was not required (445 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Va. 1978)) and that there was no cause of action in federal court (495 F. Supp. 1229 (1980); 501 F. Supp. 821 (1980)) . However, the refinery was never built. We have represented the Province of Ontario in judicial and administrative proceedings concerning the Clean Water Act discharge permit for the City of Niagara Falls wastewater treatment plant. The New York Department of Environmental Conservation first issued a renewal permit in 1982. We prepared comments on the draft permit and intervened on behalf of Ontario in New York state court when the permit was challenged by the City and industry groups. The permit was vacated by the court on procedural grounds. Industrial Liaison Committee v. Flacke, 479 N.Y.S.2d 696 (S.Ct. Albany Cty. 1984), affumed, 485 N.Y.S.2d 662 (3d Dept. 1985). After the state issued a new draft permit in 1987, Ontario was granted party status by DEC to challenge this permit. We represented Ontario in negotiations with EPA concerning a new permit for the plant. We have also represented Ontario as an intervenor in related litigation brought by the City and other parties in New York state court challenging a DEC regulation which authorized technology-based permit limits for municipal treatment plants. Buffalo Sewer Authority v. DEC. In 1998, we brought suit on behalf of the American Canoe Association, Inc., and other groups against a large hog farmer in North Carolina for operating a hog farm which for discharges of swine waste into a local waterway without a permit in violation of the Clean Water Act. In December 1998, the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina issued an Order finding that the facility in question was a CAFO and ordering it to apply for an NPDES permit from the State in order to be in compliance with the Clean Water Act. The Court also found that the hog farm had illegally discharged swine waste on at least two occasions. In 2001, the State of North Carolina issued its first NPDES permit to a CAFO as a result of this case. The district court also found that the plaintiffs had constitutional standing to sue and that the violations were ongoing at the time of the complaint as required by Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 ( 1987). The district court’s decisions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. American Canoe Ass ‘n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2003) and 412 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2005). In 1991, Bruce Ten;s testified before the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy concerning its new penalty regulations implementing the New Jersey Clean Water Enforcement Act of 1990. In addition, the firm has provided informal assistance to NJDEP in developing methods of incorporating into penalties the recovery of economic benefits enjoyed by polluters which delay implementing pollution control measures. Bruce Terris and Carolyn Smith Pravlik have served as panelists at numerous conferences and seminars addressing Clean Water Act enforcement and citizen suits. WETLANDS InALlianceforLegalAction v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, a homeowners group sued to stop the filling of wetlands for the expansion of the Greensboro, North Carolina, airport. The suit was based on the Section 404 Guidelines prohibiting the filling of wetlands unless there is no practicable altemati ve and on the adequacy of the mitigation measures. The district court found that no practicable alternatives existed and that the ratio of new wetlands to the destroyed wetlands was adequate. Alliance for Legal Action v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534 (M.D.N.C. 2004). In 1996, we brought suit on behalf of a community organization challenging the construction of a Target Store in Burke, Virginia, where the construction would result in the filling of a wetland. WATER SUPPLY We advised a Florida landowner on legal strategies for limiting growth and relieving pressure on Florida’s limited water supply. Our analysis examined municipal water franchise agreements, state water regulations and statutes, the federal Safe Drinking Water Act relating to underground aquifers, and statutes affecting Everglades National Park. Affi QUALITY In Sierra Club v. Fri, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), affirmed, 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 451 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act requires that air quality in areas still having clean air must be protected from significant deterioration as well as that air quality must be improved in areas with heavily polluted air. The district court ordered the government to pay more than $50,000 in attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs. As a result of this case, EPA issued regulations for the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality in clean air areas and subsequently Congress included specific PSD provisions, based on these regulations, into the Clean Air Act itself. In Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), remanded, 434 U.S. 809 (1977), we unsuccessfully challenged EP A’s regulations on significant deterioration as not providing adequate protection for clean air. However, we were successful as intervenors in the related cases brought by industry challenging the power ofEP A to issue regulations since the court of appeals upheld the regulations. EPA determined that certain PSD provisions of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments would not apply to sources which obtained PSD permits before March 1, 1978, and which began construction before March 19, 1979. The most significant of these provisions was the requirement that new sources use the “best available control technology” determined on a case-by-case basis to limit emissions. Representing the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, we petitioned the court to require EPA to implement the PSD Amendments as of their enactment, August 7, 1977. We also intervened to oppose industry’s attempt to postpone the effective date even further than EPA wanted. The court of appeals rejected both the environmental and industry attacks on EPA’s implementation of the PSD provisions of the Amendments. Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F .2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979). EPA agreed to pay a portion of our attorneys’ fees. In State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985), reversed, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. I 986), certiorari denied, 482 U.S. 919 ( 1987), we represented the Province of Ontario, Canada, as an intervenor in a case brought by the northeastern states to force EPA to require states to revise their Clean Air Act implementation plans to eliminate pollution causing acid rain in Canada. The district court ordered EPA to issue notices to the polluting states, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the notices could not issue unless EPA first conducted a rulemaking proceeding on the issue of whether the states’ pollution was endangering Canada. We then petitioned EPA to conduct this rulemaking proceeding. After EPA refused to do so, we petitioned the court of appeals to require EPA to begin the rulernaking process. The court of appeals held that EPA was not required to make findings as to the endangerment to Canada and as to Canada having equivalent regulations as the United States until it had adequate information to issue notices to the states to remedy the situation. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Court further held that, even though 10 years had elapsed since the first petition to EPA, EP A’s failure to act on the petitions was not arbitrary and capricious. However, the court suggested that EPA might have to act after issuance of the report of the Natural Acid Precipitation Assessment Program in late 1990. Before that occurred, Congress enacted a comprehensive acid rain program in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. We represented the Province of Ontario, Canada, by intervening in support ofEPA’s NOx SIP Call Rule which requires the Midwestern states and electrical utilities to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions which lead to ground-level ozone and smog in the Northeastern United States and in Ontario. The NOx SIP Call Rule was substantially upheld by the court. State of Michigan v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 213 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2000). We also represented the Province of Ontario before EPA in a proceeding under Section 126 of the Clean Air Act to consider claims by the States ofNew York, Pennsylvania and Maine that midwestem pollution is being transported long distances and is causing acid rain in the northeast. The sources at issue in that proceeding are the same as those that are causing acid rain in Ontario. EPA denied the petition. We advised the Province generally as to legislative, administrative, and litigation strategies to deal with the acid rain problem, including the acid rain regulations issued under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments. We advised the Northern Cheyenne Tribe throughout the proceedings it and EPA held to redesignate its reservation as a Class I air quality area under the significant deterioration regulations. After EPA approved the redesignation, various electric utilities and other parties challenged EP A’s decision. In Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), the court approved the redesignation. We represented the Tribe as intervenors in this litigation. The government agreed to pay a portion of the attorneys’ fees in this case. In Montana Power Co. v. EPA, several utilities brought suit seeking to invalidate the detennination of EPA that the Colstrip power plant was subject to EPA’s prevention of significant deterioration regulations. We represented the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and Northern Plains Resource Council as intervenors in suppo1t of EPA. The district court held that EP A’s application of its PSD regulations to the plant was arbitrary and capricious. While the district court’s decision was on appeal, the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act were passed, and EPA concluded that, regardless of its previous regulations, the PSD requirements of the 1977 Amendments applied to the plant. The utilities then petitioned for review of EPA’s new determination, and the Tribe and Council again intervened. The two cases were consolidated before the court of appeals, which held that the Colstrip power plant was subject to the PSD regulations. 429 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mont. 1977), reversed, 608 F .2d 334 (9th Cir. 1979). We represented the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and the Northern Plains Resource Council in EPA’s extensive proceedings concerning the Montana Power Company’s application for a PSD permit under the Clean Air Act for the Colstrip power plant which the company claimed met the Class I increments of the PSD program. After EPA initially proposed to grant the permit, we persuaded EPA to reject it. The utilities petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Puget Sound Power and Light Company v. EPA. We represented the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and Northern Plains Resource Council which intervened. Subsequently, the company made a new application to EPA, which provided for substantially better air pollution controls, and this application was approved. The utilities dismissed their case after they entered into a settlement with the Tribe under which the Tribe received jobs, air-quality monitoring, and financial assistance to compensate for the impacts of the plant on the reservation. We represented the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission in a petition to review EPA’s approval of a PSD permit for an oil refinery in Eastport, Maine. The court retained jurisdiction of the petition until EPA promulgated new rules which would allow the refinery to be exempt from the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1034 (1st Cir. 1982). We also represented the Commission in a petition to review the existing rules for grandfathering new sources under the pre-1977 Clean Air Act. Roosevelt Campobello international Park Commission v. EPA. The refinery has never been built. We represented Citizens Against the Refinery’s Effects and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation in opposing a refinery in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. In one case, we challenged EPA’s decision to approve a revision to Virginia’s State Implementation Plan which established an asphalt substitution program to offset hydrocarbon emissions from the refinery, on the grounds that the offset was inconsistent with the Clean Air Act and with EPA’s Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling under that Act. In the other case, we challenged EPA’s decision to issue a PSD permit for the refinery on the ground that EPA violated the Clean Air Act and its own regulations when it analyzed the modeling and monitoring data to predict the air quality impact of the facility. The court of appeals held for EPA in both cases. Citizens Against Refinery Effects v. EPA, 643 F .2d 178, 183 ( 4th Cir. 1981). However, the refinery proposal was abandoned. We advised a citizens group in Wilmington, North Carolina, which opposed construction of an oil refinery proposed by the Brunswick Energy Company. Our analysis related to the compatibility of the refinery with the North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act, the Clean Air Act, and NEPA. We recommended focusing on the lack of a demonstrated need for oil refineries in the face of current U.S. demand for oil. The project was abandoned by the company on the basis of the reduced demand for oil products through the year 2000. In Vavra v. EPA, we filed a petition in the Supreme Court on behalf of citizens residing near Galveston Bay, Texas, seeking review of a decision by the court of appeals that EPA’s conditional approval of the State ofTexas’ revisions to its state implementation plan and its resulting refusal to apply the Act’s construction ban did not violate the Clean Air Act even though, according to EPA, the revisions did not fully comply with the Act. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. 459 U.S. 822 (1982). In Citizens’ Ass’n of Georgetown v. Washington, 370 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1974), the court denied claims by a local citizens’ organization that construction of an urban commercial development would result in increased traffic and thereby cause a violation of the Clean Air Act. While the district court subsequently ordered the District of Columbia government to pay one third of the attorneys’ fees of plain tiffs (383 F. Supp. 136 (O.D.C. 1974)), the court of appeals ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award fees to nonprevailing parties under the Clean Air Act (535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). On behalf of Group Against Smog and Pollution (GASP) in Pittsburgh, we submitted comments to EPA opposing the deferral of Jones & Laughlin Steel’s obligation to meet coke oven gas emissions limitations at its Pittsburgh Works. Jones & Laughlin applied to EPA in November 1981 under the Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981 for an extension of the deadline stipulated in its consent decree for repairing its coke oven gas desulfurization system. EPA denied Jones & Laughlin’s application and filed a contempt action against the company for its failure to comply with the consent decree. United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1986). We achieved a favorable settlement for citizen groups challenging air emissions from a resource recovery facility in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Warren Energy Resource Co., l.P., Civ. No. 94-6380 (D.N.J.). We represented residents in Frederick County, Maryland, in opposing the expansion of a fluoride-emitting aluminum reduction facility in that area in hearings before the state health department. We prepared extensive legal analysis, comments and draft documents for the State of New Jersey protesting the failure of the City of Philadelphia to regulate excessive emissions of sulfur dioxide. We represented the National Coalition for Clean Air and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in support of Congressional legislation which would effectively prevent significant deterioration of air quality in clean air areas. This work included Congressional testimony and the drafting of statutory language. In 1977, Congress adopted Clean Air Act Amendments embodying most of the provisions we supported. the status quo and not on an annual basis. The Supreme Court reversed and held that NEPA does not require the preparation of environmental impact statements on the budgets of federal agencies. 442 U.S. 347 (1979). The Court also stated, however, that environmental statements are required on any programmatic decisions related to the budget. Other counsel represented the Sierra Club in the Supreme Court. Defenders o f Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977), involved the validity of the shooting hours in the waterfowl hunting regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Service. The district court held that the shooting hours were invalid because they were not based on adequate studies showing that they protected migratory birds. National Rifle Ass ‘n of America, Inc. v. Kleppe, 425 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1976), affirmed, 571 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1978), involved the validity of the regulations issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service to reduce the use of lead shot in duck hunting. We represented Defenders of Wildlife as intervenors in support of the Service. The court upheld the regulations. Conner v. Andrus involved a challenge in the District Court for the Western District of Texas to Fish and Wildlife Service regulations prohibiting all duck hunting in designated areas of New Mexico and Texas. We represented Defenders of Wildlife in an unsuccessful attempt to intervene in support of the validity of the regulations. We represented the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission in adjudicatory proceedings before EPA regarding EPA’s decision to disapprove an NPDES permit for a refinery in Eastport, Maine. The issues chiefly involved the navigational risks and the threat of oil spillage to the bald eagle and whales, which are endangered species. The Administrative Law Judge approved the permit. The court of appeals held that the ALJ did not have the best available scientific evidence concerning the risk of oil spills and required certain studies before a decision could properly be made to approve a permit. The court also held that these additional studies concerning risk would have to be addressed in a supplemental environmental impact statement. Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982). We represented the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission as intervenors when the Pittston Company applied for an exemption from the Endangered Species Act to the Endangered Species Review Board relating to its proposed refinery. The case was dismissed when the court found that the company’s application for an exemption was premature. Pittston Co. v. Endangered Species Committee, 14 ERC 1257 (D.D.C. 1980). North Slope Borough v. Andrus, which is discussed elsewhere in this memorandum, involved the protection of endangered species of whales under the Endangered Species Act. the rail line and the small probability that further litigation would prevent the completion of the line, the Sierra Club chose to dismiss the appeal. We represented a Wyoming landowner and the WyoBraska Landowners Association, an organization of Wyoming and Nebraska farmers and ranchers, challenging the application of the Chicago and Northern Western Transportation Company to the Interstate Commerce Commission for authority to construct and operate a new 56-mile rail line in Wyoming and Nebraska. The Commission approved the line. The court of appeals upheld the Commission’s approval, but stressed that the mitigating measures ordered by the ICC were to be taken seriously by the railroad and could be enforced by the landowners. Mobil Oil Corp. v. ICC, 685 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1982). We represented the Northern Plains Resource Council in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission challenging a proposed 89-mile rail line to the Powder River Basin in Montana. NPRC contended, in part, that the railroad proposal violated the Mineral Leasing Act because the railroad’s backers planned to transport coal from their own federal coal leases on the rail line. The ICC first agreed with NPRC that the issue was a significant one requiring a hearing. After the hearing, an ICC administrative law judge accepted many ofNPRC’s contentions but ultimately concluded there was no statutory violation. NUCLEAR POWER In Peshlakai v. Duncan, we represented 89 Navajo Indians and Friends of the Earth in an action seeking to force six federal agencies to prepare national, regional and site-specific environmental impact statements on the mining and milling of uranium. The district court denied a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as to a small in situ mining project. 476 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1979). We participated at EPA hearings on thermal standards to be used at the Calvert Cliffs’ nuclear power plant. We advised a local citizens group in the Staunton River area of Virginia concerning its opposition to the construction of a pump storage and nuclear power complex. We prepared an extensive analysis for the Natural Resources Defense Council of the legal requirements for the supplemental environmental impact statement on the proposed Clinch River Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor and concerning the inadequacy of the existing impact statement. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission determined that a supplemental impact statement was required. GEOTHERMAL ENERGY We represented the Santa Clara Pueblo in hearings held by the Department of the Interior concerning an environmental impact statement on a proposed geothermal demonstration project in New Mexico. We also submitted comments for the Pueblo to the Department of the Interior which analyzed the Department’s documents on the impact of the project on the Pueblo’s religion. The state In NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), affirmed, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we represented the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund in a suit challenging the position of the Department of the Interior that the Secretary has no discretion to deny a preference right lease even if the lease would result in severe environmental harm. The district court held that environmental impact statements had to be prepared before the Department could enter into major leases and that it could consider environmental factors in deciding whether there were commercial quantities of coal to lease. However, the court further held that, if there were commercial quantities of coal, the Secretary had no authority to refuse to lease on environmental or other grounds. Bruce Terris wrote, with Eleanor Granger, a law review article on federal coal leasing. Granger and Terris, The Leasing of Federal Land for Coal Production, 15 Houston L. Rev. 1175 (1978). OIL DEVELOPMENT In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, we brought suit on behalf oflnupiat natives on the North Slope of Alaska against an oil and gas sale in the Beaufort Sea because of the threat to bowhead whales and other native subsistence resources. Although the district court initially denied our request for a preliminary injunction ( 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1979)), the court later upheld several of our claims under the Endangered Species Act and NEPA and enjoined actions to consummate the sale or carry out pre-exploratory activities ( 486 F. Supp. 332 (1980)). After all parties appealed, the court of appeals lifted the injunction and upheld the legality of the lease sale. 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In the meantime, however, the Department of the Interior issued a new biological opinion giving more protection to bowhead whales from oil development activities. Subsequently, the district court ordered the government to pay the Borough’s attorneys’ fees. 515 F. Supp. 961 (D.D.C. 1981). However, the order was vacated by the court of appeals. 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In North Slope Borough v. Hammond, we brought suit against the state portion of the same Beaufort Sea oil and gas sale in Alaska Superior Court, raising claims under state law. While that court and the Alaska Supreme Court denied a preliminary injunction, the Superior Court subsequently held that the state failed to explain adequately its reasoning as to why the sale would not harm the Alaskan natives and enjoined activities to develop the leases. The injunction was stayed by the Alaska Supreme Court. After the state issued a new decision document, the Superior Court again enjoined lease activities, holding that the state lacked sufficient information to conclude that oil development outside the barrier islands would not harm the subsistence lifestyle of the Alaskan natives. North Slope Borough v. Hammond, 17 ERC 1656 (1980). The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s holding on this issue, but held that the state had failed to make adequate findings under its Coastal Zone Management Act and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. 645 P .2d 750 ( 1982). The state agreed to pay a portion of the attorneys’ fees. Southern California Ass’n of Governments v. Kleppe and related cases were brought by fifteen cities and counties in Southern California, the Consumer Federation of America and a number of environmental organizations to challenge the validity of the accelerated leasing program for the Outer Continental Shelf and the Southern Californ ia oil and gas sale. A preliminary injunction was denied. 6 ELR 20115 (D.D.C. 1975). After transfer to the Central District of California, the cases brought by the cities and counties were dismissed on grounds of res judicata (413 F. Supp. 563 (1976)) and the private groups dismissed their suit voluntarily. In GOO v. Andrus, we represented Get Oil Out and others seeking to require preparation of site-specific impact statements for several proposals to develop and produce oil and gas resources in the Santa Barbara Channel. The district court held that the environmental assessments were inadequate and enjoined construction of the oil platforms. 468 F. Supp. 82 (C.D. Cal. 1979). After the new environmental assessments were prepared, the district court held that an environmental impact statement was not required. 477 F. Supp. 40 (1979). We represented the Sierra Club and other environmental groups in challenging the first sale of oil and gas leases in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico in 1973. Plaintiffs claimed that of the environmental impact statement prepared for the lease sale was inadequate under NEPA. The district court denied injunctive relief and the court of appeals affmned. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975). Bruce Terris was a consultant to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf and to the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of the House of Representatives concerning the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1978. Another attorney in the firm was a member of the Committee on Assessment of Arctic Ocean Engineering Support Capability of the National Research Council. This committee studied engineering and environmental obstacles to development of oil and gas resources in the Arctic Ocean off of Alaska. OCEAN RESOURCES We assisted the Environmental Defense Fund in preparing comments opposing a proposal of the National Marine Fisheries to increase the maximum take permitted for important fishery resources in New England. The comments emphasized that the proposal undermined the achievement of important long-range goals of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. We represented Get Oil Out in supporting designation of a marine sanctuary off of California. We testified or submitted testimony on behalf of the New England Governors’ Conference in matters relating to deep-water ports and double-bottom oil tankers. ENERGY CONSERVATION