Oral History Project
The Historical Society of the
District of Columbia Circuit
United States Courts
District of Columbia Circuit
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Esquire
Interviews conducted by:
Robert S. Peck, Esquire
January 10, 16, 17, 23; February 7, 21, 28, and July 3, 1992
Preface ……………………………………………………… • . . . . . . . i
Oral History Agreements
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Esquire . . ………………………… …………… m
Robert S. Peck, Esquire …………………………………………… v
Oral History Transcript of Interviews on:
January 10, 1992 ………………………………. ………………. I
January 16, 1992 ……………………………. ………………… 24
January 17, 1992 ………………………………………………. 33
January 23, 1992 ………………………………………………. 52
February 7, 1992 ………… : …………………………………… 14
February 21, 1992 ………………………….. …………………. 98
February 28, 1992 …………………. …………………………. 119
Interview on Mississippi Freedom …………………………………. 147
Interview on I 967-1970 ………………………………………… 171
Interview on Four Cases (1968-1974) ………………. ………………. 192
Interview on 1976 Elections ……………………………………… 215
July 3, 1992 …………………………………………………. 229
Interview on 1984 ADA Meeting ………………………………….. 247
Index ……………………………………………………… …… Al
Table of Cases and Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A23
Biographical Sketches
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Esquire Bl
Robert S. Peck, Esquire …………… …………………………… B2
Attachment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CI
Oral History Interview of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., published June 21, 1989,
Truman Presidential Museum & Library
The following pages record interviews conducted on the dates indicated. The interviews were
electronica1ly recorded, and the transcription was subsequently reviewed and edited by the
The contents hereof and all literary rights pertaining hereto are governed by, and are subject to,
the Oral History Agreements included herewith.
© 1998 Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit.
All rights reserved.
Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit
Interviewee oral History Agreement
1. In consideration of the recording and preservation of
the oral history memoir of my late husband Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.,
by the Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit,
Washington, D.C., and its employees and agents (hereinafter “the
Society”), I, Olie w. Rauh, as a representative of the estate, do
hereby grant and convey to the Society and its successors and
assigns all of my rights, title, and interest in the tape recordings,
transcripts and computer diskette of interviews of Joseph
L. Rauh, Jr., as described in Schedule A hereto, including
literary rights and copyrights. All copies of the tap8s,
transcripts and diskette are subject to the same restrictions
herein provided.
2. I also reserve for myself and for my sons, Carl S. and
B. Michael, the right to use the tapes, transcripts and diskette
and their content as a resource for any book, pamphlet, article
or other writing of which we are authors or co-authors.
3. I authorize the Society to duplicate, edit, publish, or
permit the use of said tape recordings, transcripts and diskette
in any manner that the Society considers appropriate, and I waive
any claims I may have or acquire to any royalties from such use.
?ORN TO AND SUB?QRIBED,- before me this
.Llf0day of $fftt,K? , 2oc1.
Notary Public
/’ . ,,-, 0 _,,. My commission expires tti! I.,, “L- 1 ?’
– Notary Public, Stat& of Maryland
My Commission Expires Jan. 29, 2005
ACCEPTED this ? e..e: day of ? ? , 20!E.f, by Daniel M.
Gribbon, President of the Historical Society of the District of
Columbia circuit.
Daniel M. Gribben
Schedule A
Tape recording(s) and transcript resulting
interviews conducted by _ ,R?o?b?e?r’–‘t,P?e?c?k,,_ on the
dates !11
Pages of
Date (Jl!cnth, Day, Year) OI Title Number of Tapes
2-28-92 – Early ’60s
1992 – Mississippi Freedom
1992 – Post ’68 Elections (’67-’70)
1992 – Four cases (’68-’74)
1992 – 1976 Election
7-3-92 – Alvarez-Machain (’80-88’)
1992 – 1984 ADA Meeting
All interviews are contained on one diskette.
from thirteen
1./ Identify specifically for each interview, (1) the date
thereof, (2) the number of tapes being conveyed, and (3) the
number of pages of the transcript of that interview.
Z/ The January 23, 1992, interview is recorded on Side B of
the tape cassette of which Side A records the January 16, 1992,
interview. The January 2J, 1992, interview continues on
Sides A & B of a second tape. Accordingly, there are a total
of 12 tapes.
?/ Tape of interview lost.
Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit
Interviewer oral History Agreement
1. Having agreed to conduct an oral history interview with
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., for the Historical Society of the District
of Columbia Circuit,. Washington, D.C., I, Roberts. Peck , do
hereby .grant and convey to the Society and its successors and
_assigns, all of my right, title, and interest in the tape recordings,
transcripts and computer diskette of interviews, as
described in schedule A hereto, including literary rights and
2. I authorize the Society, to duplicate, edit, publish,
or permit the use of said tape recordings, transCripts and
diskette in any manner that the Society considers appropriate,
and I waive any claims I may have or acquire to any royalties
from such use.
3. I agree that I will make no use of the interview or the
information contained therein until it is concluded and edited,
or until I receive permission from the Society.
. ce-l’wL–
berts. Peck
-1.,.,1, ·b· 1~,,, . . ‘8″‘fct’7’5 \/’r<V,.,-, ::ss.
SWORN TO AND SUB?CRIBED before me this
?day of OClo6cv , 20.9 .
.,,,.,,,,,,’VI(• /II,’ii/ ,
My commission expires
Ju11e .s, ::-0?.•.,-i-;e;·:c
Notary Puo1ic, District ol Columtlla
My comm;ssion E,ptru &-14.QS
C f;,?,,1/
this· 3.: ::t”. day of —..:Jc. ,…,
:’IL. ____ , 20t:f, by Dan-,i-e.J.?.
President of the Historical Society of the District of
Danie.J. .. J1. GribOOn
.,,. -.::;:, . ;- r l? – “·-“”‘””i < 71 -··, ,-? · ;t· ., ,,, · · .. f r
?., l’r·••?
. ..J ,.

Schedule A
Tape recording(s) and transcript resulting from thirteen
interviews of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., on the following
Date {Month, Day, Year) & Title Number of Tapes
2-28-92 – Early ’60s
1992 – Mississippi Freedom
1992 – Post ’68 Elections (’67-’70)
1992 – Four Cases (’68-’74)
1992 – 1976 Election
7-3-92 – Alvarez-Machain (’80-88′)
1992 – 1984 ADA Meeting
All interviews are contained on one diskette.
Pages of
ii The January 23, 1992, interview is recorded on Side B of
the tape cassette of which Side A records the January 16, 1992,
interview. The January 23, 1992, interview continues on
Sides A & B of a second tape. Accordingly, there are a total
of 12 tapes.
6/ Tape of interview lost.
This interview is being conduc!ed on behalf of the Oral History Project of the District of
Columbia Circuit. The interviewee is Joseph L. Raub, Jr. The interviewer is Robert S. Peck.
The interview took place On the I oai day of January 1992.
Mr. Peck: As I said, we’re going to start with your childhood. I know you
were· born in Cincinnati and maybe you can tell us a liule about your family and any ?mories of
Mr. Rauh: Well, my father was a German immigrant. He came from
Baumberg, Bavaria, Gennany, and I think he was in his ear]y teens when be got here- or rnidteens.
He was a small manufacturer. He bad a small shirt factory in Cincinnati. He manied my
mother who was a second?geoeration American, but also from Gennan stock. We were GermanJewish
stock – the G?nnan Jews rather prided themselves with that status at the expense of
Eastern Jews. I never remember any discussion of that problem; I just remember it being
accepted that .German Jews were better, which reminds me of_a story. Do you want me to
interrupt myself and tell a story?
Mr. Peck: Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Rauh: It reminds me then? of the story of my – I was law clerk to [U.S.
.Supreme Court] Justice [Benjamin] Cardozo at the time, and I was proud to take my father and
mother to call upon him. I said, “Dad, Jook, let’s not have any of the Genl18Il-Jewish stuff. After
all, Cardozo thinks of himself, as do all Shephardic Jews, as the cream of the _ crop. So don’t say
anything – don’t bring the subject up. We hadn’t even gotten placed in our seats, when my father
starts, “Now, we German Jews.” But Cardozo was such a beautiful figure; he put everybody at
ease in a second with some comment that I, unfortunate]y, can’t remember. We were of German
– I –
descent, and my father carried an accent, I guess, until his death. I could speak German when I
was six, which would have been in 1917. I could speak perfect German because I had a
grandmother, my father’s mother, who didn’t speak English so we talked German to her. So I
could speak German. We had to stop during World War I. You didn’t talk German in your house
?cause peop]e would. start to say you weren’t loyaJ to the c?untry so that I now have no language
other than English that I can speak. It’s just that I Jost it all in the year from – well,.it’s a couple
of years there from ’17 til then.
I had a brother and a sister. My sister was 8 1/2 years older; my brother was 6
years older. They’re both gone now. We weren’t a particularly religious family. Everything was
education in our household. YoU hardly· got home from school and it was, “Have you done your
homework?” And, of course, you hadn’t done your hOIDeworic. You just got home. But that was
it; our house was a very studious place.
My sister became a pediatrician and wrote some articles on pediatrics, especially
heart troubles of babies. My brother was a mathematician. He was first in his class at Harvard in
mathematics, and I’ve a]ways thought it was sad that he couldn’t go on. He wanted to get
married, and be couldn’t go on with his studies. I think ifhe had gone on, he’d have probably
been IRobert] Oppenheimer’s assistant. Oppenheimer was first in mathematics, as I understand
it, in the class ahead of my brother. I think if my brother had been there at the time as another
mathematician there, why he’d have gone on, but there wasn’t enough money in the family so he
had to go into the business. He never was very happy. It wasn’t a hajjpy thmg for him
It was very happy in my lifetime because I got to go to the law school. I was free
to accept [then professor, later Justice Felix] Frankfuner’s push to the Supreme Court and into
the New Deal. twas the beneficiary of what was a reajly sad thing for my brother whose life
never reached the stage of ful:filhnent that I think it would have if he had gone back to Harvard
when he graduated into the graduate mathematics. He got a hundred on the final big
?thematics ext’!fll He ?as that capab]e in that field. But he never complained, and he never
complained that I had a more exciting time than he did.
I think as families go, it was very cJose, very happy. I never heard my mother and
father argue about anything. I a1ways think my ?other and sister were very well respected. We
had a nice house in walking distance to the schoo] we went to.
And my father was able to make enough- and this was the pride of his life- so he
couJd send both his boys to Harvard. I don’t think people realize the degree to which the
immigrants of.the kind of.this middle class considered that the measure of success: if you could
send your kids to the best university, and Harvard was an international institution. I think just to
hear my father tell people that his boys were at Harvard you knew that he thought that was
success. All the bard work he put into a sma11 business was vindicated by being able to send
your boys to Harvard College and that he was able to send me to the law school I did not have
to work going through school, which made life a lot easier and a lot more fun.
That was our background, and it was conducive to study. I think all three ofus
did. I know my brother was Phi Beta Kappa, and I was too. We did have a rather happy, quite a
happy young period. We were both athle tically inclined without being tembly good. Indeed,
Jimmy Wechsler in his autobiography says that I got my feelings for the underdog playing center
on the Harvard basketball team I don’t know if lhat’s true or not, but we all had dreams of being
ath1etes even if we didn’t carry them out very well.
Mr. Peck: I did read that there Was one dispute in your fati:rily when your
sister announced in the 1924 election who ·she was going•to be voting for.
Mr. Rauh: That’s perfectly true. My sister announced she was going to vote
for [Wisconsin Senator Robert] Lafollette. I thought my father w·as going to have a beai1 attack;
he was a conservative Republican. He had marched in the 1896 McKm1ey gold march. If you
recall, the question was whether you had the sixteen-to-one ratio. [William] McKinley was for
the goJd standard, and [William Jennings] Bryan was for minting silver and having a freer
currency. My father marched- in the McKmley parade. Not that I Was there, but be told me.
We used to have friendly discussions, sometimes barbed. So when in 1924, my
sister, she ?ould have been in her mid-30’s then, {guess, she 8DJlouiiced she was going to vote
for LaFollette {of the Progressive party], my father said she couldn’t. Quite a fight. But anyway,
if I recollect correct1y; and I think I do, the compromise was she voted for John W. Davis who I
guess was just as bad as the …:. well, I guess that would have been Coolidge. I guess there wasn’t
much difference. Well, Davis might have been a little bit better being a Democrat, but I doubt if
he was much better than Coolidge. Yes, that happened.
A little 1ater in life there were other disagreements. Our family was close enough
so that my father would say to my mother if my father had a visitor or something, he would say –
well, first, ·he would damn the New.Deal Then, he would say, “Get that clipping abo?t Joseph.”
I mean, there was pride even in disagreement in our family, and Mother was a real wife in the
sense that women were in those days. They didn’t argue with their husbands about things. They
were quite compliant, and Mother was like that, too. Her children and her husband were alike.
Mr. Peck: You majored in economics.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
At Harvard.
And then you spent the summer after that traveling in Europe.
Yes. I spent the summer after graduation. from college traveling in
Europe. My friend, Jimmy Plaut was quite a ta1ented pianist, and he put together a band to play
over in the surmner and back after the sunnner was up. They bad auditions with the Lions.
. .
Jimmy took a drunnner with him on the audition, and they passed the auditio1;1. They were pretty
Jimmy played the piano, and he had a fake drurmner there. There was a violin
player, a saxophone player – there were five of them They played in the tourist – we called it
different things- second c1ass, cabin cJass. The band was almost better than the one in first
class, which was an old live shipping band. We had a big crowd, but at the last ?ute Jimmy
called [the drurruner] and said that he was substituting drummers. I was that new drummer. He
had given me a couple of lessons, but, Jesus Christ, ? am unmusical.- But anyway, I played in the
.band all the way over and all the way back with my dear friend.
We traveled around Europe there. Interestingly enough, this is now ’32. We spent
a month in Berlin, and that’s the swnmer that [Adolph] Hitler’s stre??th receded a little bit. He
was obviously number one before that, but he had never gotten to 50 percent. ID the surmner of
’32, there was an election, and Hitler’s strength receded a little bit.
Everybody was very happy about that. ] was .. MY. frie?.d, Jimmy, was later the
director of the Modem Museum in Boston and that was his interest. He was studying – he was
interested in art there. J was interested in politics, so it was quite a wonderful time. They had a –
I still remember this, and often wonder what I would have done if I had a gun. Probably nothing,
but you could wonder. J went to a Hitler rally in the swmner of ’32 at a place called Wansee. J
think it is a suburb of Berlin and knew or learned enough German to be able to travel. J took a
subway train there and went to the thing. It was at a big stadium. It carried 100,000 people and a
lot of what you would hear would be [?German music].
No one knew that I was Jewish. I was just a lone American walking around.
People would parade in, and I have often wondered if we would ever get to that stage in this
country . The postal clerks would parade in. The railway maintenance people would parade in.
They were formed in military barracks, only they didn’t have military weapons. But they were
obviously being trained, and they would then sit together. I had this much in my mind.
But I was walking around down on the track around the Berlin train, and all of a
sudden the walls opened and in drove three cars. The first car, then Hitler in the second car, and
some storm troopers in the third car. I never thought about this at that moment, but that was the
lousiest security I had ever seen in my life. Here was a- let’s see, I’m a 21-year-old American
Jew within 10 feet of Adolf Hitler. It’s incredible that I never thought about the absolute
absurdity of the situation at that moment. I saw the guy, and they were hustling around him, but
there was a direct line of fire. To have allowed such a ridiculous thing – you would think that the
people being allowed that dose would have been somehow checked. I was standing alone, and
there wasn’t a big crowd around there. It was a total accident.
I have always wondered and then when they had the later [assassination] effort at
Hitler – which didn’t seem to be great security at that time but that was a different problem
because by then the Germans were losing the war. But here, I was flabbergasted.
Anyway, we had about a month in Berlin, and I was very interested in the German
politics .. I was flabbergasted in January whe? Hindenburg appointed Hider Prime Minister, gave
him what he hadn’t been abl? to win. Everybody said the Gennans elected him. Well, that’s not
uue. I don’t say the next election would have been a furtJ]er recession in his popularity. But, he
was appointed at a moment when in the previous election there had been a reduction in bis
Mr. Pe?k: .Someplace where you had mentioned this travel during that
surrnner, you were reported to have said th?t the problem that _the Gennan hberals had at the time
was not prohibiting the Nazi drilling of troops – the collecting of guns and their use of violence.
Mr. Rauh: I guess what I was trying to always say or think was ”where do you
stop?” I mean, here we are civil libertarians and certainly think they could say what they please.
I believe that very deeply. I believe that even with- I believe that on right wing, left wing talk. I
believe that for the cornmuni?ts who I wasn’t -yery fond of, and I believe tP,at for – but where is
the point at which the threat takes on such military meaning that you would stop it.
1 mean, people always ask you, ‘Well, Joe, you hotsho? First Amendment-type – –
what do you do when there’s a real danger of a takeover.” W?!l, I never h? to be precise about
it, and I’m not precise in my own mind today. I know that Hitler went too far. You know what
you think you can do – talk – and you know what went too far – what Hitler was doing there,
getting weapons and drilling. Whether they were actually, I didn’t even know. Were they drilling
with weapons or- I know one d8.y_w?en they came in there, they had various sticks and things
over their shoulder, but I didn’t see muskets there. I find that – I know that the right answer is
somewhere in there, but luckily our country has never reached that stage where you had to make
the decision that was in front of the Gennan people.
Now, I guess if I learned anything else there that was of use later on, or at least
thought later on, it was the communists fighting the socialists which made Hitler’s line the
majority – the plurality. The communists were· so· well disciplined that they cou]d vote for –
well, they didn’t want the socialists in power. They hated the socialists more than they did the
right wing, and I think that that was part of the lesson I suppose that “I had in the back of my head
when I knew there was something wrong in this couiitiy and we started the ADA [Americans for
Democratic Action].
Strangely enough, he should be here right now when 1 said that. ·Toe guy who
really started it died this morning, Jim Loeb, who was really the thought behind the principle that
bbera1s and corrnnunists had nothing in common because communists didn’t believe in free
speech, plain and simple. But I think the maneuverability of the German coIIDllUD.ists there
against the socialists who were really the majority party – pluralist party. I don’t think anything
right at that moment Cxisted that you couJd call the.majorit)’, b’Ut made the situation such that
Hitler was ultimately handed the country.
We had lots of talks there. The guy who owned the pawn shop where we stayed –
I talked to him in great length. He was a conservative, he was a Hindenburg party guy, but he
was not for Hitler, though I guess he went along. Everybody went along when the time came.
But, the question you asked, I guess I have often tried to formulate where do you
stop – where do you stop the trading. I know it haS soITI.ethin.g to do with at what poin·t is it
militarily dangerous for the civilian government – and that is as good a formula as I could use –
when does it become dangerous to the top of the civilian government, and that is the time to stop
whether you recognize it or not or whether you come too soon or not. That’s a rather pragmatic
Mr. Peck: That tends to be the problem with making that distinction of when
it’s too soon and when it’s too late.
Mr. Rauh: Well, it was obviously too late. I mean in Germany they never
should have let Hitler go that far. So that was not too soon. In many countries .where you have
repression, it is obviously too soon there. To just hit the exact point, why, I don’t think there’s
anybody smart enough to know the answer to that.
Mr. Peck: After that summer, you started Harvard Law School. Why did you
decide to go into law?
Mr. Rauh: Because there was nothing else you could do. I’m perfectly honest
about it. ?e business was too small for two boys. It was perfectly enough to make a living for
one boy but ?ot for two. Roosevelt is elected in_the fall of ’32. I don’t think that had anything to
do with it. It was really the ab_sence of alternatives. I’m perfectly honest about that. What would
you do’? I mean, people. were having temble _times gettlllgjobs; that is, peo_ple in college. This is
my 60th reunion. No do?bt we will have talks if I’m well enough to go in May or June, whenever
it will be.
Mr. Peck: What was your first job after you got out 60 years ago?
Mr. Rauh: Well, it was very, very hard. The people who came back to law
school, which a Jot of our class did, we didn’.t know where we were going to go. And, we
certain1y didn’t know then that Roosevelt was going to hire lawyer s a dime a doz.en. I mean that
the Frankfurter boys would be welcome and all of that. Nobody knew that. Also, Jewish lawyers
were not yet hired by Wall Street finns. Whether I would have gotten a job or not was never
tested because I never got to that point. Generally, l don’rknow of anybody from our c]ass who
got hired by a Wall ?treet finn who was Jewish. Many of them came down here in ’35 when we
graduated, but I think to have any kind of big wig – I had intended. to do this and do that would
just be made up. Tus was a good place to be. It couldn’t hurt you any to know some law and it
might do you some good. I think that was really why I went to law school
Mr. Peck: Obviously Frankfurter was a big influence on your career while
you were at Harvard also – also, of course, subsequently.
Mr. Rauh: The biggest. There is no question he is the biggest influence of
mine, other than my wife. Strangely enough, he was away my second year at law school My
first year he was there, but how would a freshman look at the Icing. I don’t know if I ever saw
him that year- the freshman year. l meari, Whoa, yo·u tofd·me where·you weiit to law school, but
I forget.
·Mr.Peck: NYU.
Mr. Rauh: NYU. I me SD loobng at the Harvard Law School in the fust year,
you are instructed by people in classes of several hundred by great – the greatest scholars of the
time: Scott in contracts, Beale:in conflicts. I mean, the author of the book is your teacher.
Frankfurter wasn’t teaching freslnnen. I can’t hardly remember that I saw him Then the
sophomore year he spent at Oxford. So it was I didn’t meet him until the beginning of the third
year, which was 1934. and I took federal jurisdiction, whiCh is a Frankfurter word for whatever
you want to teach.
There are all sorts of jokes about Frankfurter, but they all mean the same thing.
He called one course “Public Utilities” and one “Federal Jurisdiction.” Federal Jurisdiction was a
litt1e seminar, about twenty to twenty-five peop1e, and what you did was to read the cases in the
Supreme Court.
Well, this is 1934 when you’ve got the anti•New Deal Court. It was exciting to
have Frankfurter come and talk to you – to walk in and say “Will you recite the case that’s just
been decided?” We had t1;1e advance sheets – everybody had taken advance sheets and the
advance sheets was a textbook for that day. That’s not totally accurate or fair to him He walked
in the .fir?t day of Federal Jurisdiction and said, “1 want everybody to read Frankfurter and
Landis.” Is th?t the history of the federal courts? “Read Frankfurter and Landis and come back
in 6 weeks; we’ll have a test and then we’ll have classes every week – we won’t skip any.” . ‘ .
That’s when he was spending so much time down here (in Washington]. So we
read it. l dop’t ? he ever read our papers, but anyway, I think be graded them on the basis of
talking in the course. Anyway, he came back and then he started reading, started with the cases –
we read all the cases, and he would discuss in dass the cases that interested him
Well, I was lucky. We had just a great relationship, and I think one thing that
solidified our relationship is the time I made a fool of myself. He walked in one day; he said,
“What do you think of the [decision in Mooney]? I didn’t know what to do.
“Well sir, you have to understand those times. I mean, tlrings were – there was an
awfu.J lot of feeling going on.”
There’s a deathly silence because the rest of the class knew what the hell was
go?g to happen to me. He said, “Goddamn it. Don’t you know where l was.” He said, “I was on
a mission from President Wilson to tell him what to do about the Mooney case because it was
causing such international trouble, and you’re trying to tell me something about the case.”
He said, “What about the case?” Well, it was so obvious I had not read the case. I
made a real jackass of myself, but I think that even helped solidify affairs r.ither than – that was
the case Mooney against Hollahand, where they held – its one ofthe first cases where the
Fourteenth Amendment gets applied to criminal law. It was not the first case; that was the
Scousboro case, but it was one of the first cases. What the court ruJed there was that the
prosecutors’ knowing use of perjured testimony was a violation of due process. That would have
been simple enough. All I had to do was read the case.
After that, I read them. and he was very nice. One day in winter, he hollers at me
in the corridor, “Come here.” I went back, and he Said, “What are you going to do next year?”
1 said, “Well, I have a job sir with the Paxton & Seasongood firm” 1hat was the
top Jewish fimi in Cincinnati – at the munificent sum of a hundred dollars a month
He said, “Well, tell them you’re not coming.”
I said, “Yes, sir.” You know, you didn’t speak back really very often to Felix..
He said “Tell them you’re not corning. Tell them you’re going to Washington.”
I said, “Gee, that’s· wonderful II
He said, “I think we can arrange the law clerkship for Justice Cardozo, but I’m not
absolutely certain because Cardozo may want to keep his present law clerk a second year because
he told me that changing was a problem for him being older and not well. So it might be a year,
and, well, you could work for one of the Nev.i Dealers for a year, and it would probably be fine.”
So, it did develop that Cardozo did keep Bill Strop for the first year I was in
Washington and then actually I guess he was going on doing that because I stayed for two years.
But, so I worked for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran for the year 1935 to 1936 and then in ’36 I
became Justice Cardoro’s law clerk.
Mr. Peck: I see. That explains something that J couldn’t quite figure out –
how your government service sort of spanned your clerkships.
Mr. Rauh: Well, I spent a year .in ’35 and ’36 working for Cohen and Corcoran
and then I went to Cardozo. Then I went for a few months to the Labor Department, the Wage
and Hour Division. Then when Frankfurter was appointed, I told Ben Cohen to volunteer for me
– that] didn’t “:’ant _to volunteer because if Felix didn’t want me, I didn’t want to do it. I mean, J
had been a clerk and no .sense in doing it more than once; but on the other hand, I felt so much – I
worshiped Felix so much – and he was having trouble. See, it was mid-year and finding anybody
and especially to find so?ebody who knew his way around the Coun was a great thing. So,
whe n Ben said, “That’s very nice, but you sure you want to do it.” I said, “I want to do it ifhe . . ‘ . , . .
wants to do it.”
lben, well, he c?ed Felix, who told him “Sure, what the hell.” After all, somewhere
he wrote that I had broken rum in. Well, I did know more about the routine or something
like when you get the briefs, when you get this, and when you get that. You know, it was a little
easier to have somebody around who knew that, but then [Justice Louis] Brandeis retired, and
Butch Frazier came up from Brandeis’ chambers. J stayed for a little bit, but not too long – but
there is a kind of a back and forth shift there. First with Bea and Tom and the New Deal, then
Cardow, then the Labor Department, and then back to Frankfurter, and then the preparation for
war, pretty much
Mr. Peck: Well, what was it like being at the Court at that time. I mean, we
know that ]aw clerks have a variety of duties t0day. ‘What kind of duties did law secretaries
Mr. Rauh: In my opinion, there may have been judges who needed law clerks,
but l was working for one who didn’t. 1 would say that – you know there’s so much talk now
about, and even then they were talking about, law clerks writing the opinions. Why if] got a
sentence in an opinion, 1 thought J’ve made my life. I got very, very few. What my job was was
to read cert. petitions and write a short memorandum – and he read them afterwards; he wasn’t
talcing any chances that I got it wrong.
Then, the major job that I had was, you see, they met – the conferences were on
Saturday afternoon and then [Chief JuStiCe Charles Evans] Hughes would send around the
assignments. That came Saturday around 7:00, and J’d wait until it came. He’d show it to me and
he would always say “It wasn’t exact1y what l hoped for Mr. Rauh, but we’ll see what we can do
with it.” And When I walked in Monday morning at 9:00, he’d say, “I found some interesting
things in the case and I’ve written it up.” He said , “I put in the New York – . ” See there was a
long ball with bookcases, and he had all the New York cases reports, all the U.S. reports, and all
the federal reports. So, he said, “I put in the federal and the Supreme Court and New York cases
that are relevant. Could you fmd some other places like New Mexico so we don’t seem so …. ”
What was the word he used – paroch.ia1? Or,” … we don’t look so elitist” – something like that.
So my job was to go and based on the decisions he used, which was a cinch since the key … All
I had to do was take the key [number] and look and see what else there was under that particular
key number. Or, if you wanted to be a little innovative, you looked through related subjects too.
That was it really. The job was to make the opinions look like they weren’t just written out of
New York City.
And then he’d come in and praise you to the skies for nothing. The other thing he
did was he would take one or two .cases that were being argued at the next session and ask you
write a memorandum about those, which he would read and come in and say, “That’s brilliant,
better than the opinion of …. ” He had that habit – it’s a temble habit. It got him into all kinds of
trouble._ Let me give you an example: there was a guy named George Hellman, whose son is that
guy who writes for the New Yorker, Jeffrey Hellman. And anyway, George H_elhnan was a – he
was a_ – just sort of wrote things inadequately. The day right after Cardozo dies, he [Hellman]
comes in, he says he’s going to write a biography. Well, he was no more qualified to write the
Cardozo biography, and I told him so. I was a yo?g, brash kid. J said, “You shouldn’t do that.
There should be somebody that knows the law.” He pulls out a picture, autographed, from
Cardozo, in some such flowery way. You could have argued that Cardozo had.chosen rum as his
biographer, because it had all this flowery (junk] on his picture. Why J couJdn’t say any more,
except J won’t cooperate. He thanked me, however, in the introduction for cooperation, but that’s
an old trick that people use – that’s what, what’s her name used on Mrs. Reagan.
Mr. Peck: Oh, Karie Kelly.
Mr. Rauh: Right. She thanked a lot of people who claimed she never really
got near them, but the idea was to show how thorough a job she did. So be thanked me but J
never did talk co him
At any rate, those were the things you did. You did a review memorandum on the
cases to be argued. There was research, which he reviewed very carefully. And there was “add
cases” from the not•elitist places. That’s all you did, and it never was very hard.
The on1y hard assignment – 1 mean this was Jong, because it was so dusty – the
really hard assignment came on tbe Socia] Security cases. There was some argument made that
this was an illegaJ head tax, and Cardozo said, “I remember reading in a book someplace that in
the colonies they had statutes on taxes, not unlike the Socia] Security taxes. Mr. Rauh. you see if
you can find anything out about that.” I went to the Congressiona1 Library, and I talked to the
– the Supreme Court Library had nothing on the colonies. I think I checked that. So I went over
there, and I think I talked to the guy. He said, “Yeah, we got the statutes” from the colonies.”
They took me into some room – it was so dusty – nobody had been in that room I guess for least
fifty years and said “all the statutes of the colonies are here.” And I said, “Thank you very
much” He turned around, and he lit up as much as he could. We took a rag and cleaned off the
dust that was in the room, and I found them. They’re in the case – and I found some of the things
that were exactly what he wanted. I think indeed it was so. I was so wonied that in copying it
I’d be hard – I’d tear the pages. We took about ten books out to him of colony statutes. We dealt
with the origina1s. I’d open them and show it to him, and he’d make whatever notes be wanted
about it. He was just ecstatic about the research.
But he never wanted to do what Brandeis did. You know Brandeis would tell a
c1erk, just no relationship like Cardozo and his clerk – they were even on different floors in their
apartments. You see, they worked at home. They didn’t work at the Court. Brandeis would say
to Willard Hearst, who was there the first year I was, “Hey, Mr. Hearst, will you please get the
law of this point in all 48 states?” Why, that’s a pile of crap to do that; he’s just showing off.
But, “oh, yes, sir.” So Willard was out Jooking up the law of 48 states, and I was having a good
time talldng to the Justice.
I was so lucky to have a Justice like him Now we were there in the coun•packing
plan. See, l got there in September of ’36, and the court-packing plan comes in February of ’37.
Well, l had the best seat in the house on the court-packing pl?Jl because Cohen and Corcoran
were more Jess running it for Roosevelt, I’ll tell you. They weren’t in on sending it up, but they
worked on changing it so I wou1d go in their office at nights and find out what the hell they were
doing and I also was on the Court – so I’ve always said “] had the best seat in the house for the
court-packing plan.”
Well, what actually is s1;nnewbat of a dispute and if you read the North Carolina
piece [Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., An Unabashed Liberal woks at a Half-Century of the Supreme
Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 213 (1990)], you’D see it- it’s also in the Supreme Court Historical
Society- they took the first part of my article- the_pan on the court packing. But you cou1dn’t
take the later part because I found out the rule of the Supreme Court HistoricaJ Society: you
could slander dead judges, but don’t touch a living one.” That’s why they took the first ten pages
of my piece, but not the later forty, because it slaunned the living – so I’ve now got the rule of the
Supreme Court Historica1 Society down pat.
Anyway, Cohen and Corcoran both told me, especially Cohen – because my
relationship was much doser with him- that they had not known until the day before the plan
went up. I don’t think I- Warner G?1dner, who was.working for _Cunnnings at that time, wrote a
persona] history, a memoir in which he includes a jab at me saying that, something like,
“obstreperous Joe Rauh” – I think it’s in his … no ]_think J may have even put it in my piece
because I answered it. It said, “Obstreperous Joe Rauh says that Cohen and Corcoran did not
know it.” He said that “Cunnnings and I spent a morning with them discussing it.” Now I can’t
believe that Ben lied, and I can’t believe Warren did. I now have what I believe to be the
resolution, which is that they knew a packing was coming. But they didn’t know that Roosevelt
was going to use that absurd theory that the old men weren’t doing their work and that that may, I
wrote, “solve the.question whether Cohen and Corcoran were lying in a ?emo they wrote to
Brandies was qu,ite put out with Cohen and Corcoran for having been in on this,
and they wrote him that they hadn’t been in on it.
Now, the only explanation I think I’ve gotten, if th?re is an exp}anati?n, maybe
somebody didn’t cause it, if as I believe there must be an explanation, I think it is they didn’t
know the rationale – they kne? the packing, and that’s my guess.
At any rate, as _Ben puts in th_e memo to Brandies, “We re;a.4 the thing; we had two
cboic_es: one was to go along with it, one was not to. We decided to go along with it.” But they
also changed it. .They changed the rationalization from the old men are?’t doing their work to
“we need these statutes for our country, and we need them now.”. And that word “now” you’ll
find – that sentence 1 just gave you is out. of Cohen and Corcoran, and they also produced that
wonderful sentence: “We say the purpose was to save the Constitution frqm the Court and the
Court from itself.” They sort of took it over.
So, when I say I had the bes_t seat, I was one wbq could w? from the courthouse
to Cohen’s office where they were working. I tell the story in this North Carolina law review,
and it was a very interesting period. You come along with the Court reversing itself on the
minimum wage, _but that had nothing to do with the court-packing plan, because [Justice Owen]
Roberts bad already voted in conference to uphold and had reversed himself so it had not to do
with the plan. But Jones & Laughlin is cJearly – there’s no other explanation of {NLRB v.J Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937)].
On Saturdays, I would ride to the Court with the Justice, then I’d go to the library .
.H e’d go to the conference. He used the suite of rooms to put his coat on his desk and go into the
conference and then the minute I heard the bell that the conference was over we’d go down and
he’d let me ride home together [ with him]. We rode home together after Jones & Laughlin, and
he said, “Mr. Rauh, you won’t believe this. Roberts and [Chief Justice] Hughes vote4 to
overrule, against /Carter v.J Carter Coal Co., [298 U.S. 238 (1936)], without even mentioning it
[the case].” Oh, he was flabbergasted. I mean, he was glad he’d won and then you get Social
Security, overruling a Jot of stuff. In fact, what (Justice James McReynolds] said there, I guess,
in Jones & Laughlin was ql!,ite true. He said, “We have voted within the last 2 years a number of
times to throw things out as a whole, as unconstitutional, things ijke we’re now upholding.” I
mean, McReyno)ds was right in that sentence, but that way he wasn’t right on the result.
Anyway, Cardozo was so happy and then he did the Social Security case.
Then (Justice Willis] Van Devanter comes in one day in May. I answered the
doorbell and escorted him to the jus?ice’s office. Five minutes 1ater, the justice comes out and
tells me that Van Devanter is sending a letter to the president resigning, and the fight was over.
We’d wo1;1. But the tragedy, if you think about it, Cardozo wou1d have been the spiritual, h”beral
lea?er of that Court. He was just about to take it over, and he dies. He would have been the
liberal leader. Brandeis was about to get off. [Justice Harlan Fiske] Stone was an excellent
judge, but no leader as his period as Chief Justice demonstrated. llris was going to be the
Cardozo’s fmal shining Ught, and he got sick in December. The Court met in October, he got
sick in December before there were any cases that showed the new Court, and he never returned
to the bench The real tragedy – in the [North Carolina law review] piece, I?? the point that I
had two bosses who blew being the leaders of the Court, Card.ow by health, and Frankfurter by
your case {Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 3 JO U.S. 586 (1940)].
Mr. Peck: Well, lets taJk a little bit about Frankfurter. Obviously, as you said
already, he relied on you to just sort of show him the ropes.
Mr. Rauh: Th8t’s work. They were not substantive cases in any way. But I
wasn’t there really long enough to have had any great effect. But, he was easy. l mean, easier to
write in or if you had made a suggestion, he would put it in, but he could put it in his own words
easier than you could. So there is more.
Oh, on Cardozo – he got sick in December, and he had a gold clause case. I don’t
know if you remember the gold clause fight. When we went off the gold [standard], we violated
all of them bonds that were redeemable in gold and all that. I wasn’t on the Court then. They
upheld going off the gold standard, but Stone – didn’t dissent but he said that their theories were
all wrong and he was the only one – the rest of them all voted you could go. 1 don’t remember
exactly how the vote was, but I wasn’t on the Court then.
But there was a gold standard case by a suit in the Court of Claims. It was very
difficult to reconcile with the decision in ’35 allowing them to go off the gold standard, and
Cardozo was assigned the opinion. And it was damn hard, and he was having a hell of a time,
but he finally got a draft out. Then he got sick and damned if Stone wasn’t so – I can’t think of
the right word to use – Stone was so detennined to have his own vi?ws accepted ?d to show that
he had been right that he circulated either a concurring or dissenting opinion ? I can’t remember
which, but it’s in the books.
And, I said to the doctor [Cardow’s doctor], “Look doctor, I’ve got this problem
We’ve got to answe! Stone. May I please discuss this with tht:; Justice.” Under no circumstances
may you talk anything, any Jaw to the Justice, especially something where his best colleague on
the Court has criticized something. He says “hold on, you may not.”
Well, here’s a 24, 25-year-old – not knowing what in God’s name to do. Well, I
was just beside myself. I wanted to talk to the judge, and I didn’t think it would I thought it was
alright, but oh no, he was in bed with heart trouble, and the doctor said “Absolutely not,” so the
doctor had his way.
So, when Cardozo asked me about the case, I said, “The acquiesces have come in
fine, sir,” lying like a trooper. I wrote two sentences that I thought”handled Stone as best as
could. Well, what do I do with them? Do I put them in the opinion without the Justice knowing?
Finally, I said, “Look, there’s only one t.1:ring you can do. You got to go see the Chief Justice.”
The chief said he would receive me, so I went to his house on R Street. I told him exactly what
had happened. He looked at the – something’s wrong with my memory here, I’ll show you why –
or something we have never been dear on. He said “Go ahead and put it in. Put what you have
in.” I said, “Yes, sir” and left. So I was blown out of the room He looked like God, and I wasn’t
sure he wasn’t. So, I went out, I went back, I sent it back to _the printer with the two sentences in.
I think on1y Andy Kaufman at Harvard – he’s a professor at Harvard, is a
biographer, and he’s been working on Cardoz.o’s biography 30 years. We cannot fmd those two
sentences. So, something is wrong in my memory. I can’t fmd those two sentences. Oo the other
hand, I think he told me to put them in. I think that I did. We are jus? beside ourselves; I’m
beside myself to find out what is the right answer to that story. Andy has been looking with me,
and most of the book is written. It’s going to be a famous book, a real s’tudy of a Justice – it’s
going to be a great book. I never knew a guy who did so much research as Andy has done on that
book. But we’ve never found the two seritences.
Now, is it that I wrote a whole paragraph and there’s one in there that fits in so
well? We’re not sure. So, that’s the story, but it’s not a story with an ending that I can be sure of
– unless Andy comes across it. lt’S an interesting point whether the Supreme Coun or the printer
has the earlier copies – the earlier drafts [maY Dot be aV·aifabJe] because the Court gets so many
drafts as they change. Indeed, Brandeis was supposed to have sent down drafts that were
elongated all the time. · And those would be very valuable in history, bu·t we haven’t any way yet
to know that, so maybe Andy will find out. He’s been a professor at Harvard ever since he was
Frankfurter’s law clerk.
Frankfurter called one morning when I was working in the govemment then and
said that “Joe you have to stop Mason from writing dear Ben Cardozo’s biography.”
And l said “Well, judge, he’s planning to come see me this afternoon. What will I
tell him?”
He said, “Tell him you can’t write.”
‘Well, you’ve gotta come up with a better reason than that.”
He said, “Just tell hlm somebody else is writing it.”
I said, “Well, he’ll ask me who the somebody else is.”
He said, and he was apparently sitting there with Andy Kaufman, his law clerk,
and I could hear him over the telephone. He said, “Andy, you’re a surnma cum laude from
Hruvard in history. You wam to write Ben Cardoz.o’s autobiography?” And apparently, I did not
hear Andy’s answer, but Felix said, “Andy’s gonna write it.”
So that’s how the book started, and it’s been going on for years, but it’s going to be
– I mean – it is so brilliantly researched. 1be guy used such innovation to find things, and it’s a
story really of a judge way back in New York in the late 19th century. It’s so marvelous- the
book is, you’ll have a c_hance – I’ve always laughed at Andy. I said, “I’m not going to be alive to
see this work of yours.”
He said, “Oh, Joe, I’ll get it out before you die.”
I said, “You’d better hwry.”
And so we’ve been joking about it, but I doubt if I’ll ever see it. But J’ve read the
manuscript and tw ?•?ds of the chapters, ?d it’s wonderful It’s tJ:ie kind of a book that scholars
are going to say, “This is scholarship unprecedented.” But we’ve never found the two sentences
that I think are there somewhere.
Mr. Peck: I wonder whether since it’s ahnost six o’clock, probably we ought
to stop?
Mr. Rauh: I was going to ask you one thing: whether you feel its part of your
help to me-
Mr. Rauh:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
January 16, 1992
The second matter for the foundation was the relationship between
hberals and communists. You had in this country a united front; it was perfectly open. Actually,
there had been some grumblings about the united front in the ’39 to ‘4r Nazi-Soviet pact. That’s
when I had my experiences with those who didn’t want to prepare for war and didn’t want to help
save Englan& But Russia was our ally in the war. The pact was over. The united front was
back, but then in 1946 you began to see the· differences.
One of the great spiritual leaders Of the ADAY was Reinhold Niebuhr who I think
· said it best in a statement I just fove to quote. Reinnie said, “! don’t believe in my country right
or wrong, especially when it’s not my country.” And that summed up bow we felt about the idea
of Stalinism If You think that civil liberties are your or my beacon, bow can you be part of a
group that says yes to whatever Stalinists wanted? And that was pretty clear.
Jim Loeb wrote a letter totbe New Republic in May, I think, of’46, making this
point. Oh boy, the __ hit the fan. I mean there were connnunistS in many important media.
Boy, they went after Jim with an axe but Jim had the perseverance of a dynamo. I am speaking at
a ri:iem6rial service for Jim a couple of weeks from now. He is hard to describe. He was not easy
going. He was so right on everything and so persevering in what he wanted to do that he was
quite a wonderful human being. He’d been for the Spanish loyalists; he wanted to prepare for
war. He had been a socialist with Norman Thomas but, when Thomas was anti-wfil”, Jim and
Reinn.ie and some others broke with Thomas. The socialist party was quite divided over the war.
Americans for Democratic Action.
And then Jim led this new group. When it was formed, I think the headline in The
Washington Post the day after we staned the new group – I guess that would have been Sunday,
the 5th of January – on the front page was “Liberals Without Reds.” That was what was
newsworthy. 1 don’t think if Truman had continued with the people that bad been around
Roosevelt or with the ideas that had been around Roosevc::?t that probably wouldn’t have sparked
it – breaking with the Communists wouldn’t have sparked it. But the two together kind of created
a situation where the ADA had an immediate success and then we went on in.1948. We beat the
pols. Well, we beat the machinery of the Democratic party and came out for civil rights. But we
had the politicians, the big bosses were with us.
Mr. Peck: Let’s talk little bit about the development of the civil rights plank
for the Democratic Convention. Wa s that when you first started an association with Huben
Mr. Rauh: The ADA was before that. On January 4th of ’47, it’s formed. In
March, there is a conference in the Middle West, trying to build ADA in the middle west. Two
people were there that were very significant figures in American political life. One was Huben,
the mayor of Minneapolis. The other was George Edwards who was Chairman of what they
called the Common Council. It was the City Council of Detroi?. George Edwards later was on
the Sixth Circuit, still is but he’s quite sick, and Hubert becmne what he was. Well, this was a
very successful conference.
AdJai Stevenson came and didn’t join. He was Ham1et a]ways; wonderful, we
loved him, but he was Ham1et. He came but he didn’t join. Hubert made one of his stemwinders.
Oh, God, it was wonderful, and I fell in Jove. So, Hubert and 1 were dose friends from March
1947 on.
But the way the civil rights thing started was we naturally had civil rights as part
of the platfonn. You could not have a liberal organization without.civil rights, and Roy Wilkins
bas given us lots of credit for what we did as the leading white civil rights organization. We
weren’t the leading civil rights organization by any manner of means. The NAACP, Urban
League, there were a lot of wonderful groups.
Well, I think this was evidence of Jim Loeb’s genius in ’48 when Truman was at
the bottom of the barre] and there were lots of desire to dump him ADA was in on that. Paul
Porter came to me one day and said I have got a message for you. I said, “What is it?” He said,
the President told me to tell those hberal creeps in the ADA that anybody sitting behind tbis desk
where I am sitting – . ” I think the word that Truman used was “any shit sitting behind this desk
could get himself renominated and I’m going to.” At any rate, he did. But, and this would have
been quite – with nothing else at the convention but the renomination – it would have been quite
a blow at the ADA. Jim Loeb thought of making the fight on the civil rights plank, and we all
rallied ’round. It was that that made it look like we were a big part of the Democratic party. And
while I’m supposed to be the author of the plank, it really bas no authorship. It grew over weeks,
you know.
Jim was the mastennind in the organization. A letter went out to all the delegates
from Hubert, Jimmy Roosevelt who was chairman in California, and Bill O’Dwyer who was the
mayor of New York about this. We were going to have a real plank. Jt was beautifully organized
and beautifully carried out there. We won – we did win because we had – you got to give credit
to a lot of places, not just to Hubert, me and the people at the convention there that day. We
have to give it to Henry Wallace because one of the best arguments we had on the floor was: are
you going to turn the black vote over-to Henry Walla? who is going through the South doing
things that were quite wonderful? And we don’t want that.
I argued to the bosses, Jack Harvey, David Lawrence out of New York, Frank
Haig and all these bosses – well, don’t you want the blacks to support your local tickets? Well,
anyway, they were wonderful These guys, oh, what a gem. Bjp. Green in Philadelphia, all these
guys. Here were a bunch of hberals. We hated their guts, and they hated ours. Here, we’re
strolling around the convention together- and they won it for us. Look, I think we got every
vote from Illinois. You-don’t get every vote from Illinois if Jake Harvey doesn’t want you to get
every vote from Illinois.
So there are Jots of people who deserve great credit. But 1 guess no one more than
Hubert and his beautifu1 speech. 1 think the guy is still living who wrme that speech. Milton
Stewart was his name, and Huben put in a few things I think probably that line that it’s time for
Democratic party to come out of the darkness of i;;tates rights and. into the sunshine of human
rights. As far as 1 know, 1 have never read that Milton died, but he was the ADA staff in New
York and he was there with us. We needecj a speech Hubert delivered it as only he could.
Hubert could take a lousy speech and deliver it good, but this was a good speech Anyway, we
did win by a substantial margin. That morning, Dave Niles on the floor said to me, “You’re
ruining the career of the greatest prospect the Democratic party has had for years. I said, “What
the hell are you talking about, Dave.” He was Truman’s civil rights guy in the White House. He
said, “Well, you are going to ruin Hubert Humphrey and not going to get 15 votes.” I said,
“yes?” You know, Truman wrote in his memoirs that he had written the minority plank, but the
absurdity of that is that the Missouri delegation voted against it. The Kentucky delegation of
Alben Barkley vote d against us. The Chairman of the Democratic party, McGrath of Rhode
Island, voted against us. It is pretty clear that the bureaucracy was on the other side but what had
happened was a bunch of crazy hberals with a wonderfu.1 speaker and the city bosses upset the
machinery of the Democratic party.
MI. Peck: Well, sometime after that you were said to have claimed that the
only difference between the ADA and the Democrats was that the ADA believed in the party
platform and the Democrats didn’t.
MI. Rauh: I said that, and I think there is a great deal of truth in that. But we
really – you know, take historians. Arthur Schlesinger has got a piece somewhere in the last
month saying that platforms don’t mean anything. Well, platfonns can mean something. I wrote
Anhur a letter and said that I think that’s not a helpful thing to write; platfonns should mean
something. The fact that politicians don’t follow them is only a measure of the:ir care for
platfonns. Well, we cared for it and that turned the tide. You know, I think historians will one
day say that when the ADA tied civil rights to the masthead of the Democratic party in ’48 they
changed things. Now, from the point of view of the Democratic party that may not be so good,
because civil rights today has lost the white vote. We have to count on Hispanic, black, Chinese,
poor, homeless, every goldam thing to make up for the fact that the majority of whites are against
us just because of this. But I am only saying that this was a historical event. 1 think that one day,
when we’re all gone and they’re not going to know who the hell we were, that they will say this
was a big event in life there.
Mr. Peck: In 1949, I read you had an early run in with LBJ over the
reappointment of Leland Olds to the Federal Power Commission and . that some people think that
Abe Fortas put LBJ up to that.
Mr. Rauh: Well, now there’s a dispute on that. I thought so, but I have a Jetter
from Abe Fonas saying that I was wrong. The Fortas role in that , to my mind, has never been
resolved. If I had to guess, if St. Peter asked me, I’d tell him I think he was involved but I don’t
want to sa y that I know that – Abe said it wasn’t true.
AI?A fought for Leland Olds but Johnson just wrecked it, and I _have alwa ys
thought that Abe was in. on that but I now would rather say: Well, I thought it then, and I am not
sure of the answer. Abe has written me a letter saying it wasn’t true, and I ?uess I want to believe
Mr. Peck: I also found :in 1949 another D.C. Circuit case. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and En_ginemen v. Graham.Y
Mr. Rauh: You know that case went to Supreme Court. What ha ppened was
the railroads and the white union of locomotive firemen entered imo an a greement that you
wouldn’t have black firemen – that’s the essence of it. We brought a suit under the Steele ca? to
say that was illega1 but the union couldn’t discrimm.ate against people ll1 the bargaining unit.
Now the blacks couldn’t get ll1 the union but the union bargained for them because they were part
of the unit. And they made this thing called the Southeastern Caniers Agreement which was so
outrageous. At any rate , this was not one of the Circuit Court’s fmest hours. We brought a suit

175 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev’d 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
to outlaw lhe Southeast Carriers Agreement and, under Steele, we were entitled to that. We got a
preliminary injunctiqn from Judge [Alexander] Holtzoff, wh o was not what You would call any
great radical, and we were feeling pretty good about that. They went to the cowt of appeals and
they got the thing upset. What was the Judge, what was bis name, the Chief Judge of the D.C.
Circuit, [Harold M.] Stephens. I think you missed one, but my name wouldn’t have been on the
brief and I think we will have to come back to that – ask me to tell you about La,ndis.
Mr. Peck: Okay.
Mr. Rauh: Do you know the Landis case? Let’s try to remember what
happened in Graham. I went for cert., got cert., and the [Supreme] Court reversed it, which was
an important case in my life because we got paid something, not much, but something. We were
rather on the edge and ,.,;ere going to make a go Of it only taking public interest cases. But the
Graham case, jf you look at it, is absurd, and the Supreme Court made that perfectly clear during
the argument. But I was in on a case there that was also wrong, I believe. It was called Landis V.
North American Co. It’s the Holding Company Act case. Toe Holding Company Act was
passed in 1935. Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran deputized themselves to run it. They got an
order from [Attorney General Homer] Cummings that they were to be in charge of that litigation,
so I worked on that litigation.
Well, when I say there was a flood of suits, I do not use that word lightly. There
were more suits against the – there must have been 50 or 75 suits. So Ben Cohen who was the
greatest tactician lawyer I have ever seen. I don’t say that he is the greatest lawyer. I don’t know
that he would know how to cross-examme Tony Boyle and he probably wouldn’t have been able
‘ 85 F.2d 398 (D.C Cir.) rev’d, 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
to, but this is what he did for tactics. He announced – he had the Attorney General announce that
they wouldn’t prosecute anybody for not registering under the Holding Company Act and the first
thing you had to do was register. Nobody would be prosecuted until the Supreme Court decided
the constitu?ionality. So they brought one suit against Electric Bond & Share Co. which is the
suit that upheld the Holding Cornpan:r Act several years later.?’ But for North American and
others that were plowing ahead – some just let it lie, he moved for a stay in the district coun
before a Judge Bailey, I think was his name, an old Wilson appointee. I learned a lot about the
rjght judge makes a big difference from Ben and Tom I think we had a Wilson appointee as our
judge and he gave us – oh, not on1y did we have a Wilson appointee but Ben called up the
Attorney General and said, “Tom and I think it would be well, if you’d argue the case. It wou1dn’t
take you more than five minlltes to argue for the stay.” So here is the attorney court of the United
States on a lousy stay motion in the district court arguing it. Well, we obviously won. They
went to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals again issued a lousy decision. By the time
it got to the Supreme Court, I was law clerk to Justice Cardozo so be said why don’t we not talk
about the case. So we didn’t, but that was another case where I had worked on the coun of
appeals. But the court of appeals in those days wasn’t such a good operation. Sometime we are
going to find that it moved and maybe you can help me remember th.ings on the move. I had
[been before it] either for the government in the FCC work or the government in the Holding
Company Act as earlier contacts than the one where my name appeared in private practice.
Mr. Peck: The next thing that I have noted down brings us up to the 1952
5 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 \J.S. 419 (1938).
Mr. Rauh: Well, Jet’s hold it because that was one more. I bad a case in my
head that J wanted to mention, and we are going to stop anyway. When is -Landis is 1936 in the
district court and court of appeals and then it goes to the Supreme Court. Graham is 1949 and
·1here was something I watited to tell you and then irslipped my mind. But anyway we will
remember. It will come back to us.
Mr. Peck:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
Jaouary 17, 1992
**Tape 3 (missing)**
As we get started, there are a couple of thmgs that I wanted to go
over from last time. The first thing, which is sort of a silly little thing, but one thing to clear up
because in one report l saw that your middle initial stood for nothing in particular. And m·
another report it stood for Louis.
Mr. Rauh: No, it stands for nothing really because my father had nothing. But
if it is ever a silly thing, in earlier generations that would have been German, it would have been
Ludwig. But I don’t think in this country there was ever anything profound. My father never did
anything but use the “L.”
Mr. Peck: Okay. That settles that burning issue. Okay. Wh? we left we
were about done with your clerkships at the Supreme Court. but before we did that one of the
things that you described in your law review article was the factions on the Court and how they
planned separately their strategy and all And I was hoping, maybe, that we could talk a little bit
about that too. You.described Van Devanter as the leader of one faction that included
McReynolds, Butler and Sutherland.
Mr. Rauh: Would I ever call him the leader? He was the most senior. Did 1
ever use the word leader?
Mr. Peck: Maybe you didn’t use. the word –
Mr. Rauh: Because I mean the leader would have been a person who had great
influence on the other three.
Mr. Peck: Maybe you-
Mr. Rauh: I don’t think I would have used the word, but he was the oldest, the
senior. That’s not a word I would go for because he was a rather reserved person. I don’t know
that those four ever had what you might call a leader. ButJer was the bully in the crowd. He
would try to force, assert on all federal employee liability cases that the employee had won and
Cardozo was just outraged that Butler was bullying. Sutherland was probably the most politic of
them – having been a Senator. MCReynolds was the most malevolent of them, so antisemitic that
he wouldn’t talk to Brandeis and Cardozo. Van Devanter was rather a reserved guy, so I don’t
know where in that crowd you could call anyone a leader. They coalesced around whoever was
writing the negative of the New Deal.
Cardozo said as much to me. He said, ”When we found out that they were having
their meetings together, then we decided on the 6:00 Friday night meeting at Brandeis’ house.
That was really counter, to counter the others.” When he told me about the Brandeis meetings,
he said, ”These were really in response to the fact that they were meeting. We can’t call
meetings. We weren’t in the car with them, but they seemed to be always – had their ducks in a
row when the conference started.” I think the Brandeis meetings that Stone, Cardozo and
Brandeis had at 6:00 on Friday before the 7:00 – before the Saturday conference was a necessary
way of combating the other. None of them had any meetings in the courthouse.
Mr. Peck: Now another thing that you mentioned in your }aw review artic1e
was that – what you called a judicial tragedy that Brandeis’ and Frankfurter’s advice did not
prevent Van Devanter not being asked to step down. Is there any more insight that you can give
to me?
Mr. Rauh: That is a tough problem that I faced Jast week when Arthur
Schlesinger, who is at that point in ?s seri?s of books, book four. He’s done three, you know.
Theo he really stopped – Kennedy came in. He’s going back to four and he called me to discuss
the court-packing plan. He’s a close friend. I told him that the biggest unsettled question in my
book, is the Van Devanter thing. He asked me where I got this idea. Well, I got it from Ben
Cohen who had discussed it with Frankfurter, this thing that Van Devan.t?r was a very important
man in conference, a very useful man, and it didn’t matter that he didn’t write any opinions as
time went on. Ben thought that it was all a Jot of malarkey. I have one bit of evidence that that ‘.s
true. Are you from Harvard? Where are you from?
Mr. Peck: Yes.
Mr. Rauh: Frankfurter taught a federal jurisdiction course. The course. was _ a
seminar of about 20 student.S on what he called federal jurisdiction. What we did was_ in federal
jurisdiction, was reading the cases in the Supreme Court. We had to subscribe to the advance
sheets and we discussed the cases. This was so exciting because this was at the time the fight
between the New Deal and the Court was going on and it was at a time when the teacher
[Frankfurter] was in the middle of that fight as Roosevelt’s advisor. In fact, I think he probably
had as much influence with Roosevelt as the Attorney General. At any rate, I do remember on
more than one occasion Frankfurter referred to Van Devanter’s usefulness in conference. I
remembered that when some years later Ben [Cohen] told me that there never would have needed
to be a court-packing plan, because Van Devanter was willing to give up. I’ve always said
somebody, and I don’t mean you because this is so rather peripheral to what you are doing, but
I’ve been surprised that nobody’s ever looked through the Van Devanter papers. There may be
somebody who has and didn’t find anything, I can’t speak for that. Now Lautenberg l?] has a
manuscript that he’s never uncorked. But as much as 10 years ago, or ahnost – cenainly more
than 5 – it’s more than since I was sick in ’87 – there was a coming-out party for Lautenberg’s
book at Steve SoJarz’ house. Lautenberg spoke of his book as, you know, there it is. But it’s
never come out. So I don’t know what Bill thinks of the Van Devanter point. But after Arthur
called me, I Jooked back to see what I had – what my source was. But I can truthfully say that
this idea was that Frankfurter and Brandeis thought Van Devanter was useful in conference was
corroborated by Frankfurter during that seminar. You just have to judge bow·mucb you trunk
one can say about that. The fact that Van Devanter got off innnediately after it was clear that
they were linked sort of supports that too, that he was really ready to get off because this
happened in May. When does Jones v. Laughlin come down? April?
Mr. Peck
Mr. Rauh:
Well, it doesn’t matter but it’s very shortly after -1 can’t remember
even if that knock on the door is before or after Social Security came down. But it didn’t matter.
Van Devanter was known by then, because all the arg\U11ents were over. They’d lost them all
The fight was over with Roosevelt and we won. I must say that I don’t have it wrapped up. And
it will never be wrapped up unless somebody really makes a study of Van Devanter’ s papers or
there’s a biography or something. It’s one of the unknown factors. The whole thing is that if
Brandeis – if my story is correct and Brandeis had – after talking to Frankfurter – said, “Oh, I
know that you’ve done some wonderful work, why don’t you, of course, if you feel like that, we
shouldn’t stand in your way.”
Mr. Peck: Rlght.
Mr. Rauh: See, if you have four votes, three of them are liberals and the fourth
vote, a Roosevelt appointee, Hughes would have gone off then. AU Hughes wanted to do was to
be with the majority, I mean, he had a temble time swinging on a tra?ze. There would have
been no occasion for the court•packing plan. Now since I’m one who thinks it came out as well as
it could have, it sounds so temOle to me. All the people who had been so down on the court•
packing plan don’t realize that it was brought on by the liberals not understanding that they have
10 play hardball.
Mr. Peck: But speaking of the court•packing plan, rou wrote that Cardozo, or
course, opposed the plan –
Mr. Rauh: Yes.
Mr. Peck: But did not think it was his role to do something about that. But he
was upset with his brethren for getting involved?
Mr. Ra? Very upset at the Hughes letter. Ami not right that the Hughes
letter was also, was based on – Hughes said that he had the support of Van Devanter and
Mr. Peck: That’s right.
Mr. Rauh: Cardow or Brandeis said he was part of their team and went ahead
and did that. But Brandeis did a lot more. That story I got, nobody else had ever printed the
story, about how Mrs. Brandeis got [Senator] Wheeler to call the Justice and (laughter) they
worked together wi.th Hughes. But the guy who told me that story, that’s a pretty good source.
It’s Ed Wheeler, the son of Senator Wheeler, who is the one who told me story. I actually asked
him twice – it seemed like such an important story – about Brandeis’ role in defeating the bill. 1
asked him a second time, and he told me the story at Gerry Reilly’s house. Gerry Reilly is a long•
time lawyer-he was on the D.C. Court of Appeals. He was a judge on that court here. He was a
rather conservative ?ew Deal fellow. A good friend. I was over visiting him while he was sick
one day, 1 was ove r visiting him and in walks “Wheeler, and he said – I don’t know how it came
up, but Ed Wheeler just uncorked this story. Before I wrote that I called him again and said this
is what I’m writing and he said it’s absolutely right.
Mr: Peck: One of the other tbio.gs that you recalled was Frankfurter’s role in
tlieF/ax cdse. Ken Pritchard called you after he saw – ?
Mr. Rauh: He didn’t call me. He came to the house and he (chuckle), Ed was
300 pounds, and this is a sight you can hardly believe. He was climbing the hill to our house and
the steps and out of breath He slumped down in a chair and didn’t say anything. He just handed
it to me as he slumped down in the chair. Actually, he came unannounced about 7:00 or 8:00 in
the evening.
M r. Peck: And you both foresaw tbis as the end of the Justice’s role on the
Mr. Rauh: Yes. The fact that he would lose the leadership of the Court and 1
believe it did.
Mr. Peck And you were urged to try and talk to the Justice and could not find
a way that you could appropriately do that?
Mr. Rauh: (Chuckle) Well, I mean, before the evening was up we were
laughing at our own inability to cope with the problem ] said to Bruce, “Can I tell the Justice he
showed me the, be showed me the opinion and the dissent?” And he said, “Oh, no. Oh, no, no,
no, Oaugher) you can’t bring me into it.” Well, it was impossible. I couldn’t – I wouldn’t think of
-3 8-
it without being able to be telling the Justice the truth or bow I happened to know it. In those
days, too, there was much more secrecy around the Court than there is today. With four law
clerks, things do leak out that shouldn’t.
I told you the story of the leak on the McGovern case when we brought suit to
keep the California delegates, and all day long that place leaked like a sieve. It shows you that
when you get excited and you’re intense, you don’t truDk as clearly because I never thought,
maybe I was doing s?miething unethical in letting the young people who were helping me tell me
the story, I mean, I didn’t initiate it, but maybe I should have said, “No, this is confidential __ ,” and maybe I sho?d – except I never thought of it. It was only years later _that I ever
thought the whole thing might have been a problem The place had started to be an ordinary
leaking (chuckJe) place ! but it wasn’t that way back in 1936. There were a lot of cases there that
involved tremendous sums of money – the Gold Clause case, the other bond cases.
Nobodywould have ever done anything that would have caused – the stock market might have
be_en affected by a leak there, so nobody ever thought of leaking_. I was quite shocked at myself
when I sobered up after that McGovern case and realized that now the place does leak but what is
the option – what is the responsibility of a lawyer who is in charge of a big case that may affect
who is President of the United States, and he has some young associates in the case and they,
because they’re really just offthe Court or somewhere, they can get information they shouldn’t
have? You may not believe this, b’:1-t I swear I didn’t think of that until the thing was all over.
Mr. Peck: I bet you bad some moments there –
Mr. Rauh: Yeah, the heat of the moment there was just – the temperature was
too high and we worked right through for about 48 to 72 hours. We had a wonderful group of
young men then. Many of them are academics now. We couldn’t have had a brighter group. I
mean, they canied me, it wasn’t the other way around. But, this did occur.
Mr. Peck: Well, in looking through the records, the first time I found an
association between you and the D.C. Circuit, was in Colorado Radio Corpi:Jration·v. FCC,
which you were on the brief with the FCC there.
Mr. Rauh: Oh, really? Well, it’s when I was Deputy General Counsel?
Mr. Peck: I knew that you were involved in the antitrust work then that led to
the breakup of the red and blue network.
Mr. Rauh: Yes, we were in that, but I left shortly afterward so that l wasn’t in
the litigation on that when NBC tried to upset it. I guess it was NBC that tried to· upset it. They
didn’t want to give up their blue network. I do remember working very hard on the report. You
know the funny story about the report? We had the report all ready to go, and it has some pretty
radical ____ . Taking away one network from _____ was not a little game there.
That’s a pretty big thing we were doing. There were soltle””other g6oo things in it. That was a
good report. 1t was a New Deal type of report where the kids – younger people, lawyers, and
mostly lawyers – got their way. Larry _____ . of course was a lawyer, he was older, maybe
10 years older than I was, but he went all for it. He loved it. He used to say, “Thank goodness
we’re doing sometbmg to improve this.” He was so happy with the report. Nathan David was his
assist3Dt. I think Nate died. Well, I don’t know for sure. He’d be about 80 if he’s alive. Anyway,
it leaked out – the report leaked out and the Louisville Courier Journal, station WHAS, was one
· of those 50,000 watt stations – clear channel stations – and we were ready to screw up the clear
channel stations as well as everything else. A clear channel meant that a lot of people didn’t get
any servtce. Clear channel stations could charge more, so this fellow, he and the family that
owned the Louisvill? Courier Journal that just had all .the trouble where they had to sell their
whole holdings because there was a family fight.
Mr. Peck: I don’t recall the name.
Mr. Rauh: Barry Bingham was the editor in chief – the man I’m thinkine of
was the chairman, but I mean the two of them together ran it. Tbis man getting the leak of what
we were doing to the clear channel stations, and I think they were Columbia, not NBC, but I’m
not sure, and be immediately asked for a date with the President. He hurried to Washington. The
President calls Larry and says, ‘1 want you to hold up the report, I’d like to see a copy – and tell
him this guy’s in there.” Roosevelt’s a cagey guy and Larry, thinking i;;o fast says, “Oh, gee, I’m
tembly sorry, Mr. President, it’s been released.” It was released about 10 minutes later (chuckle)
because we had the copies all ready to go and everything was ready but it hadn’t been released.
So that’s how that thing got out. And I believe Larry’s story. He got the Presidential phone call.
Larry was a guy who would take on anybody ifhe wanted to. He was absolutely great. He went
up and had a secret hearing before the House Judiciary Committee opposing Roosevelt’s __ _
I was the only guy in the room who wasn’t on the Committee or its staff.
Mr. Peck: Well, other government service: You were in the Office of
Emergency Manageme?t which is usually described as an office to prepare industry for the war
Mr. Rauh: That’s right. It was the holding company of all the agencies• that
were preparing for the war effort. One was successively the National Defense Advisory Council,
Office of Production Management and the War Production Board. Then there was Lend/Lease,
Economic Warlare, but this was the coordinating body. Wayne Coy was the head of the Office
of Emergency Management. He couldn’t direct the people who ran these different agencies, but
he could try to see that the thing was smooth and that it was going well On occasion, he would
be the one called in by Roosevelt. When Roosevelt went to the Atlantic Charter meeting off in
Canada, he put Wayne in charge of getting things to Russia. The Russians were complaining,
were coming forward to Oscar Cox, who was quite a remarkable, bright guy, was the General
Counsel of both the Office for Emergency Management and Lend/Lease. I was the Deputy
General Counsel of both of those. We had our offices in Lend/Lease because that’s where we
spent most of our time. Wayne would call all the time with different instructions. Some of the
other people who didn’t have full siaffs used us as their lawyers. There waS a guy named Budd,
head of Budd Wheel The first day I’m there as the Deputy General Counsel, Oscar comes in and
says, “I’ve got to go to a meeting here. Will you go upstairs and see what Mr. Budd wants and try
to be helpful to him because that would be another client we have.” In other words, we are
building our turf, so I go up in April of ’40, I guess, and he says, ”Young man, is it all right if I
gave the government car to the Open Games?” That’s how serious the war effort was in April of
Mr. Peck: Somewhere I read of a little experience you had with Lee
Pressman, the General Counsel from CIO, where he had opposed a plan to allow the taking for
the war effort of machines not in production with giving just compensation. Pressman said it
was an imperialistic war, and be would support such a plan. Is that accurate?
Mr. Rauh: Here’s what happened: Oscar [Cox] cmne in one morning and said,
“The President wants a bill that will allow the seizure of private airplanes, machine too]s that
would fit into our production, and things like that.” I think that it had been sparked by a private
plane owned by a man named Guggenheim out in the West somewhere, and the Army wanted to
buy it right away or the Air Force – well, there wasn’t any separate Air Force, it was the Army -and
they wanted it for Britain’s reconnaissance. So, Oscar says we will get the CIO and the AFL
and the other big organizations you think that we might need and do it fast. So, I called the AFL.
That was easy. Anything the President wants, you know, with the war, they were okay. So I
called Pressman. I never should have done that. I should have gone through some other way. I
knew him and you think of people you know, and you never think, at least I didn’t, that there are
hidden motivations. So I called him and I said the President wants to do this but we want to be
sure it’s okay with Labor. I said, “Can we put the CIO down as favoring the p]an, provided, of
course, we make compensation. We must do it and we must do it fast.” And then, much to my
surprise, he said, I think quite exactly what you just quoted, that they would oppose the bill, that
this w?s_ an imperialist war and he didn’t – they woul dn’t take sides in the war – and it was quite
ugly. I saw no reason to let him know how deeply I felt. It was what later came out as
Communist spies. He was then a member of the party. And that came out later. Of course I
didn’t know it, although I heard reports, but I guess my civil hberties side was up. So anyway, I
shouldn’t have done that. I should have gone a different route to the CIO than I did, but you
know, sometimes you don’t think of the important things. Anyway, I think we dreamed up a way
of getting around him, and the bill d.id pass very shortly, and it was very valuable. I mean there
were people who didn’t want to be inconvenienced, but if they got an order they didn’t want to
fight it either. So it did work out fine.
Mr. Rauh: I guess it was the first time I had personally experienced what was
pretty close to treason. No, that’s not the right word. The right word is subversive because
treason has a precise meaning. Tiris was not that, but this was some very ____ . Just
because the Russians and the Germans were then in a mutual pact, to go against the democracy
and England as against the interests of the Russian Nazi pact. It was the first – well, it had a real –
effect on you. You couldn’t help it, but then it developed over the years and there were some
such feelings around. I would say that probably if a pressman was saying that to me during the
Nazi-Soviet Pact, that’s probably the high-water mark of Corrununist influence in this country.
That’s 10 years before Joe McCarthy. By the time Joe comes, the thing is gone. They’ve lost the
battle, but they were not insignificant in 1940.
Mr. Peck
Mr. Rauh:
September 1st of ’45.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Well, in 1942 you joined the Army and served about 3 years?
Yes, I joined in, I think, March of ’42, and I got discharged on
And were you immediately assigned to MacArthur’s staff?
Yes and no. I mean, yes, in substance. But, it’s a question of what
you could call MacArthur’s staff. I was – went through Australia and that’s where the
headquarters was, but there were layers of headquarters. I was not at that time in what would be
the top headquarters because, I don’t know if you’ve ever been in the Army, but functions get
moved around. People follow the functions and sometimes we were in the general headquarters
staff because the function that we were working on was there. Sometimes we were in the first
headquarter staff below it and I guess it’s not unfair to say it was all MacArthur’s staff. But in the
later period there wasn’t any question that it was MacArthur’s staff. In the earlier period you
could say well, it was a subsidiary staff and the function there was trying to make Lend/Lease
work for the Anny, so we didn’t have to ship everything from San Francisco but could ship from
· Australia which was a Jot closer. It was a rather civilianesque job. We really didn’t get into the
real military job until we went into the Philippines and I was one of the heads of the civil affairs
section. That was more real military service.
Mr. Peck: Well? during that period were you sort of the unofficial mayor of
Mr.Rauh: What happened was that we came in with the Japanese troops who
were being ousted from Manila. There was.no food. We had to get it off the ships ’cause there
was ____ . I’m not an idiot. After all, you capture the territory around there, but there’s food
there. J mean, fanners know how to find food when peop1e are sitting hens. So we had
requisitioned plenty of ships of rice. We had requisitioned a Jot of rice. We didn’t get it all. We
got someqiing that was called cracked com, which was not only in?dible as cracked com, but had
bugs in it. We had some rice and 8? we ha? to devise a sy?tem for distn’buting it and not Jetting
people starve there. So, we fought our way out of the beaches to try to get the stuff unloaded.
We were fighting, not with the Japanese, but with our own Army. We got somewhere, but one
day when we were really in pretty bad shape somebody told me, “Look, why don’t you go to the
Quartennaster? Ins.tead of having 90-days supp1y, which is always what you’re supposed to have,
he1l be embarrassed into giving you some flour.” So I said, ”All right.” So, I went over there, J
gues s l was a Lieutenant Colone] by then, or Major, no, I kind of think l was a Lieutenant
Colonel I went over there to see the guys with stars all over them and I explained that we could
use – it was to be the equivalent of a pound for a million people – it was a million pounds we
could use. l don’t how many tons that it was – 500 tons? Five hundred tons of flour and that I
hoped he would provide it. He said, “Yes,” because apparently he knew he was a little
____ with all μiat extra stuff So he said, “Okay, have your trucks drive up in the morning
and we’ll give you the million tons.” “Who’s going to sign for this?” So I figw-e, oh, if I have to
go to jail, people are going to start eating, so I said, “I’ll sign for it.” So somewhere there’s a
note by me to the Quartermaster in Manila for 500 tons of flour and it’s signed JOSEPH L.
RAUH, JR., something-Assistant Director or sometbmg- Civil Affairs Section, General
Headquarters, Manila. Anyway, there was more bread the next day than, I mean that’s a lot of
flour and you think of what a pound for every person there and a lot of times their kids and their
people don’t get any, so this was really a lifesaver there. Then our job was to rum the
government over to _____ _ I trave]ed around the Philippines getting local cities going,
and that was a good job. There you were close to the Japanese lives. That was a job where you
felt you were in the military.
Mr. Peck:
some liberated islands?
Mr. Rauh:
Well, I also read that you helped establish military governments on
Yes. I was in most of the islands in Sabou where Magellan’s
Straits are – where you go through there- and that’s where Mage11an’s tomb is, right outside the
Sabou. We lmow which was the borne of some of the best guerrillas, and we did link up
with the guerrillas. They had things rather screwed up at times. The Civil Affairs Section was in
the same unit really with the guys dealing with the guerrillas, and with the propaganda section,
whatever that was called. We worked awful hard. It must have been eveDUlg and we’d worked
all day and everybody else was gone but I was still there and I answered the phone. It was
General Sutherland who was Chief of Staff and he said, “Who is this?” and I identified myself. I
should have done it first, I mean that was the wrong Anny etiquette. You answer the phone with
your name, but I didn’t I was a wiley soldier. He said, “This is General Sutherland.” Oh, God,
then I was scared to death. I was scared of Japanese bombs, but I was really scared of Genera]
Sutherland ’cause be was the toughest guy that ever lived. So be said, “Who prepared the leaflet
that was dropped this afternoon over the Japanese lines?” Well, I didn’t even know there was a
leaflet ’cause while we were right in the same section, we were not the same people who were
doing these things. So I said, “I don’t know, Sir. I’ll inquire and call you back.” He said, “I want
to know right away and I want a new leaflet dropped immediately!” And I said, “What will it
be?” He said, “The way that leaflet reads was WE HA VE RETIJRNED. The leaflet I want is I
HAVE RETIJRNED, signed by General MacArthur.” I said, “Yes sir. It will be done right
away.” I found the guy who was in the other unit and I got him out of bed and then he got
something out. I don’t know. But at least we-were in the ball game there. As one who had been
so much for getting in. the war, l felt I just bad to do something. I mean, you couldn’t have helped
your country get into war and then, get prepared – we were well prepared – so I salved my
Mr. Peck: You said to one interviewer that when you were given this
assignment to help establish military governments, you had no idea how military governments
were set up and the only reference you really had was John Hersey’s novel?
Mr. Rauh: When that came up was when you’re goin.g to have a major
invasion you have a thing called a battle planner. And the battle plan is really – it says staning at
such a time you do so much and then they have appendices. There is an appendix on which
division is going where. An appendix on supply. An appendix on where the Bll])ons are to be
made and how they are to be made. And then an appendix on civil affairs. It was one of many
appendices. Well, one of my first jobs when I was assigned to the civil affairs, taken away from
the other duties on the supply side, was in the appendix on the ba ttle plan under the Philippines.
It’s all in code too. I mean it’s very carefully done because we were going to ]and in ___ , and
any Jap could have figured out it was ___ , but they use some funny ways. When I got there
I was studying up on the thing and a friend of mine, Ray Kramer, who was also on the supply
side, big business man from.New York, came back from the United States. He had been over
berC doing something for the General and he heard that I was assigned to civil affairs side and he
came and he said, “Oh, God, am l glad they finally got some sense in there.” I said, “Yeah, but
what do I do? This is Something,” I said, “they got all these danm colonels and generals over in
Charlottesville,” that’s where they were training civil affairs people, but MacArthur would have
none of that. So I said, “They wouldn’t even let me ask for the documents that they used over
there to teach these guys with.” They would have nothing t6 do with it. See, in MacArthur’s
headquarters there aren’t any Pentagon. So, at any rate, Ray Kramer says, “Well, here he is.”
And he goes into his room, bis office and comes back with John Hersey’s book. He says, “You
read that and it will help you.” And I said, “Well, thank you.” I started to read that night and I
read for twenty-four hours. I read the whole book- every word ofit. Wonderful. It taught you
things you never would have thought of. Would you have thought of traffic control on roads
where you wouldn’t ·have thought any traffic could drive? Boy, that was the most important
thing. All the refuge es were stopping our tanks from getting anywhere. Well, I’ve seen Her sey
since. I told him that Hersey was the civil affairs God of MacArthur’s headquarters but it’s a
wonderfu1 book anywhere. Have you ever read it?
Mr. Peck: Yes, I have.
Mr. Rauh: It’s a great book but it’s so thoughtful – without meaning to be –
when it told all about the roads out of Rome being clogged. Strangely enough, one of the first
assignments we had was to change the drive frolll; one side of the road to the other side. One
Saturday night, we had orders_ a week before that, on Saturday night at 12:00 they were going to
change over from one side to the other and that was assigned to us. Of course we couldn’t carry
it out. See, you’ve got Anny units to paste up things and it worked rather well – a few accidents,
but they probably would have been accidents anyway. Like that story by Hersey is absolutely
true and we had a good laugh together.
Mr. Peck: You received the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Service
Star for your service, and then you came back to the United States.
Mr. Rauh: I would like to cell you the first battle I had with the John Birch
Society. When you mentioned the Legion of Merit, the General in charge of civil affairs, when I
was coming ho?, wrote a lov.el)’. write-up for the – what’s the meda1 call?, it’s the top meda1,
not the Congressional one. It was a higher medal and to get that you had to have dearance from
Washington. General MacArthur’s secretary was a John Bircher. He re-wrote it into a Legion of
Merit and didn’t send it to Wasl:rington. Bunker was his name, something Bunker. He went
back, and I didn’t know he was a John Bircher, and I read the New York Times one day,
LAWRENCE BUNKER, former secretary to General MacArthur, today said/or the Boston John
Birch Society … some terrible thing, and so I bad a good laugh over the fact. I bad been told that
I was going to get this higher thing and I’d been told when I didn’t everybody told me it was
Bunker who had done it. I never realized that it. But anyway, the President oftlie Philippines
kissed me on both cheeks and gave me that Filipino medal. That was the highest one over there
so I feel all right. (Laughter)
Mr. Peck: So then you came back to the United States and you became
General Deputy Housing Expediter?
Mr. Rauh: Well, I practiced for a few months before I did that. The practice
was rather desultory. I had one client which was the Polish Supply Mission. This was when we
were still trying to keep some influence with Poland and the job was to get a loan from the
Export/Import Bank for railroad tracks and Cars, coal cars especially in PolaD.d, and that was used
against me when I was such an anti-McCarthy type. But then soon we were Over with the
Housing Agency.
Mr. Peck: Tiris was to help veterans returning find housing?
Mr. Rauh: Yes, there was a thing called the Veterans Emergency Housing
Program. The head of that was Wilson Wyatt, who was the former Mayor of Louisville. It had
had housing programs and he was a great guy, but the job was hopeless. As the war ended,
people were just so angry over having all of these regulations, you know, price control We had
the right to order nails, order steel mills to make nails, to make everything. We still had a wartime
economy in housing. Well it soon became this island of regulations in a sea of decontrol.
We tried to make one last stab at building houses. We wrote a letter to the President from
Wilson. He was the Director and I was the Deputy Director of the Veterans Emergency Housing
Program We wrote this letter to the President, and said it just wouldn’t work unless the
government was willing through the RFC to put up 100 percent – take a 100 percent risk.
Nobody was willing to take a risk in a situation where you couldn’t control anything. You
couldn’t get nails from this guy and you couldn’t get … Well, that’s the picture up there of all the
things we, on the left there at the top, that’s Wilson’s picture. It’s got all of the things we needed
– it’s got nails, boards – that’s when we got fired. At any rate, some __ , I think I know who it
was but it’s not important, leaked the thing and then a few hours later we got a letter. Well, it
was printed in the Wall Street Journal, and a few hours later Wilson got a letter from Truman
saying, “I don’t like reading my mail in the Wall Street Journal.” And pretty soon he resigned. I
was so involved with him it was just ridiculous to even attempt to stay, so I left too. Interestingly
enough, the man who fired us was Clark Clifford wbo my son now represents. (Laughter)
Mr. Peck: Well, you were admitted to the D.C. Bar in 1946 and I take it was –
_ the reason it was so late in your legal career for admission to the Bar was that government
attorneys did not have to be a member?
Mr. Rauh: That’s right. When you were a government attorney, you did not
have to be a member of a particular bar, but then, of course, came the war, So that was why it
wasn’t lllltil then that I had to be admitted to the Bar. But then it wasn’t any work really because
it came on reciprocity.
Mr. Rauh:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
January 23, 1992
I wanted to mention one thing to you which was where I used
expressive language, curse words and so forth I take it that you are going over this and you’ll
take that stuff out. You can put in your own adjective or you put in expletive deleted, whatever
you like.
Mr. Peck: We may do that famous little phrase there. When we do the
transcript. you will have a chance to see it.
Mr. Rauh: I know, but won’t you be going over it beforehand?
Mr. Peck: · I will, I will.
Mr. Rauh: You fee] free. I mean, we’re so close to each other. Use what you
think. Just go ahead and fix it. We were talking about 1952. Also what made me think of it is if
there is repetition – I do repeat myself. Not only that, but there could be repetition that was
What really happened in 1952? You have to go back to 1951. The question was
whether Truman would run again. He could have under the Constitution. He hadn’t served more
than one full tenn He could have run in ’52, but he decided not to.
In ’51, strangely enough, the front-runner was a wholly different Illinoisan, Paul
Douglas. Paul Douglas was the first of the Democrats to talk about waste. He became quite a
top figure. In a poll sometime in early or mid-’51 of Democratic county chairmen, he won.
However, those numbers went down, and [Adlai} Stevenson became the obvious from-runner.
I remember in 1952 going to see Stevenson with Jim Loeb who had been in the
ADA, but at this time was working for Charlie MUiphy in the White House. Jim and I went
down to see Stevenson. We spent the day with him in Springfield at the Governor’s mansion.. He
was without any doubt the most charismatic guy that ever lived. He snowed us. A lot of the
things he said were not what we wanted to bear, but he said them in such a way that you could
hardly take issue. He got.me when he read me part of his veto message on the so.called Broyles
Bill which was a real Joe McCarthy•type peifonnance. Stevenson had gotten it out of the
legislature of Illinois. Stevenson vetoed it. We were just devout fans of Stevenson. He was,
however, a much better politician than the rest of them He said, “I won’t be able to beat
Eisenhower.” We said, “It’s going to be Taft.” This is early ’52, and we were so smart. We said,
“Of course, it’s very hard to beat Eisenhower, you can beat Taft.” We also thought he could beat
.Eisenhower, but that wasn’t the simplest task when you had a war hero that way. At any rate, he
began to show that he was; worried about running against Eisei;thower, and he kept saying that he
wasn’t going to run. Hamlet is the best word to use for it. He couldn’t make up his mind. He
wasn’t going to be equivocal like Shennan, but he got awful close to it a few times.
A lot of people went for Harriman – a lot of hberals went for Harriman – not
because they weren’t for Stevenson but because, of the others, we thought Harriman was the best,
the others were primarily Kefauver. [NY Governor] Herbert Lehman called me in April, I think,
of ’52 and said that he and President Truman and a number of others were going to support
Averill Harriman. They had decided that I was to be his campaign manager in the District- of
Colwnbia. Well, that wasn’t so strange. I had done an awful lot work in the party. I wasn’t a
ridiculous choice for being wo hberal in this city. I probably would have been too liberaJ in
many p]aces, but here I obviously wasn’t. There wasn’t any niche here for Averill except on the
far left because Kefauv.er was a hberal guy and they had a draft Stevenson crowd in there. I said
to Governor Lehman, “You are a hero of mine, and I would like to do anytbjng that you suggest,
but I would like to speak to Mr. Harriman because there is no way to do – there is no route to this
thing – except through civil rights and we got to go pretty far.” He said, “Go ahead.” I went out
and taJked to Averill, and I don’t think he knew what I was talking about. At that particular
moment in bis life, he hadn’t been in national political affairs. He said, •?es.” So, we wrote a
civil rights plank that was pretty damn far out. It was school integration. I_t w?. everything you
would have wanted if you bad been old enough So we ran in the District of Columbia, and we
won. We beat Kefauver, four to one.
There was a wonderfu] crack in this thing. The votes were counted at City Hall
down there at the D.C. Building, 14th & Pennsylvania. They were counting the votes, and Al
Friendly was one of the count?rs. He “‘.’as the editor of The Washington Post. He crone up to me
and said, ”What are you looking worried about?” I said, “I’m not worried; it’s going all right.”
He said, “Going all right; you just carried so.me black precinct 331 to 3.” He said, “It’s just a case
of Harriman and his brown brother.” Then we stayed with Harriman. The District delegation
went to the convention for Harriman. It soon was cJear that Harriman couldn’t go over the top:
that Kefauver couldn’t go over the top. Then Truman anived and told Harriman to withdraw. He
couldn’t tell Kefauver to withdraw beca1:1se they were aimed B;t Kefauver. Kefauver had beat
_ Truman in New Hampshire and was the enemy. So the President t(!ld Harriman to get out and
the thing went to Steve?son in a walk after that.
Mr. Peck: Before you got to the campaign, there was an issue of loyalty oaths
and the platform
Mr. Rauh: That is absolutely correct. My role in the thing has been written up
in a book by John Frederick Martin. I think he is the son of the Stevenson biographer. What
happened was that the hberals were awfully sore because what had happened in ’48 was that
(Senator Strom] Thurmond and the Goveri:ior of Mississippi and a number of others bad
participated in the Democratic Convention [and then ran against the party’s ticket]. They had
fought us – that was a great fight – on the minority plank on civil rights. They came to this
Convention [ even though] they had started a third party for the purposes of the ’48 election. They
had carried four states where they didn’t have Truman’s name on the ballot under the Democratic
label. We proposed what may be misnamed as a loyalty oath, but what its real purpose was to
say if you are going to participate in a convention, you can’t go out and lick the nominee or, at
least, there was a little fallback position there too – at least, you can’t keep the nominee off the
ballot. We finally just fought for the right to have our guy on the ballot, ’cause you would win.
In those days, if you were on the ballot under the Democratic label, you would carry the South.
You really didn’t need to make it a loyalty oath. It was really a ballot oath. That’s what we
fought for there. lt was fmally compromised and ultimately the rule – I think the role today still
stands the way it came out there. If you participate, you are agreeing to see that the nominee is
on the ballot, or if you are a member of the Democratic National Conunittee, you are agreeing to
support the candidate. I think something like that is the rule today. That was what came out of
that battle. The battle in ’52 was precipitated by Thurmond’s party in which he kept Truman off
the ballot under the symbol and maybe in some places he was totally off. Southerners were
educated to vote for the rooster, whatever (I think it was a rooster not a mule in those days) – so
that was the battle in ’52. By ’56 it was all cleared up. I think that now nobody would try what
Thurmond did there.
Again, Stevenson took (Alabama Senator John] Sparkman as his person, and that
was bad. Sparkman was probably the best of the Southerners. He was not a racist. He was
political, anti-black as to· politics, but he was not a racist. He was very fine guy if you could be
anti-black and be a fine guy. That’s a good question one has to consider. If there is some way
you could avoid considering that, he was a first-class guy. On the civil rights plank in ’52, we got
most of everything we wanted, but not everything. We did, however, get a provision in there
against the fihlmster. There is a provision in there about majority rule in Congress, not that
anyone paid any attention to it. But we did go into the convention demanding majority rule
against the filibuster and we got it. That’s sort of a hidden secret of history. The Democratic
pai-ty pledged the end of the fihOuster in 1952, and it succeeded in having it used ever since.
Mr. Peck: Before I brought you back to the loyalty oath issue, we were going
to talk a little bit about the campaign.
Mr. Rauh: The campaign was really difficult. Stevenson obviously was
worried about Truman. As you look back, there wasn’t very much squalid in the Administration
– there wasn’t too much comiption. There was some. Stevenson once in arriving in Washington
referred to “the mess in Washing ton.” Oh, the White House was so mad. It was not a
particularly good campaign, except Stevenson was perfect. He would go to the American
Legion and tell off Joe McCarthy. People like us and my wife and our friends, we were just in
seventh heaven with this candidate. It didn’t go against Ike- with jokes on Ike’s train- “we just
passed the thirty-eighth platitude” and things like that, but platitude or not, he had what it took as
a war hero and he won rather big. Stevenson always had felt that. If he had had bis way, he
wouldn’t have run. He was really pressured into running. He wanted to be President, but he
doubted that anyone could be President against Eisenhower. Whether he would have won in ’60
ifbe hadn’t run in 1952 and 1956, one will never know.
Mr. Peck: I noticed in 1952 you also had a case in D.C. Circuit Kutcher v.
Gray [199 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1952)].
Mr. Rauh: Kutcher v. Gray was a beautiful case for which I have the original
the Herblock cartoon. That is about the Kutcher case. I’ll explain it as we go along. So sad.
What happened there was Kutcher had his legs amputated at Anzio. He was an admitted member
of the Socialist Workers party which was on the Attorney General’s list and was probably more
radical than the Conmunist party was at that time. But the country was in the battle. He fought
all the way up with his troops, lost his two legs at Anzio, came home, recuperated and they gave
him a job in the Veteran’s Administration as a file clerk. Kutcher was a man wholly without –
he’s dead now, but he was a man wholly without education, knowledge or anything. He was a
legless veteran. He was the Socialist Workers party’s best drawing card. He’d come into the
meeting with two canes, stumble up and say a few sentences that he had memorized. He was a
manipulated guy but as a danger, there was a joke in there. But he was an admitted member of
the Socialist Workers party. So we lost it in the district court before some right-wing judge.
Curran-Judge.Eddie Curran. He had been the, I think, the U.S. Attorney. He was a very rightwing
guy. He said, ”It says here you can’t belong to the Socialist Workers party.” You’d·have to
read the court of appeals decision because the Jaw was against us. It was so outrageous because
they just weren’t going to let this guy be fired, They sent it back. I don’t know how it happened;
they had another hearing and then they sent it back a second time. I believe it was the second
time. I am actually not. sure. Each time Curran would rule against us, and the court of appeals
would rule for us. After I guess it was the second ruling, I went with my order to Curran to have
Kutcher reinstated with back pay. The government comes in with an order not to reinstate him
Curran, after listening to me for a couple minutes and the government for a couple of minutes, I
guess it was in his chambers, says, “111 sign the government’s order.” I said, “Your Honor, you
are going to be reversed.” He said, “Well, I have been reversed before,” and I said, “Not for the
second time.” That came pretty close to being contemptuous. But I was contemptuous. If you
want to know the honest truth, be kept fighting the court of appeals on this.
I admit it was a bard case, because this guy is an admitted member of the Socialist
Workers party. On the other hand, it was so ridicuJous a case – it was the kind of case where
they had to find some way out. Tuey found a couple of ways out procedurally. They were trying
to let him keep his job. They just thought it was such an outrageous thing. Anyway, he goes
back to work at the Veterans Administration in Newark, and North Korea invades South Korea
Tue Socialist Workers party for some reason, I don’t know why, because they hated the Stalinists.
The Socialist Workers party had Kutcher issue a written statement that North Korea was
absolutely right. That’s where the eggs really hit the fan. I won the case to get him his job back.
He gets a letter saying your disability pension has been stopped because of what you did – what
you said about -here we’re fighting – the U.S. is fighting in South Korea and you are saying that
North Korea is right. Naturally,] demanded a hearing. We go to the hearing over there at the
Veterans Administration at 15th and Vermont. Every television camera in the city is there. I
walk in with this guy, it takes you about 10 minutes to go a block and we would go, get in, and
sit down and a guy comes in who is the hearing examiner. I figured, I’ve gotta blow this thing up
some way or another. I can’t figure exactly how to do it bllt I was saying to myself, ”There must
be some way.” This is so absurd to take away this guy’s disability payment for losing his legs
fighting because he says that North Korea is right.” I looked at the guy and he starts the hearing
and he asks for Kutcher’s name and my name. Do you James Kutcher take this man as your
lawyer? He wanted to make sure I was his lawyer and not some violent guy with a bomb. I
suddenly realized, “I got it.” When he said Mr. Rauh, he recognized me, I said I have a question.
May I hav? a copy of the rules for this hearing? I knew that there had never been a hearing like
this an_d there were no dam rules. I saidi “May I have a copy of the rules?” He said, “What
rules?” I said, ”The rules of this hearing. What are we proceeding unde??” And he said, “I’ll
make the rules as we go along.” I said:, ‘Well you can’t do that. I’ve got to know now bow this
thing happe–ns. I’ve got to go see the Administrator of Veierans Affairs. I can’t possibly allow
this. It’s bad_ enough that you are doing all this stuff” I said, ”This is a kangaroo court.”
It was so easy. It was like talcing candy from a baby. All the reporters are just
laughing at this guy. So he says, ‘We will have five minute recess.” ‘That’s all right with me.”
He goes back and has to talk to the higher ups. He comes back, I can’t remember what he said,
but it was something to the effect, “If there is anything you object to, I’ll take it up to a higher
authority.” He came back – there weren’t any rules. Herb [Herblock] hears about this, and does a
wonderful cartoon: “I’ll make the rules as we go along.” Anyway, they ducked out of it as fast as
they could, reinstated the disability thing. The court of appeals, at this stage is a divided body
and everything depends on the panel you get. We got a good pane} is my r-ecollection, although I
couldn’t remember exactly who we got. Do you remember who we had? [Wilbur K. Miller, E.
Barrett Prettyman, and James M. Proctor, who wrote the opinion.]
Mr. Peck: No, I don’t. I didn’t jot that down.
Mr. Rauh: It was a good a panel, and we won. It was justice done. There is a
full book on the Kutcher case, if it’s of any interest.
Mr. Peck: For purposes of the tape, let me just state that the Herblock cartoon
depicts Alice in Wonderland with the quotation, “I’ll make the rules as we go along” attnl>uted to
the Chainnan of the VA Pension Committee HearinJ? in the Kutcher lovaltv case. It has. I 1rness.
it’s the queen saying, “Gad, I wished I’d said that.”
That was also the period in which the Senate Internal Security Connnittee was
do’lllg its .investigations. I know that you’ve said .in the past that although Arnold, Fortas &
Porter’s corporate work was something that you criticized, that they were cashing in somewhat on
their New Deal experience. Still you said they did wonderful work in the loyalty cases.
Mr. Rauh: Arnold, Fortas & Porter were simply superb. Paul Porter was the
superb-est, and Abe (Fortas] was very good. They were wonderful on loyalty stuff. They
represented Dorothy Bailey. This case, I believe, went to the court of appeals. I know it did.
What happened was that sometime about 1949, the Loyalty Review Board bad two cases before
it. One was William Remington who was my client. The other Was Dorothy Bailey who was
Arnold, Fortas & Porte(s client. Toe charge against her was that she was a member of the
Communist party. I have never known if it was true. I was busy with Remington, and I didn’t
follow that very closely. They held her disloyal. Tuey held Remington loyal. Toe same day,
they balaoced them So naturally there was joy in our office, and there was sadness there. It had
nothing to do with them; they put everything into the case. We didn’t have to go to court because
we’d won. Our cases in court came up through an indictment in New York which never got to
the court of appeals here. It got to the court of appeals in New York. Theirs went to court, and
the court of appeals ruled against them If my memory serves me, the Supreme Court denied
cert. They handled a lot of cases for people and usually they were able to do it for nothing. Their
other clients were in effect paying for it. That was fme. I have only the highest regard for their
performance in the field of civil hberties during this period.
What Porter and Fortas and Thurman Am.old wanted was a decision that you
couldn’t use secret informers. That comes many years later. They did make clear that they didn’t
think Congress intended the use of informers. I don’t know what Congress intended or not.
Anyway it was really stopped to a large degree. Unfortunately, Arnold, Fortas & Porter didn’t
have a chance when the Supreme Court finally acted. There were two cases. One was mine and
one was a fellow named Carl Bereuffy whose case was actually the one that they wrote the
opinion in.
Mr. Peck: Since you mentioned him, William Remington had been a
Commerce Department official. One of the things he had been accused of was conveying secrets
to a Soviet agent during the war. He had been the subject of both a House Un•American
Activities Committee investigation and a grand jury.
Mr. Rauh: The details on that are this. Though I think at the time that it came
out, he was at the Commerce Department. He had been at the War Production Board and other
agencies. He was a very brilliant young man. This history is too long to go through the Whole
thing. Let me summarize it. Miss Elizabeth Bentley, the spy queen, was not what you’d call
Mata Hari. She did testify before both the Senate Investigating Committee and the House Un-
American Activities CollDDittee that Bill had given her secret infonnation. She called him a
Communist on “Meet the Press.” We brought a hbel suit which NBC settled with us for a fair
amount of money. They kept on after him, and the loyalty program opened up on him, and the
lower board found him guilty and ordered his discharge. That’s when he came to see me. I was
not in during the hearing stage or the 1oya1ty lower board. We appealed to the higher board. We
asked them to call Miss Bentley for cross-examination. Ms. Bentley didn’t come. They didn’t
have subpoena powers. Bill testified and they ruled that he … [tape ends]
[Side A of January 23, 1992, Tape]
Mr. Peck: We had left it where this had upset a number of people.
Mr. Rauh: This clearance of Remington upset the publishing house of Devon
Adair which had a contract for a book on Miss Bentley which was ultimately published. They
wanted her cleared. I believe they got the House committee to reopen it. The main thing in the
reopened be_aring, which I think was also in ’49, was a couple of people down in the Tennessee
Valley Authority who said that Bill had been a Connnunist that sunnner down in TV A and that
made some news. Although there was nothing new on Bentley, she didn’t show up again. They
did have these two people in the Tennessee Valley. Bill, at that time, I think was 19. · He was
. there from Dartmouth, where he was a junior. They did go after Bill.- To show how tough the
Justice Department was, they indicted him in New York. Tuey indicted him for denying he had
ever been a member of the Communist party. The grand jury that indicted him was headed by
the man who had the contract to write the book about her which depended on rehabilitating her
through debilitating Remington. In addition, the lawyer for the goverm:nent before the grand jury
was a man named Donovan, I believe, who had been Miss Bentley’s lawyer. The head of the
grand jury called Mrs. Remington, the wife of Bill, before the grand jury; his name was Bnmini,
he was a high-ranking person in the church there, he ran the grand jury, he had the contract for
the book. lt was a pretty shocking story. When we ]earned of it by telephone from somebody at
Devon Adair, we tried to get the case dismissed. We were unsuccessful. The case went on and
Bill was convicted of having been a member of the Connnunist party. We went to the court of
appeals and won. The coW1 of appeals reversed and sent it back – that was the New York Court
of Appeals [for the Second Circuit]. It sent it back. We tried to get cert. to get the case
dismissed. The government, however, in what I think was an outrageous thing, dismissed the
complaint on the membership and indicted him on five counts of things he said in hls own
defense when he took the stand at the trial By this time, we knew all about the shenanigans in
front of the first grand jury, and since the second grand jury would never have been there but for
the first grand jury, Bill would never have testified, we tried to get the thing dismissed. Bill hired
a regular criminal lawyer to try the case. He got Bill off on a couple of the counts, but on three of
them the jury found him guilty. We then went to the Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit.
We had a remarkable bench Tom Swan, Gus Hand, and Learned Hand – they split two to one.
Learned Hand was so shocked by the grand jury that he said that you couldn’t possibly affirm
that. The other two didn’t want to go that far. We petitioned for cert., and now my authority is
Justice Frankfurter. There were four votes for cert. going into the conference- the Supreme
Court Conference – Frankfurter said. Himself, Jackson, Black and Douglas. During the
discussion of the case, Black said he wanted to go for cert. for the purpose of ovemtling an
earlier case, the Williams case, which he thought was wrong, and this would be the place to
straighten the law out on the problem of grand jury actions like this. Jackson lost his temper and
voted against cert., even though be told Frankfurter that he was going to vote for cert. We had
three votes for cert. and we didn’t get it; it takes four votes to get cert. I was in Frankfurter’s
chambers one time shortly afterwards, and he told me this whole story of what had happened. It
was after Remington was killed in jail. What happened there was they sent him not to a
minimum security prison, as they would all other whlte-collar criminals except A1ger Hiss. They
sent him to Lewisburg, which was a highly secure place, and two car thieves announced that they
were going to – quote – get me a commie – unquote – went in and killed Bill who was in an open
dormitory w_itb bricks in a sock which could never have happened if adequate arrangements for
Bill’s security bad been.made. After t?. I think it was after Bill bad died, Justice Frankfurter
told me the story of the cert., and then said, ‘We did everything we could, Joe, you and I, to save
this man. Yo1,1 should not feel badly.” I did not say anything, because I was sort ofoverwhehned
by the fact that he thought that Black was the wrongdoer in this thing, not Jackson, who should
not have allowed his temper to change his mind. I love Felix and I cou ldn’t bring myself to ask
that question.
Mr. Peck: Another of those issues, actually it was 1952 when you were
counseling Lillian Hellman before the House Un-American Activities Committee, and she was
not prosecuted. I think she may have been referred to you by Fortas?
Mr. Rauh: Yes, I think Abe did suggest it to her. That, too, is rather a lengthy
story. I can tell it or not as you see fit.
Mr. Peck: I think you should.
Mr. Rauh: What happened is a very fascinating legal problem and public
relations problem It is 1952, McCa rthy is at bis height, the House Un-American Activities
Committee is at its height, and she gets a subpoena from the House Un- American Activities
Committee. She crune in to see me and said she would like me to represent her. Of course, I
thought that was great. She’s a great playwright, probably the greatest lady playwright in the
history of this country. Brilliant woman, had cooperated with the Communists for many years,
but I had no idea what she actually was, but she had been in the same conferences the
Communists bad run. She made a number of st atements. First, she would be happy to tell all
about herself, her aclivities, her political affiliations, anything, Communist or otherwise, if she
was asked about herself. But, a) she wouldn’t name other people who had been in various
meetings with her, b) she didn’t want to go to jail, and c) she didn’t want to plead the Fifth
Amendment. When one trunks for a minute, those are rather inconsistent things. If you don’t
want to go to jail, the safest way not to go to jail is to plead the Fifth Amendment and the
Supreme Coun had already ruled that you could use the Fifth Amendment on Communist activity
because of the Smith Act, which makes it a crime to advocate the ovenbrow the government by
force or violence.
So, here’s this dilemma. If she tells all about herself, she waives the privilege
against self-incrimination and then can’t refuse to tall;: about others, so she is going to jail. On the
other hand, if she doesn’t tell about herself and doesn’t want to tell about the others, she has to
plead the privilege of the Fifth Amendment for herself. She says she doesn’t want to plead the
privilege. After many starts and stops, I made the following suggestion: We would write a Jetter
to the House Un-American Activities Committee saying that she is prepared to tell all about
herself but she wants them to agree not to demand answers about others because she will have
waived her privilege. We got a very negative answer to that suggestion and so we had to do
something. It had been shown that you keep the privilege for a period just before the statute of
limitations runs out. In other words, if the statute of limitations is 6 years, you could say that you
weren’t a Communist for the last 4 years, and you still save the incrimination for the later period.
We got ready for the hearing. We went in front of the hearing and they asked her if she was a
member of the Corrnnunist party. She said, ”No,” and they asked, ”were you ]ast year” and she
said, “no,” “the year before,” ”no”, “the year before”, ”no.” I think it was about this time when
she said I refer you to my letter. Dan Pollitt, who was my associate then, gave out the letter to
the press. The Committee and the counsel are having a fit because we look so good in the letter
and everything, and so they’re having a fit. Here we’re giving out the letter so the counsel for the
committee, Tavenner was his name, be read the Jetter into the record. After about an hour it was all
over. We ag reed, Lillian and I, that the test of whether we won or lost, was whether the New
York Times account of the story said, “Lillian Hellinan refuses to name names” or “Lillian
Helbnan pleads the Fifth Amendment.- ” If it reads that “Lillian Hellman pleads the Fifth
Amendment,” we lost. If it reads “Lillian Helhnan refuses on principle to name names,” we won.
It was perfect. Absolutely a perfect story. I don’t think that the Fifth Amendment is mentioned
until about the sixth paragraph in the story, We were all very happy with that result. That shows
a lawyer’s public relations abilities, as well as legal knowledge of the case, and I think it was
copied a number of times after that. At least Lillian was pleased with the outcome, and she’s
written a book called “Scoundrel Time” which relates the story of that meeting. I wou1d say I’d
give it an A+ for drama and a B+ for accurac y, but there are some mi.stakes in it.
Mr. Peck: Obviously there were lots of hopes to try and get past the
McCarthy period, to somehow take away his power. In 1954, there was the Paul Hughes incident
which, 1 guess, basically was a scam
Mr. Raub: 1t was a scam We were all taken by a confidence man. There is a
man at the Library of C?mgress writing a piece right now in which he shows that Bill Buckley’s
ugly hand was iD the whole thing. There is no question that this confidence man had fooled me,
and The Washington Post, too. I think 1 can be fooled easier than The Washing10n Post, but he
was obviously a guy of considerable ability, and he fooled us. I hate to be fooled. I wanted so
desperately to find some way to stop this thing. Luckily for the country, Joe McCarthy stopped it
himself by drinking himself to death after bis hearings, so the country was inoculated against any
future McCarthyism
Mr. Peck: You’ve called 1955 the yeax that the tide turned back toward civil
Mr. Rauh: In the end of 1954, we had to censure McCarthy. You saw an
awful Jot of it. There was an article printed in one of the magazines that I wrote about the tide
having turned. McCarthy was dead. HUAC had been weakened. Arthur Miller had told HUAC
off in ’56. They went to court but they lost. So that ’57 was sort of the dawn of a new day. May
I ask you, do you have the date of the first Kohler case up there? When does it come? Does it
come later or are we about there? Because that is a very interesting story.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
turning of that tide.
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
I think it comes a little later.
I just didn’t want to get ahead of the story.
Right. Since you mentioned Miller, I mean, this happened after the
It was at the twn.i:ng of the tide – ’56, ’57.
He first testified on June 21, 1956.
I understand it was an exciting time in this household, too.
Well, no she [Marilyn Monroe] wasn’t here then. She came in ’57
when we had the trial. Arthur just came. I guess we just spent a few hours the day before going
over it. An.bur was an easy client. You might say that Lillian Hellman required a great dea1 of
skill. Arthur Miller didn’t require any skill He said, “I’m not going to tell about anybody e1se. I
don’t mind going _to jail.” This was a perfect client. If you got him into jail, he wasn’t so angry; if
you kept him out of jail, he was very happy. He was the perfect client. I’ll tell you about the
court of appeals on that case. We were convicted in the district court.
Mr. Peck: Congress charged him with contempt by a vote of373 to 9.
Mr. Rauh: Yes, and all my friend? were calling – do 1 have to vote for Miller
and against contempt, and I _said, “No. Vote your political best thing.” We could have gotten up
to 50 or JOO votes, but what was the use. We couldn’t win.• Why put guys on the spot that are
honorable guys. I think that the 9 is not an accurate reflection of the feeling up there. I don’t
Imow what we could have gotten, but_ we could have gotten more. Guys there who were my best
friends that voted for contempt. We. did have that, and they indicted him Then he was tried. He
was convicted. His prison sentence was suspended, and his fine was not exorbitant. In a sense,
there was no day, but he didn’t want a conviction of a federal crime on the books. lt was only a
misdemeanor because that statute only calls for a misdemeanor. Why did he want that? We
went to court to reverse that. We went to the court of appeals. We desperately wanted to get a
decision on the First Amendment. I trunk both of us wanted a decision on the First Amendment
so badly we could taste it. We didn’t want a decision on some crackpot point. The court wanted
a decision on a crazy thing just to get out of ruling. The court didn’t want to say there was no
First Amendment right here, but they didn’t want to say there was either. So they said he hadn’t
been ordered to answer the question. That was sheer nonsense. He knew, I lmew, that he was
under orders to answer the question. That’s the ground on which they let us off. The First
Amendment case was so appealing. What they did, the Committee, was to ask him questions
about his plays, about his writing, about his feelings toward the Coannittee. If there ever was a
chilling of First Amendment rights, this was the petfect case. I’m dreaming of a win on the First
Amendment. Then they would have had to go to the Supreme Court. We might very well have
gotten a really staunch case. After all, in the Watkins case, Chief Justice Warren says there is a
First Amendment right here. He doesn’t say what it is, but he says it’s here. We had the petfect
First Amendment case under Watkins. You can’t get the Court to go beyond what it wanted to
say and what it wanted to say was that he hadn’t been directed to answer the question. Of course,
Arthur Miller could say, “Well, I beat the court of appeals.” He did. They directed that he be
acquitted, but it wasn’t the civil liberties thing that Arthur and I were praying for.
Mr. Peck: The district court in its original finding, that he was guilty of
contempt, relied on Watkins, which at that point was just a D.C. Circuit opinion. It was pending
at the time before the Supreme Court. So when the D.C. Circuit heard that, it was still pending.
Tuey were basically ignoring their own decision on Watkins, weren’t they?
Mr. Rauh: You have to straighten out the time factor in Watkins. The first
thing that happened was we won in Watkins two to one. Then they had a rehearing, and we Jost
in Watkins. I’m sorry, but my memory doesn’t serve me, whether Miller, tirneframe-wise – can
you straighten me out?
Mr. Peck: The Watkins decision in the Supreme Court was 1957. The D.C.
Circuit was 1958, in Miller. They already had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Mr. Rauh: They wouldn’t go for the First Amendment?
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Rauh: You know, I don’t think that’s been decided yet. What do you
think? Do you think that it has been decided? Whether the right of silence before a committee is
a First Amendment right?
Mr. Peck: I don’t think it has been decided.
Mr.Rauh: I don’t either. You have the Hollywood Ten cases and the Supreme
Court refused to go into those cases, so you have those cases. I do not know anything that
overruled them in the court of appeals, but there may be something. I haven’t kept up as much as
I should over the last few years.
Mr. Peck: I’m not aware of anything that has. Okay, so it was during the
hearings in the D.C. Circuit that Miller and his new bride stayed here. I read somewhere that you
have dined out on this story for years.
Mr. Rauh: That’s true. That’s absolutely true. Do you want to hear the story?
We had the bearing before the Committee in ’56, contempt charges come down, Arthur is
indicted, the day for the hearing in May ’57 comes and the day before Arthur calls and says “Do I
have to be there?” I said, “Yeah. you have to be here. Don’t you remember, you’re the
defendant?” He says, “Well, what’ll l do about my wife? We can’t stay in a hotel People take
snippets of her dress and everything.” I said, “Why don’t you stay at our house.” I came home
that night, and Car] was sitting in his usual pose in front of the television with bis feet up on
another chair. I said, “Carl, you got to go to the station tomorro w morning and pick up Marilyn
Monroe.” He fell off the. chair. At least that’s my story. Carl went to the station the next
morning, picked up Arthur and Marilyn, and he recognized her some way or other, and they came
out. We were having breakfast, and Marilyn asked for a glass of water, and Carl and I knocked
each other down in the doorway trying to get to the glass of water. Olie muttered something
about it was the first time she had seen us off a chair in a long time. Anyway, we bad a nice two
weeks there. They went home over the weekends, but they were here for a few weeks.
Everybody had a good.time, except Arthur. He got convicted, but the rest of us had a fine time.
Nobody knew that Marilyn was there. It was a secret. We would come home in the evening and
she would talk. She was very bright, but totally uneducated. She was not on dope or drinking.
Whatever happened in the next 5 years we don’t know, but we can vouch for that. They were
very much in love. She was having a miscarriage, and we got the doctor. I always said that the
way to get a doctor is to tell him th&t Marilyn Momoe is here, because when I hung up the phone
from the doctor, the doorbell rang and you know, house calls are okay. Carl came home from
school every day for lunch, allegedly to take a shower, but really to have another quick view of
Marilyn and talk to her. He came home the last day – the day they were leaving – and he came
home from school at aOOut 3:00 and it had gotten to the press that Marilyn was here. Our front
lawn looked like Sherman’s march to the sea. Everyone knoWing that Marilyn was .in.side, and
they wanted her to come out. I think Olie went out and said to the lady press people that Marilyn
will receive them in our house shortly but she wasn’t ready. So Carl held a press conference on
our front lawn. They said, “What’s it like?” They asked him all about her. The Jast question
was, “What’s it feel like, Carl, (he was then 16) to have Marilyn Monroe around your house for a
couple of weeks?” Carl said, ‘Well, it ain’t quite like having your brother at home.” The New
York Times Review of the Week used to have the Remark of the Week. Carl made the Remark
of the Week at age16 with that remark. We were very devoted to both of them and were very
broken up about their breakup. Most important of all, we did, especially Olie, had an interview
in Ms. magazine defending her against all the charges that had been made – drugs, booze, men, in
which we saw no evidence of any of that. Most important of all, I think, is our lesson from this.
[Side BJ
[The press people] are reckless. Here is Olie Rauh who spent every day all day
with this woman, all alone, except Olie would invite one friend for lunch and swear her to
secrecy; other than that, they talked a lot. Olie was watching what she was reading, she was
reading all psychiatric books, the book we remember the most was one called The Fifty·Minute
Hour by a man named Linder. Hefe they never asked a person about her-character or habits, who
knew something about it, it was all just vicious stuff. So there is, we’re pfoud to say, in Ms.
Magazine, they sent a reporter, she spent the night with us, she interviewed the kids, she
interviewed me, but primarily she lived with Olie for the time, so there is a story about Marilyn
that reflects nicely upon her.
Mr. Peck:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
February 7, 1992
[Side A]
Okay, today is February 7″\ and this is continuing the ora1 history
with Joseph Rauh We are in 1956-in the presidential campaign. I know one of the things you
tried to do at the [Democratic] Convention was to get passage of a plank in the platform to
support the Brown [v. Board of EducaJion, 349 U.S. 294 (1954)] decision. You were
Mr. Rauh: Unsuccessful is a nice understatement. What happened was that
we were trying to – I mean, it was so obvious. Here, Brown comes down in 1954 and 2 years
later, America’s great liberal party can’t decide what to do about a decision of the Supreme
Court. What happened was that we fought like tigers, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
and all the civil rights groups, to get support for the dl!Cision by simply saying that they should
enforce the law. There was a case there, where, I think it’s called Hoxie [Brewer v. Hoxie Sch.
Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8 11, Cir. 1956)], where vigilantes had tried to postpone integration.
And the court [of appeals) had said, “Well, gee, that’s tem”ble, we can’t interfere with the action
of that court to carry out the Supreme Court decision.” But, what the powers that be at the
convention -what they all decided was to use that as a counterpoint to us, so they said, and thls
is the diabolically cJever language in the thing – it says, “force can’t be used against, for or
against the decision.” You can’t use force to prevent carrying out of the decision, but you can’t
use force to enforce the decision. And that’s, in essence, what-if you read carefully what the
platform in ’56 says, is what I just said. I’ve simplified it a little bit but not tem”b)y much – force
from any source at all in enforcing a decision is not supported.
Well, if.the question is, ”How did we lose?”, looking back, how could we have
Jost? It’s ahnost impossible to think you cou1d have lost that thing. Well, I think. it goes all the
way to the top. What we had was a decision in the civil rights connnurrity to make a floor fight if
we didn’t get our way. To make a floor fight by ’56 you had to have – it’s the same number as
you h?d to have in ’64 when we had the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party. You needed ten
percent of the Resolutions Committee and, I think, seven states demanding a roll call –
something like that. We had that.
After the Resolutions Committee made its report, which showed this utterly
absurd “compromise,” because it really wasn’t a compromise, it was just a licking for us. When
that came out we had to stay through to demand a roll call. We had the minority, I think we had
something like 14 people on there, and we were ready to go.
Well, the plug was pulled on us, b,ut we have never been absolutely certain what
happened. I believe what happened was that Mrs. Roosevelt called Walter Reuther and said that
she and Adlai didn’t want a floor fight over it. She admitted if you had one, you had to win it,
but she didn’t want to win a floor fight. She thought it was a mistake. We should just accept it.
Well, I think the author of the document really was Phil Graham of The Washington Post,
although there were many authors. In this kind of a thing, you get a lot of authors because you
change a nuance here and a nuance there.
At any rate, the speeches were made on both sides – our minority and the other –
and we had an oral vote, voice vote, declared null and I’m just standing there on the floor. I was
che Chairman of the ADA [Americans for Democratic Action] at that time so I wasn’t a delegate
because I couldn’t be for any of the candidates because the ADA hadn’t taken a position. And
I’m standing there and .nothing happens. The banners don’t wave for the roll call.
It subsequently developed that h1ichigan, which was the key state for the roll call,
which had led the whole fight for the roll call, didn’t wave the banner. And I subsequently found
out that Reuther bad told them not to do it – that the convention had decided not to have a fight
over that in a roll call. So there was no roll call.
Well you never – the only way you ever win anything in a convention is if you’ve
got enough for a roll call because otherwise the machinery can win anytlring. 1 mean, you can’t
win a fight without a roll call. And what the machinery of the convention demands is that we
don’t have any roll calls. That you make a fight up to a point, make your po.int for your
constituency but then shut up. And that’s exactly what happened here. We would have won if
we’d have had the roll call ’cause everybody realizes you can’t have an anti-black roll call. You
may have no roll call, but you shou1dn’t have it as an anti-black roll call. So I think this is pretty
much what the story of chat fight was.
As far as the nomination was concerned, Stevenson bad it all locked up, and he
did one other thing that 1 didn’t think was quite fair. He led Hubert [Humphrey] to believe that
he was going to give it to Hubert so Hubert was nmning for vice president, and then he
[Stevenson] threw the convention open on the vice presidency. Hubert wasn’t ready, and he just
got slaughtered. It was the lowest po.int in his career there that he got about 100 votes, and it was
just so damaging. Two of them had hurt our cause in ’60 although, no, you can’t ever win a
thing like that. So, the convention was in that sense bitter, and I think (Senator Estes] Kefauver
was entitled to consideration.
-7 6-
[John F. J Kennedy was lucky he lost – if Kennedy had won that – I tllink he was
second – lots of guys their age: Gore, Humphrey, Kefauver, but anyway, Kefauver got it and the
two of them ran, and it was pretty well sure that Eisenhower would be re-elected. It was sad, and
J think the beauty of the 1952 Stevenson Common Sense Campaign couldn’t be quite repeated in
So, there you get, really, the sad thing of a great Supreme Court decision,
absolutely unanimous from right to left on a most important point in American history, and you
can’t win the fight to support that decision. And it came up immediately.
What had happened was the House had passed a very good bill – a very strong
civil rights bill about a month before the convention in ’56. It came over to the Senate, and
(Senator] Paul Douglas tried to get it taken up on the floor. He made such a motion; we got six
votes. We got mavericks; we didn’t get Humphrey. We didn’t get any of the real people. I had a
temble fight with Humphrey right there in the cloak room He wrote a letter of apology, said he
was wrong. He realized he made a boner when it looked like we had no civil rights people. We
had three people on the Democratic side – Douglas, Lehman and I think Hennings – I’m not
On the Republican side we had Duff, Langer, and Bender, I think. It was a real
maverick crowd. [Lyndon) Jolmson had made up his mind he was going to show Douglas who
was running the Senate, and he just buried his nose right in the dirt there.
But, he couldn’t bury it forever. So comes ’57 and the new Senate elected in ’56
was Democratic even though Eisenhower won the election. He didn’t have the coattails
everybody thought he did. So back comes the bill, the same bill that Douglas had tried to take
up. It had a thing in it called Part Three. Part Three gave the Attorney General the authority to
enforce all provision of the Constitution, including, without saying so, the school desegregation
[requirement]. lt was our victory on school desegregation. When Johnson got a hold of that bill,
as he naturally would as the Majority Leader, and it was clear what he was doing, he announced
that they were going to make two changes. They were going to take Part Three out and limit it to
voting rights, and they were going to put a jury trial amendment on the voting rights part. Well,
Jolmson did exactly that. He took Pan ?ee out – they won that, it was called the Anderson?
Aileen Motion to Delete Part Three – Anderson being the Democrat and Aileen being the
Republican and, ob, they beat us badly.
And then there were four versions of the jury trial amendment that kept changing.
O’Mahoney was Johnson’s man on that, the Wyoming Senator. And we lost on that.
And then comes the really hard part. What do you do? Toe bill which had once
been fine had lost all its luster, but it still was something. It was awfully small, but it was still
something. We had a meeting of the Leadership Conference in the library in my law office. It
went on all day. Roy Wilk.ins was under temble pressure to say it was worse than nothing.
There was a considerable NAACP militance at that particular moment, and they were demanding
that he tell the truth that the bill was worse than nothing. Senator Morse voted and said it was
worse than nothing, and Senator McNamara followed him. I think those were the on1y two who
went again.st us. But Clarence Mitchell, Roy and I didn’t want to give up the bill We thought
that sometimes you got to show you can make some progress. So we were on Johnson’s ·side.
We wanted the bill, and Roy, late in the afternoon, said – because it really was up to him He
was at that moment the dominant figure. I mean, there is no (Martin Luther} King yet. There is
having the boycott, but there is no real King. Roy is the leading figure in this siruation. And Roy
finally said, because Roy’s own lawyer was on the other side, the one who didn’t want him tQ
take it. He’s now a judge in New York.
Mr. Peck: Robert Carter?
Mr. Rauh: Yes! Exactly. Carter didn’t want him to take it, but he finally – it
was pretty courageous – he sided a white man against his own blacks but be did. And he said he
thought I was right and from then on it was all ours – that ended it, Roy’s decision there really –
ended the thing, and we got the bill. Johnson bragged about it – be did the first civil rights bill in
87 years. It was 87 [years] from ’57 back to 1870.
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Rauh: And it was Roy. Johnson did give us credit; we saved his bill for
him. He called Phil Graham at 6:00 in the morning and told bim I’d saved his bill for him
Maybe we were wrong. I mean, this isn’t something where you’re so goddamn sure you were
right [to save the bill], but we felt you had to move something no matter. Somebody quoted
Confucius that a thousand-mile journey is taken with one step, and there were all sorts of old
class suits drug out to help our side. And we go the bill. Well, if we were right and the fact that
we got the legislation a few years later – if we were right – this was a tremendous step forward.
The bad part there, and this is really related again back to the convention of ’56,
all the southern Senators went home and claimed victory. Russell and the others went back and
said, ”My God, look how we’ve beat them! They can’t even enforce the desegregation decision.”
And that was true. Now we hadn’t been able to do it at the convention, and we weren’t ab1e to
do it in Congress. So they really- I don’t think that when I was arguing for talcing the bill, I
don’t think that at that particular moment it ever occurred to me – the argument that was going to
be used. But it was used.
The New York Times reporter on civil rights in those days was a Texan by the
name of William S. White who has written a book on the Senate, and he was Johnson’s
presidential promoter. And be was the one who played that thing about how we got beat. I don’t
think we’d quite seen that ta1cing the bill without the school desegregation, without the Part
Three, was so bad. Part Three was in the ’64 Act, and everything changed. The story of the ’56
convention is really related to the ’57 statute because they went in tandem Johnson won both
Mr. Peck: Well, shortly thereafter the [Supreme] Court decided Cooper v.
Aaron [356 U.S. 1 (1958)]. What was the reaction to the Court? Here was the Court in an
extremely rare instance, a unanimous co•signed decision by all the justices.
Mr. Rauh: Naturally, we were delighted with that, but there’s not much law in
Cooper against Aaron, if you think for a minute. How, after they had done Bro·wn, could they
have done anything else with CoOper v. Aaron? They might have put it off for a few months,
you know, and n?)t been so aggressive about it. But essentially there was no Cooper v. Aaronwhich
I’ve quoted five million times in my life – really it isn’t much of a legal advance. It
simply says that the government can’t do what they told them they couldn’t do.
Mr. Peck: Right. Well, I mean, it essentially stands for the proposition: we
said it before, and we meant it.
Mr. Rauh: That’s right. I think that’s exactly right. So, you do have this, but
there was a real conspiracy. I’ll tell you the story because it’s relevant even though it’s more
personal than – it’s very personal. In the spring of ’57, when the bill has come over from the
House, Phil Graham called me up and said, “Will you and Olie come out to our farm for dinner
tomorro w night?” Well, it seemed like a nice invitation, and so I said, “Sure.” And then after I
said “Sure,” he said, “Pick up the Justice on your way out and bring him too.” Titat was, of
course, referring to Justice Frankfurter for whom we both served as law clerks. I said, “Sure.” I
was conned easily. And so we picked up Felix and on the way out – it’s about an hour’s drive
out into the country- why, Felix tells me how wonderful Jolmson is and how I’m making the
greatest mistake of my life fighting for Part Three because it really ought to just be the voting
rights provision. Johnson is right in wanting to just do voting rights. Voting rights is everything
impon:ant, and he makes a big speech for voting rights. Remember, he is on the Supreme Court,
but he’s making a big speech for voting rights.
_ So we get out to the Graham’s – it was mid-afternoon then or a little later – and I
don’t know what, it’s just all _small talk until we get to cocktails. Then Phil opens up and, at last,
I’m awake. This whole thing is Johnson doing a job on me. I don’t know. His reporters from
inside our crowd must have told him that I was the lone holdout – I was the real problem in
getting rid of Part Three and, ?yway, those two guys really worked on this thing. Anyway, I told
them I was going to fight for Part Tbree, to hold onto it. A lot of the press began to see what was
going on and they would come and say, “What are you going to do if you lose Part Three?”
Because they saw that we would have a terrible dilenuna if we lost Brown again. And so
anyway, we did try, but some historians have asked me if] didn’t sell out in the sense that
Frankfurter and Graham and Johnson had really put that much pressure on. I cannot answer that
question because J can’t tell you how much, if any, that they bad as a matter of influence on my
thinking. I know that I accepted that in the sense that I fought for getting the bill even though it
didn’t have Part 1bree: So in a sense I did what Jolmson and Graham and Frankfurter wanted me
to do, but I can’t – to be honest, I don’t know if they had any effect on it or not. I just can’t – if
I’m going to tell the truth I have to say, ”I don’t know.” I did end up where they were. On the
other band, I guess I’m going to my grave thinking that we made a very important decision, and
that we made the right one.
Mr. Peck: So certainly the ’57 Act has been used very well, I think, in many
ways that it wasn’t anticipated. So, at least from the perspective of people who weren’t involved
in that, it has been considered valuable. Another thing that happened in ’57, but you were
involved even before that, was the Supreme Court’s decision in the Watkins [v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957)] case. And, maybe we can talk a little bit about that.
Mr. Rauh, Oh, we can and would you like to see a piece I did on selfincrimination?
Or have you seen it?
Mr. Peck,
Mr. Rauh,
I’ve seen it.
In Consritutional Commentary. That case in some ways is a good
illustration of just bow disastrous Joe McCarthy was for the county’s corrnnon sense. Walter
Reuther was a decent, honorable, civil libertarian. I had my differences with him, and I gave you
a story of the ’56 convention when he, in effect, did sell us out. But I don’t know of any labor
leader who was as much for civil h’berties inside and outside the union as Walter Reuther.
Anybody who did as much to fight Joe McCarthy. But, it was having a disastrous effect –
People don’t realize that McCarthy didn’t want to know anything. He wanted
them to plead the Fifth Amendment. He called them “Fifth Amendment communist.” And he
wasn’t trying to get information. He knew there weren’t any spies or at ]east that this was no way
to catch a spy by having them go in front of a television camera McCanhy knew that, but he just
loved charging people with being Fifth Amendment Communists. He had to fight with my great
friend, Jirrnny Wechsler, called him a Fifth Amendment Communist but actually Jirrnny didn’t
plead the Fifth Amendment.
At any rate, in_ 1954, Walter felt the union was in such trouble from the attacks on
it because people were pleading the Fifth Amendment – most of them were pleading it because
they didn’t want to name names of other people, who were ready to tell about themselves, like
Lillian Hellman who was our client. So, what happened was that Walter issued an order to the
FIFTH AMENDMENT, YOU ARE GOING TO BEFIRED. If you want to fight your fight, for
not naming names or anything else, we will give you legal counsel”
Well, in walked Jolm Watkins shortly after that. And he’s beside himself. He
wants to plead the Fifth Amendment, but he needs a job. And he looked at me sort of sadly, you
know, what can this guy, this elitist Harvard guy do to help me out? So I said, ”you know
Walter’s position, and I can’t talk him out of it.” In fact, I wasn’t even so sure he was wrong. I
thought he was wrong, and I said so. You cannot believe what it was like if you weren’t there.
Here’s a guy with over a million people relying on him in the union, being weakened in his
political strength by McCarthy, trying to figure out what to do, offering these people all sorts of
alternatives – legal counsel I mean it wasn’t just offering them any lawyer, they were offering
him my whole staff and I was able, I mean, if I needed more help, I could have it. Walter was
very much a tightwad, but here he was being very generous.
So I said, “Look, we’ve gotta do something, John. And here is what I propose we
do. Let’s go to the hearing, go ahead and tell him the truth.” And the truth was, as he put it,
”Look, I never became a party member, but I was close enough so it didn’t make any difference.”
And he was perfectly honest about that. And then we agreed that he would say, ”Look, I’m not
going to plead the Fifth Amendment. I’ll tell you about myself, but I won’t tell you about others
unless and until you have the court order directing me to – meaning that we could go to the
Supreme Court and if we had a court order we could try to keep him out of jail by answering a
Supreme Court order to answer. Well, you know procedurally that wasn’t going to happen, but it
sounded pretty good at the time.
Well, we went up to the hearing. He told all about himself. When it got to “Was
so and so in the party with you or working there?” ”I can’t tell you. I won’t tell you without an
order from the highest Court that J have to do so.” Well, the judge, quite naturally, found him
guilty of contempt of Congress. On the laws as it then stood, he had no rights. The Fifth
Amendment had not yet been declared [applicable] because it’s declared right in Watkins’ case
that the First Amendment applies.
So he is indicted. He is convicted, sentenced to a light sentence because they
were waiting to see what was going to happen. So we went to the court of appeals, and we won
two to one [The opinion of the court was later refiled as a dissent from the rehearing en bane and
can be read at 233 F.2d at 688]. Then there was a motion to reconsider and we lost blank to two.
Mr. Peck: Six to two [233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956)].
Mr. Rauh:
Bazelon and Edgerton.Mr.
Mr. Rauh:
Six to two because we bad the two [earlier] votes . .J guess that was
That. s right.
So, I guess I had Bazelon and Edgerton when I won and when]
Jost. I was just determined I was going to get cert., and our cert. petition was pretty hard work.
What we did was to list. and I think it’s in an appendix to the petition for certiorari, every
statement by a House committee .member that we’re going to expose the Communists in this
country. And I really glommed onto that exposure. There had been a couple of writers – Alan
Barth was one, I think there were some others who bad written the big question – Is there a
power in a Senate committee of exposure for exposure’s sake. I glommed onto that, and we had
an appendix of it.
[Side BJ
-We had proved that that was what they were doing. Well, the court granted cert.,
and I was sure I had it won. I mean, from then on it was all doWJJbill be.cause getting the cert. is
always the hardest part, as you well know. At any rate, the decision comes down – it’s the one
over there – it’s the middle one there [pointing to a shelf in his study]. Oh no, no, no, no – it’s
the top middle one. That’s F?tzpatrick on Holmes saying- that’s the day that I think-June of
1957 – when that string of pro-civil rights cases comes down. I’ve always said that’s possib1y
the high period on civil rights in America. And that was Fitzpatrick in the St. Louis Post
Dispatch and Watkins is one of those. Swayze is one of those and that’s –
I was in on that. That was the happiest day of my life I guess, other than getting
married. Anyway, [Chief Justice Ear]] Warren says everything just right. Except we may have –
one thing I don’t think.he – I wouldn’t have said if I’d been him but basically he was right – he
said that there’s no power of exposure for exposure’s sake and the First Amendment does apply,
but then he sort of makes clear that the First Amendment is going to be hard to prove because
you can’t go into the motivations of the Committee.
But it was a wonderful, wonderful result, and I thirik it was the starting of the
slowing down of the House Committee. Joe McCarthy was already gone. I don’t know ifhe
died or was just drinking himself into a whatever, but he was already- he wasn’t the power he
had been – he was censured three years earlier. So, that case is now a leading case still on
congressional iDvestigations: that they have to have a legislative or oversight purpose, they can’t
do exposure for exposure’s sake, the First Amendment Free Speech [Clause] does apply there,
but they’ve never applied it. And that, you see, this is ’57 and ’58, we’re trying to get the D.C.
Circuit to apply the sentence.in Watkins that free speech does apply to the proposition that
applies to the right of silence.
The court found the most asinine ground for reversing, namely that he hadn’t been
directed, that Arthur Miller hadn’t been directed to answer. We didn’t know we had to answer.
If there ever was anything silly, and I knew dam well we had to answer that question. We’d been
ordered, and I didn’t have the slightest doubt that we had to answer it. Indeed, I think I stopped
and said, “Arthur, this is the last shot. This is the point you really don’t want to answer?” And
he says, ”I’d rather go to jail” I mean., he didn’t – he just said so – we knew we bad to answer it,
but the court didn’t want to decide our case. We had the best possible free speech case. They
had gone into Arthur’s place. Why did you do this? Why did you do that? Tney’d gone into
Arthur’s criticism of them! They had made – they banged him around for having criticized them
It was a perfect free speech case, but they dam well weren’t going to decide it, so they said that
the defendant hadn’t been properly ordered to answer.
Well, anyway, that’s sort of the aften:oathofthe Watkins case. They didn’t carry.
I thiDk the day of the Watkins decision, if there had been no other way to say be had a free speech
right, Warren would have said that. But Warren had that other alternative of saying he didn’t
know why they needed the names add?d, they had to tell rum why they needed the names.
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Rauh So, that’s where- that sounds to me- I can’t swear to this, it
sounds to me like a Frankfurter, Warren, Black promise (laughter).
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Will, you know Frankfurter concurred – and elaborated about that.
Yes. So, I think there was some compromise in there. But I think
that at that moment in life when that cartoon [on the wall] is done- is written- why, I think we
might have bad a majority for the proposi tion that there is a right of silence under the free speech
provision of the First Amendment, but it sort of eroded out and, I guess, wouldn’t you say that
that question is not decided right now?
Mr. Peck: Umm-
Mr. Rauh: How would you put it on that? Because to my mind what I
remember is that that• s still an open question.
Mr. Peck: Yeah, yeah. You know, while I think it would be very difficult for
the court to come to a different conc1usion, there’s no decision on all fours, yes.
Mr. Rauh: And then there’s that Barenblatt case. There’s lots oflaw -I
mean, there is some conflict between that sentence by Warren and some of the actions of the
court in not talcing cert,, but anyway, it was fun. Watkins was fun. We took the starch out of the
attacks on Reuther for being weak on civil liberties. Reuther had been under attack by civil
liberties groups because of saying that he’d have to get rid of a person who pleaded the Fifth
Amendment, and so we sort of deflated those attacks by virtue of the fact that we had made new
grounds for fighting.
Mr. Peck: Now, around the same time period, you had to defend the UAW
against charges under the Corrupt Practices Act for featuring nine Democratic candidates on its
weekly T. V. program
Mr. Rauh: Now that case is – there is a Supreme Court case on that. I don’t
know if you – we ultimate)y got an acquittal, but Jet me just tell you the story of it. What more
accurately, ifm)’. memory serves me, would descnbe it is that we had a television program, and
we put Senator [Pat] McNamara on the program, and they – the government – the Eisenhower
government – indicted on the ground that that was a union expenditure in a federal election,
which is forbidden, just like corporations may not contnbute to a federal election, neither could a
union. The corporation ban goes back to 1907 – the union goes back to about – well, it goes
back to just Roosevelt and Taft-Hartley – but now they’re in tandem – the unions and the
And, so we were indicted for that. We argued that it wasn’t any different than the
C/0 case [U.S. v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)]. The C/0 case
was an indictment of Phil Murray and the CIO for their putting in the newspaper of the CIO an
endorsement of a federal candidate. And they won that case in the Supreme Court. We argued
that this was the same thing. Tiris was – we didn’t get away with it. When the district cowt
dismissed the .indictment, the government appealed under its direct appeal rights to the Supreme
Court. I argued it in the Supreme Court and lost six to three [U.S. v. International Union of
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Workers of America, 354 U.S. 567 (1957)). And
the three that found the union had a right of free speech, that was, I think, Warren, I don’t
remember Black and Douglas or Goldberg. I just – Goldberg was gone I think. It probably
would have been Warren, Black and Douglas [Jt was.]. At any rate, the Supreme Cowt reversed
the district court, sent it back for trial, and Frankfurter, I think, had written the decision against
us. I’m not sure but I think so.
So, we prepared, bad a trial, and got an acquittal I got an acquittal from the jury.
And (laughter) part of that story – we spent the Wght carousing, and when we got the acquittal –
it was about a week’s trial and we got the acquittal- you do some funny things in a trial We had
that judge who had decided the case about time getting to your job being time the employer had
to pay for. Some Mt. Something case, what was it – you had to pay for the time that you – when
you get to the office and if you’re in a, say in a mine, you gotta pay for the time getting to the
digging and all of that.
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Raul: And this – that was our judge in this case. And he was a big show?
off like thing and he was show ing off like mad. He was badgering our witnesses. So, Harold
Craigfie1d and I decided that he would take a coup le of drinks at noon because he always took
too many. We’d tell rum we’d limit the amount and then he was going in and tell the judge that
ifhe didn’t smp the badgering, we weren’t going to put Walter Reuther on. Because I’d
announced to the jury that Walter Reuther wouJd come and testify. And he was waiting for
Walter Reuther. So Craigfield tells that to the judge, and the judge is like putty. From then on,
he doesn’t touch anything-he wants Reuther in the courtroom so bad he can taste it.
So Walter appears and testifies, and of course he’s magnificent. He just says
we’re trying to explain to our own members just like the CIO thing. Anyway, we get the
acquittal. So then we went out and got stewed that night, having won the acquittal, and I made
some bets with the UAW people that I’d be – we’d be on the front page of the Detroit Free
Press. They all said, “The UAW never gets a victory on the front page!” Well, the banner
so we just had a wonderful year.
I take the plane back the next morning, and I walk in the door and Olie says to me,
”Felix called.” He [Frankfurter] said, “See, 1 fixed it for Joe.” I think he had written the decision
the other way. I’m not absolutely sure, but I think so. Anyway, we just had – I explained the ·
case to Olie -how it was and what happened and all. But anyway, we loved each other, so he
bad – he was right – I hadn’t even been on the radio or on the phone when Felix calls Olie and
says, “I hope Joe realized how much 1 did for him” Oh, God, that was funny. Anyway, that’s
the story of that case. But by and large now, I think that [the union action] wouJd be treated
[today) as an expenditure.
Mr. Peck: Yes, I think that’s right. One thing I skipped over but I think worth
talking about is March 6, 1958, when you appeared with a client before the Senate Select
Committee on the Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field, better known as the
Senate Rackets Committee. This was Emile Mosey.
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Well, the New York Times spelled his name wrong.
It did?
M-0? It’s M-A – M-A-Z-E-Y.
And this arose out of a 4-year old Kohler strike. And you got into
a shouting match with Senator Mundt.
Mr. Rauh: Senator McClellan.
Mr. Peck: Well, it started – according to the Times repon – let me tell you
what ..
Mr. Rauh: Yeah. I remember there was a Times repon on this. Maybe it wasthere
were plenty of shouting matches.
Mr. Peck: Right. Well, apparently you were responding to an accusation
leveled at your client that he was attempting to intimidate witnesses. You were gavelled down
and threatened with expulsion from the hearing by [Senator] McClellan. And the accusations
came from Mundt, and you were exchanging with him. Then I guess Mundt and McClellan
began arguing with each other. I guess at one point McClellan said to Mundt, ‘1f you want to
take offense at” something that McClellan said to Mundt, “then that’s all right with me.”
Mr. Rauh: Uh-huh.
Mr. Peck: But you continued to argue.
Mr. Rauh: (Laughter) Well, let’s-we have to put this in context. There are
really several stories. We have to try to get them all, and we have to separate them One is the
Kobler story in the courts – with the court of appeals. One is the hearing before the Select
Committee. What you addressed yourself to was the hearing before the Select Committee. 1bis
is what happened.
Hoffa and the Teamsters were clearly corrupt; and the Democrats were perfectly
willing to have an :investigating committee do Hoffa. Toe Republicans responded by saying,
“My God, the UA W’s more powerful. They’re more in politics – we’ve got to investigate the
UAW. So, let’s investigate the Kobler strike, which is the best example of the UAW’s
intimidation. They do temble things, they go to the house of strikers and picket and threaten
them They wear gloves with brass knuckles und.er them on the picket line.” And so the deal
that was finally made was they’d investigate both the Teamsters and the UAW.
Well, the Teamsters went first. Ed Williams represented Hoffa, and also Beck.
Ed Williams represented both Beck and Hoffa and they pleaded – Beck pleaded the Fifth
Amendment to the first question I think, “Where do you live?” (Laughter) So then they went –
after they got rid of the Hoffa investigation, the Teamsters investigation, then they went to the
UAW. We had a month’s hearing. It was maybe – 5 weeks is my recollection on the Kohler
strike. And the hearing – it was a very political hearing. On the Democratic side was McClellan,
Ervin, Kennedy, McNamara On the Republican side was Ives, I think Goldwater, Mundt and
Walter (Reuther] wants to go on first He said, ”lt seems to me that I’m entitled to
go on and explain exactly what happened.” Well, they were deadlocked. The Democrats said
“sure” and the Republicans said “no,” so you couldn’t have a vote. So, they had to compromise
even the order of witnesses. So, what they finally did was to put the head of the localrepresenting
the Kohler workers – on first and then went ahead with other people. Walter was
the last witness. So, the hearing progressed – now my recollection of the story is not exactly the
way you state it- but there’s no question I was shouting. And the New York Times says I was
shouting. But the thing got very heated, that hearing, because Goldwater, Mundt, and Nixon
were playing politics. Kennedy was playing Reuther politics. The joke on our side of the aisle
was that whenever we were in real trouble, Jack Kennedy would walk down the aisle to take his
seat and help us out. I mean, it was perfectly clear that this was – Goldwater, Mundt, and Nixon
– trying to get at the UAW, and Kennedy trying to ingratiate himself to the UAW. After all, his
brother is the counsel for the Committee. Well, I’ve always thought that what happened was that
Bobby [Kennedy] bad some way of communicating with his brother.
Once we had – one of our guys was accused of murder by Goldwater, Mundt, or
Curtis. I treat them as a fungible item because I can never remember which one of the three was
doing it. But one of the three was – and I think it may have been Goldwater – however it was,
just as he’s coming down, he said “Didn’t so and so commit murder?” Because a guy died that he
hit, whether it was murder or not is another story. But, Jack walks down the aisle. So, I mean, it
was abnost a joke; he simply – he was trying to get the UAW’s support to fix the elections and
then Mundt, Curtis, Nixon – Mundt, Curtis and Goldwater were trying to show up the UAW as a
pretty violent crowd. Well, at one stage of the story, Mazey is on the stand, and this is not the
time when I blew my stack – what they had Mazey- we did something, I can’t remember, but
boycotted some store because it was owned by a judge who had done something wrong. And
when Mazey was asked about that, he sort of implied that the Catholic Church had ordered him
to do it. That really – then Mundt really went crazy. They had him and he – I tried to knock over
the table. I mean we were in such terrible – it was awful I mean we were making a charge
against the Catholic Church. For God’s sake, in American politics?
Anyway, during the recess that night there were all sorts of proposals, including
[Leonard] Woodcock, who 1ater became UAW president, proposed that we have Emile say he’s
unstable and we have him locked up. It didn’t sound like that really would work. Anyway,
Emile made some sort of halfway apology, which I wrote overnight to the Committee and that
went off abight and he got off the stand. But then at some stage, Lyman Conder, the lawyer for
the Kohler Company, claimed that I think it – I don’t know if it was Mazey or Mazey and his
thugs or what – were intimidating witnesses, and I started shouting to McClellan to shut him up.
And McClellan had a big gavel and he was gavelling, but I was just going on and on – gavel or
no gavel. And then it cahned down and at the ]unch hour I went in and talked to McClellan. I
said, ”I’m sorry about that but look at it from my point of view for a second.” He couldn’t have
been nicer. 1t all happened at the time, and I think this was sort of a profile that they did on me
that’s ju.st –
Mr. Peck: Well, there was the story about the incident and where on the
jump-page there was a small profile –
Mr. Rauh: Yeah
Mr. Peck: – where the New York Times said about you that you were “about
the loudest, most determined, most aggressive and least easily sile□ced battler for civil rights and
bberties and human rights practicing law in the capital”
Mr. Rauh: (Laughter) I don’t know – well, that’s half good. Anyway, the
hearings went on, the staff of the Committee was ail with us – oh, l’ve got to tell you a story.
After the hearing each day, I would go downstairs to Bobby’s office and· ask him who they were
calling the next day. And when I went down after Mazey had accused the Church, Bobby looked
at me, _and then he and Kenny O’Donnell are sitting there. They’d sit there and throw the dam
football back and forth across the desk. And they were throwing that football back and forth and
Bobby, without looking up, says, “Joe, don’t worry. I haven’t heard from the Pope yet.”
But it was rather congenial between us and the Kennedy camp because they
wanted Walter [‘s support] for the nomination against Hubert. And Walter more naturally might
have gone to Hubert. And so this was a v.ery political thing. At any rate, the report was issued,
and the report, I think, is rather favorable to us . And Walter, because it said some UDfavorable
things, shouted at me that I hadn’t done a good job and all that. But tpe fact is that we had
written – most of the report was written in my office. And that was sort of the end of that part of
it – the bearing. Now you got the court part and this is another story and … do you have the date
of the court of appeals – it w?, I know the court of appeals argument was on Rosh Hashanah in
one year, and I don’t ?ve that year.
Mr. Peck: I’m not sure which case that was.
Mr. Rauh: Well, it was the case in which the question was, ‘Was this an
unfair labor practice strike?” And secondly, because it was an unfair labor practice, “Could
people who have connnittee violence get their jobs back?” And the Labor Board had ruled it was
an unfair labor practice strike, but you couldn’t get your jobs back because of the violence. And
that was argued – I’m now groping for the year – because I happen to know the day it was
argued. And the reason I happen to know is because we always were joking about the fact that
whether we were going to temple or to court on Rosh Hashanah. And I said, ”I’m going to go to
temple the night before and pray that [Judge David] Bazelon says ‘not a good Jew,’ and will
show up in court.” Which he did. And we did win the case and we won – and almost all of the
people who had committee violence on the picket line were reinstated because they said that the
court was – that the employer wrong-doing, I mean unfair lalx>r practice, was worse than the
employee wrong-doing on the picket line. And if you’ll look over there, you’ll find the check –
the results from that – by the Kobler Company to the NLRB because once we got that decision –
that you weigh these wrongs, we were in because they knew that the court of appeals was on our
side, and we got a great settlement. That was the biggest settlement up to that time. I think there
have been bigger settlements since then, but that was the biggest settlement up until that time.
Mr. Peck: Seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars.
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh::
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Oh, no-
You can take it down and bring it over in the light, Bob.
Oh, I’m not sure – this is a different case.
It’s obvious that what I thought was there is not there. But I think
it’s in the four million or something, and that’s why that isn’t correct. But there are books on the
Kohler strike, and it’s an easy thing to-we can add ifwe decide we want to.
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Rauh: But it was the court of appeals that turned the tide for us. Because
they – J don’t think you could say it was a seminal ruling that it was an unfair labor practice
strike, but it was a quite seminal ruling that you weighed the violence on the picket line against
the employer’s wrong-doing and then we had all sorts of hearing examiners and so forth. But
almost all of the people were then reinstated, and we were in the driver’s seat and Mazey settled
the case for a large amount of mon.ey. Funny, UAW and Kohler since then have been rather
“club by.”
[End of Side BJ
Mr. Peck:
Oral History of Joseph L. Raub, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
February 21, 1992
[Side A]
Okay. Today is February 21, 1992. This is the oral history with
Joseph Rauh. When we left off, we were toward the end of the 1950’s. We had talked a little bit
about the convention, the Civil Rights Act, the Senate Rackets Corrnnittee bearing. I’m not sure
what else appropriately falls into that category. I know that at some point you represented the
NCAA over its television rights for college football. Was that in the ’50s or was that the ’60s?
Mr. Rauh: That was in the ’50s. It was early in the television days. I had a
friend, actually, from the war who was on the connnittee of the NCAA to deal with television.
The argument for our side, at least at first blush a good argument, was that it wasn’t a per se
violation. J didn’t know, in all honesty, you could have blown my brain out on antitrust law with
a peashooter, but I did know there was a difference between per se and reasonableness. I thought
you could make an argument for it being a question of reasonab]eness, and reasonableness was
easy, because what you had was that the football receipts covered the intramural athletic
expenses; if you didn’t do that, then you had to have an additional charge to the students for
athletics, and that was a mess. So football receipts were really carrying the athletic programs, so
that it seemed there was a reasonable ground for wanting people to go to the game, but you had
to admit it was a per se violation.
Well, I did some work, and I was ready to argue the reasonableness. We were
making some real progress; it was big stuff in the press, and the press seemed to be rather
favorable to us. The two groups that didn’t want to cave in to the NCAA and go along were
Notre Dame, who wanted to be on their own thing every day, and Pennsylvania – Harold Stassen
– and that one, I think, .was temporary.
With Notre Dame, they always want to be first, and so it was very serious. I think,
it’s my recollection that Father [Theodore M.) Hesburgh was one of our opponents, that be had
come in at just about that time.
At any rate, we weFe hauled down to Justice one day. Stanley Barnes was the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitru.st Division, I think. He later was a Ninth
Circuit judge. And t here was a real misunderstanding. I thought I heard Victor Kramer, who
was the top expert at Justice, say that something went for reasonableness, not per se, and Vic has
told me since that I misunderstood him At any rate, we stood by our guns and for many years
we had the limitations that, they’re all off now pretty much, and there was a case, oh, I was long
since out of it, a case rather against what we were trying to do. It never got to the courts while I
was there, but it was a great deal in public opinion. It was more a public relations job of selling
the idea that this was the best way of handling a difficult problem.
Apparently, television has not had the disastrous effect on gate that my clients said
it would have. It just didn’t have that effect. People loyally went out to see the home team play,
and so that probably, it may be that the thing was a mistake from start to finish to try to have
some kind of rules for it. What the alternative would have been was it would have been a lot of
money for a few sch:lols, instead of more spread out. If you’re going to apply the antitrust laws
strictly to the educational system, why it may be that it was a mistake to try it. But we were quite
successful in holding onto the ru1es as long as we did. And I never really followed it after I got
more involved in other things.
Mr. Peck: I’m sure no one at that time had any idea of the kind of money
they’d be talkiog abouuoday.
Mr. Rauh: My God! Think of it! I imagine Notre Dame can fmance not only
its athletics out of it but its education, too!
Mr. Peck: That’s right, that’s right.
Mr. Rauh: I’ve seen Father Hesburgh so much in the civil rights stuff, but I
don’t know that we ever, that he ever or I ever mentioned that period. He was obviously a most
attractive person, but they do have the most attractive people that they put into jobs like that. I
mean, be could have persuaded anybody of anything. So it was a real battle of advocacy. As
they say, in a sense you can say that we won during the period I was handling it, that we did
pretty well, even Notre Dame didn’t telecast except when they were put on the one network that
we sold the NCAA to. So in that I can claim a victory over Father Hesburgh. but I mean it as a
joke, because he is such a terrific persuader for anything he’s for.
Mr. Peck: Right. Well, it’s funny that you were on opposite sides then and ilJ.
almost everything else, not. Also, around that time, wasn’t that when you represented A. Philip
Randolph in the case involving membership in the Railway Executives?
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
That was 1950.
Oh, it was earlier.
It was earlier. In 1950, 1 was representing really the Sleeping Car
Porters there for a while. It was 1941 when I wrote the executive order on the new war plants,
the discrimination in the new war plants, and I didn’t know Mr. Randolph. I was a young lawyer
in the Office for Emergency Management, and I got called in one day by my – I was Deputy
Genera] Counsel of the Office for Emergency Management. Wayne Coy was the head of it; he
was a Presidential Assistant, and it was sort of a holding company of new groups that were trying
to get prepared for war and – have I told you this s?ory?
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
I don’t think so.
Because if I have, I don’t, I don’t mean to repeat! I’m sure I do.
That’s all right – go ahead.
Well anyway, Wayne, when I got to the office about 9:00 one
morning – this is in June of 1941 – my secretary said, “Mr. Coy wants to see you right away. It’s
urgent.” So, his office was in a different building from where we were housed, and I ran over
there. And he said, “Can you write an executive order?” I said, “Anyone can write an executive
order. What do you want to put in it?” He said, “Well, there’s a guy named A. Phillip Randolph
who is threatening the President with a march on Washington ifhe doesn’t get an executive order
ending discrimination in the new plants that are growing up for the war production.” And I said,
“Well, it so happens that this is a cinch” be.cause I had worked on a similar problem a couple of
years ago.” We were going to have an executive order that anybody who violated the Nationa1
Labor Relations Act couldn’t bid on a government contract. You didn’t have to use the sanctions
of the NLRA, you could use, this was another sanction. We never got the order, but we kept
drafting, I mean, we had drafted the order. I said this is really quite a similar thing, only] think
easier, since you could order them to make tanks in a certain way, so you have the tanking order
and make it with certain people. So I didn’t think it was very hard.
Well, he seemed to be very relieved that we weren’t going to have a long legal
batt1e while the President is saying, and then he said, “Well, that’s all right, Joe. Go ahead, I need
the draft tomorrow morning. Go downstairs where the Budget Bureau is and they’ll give you all
the fonns and everything.”
So I went out the door and just as I was shutting the door I heard him holler at me,
“Come back.” And he said, “Don’t forget the Poles.” I said, “What do you mean?” He said,
“The President’s had a couple of phone calls from Buffalo, where there’s a new plant. I don’t
know whether it was for ammunition or what, and they haven’t hired Poles. Discrimination
against Poles goes on there. Tue President said as long as he’s giving Randolph what he wants on
the blacks he might as well give – I guess, colored people was the way they would have said it
then – and so stick the Poles in.”
And a lot of historians have come to me and said where did you get “nationa1
origin” from? Because, see, .in the state laws that existed then, you used to say, “can’t
discriminate on race, creed or color,” and all I did was add national origin. They said where did
you get nationa1 origin from? I haven’t the vaguest, gosh-darn memory of where the words
national – where I got those words to stick in there. But the only thing I can say is, the only
place I think those words were at that time was in immigration statutes, so it may have been that I
had something in the back of my bead from an immigration statute. I can’t be sure. But anyway,
I always use that example to show how the black thrust affected the rights of other people, that it
was here, the first time you ever had anything to stop disc rimination against the ethnic minority,
immigrant minorities, came because A Phillip Randolph was in there fighting like mad for his
Well, subsequently to that – well, that was ’41. In ’46, Mr. Randolph hired me to
bring suits ro stop what was an agreement between the railroads and the lily-white union of
firemen to block the agreement which was that you couldn’t have a black fireman on a diesel
engine. You cou1d have a black fireman on a coal engine, because that was dirty work, but a
diesel engine, all a fireman had to do was fiddle around with a few knobs and that was the job. It
really wasn’t a job because it cou1d have been done by the engineer or anybody else, so it was
really featherbedding. But we fought, I mean, if there’s going tO be featherbedding, we didn’t see
why the blacks, who historically had been firemen, shouldn’t have the jobs. So I was hired by
Mr. Randolph to do that and we brought suits in ’46-’47, in that period. We won them all. The
real brains in that suit were not mine, though, they were Charlie Houston’s, who had brought the
Steele case. You remember Steele, that they said this was state action, the union was state action
there, and so that Charlie Houston really was the father of that thing. We were the ones who
actually enforced Charlie Houston’s Steele case because Mr. Randolph put up the funds so we
could bring severa1 suits and we did make tb,ese pe0ple the most privileged southern blacks
because they got the same wages, they got as they wol:)Jd for real work. So we had a class of
leisure, and when Mr. Randolph and· I used to· go south for meetings with these people, you’d
have thought Mr. Randolph was the Second Coming. They just worshiped the ground he wruked
on. Of course, he was a great man. Well, then one day he says to me, how do I get into the
Railway Labor Executives? I said, “I don’t know a thing about it, maybe there’s some state action
there we can find.” So we filed a complaint, I think, with the Labor Department, and they
. dCCided to cave in.. The Railway Labor Executives decided to cave in and let Rm:idolph and the
Sleeping Car Porters in. Mr. Randolph called one morning and said they’re going to have a
meeting with me this evening, will you go with me? I said, “Gee, sure, I’d love to.” Well, the
Hamilton Hotel then on 14th and K, which is now a retirement home of some kind, it’s the
northeast corner of 14th and K, was sort of a labor hangout. So we went, we went to the room
we were assigned.. It was a big par]or. And there were about 20 comfortable chairs in there, and
we walked in and nobody says anything, and nobody got up to greet Mr. Randolph. who was a
great man. The chairman of that was the bead of the Brotherhood of Railway Oerks. George
Harrison, and he finally said, “Randolph. I’m glad you’re here.” And, you know, we’re looking
for a chair! And nobody got up. There were no chairs, and nobody offered to go in another room
and get even a bench to sit on. So Mr. Randolph and I were standing in a comer, and in another
side of the room is George Harrison, and the rest are all seated, all these rather, shall we say,
rotund labor executives. Well, it’s so embarrassing to be, for rile, if I had been black I wouldn’t
have been so embarrassed, but I mean, I was so embarrassed for Mr. Randolph, this beautiful
figure, a well-spoken, dignified man.
So George Harrison says to Mr. Randolph, “I understand you want to get into the
Railway Labor Executives Association.” Randolph says, “Yes, I do, we do.” And Harrison says,
“Well, the fee for a year is so-and-so,” (and it was an astronomical amount of money for the
Sleeping Car Porters, who were a small union, I think, maybe 10,000 people, about that), and Mr.
Randolph says, “We will pay our share.” There may have been one other statement, and then Mr.
Harrison says, “Well, you’re now a member. Thank you and goodnight.” And we walked out!
We never did shake a single hand of anybody in that room We walked out, and we got on the
comer opposite the Hamilton, so it would be the northwest corner, and I said, “I don’t know about
you, sir – ” He was so dignified. You didn’t call Phil, Randolph. He was really a guy, I Was
much younger and everything – I was 39, I guess – and Mr. Randolph was 60 or 70 – and so I
said, “I don’t know bow you feel, sir, but I sure need a drink.” And he said, “Mr. Raw- R-A-W-
Mr. Rauh” – cause he never could get my name straight – “Mr. Rauh, where do you suggest we
go’?” Well, this was 1950. And I said, “Well, sir, there are two places. We can go down to the
railroad station, because there was a recent case and they wouldn’t, if I make clear who you are,
they’ll serve us, or we can go to my house, where my wife will be honored to have you.” And he
said, “Mr. Rauh (Raw), we’ve just had a symbolic drink I bid you good night.” And be vanished
into the darkness. It was the most dignified thing you can imagine for this man to have really, he
thought it was undignified to come to my house as a way, because the reason being that we
couldn’t go to a normal place, and he thought it was undignified to go to the railroad station,
which was the only place in town. So that sort of bonded our friendship and we, I have a picture
ofbimon the wall them, it’s down below, see it’s right under the light switch. That’s Mr.
Randolph on his 80th birthday. And so we had beautiful relationship for many years.
A terrible thing happened in later life. I represented a man named Sadlowski in an
effort to bring union democracy to the Steelworkers Union. He ran for president against the
machinery. Well, Bayard Rustin was a – oh, 1 don’t know what you’d call him for the
Steelworkers, maybe a consultant or what, and he helped the machinery of the Steelworkers
against us. And he issued a statement by Mr. Randolph, which was very ugly, about Sadlowski,
but about me, too, that Sadlowski’s lawyer was stirring up trouble in the ]abor movement. I
knew, by then, that ?- RandoIJ)h was senile. Whether he had Alzheimer’s, the word wasn’t used
in those days. And I tried to get through to Mr. Randolph, but all the mail was not shown him or
if it was shown him he wouldn’t have been competent to deal with it. So iD the end Mr.
Randolph hurt the cause I was espousing, but I’ve never thought of him as having done anything
wrong. He was sick by that time. But he was one of the greatest men I ever met. And the story
of the relationship is really that story.
Mr. Peck: Before we leave the 1950’s, in one of the profiles of you I saw a
description that was just put cryptically as “recurring battles with J. Edgar Hoover.” Maybe you
can fill in some of the blanks there.
Mr.Rauh Well, let’s see, or try to … 1 think it’s 1950 … Max Lowenthal, a
New Dealer and a man obsessed against wiretapping, wrote a book about the FBI and Hoover. I
was opposed to wiretapping, I mean, I had all the usual ACLU complaints about Hoover. Indeed
I had given a talk in 1949, I believe it is, and I may be able to dig it out for you if you’d like to see
it, it was an attack on the FBI on civil liberties. Would you like to see it?
Mr. Peck: I would.
Mr. Rauh: Turn off the machine. [INTERRUPTION] What I just handed you
was a speech I made at the conference of what was then called the National Civil Ltberties
Clearinghouse, I believe was the name of the group. It’s no longer in existence. It was an attack
on Hoover and the FBI. And Hoover’s reaction was not exactly what you’d call friendly. He bad
a guy named Lou Nichols who was his public relations guy, and Nichols went around town
attacking me. Drew Pearson picked it up and was about to run it when Phil Graham. who was
the local Drew Pearson outlet, called him up and told bim be had rocks in bis head to listen to
crap like Nichols was spreading about me. They killed the column. But the next year, what I
was coming to, why I remember this example- I think it was the next year, Max LowenthaJ’s
book comes out. Well, you can’t believe this – it’s evidence of the rea1 fear in Washington – that
The Washington Post couldn’t have me do a book review of that without having a pro.Hoover
book review. So one Sunday morning there is in what was the Outlook [section], or the
predecessor of it, there are two book reviews. One, Hoover’s the greatest man that’s ever lived,
and the other is mine. And I thought mine was rather moderate, it was son of on the line that
Max Lowenthal had written the indictment, the question of the triaJ is still open, but I obviously
identified myself with Max. And all it was- it wasn’t even 9:00 when the phone rang. It was
Felix Frankfurter saying, “Joe, what a wonderful thing you did! You really nailed that swine
Hoover!” And I remember those words because that was a common word that Justice
Frankfurter used for people he didn’t like, and then of course I did remember that Frankfurter had
cross-examined Hoover at the Anderson case up in Boston, which was the case for the
deponation after the Fahner Red Raids. Hoover always claimed he wasn’t in the Pahner Red
Raids, but Felix always said he was, and that he cross-examined rum in the case. And I used to
tell reporters, for God’s sake,” get that c ross-examination! They would get the whole file of the
Anderson case up in Massachusetts, and it was missing. And history will never know what the
Frankfurter-Hoover thing was, except that Frankfurter said he murdered him, but] wasn’t there!
At any rate, during the day, a lot of people called. It was the big thing in Washington that day,
was these two reviews. And then J went to the football game. And I came home, and I said to
Olie, “Well, we’re out of the woods.” She said, ”what do you mean?” I said, ‘”Well, Hoover
couldn’t have done anything this afternoon because he was at the football game!” They
announced that the FBJ chief was at the football game, so I said that was a great relief. So that’s
how dumb I was. At 12:00, when the Senate met, Mr. Hickenlooper, Bourke Hickenlooper of
Jowa, I think, got up and addressed the Senate on my wrongdoings. And it was some wild kind
of an address that he made about me, and all my FBI file and cases I had, the Remington case,
this case, that case – I’d represented the Polish Supply Mission in ’46 – all of it was true!
Everything was perfect1y true! It was the adjectives that Hickenlooper added. So, those are two
examples of … and of. course, in the loyalty program period, see, this was, we already had the
loyalty program in ’49 and ’50, when in my civil liberties speech. I always said that Hoover was
solely responsible for the fact that you had this system without the right to face your accuser. I
don’t say he was responsible for having a loyalty program, but Max Lowenthal was an advisor to
Truman, very close to Truman, and he pointed this out. And Truman really wanted – I believe
this – that Truman really wanted to have a face-the-accuser rule applied, but Hoover said he
wouldn’t, I mean: Hoover just threatened and it never was in fact. You could be thrown out
without facing your accuser, until there was a case in the, Green v. McElroy, let’s see if I can find
the date of that –
[Side BJ
Mr. Rauh, The date of the case, it pretty much gave the right of confrontation,
is 1959. So that you had for that long period Hoover insisting that he would not safeguard the
United States if he had to give the names of people who came forward and gave him information.
So it was a nmning battle there and I finally got to argue that proposition in front of the Supreme
Court in 1959. There were two cases up there, and my case was declared moot It was the
Taylor case. That was the same day as the other case, but I did get to argue the proposition in
front of the Supreme Court. That was made possible by the Peters case, which is the one that
Burger had argued because of Frankfurter. Thurman Arnold was trying to knock out, Thurman
Arnold and I were in a race to see which one was going to knock out the confrontation thing first,
and Thunnan won. He was there in front of the Court in the Peters case, which is the one
[Simeon E.] Soboloff wouldn’t argue, and Frankfurter discovered a way no1 to decide the issue,
namely, that the loyalty initial board, the bottom board, had cleared Dr. Peters, and Frankfurter
says to Thurman Arnold, “Well. you were cleared down below – why don’t you argue that there’s
no right of the government to appeal? They can’t appeal from a criminal case! This is just the
same, and if it doesn’t say in the executive order, the government can appeal a verdiCt of loyalty,
why didn’t you argue that?” Arnold, with all the chutzpah in the world, says “Well, I don’t want
to win on any technical ground like that!” And Felix jams the paper down and shouts out, “We11
decide – the Court will decide which is that!”
Because they didn’t decide that case, I got a chance the year after that, I guess it
was, to argue the point in the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed with the petitioners in both of
the cases. So, I was fortunate in that regard. But there was a running battle with Hoover, and, oh
there were many things – Hoover wouldn’t – I tried to – Walter Reuther was going down to make
a big speech, and I tried to get him some protection, and Hoover just said no. I think it’s about
’49, my partner Levy and I went down to Tom Clark, the Attorney General, to ask for an
investigation of the Reuther shooting. Walter Reuther bad been shot – this was ’48, I believe –
and God knows, we don’t know to this day who did it. I mean there are so many possibilities –
the communists, the employers, the Mob, because Walter had wiped out the numbers game in the
thing. So there were plenty of possibilities. And so I was asked by the UAW, I was one of their
lawyers, would I go down there. Herb Levy and I went down to see Tom Clark. We explained
the thing, told him what we thought was the grounds for federal jurisdiction, and Tom Clark,
very agreeable always, said he would take it up with J. Edgar Hoover and let us know the·next
day if we came back. So we went back the next day, and Tom looks at us and says, “Edgar says
no. He’s not going to go in every time some nigger woman claims she got raped.” Well, we
argued with him In essence he said, “Your argument’s not with me. It’s with J. Edgar.” So I’d
say we had rather a running battle, but wherever either ofus was, the other one was on the
opposite side, and now Hoover’s getting bis comeuppance, but he’s long gone. But the books are
coming out right and left about how bad he was.
Mr. Peck: Well, is there anything else that I haven’t covered from the 19SO’s
that you want to talk about before we begin the ’60s?
Mr. Rauh: Well, I don’t think of it at the moment, but maybe you’ll see
something as you – I mean, if at any time you want to go back, I’m available for it, but I don’t –
my mind doesn’t work abstractly.
Mr. Peck: Okay. Well, you know, in 1960, another Presidential election.
You were a Humphrey supporter. I guess, by the time the convention occurred, you tried to urge
Humphrey to throw in with Kennedy, become the Vice President, but at some potD.t you were
physically blocked and actually punched by one of Humphrey’s aides to prevent you from getting
to him!
Mr. Rauh: That’s substantially accurate. My friendship with Hubert really
started in 1947, when we fonned the ADA. I met him in March of that year, ’47. We had a
Midwestern conference and he was the keynote speaker. I just fell in love with him He was
persuasive, caring; he also liked to have a good time. The first time we ever really had a talk was
at a bar in the hotel where the meeting was, but this was after the meeting was over, we spent a
few hours there, talking. He was absolutely, I thought, wonderful, and then he was very active in
the ADA. We worked together in the ’48 convention to get the minority civil rights plank. I
always hoped that one day Hube11 would be President.
There was rea1 friction inside the Humphrey camp between those, I’d say, largely
ADA-ers who wanted Hubert always to be the liberal leader and those who really wanted him to
become much more middle of the road. I think there was good faith on both sides, that they
thought that was a better way to get elected than we did, but there was some bitterness. At any
rate, Hubert’s way of handling that was to put a group together of those who believed he should
moderate and those who didn’ t. So we had a task force of maybe five, six, seven, eight people.
We’d meet and talk, and it was rather a bitter battle that went on there. But in early ’59, Hubert
said he was going to run, he was going to run as an all-out hberal and in fact, he did. We were
out in Wisconsin in March, I think the primary was there. And Kennedy beat us badly. It hurt
everybody, because Hubert was ahnost the third senator from Wisconsin. Tuey didn’t have any
Democrat, and Hubert was on their border there in Minnesota. The labor people in Wisconsin.
you’d have thought just would go all out for Hubert, but the Auto Workers in Racine, and all
these different big plants, they went their religion, not their geography. They were largely
Catholic. 111 never forget the meeting we had after the returns were in. It was about one in the
morning, and it went on for a couple of hours. The question was whether Hubert was going to
pull out that night or go on to West Virginia. He decided to go on, I don’t know, I was so mixed
up I couldn’t tell you which way I thought – we had no money, we had nothing, and here is the
smooth Kennedy machine, and it just was, we didn’t know. Well, Hubert decided to go on, and
so I said to him- there must have been 25-30 people in the room there- I said, “Well, Hubert,
don’t you think we better arrange for your homecoming to Washington tomorrow, because we
don’t want to walk in as defeated people, we want to waJk in as people cheering on to West
Virginia.” Well, somehow I was ab]e to get back from Milwaukee to Washington in the next few
hours and I didn’t go to bed and we had a rally at the airport when he came in and we went on to
West Virginia. By this. time, there were real differences in our campaign. A lot of the people
that came in for Hubert really were for Lyndon, and when we went into West Virginia we had
Bobby Byrd was on our side because he was for Johnson, and we had, it was a pretty mixed
crowd by the time we were in West Virginia. Well, the Kennedy performance in West Virginia
was nothing short of brilliant. WbB.t they did was to convince the people of West Virginia if you
voted for Humphrey you were a Protestant, anti-Catholic bigot. And so if you wanted to show
you were an honorable, non-discriminating American, you bad to vote for a Catholic in that
Protestant state. And it worked.
When we were in Humphrey’s suite that night watching the rerurns, it got to be
clear that we had lost. I remember going to the headquarters at about eight o’clock and there, we
had a big blackboard, standing next to Huben and watching him watch it, it was like torture
because it was 60-40 against us in a Protestant state, and you couldn’t believe it. Then we went
back to the hotel. Our crowd, the ADA part of it – Jim Loeb and Marvin Rosenberg and I –
wanted Hubert to pull out in favor of Kennedy aod go for the Vice Presidency. A number of
others didn’t want him to pull out – they wanted to use their leverage for Johnson. And it was a
real battle, and Hubert sided with us. And Jim Loeb was at the typewriter and wrote the – he
was the first director of the ADA and he wrote the concession statement. It was a very nice
statement. Well, I got on the telephone to Kennedy’s headquarters and read it to Bobby, and he
couldn’t have been more delighted with it. He was, of course, the enemy. Everybody in our
camp hated him – he was a tough guy. At any rate, that was one of the few battles we won in that
campaign was to have Hubert be gracious to the Kennedys because we really hoped he’d be Vice
A few minutes later, we were watching television and there must have been 50
people in the sui te and the telephone rings from down below. And I’m standing next to it then, so
I picked it up, and the hotel clerk says “Mr. Kennedy is on the way up.” So I simply announced
that. Of course, everybody thought it was Jack. Only I look and there’s Jack live on television.
So I knew this was going to be Bobby and I knew how much everybody in that room hated his
guts. I didn’t know ·what was going to happen. The door opens and Bobby walks in and it’s like
the Red Sea parting, because Hubert and Muriel wer.e at the other end of the room- and Bobby
walks down this new conidor that’s been made and I couldn’t tell- Muriel hated him more than
anybody else, I think – and he leans in and gives Muriel a kiss. And I didn’t know if she was
going to sock him or what. God, it was awful Anyway, the tension finally broke and Bobby
asked ifwe wouldn’t, if Hubert and a few of his top aides there wouldn’t come over to their
headquarters. So we did, and Hubert was very nice with Jack that night and Jack was very nice
with all ofus. There wasn’t too much hard feeling. The show was over, but going back on the
plane the next day, Hubert opened his heart to Mary McGrory that he hadn’t been able to keep his
people together, that he hadn’t done a good job.
Those ofus who wanted Hubert really to be President tried to get him the Vice
Presidency and we kept at it. I thought I had Huben’s ear, that he was willing to do it. But I
think I was wrong. I think that Lutheran base all around there – there was a real anti•Catholic
feeling, and Hubert wasn’t going to be the Vice President on that ticket. I didn’t know all that at
the time. I kept in good touch with Sorensen and Feldman – they were really the two top staff
people. I was for KeODedy, and we went to the convention. We had won the primary here
[D.C.J, the Humphrey crowd had won the primary so we were all delegates. I was there and the
Vice Presidency had not been agreed upon yet. On June 10th, about, there was a fundraiser for
George McGovern for Senate from South Dakota and when Kennedy finished speaking, be
motioned to me to come outside with him I did. He said, “Will you ride back to the Capitol
with me?” I said, “Certainly, if you want.” On the way he said, “Your friend Jimmy Wechsler is
going to kill my chances to be President of the United States tomorrow by printing a story that I
am not physically ab]e to be President because of this disease and that … ” and he gave me a
long medica1 thing that I didn’t fully understand. It was obvious he was asking me for help with
Jimmy, who was one of my best friends. I said I would call Jinnny, and I said, ”Will you just
give me enough now, repeat enough so that I know what I should say, so I can simply tell this to
Jimmy and say will you take another look at the story before it goes out.” Well, he did and we
were getting fairly close to the Capitol by now. And it was silent for a minute. I said, “Well,
since I’m going to do this, and since I’m for you, do you think I’m entitled to know your intentions
on the Vice Presidency? I’ve told you many times I’m for Hubert. What is your intention?” And
he said – I wrote this down, it’s in my book in the hbrary. I wrote it down because it was no1 an
unimportant statement for a guy who was going to be the nominee – he said, “Joe, it will be
either Hubert Humphrey or another Midwestern h’beral.” In my opinion, he was thinking of
Orville Freeman at that moment, and Orville thinks so, too. Orville may someday write his book,
ahnost to the nomination or something; it would have been almost to the Presidency. At any rate,
I thought that was a fine answer. So I reported that to Hubert, of course. And I thought that
when he came out there to the convention he was really going to, there was a chance he would be
the Vice President.
Well, I had some reason for wanting to see him to report something. And I went
to the hote] headquarters where he was and I felt something in the air was – there was something
wrong. I couldn’t tell what it was, but I wasn’t what you’d call greeted as the loyal aide. There
was a sort of snickering in the air, and they said they didn’t know where he was. Well, I decided
to just, I left, and I was walk..ing down the ball and I heard him. And I thought I was welcome, so
I knocked on the door, and a fellow -Pat O’Connor- came to the door, and, I was just not
thinking, I just sort of walked by him to go in the door. I didn’t think there was anything wrong
with that. And I said – and then he did swing at me and I said, “what’s going on?” I had a
briefcase and I put it down. I was about to fight when another door opens, and it’s Jim Rowe
looking at that door and then slamming it shut and then he went in the other door and slarrnned it
shut. So I just walked away. I didn’t, there was no fight, there was one blow struck – and I
walked away and I couldn’t figure it and then I said oh my God, Johnson’s in that room And of
course that’s the way it was. Hubert came out for Stevenson and thereby ended any Vice
Presidentia1 ambitions. It was then down to I guess Freeman or Johnson, and he took Johnson
and you know how the story goes – I did say in front of 40 million people that there was a
double-cross which, if you believe my meeting, it was, he said to me it was between Hubert or
another Midwestern liberal It was. I guess that’s the story.
Mr. Peck: Right. Well, in his discussion with Johnson, Humphrey made the
deal to support Stevenson on the first ballot and then if there were subsequent ballots he would
throw support to Jolmson, wasn’t that it?
Mr. Raub: I can’t answer that. I mean, I wasn’t in on it then. With Hubert for
Stevenson and I was really working with Kennedy people. I was on the drafting committee of the
platform committee, and we were just, they just gave us Bobby Kennedy’s orders were to the
platform committee, what’s his name, Chet Bowles was the chairman, to give the civil rights
movement what it wants on this platform, so J really wasn’t in on the – . Once Hubert had
declared for Stevenson, it ended any chance of his being Vice President, J don’t think J saw him
again at the convention. So I really don’t know what the deal was ever. I do know that
Humphrey and Johnson were in the room when this event that J described occurred. That’s the
last I knew of the thing.
Well, Hubert, we made up and we were friends again and we were friends in ’64
with the Freedom party and I would say that Hubert acted much nicer than his assistants did
about the Freedom party thing. I would say that his conduct on that was as fine a political act as
ever happened in my lifetime. I went to see him every night before I went to bed at the
convention and always said, “Hubert, you gotta give us some more! You can’t, you gotta give
more!” And he’d say, “Joe this-” and we argued a bit. He never once said, “Look, Joe, go
ahead and let me have it. I’ll be the Vice President. Sometime I can help you.” He wasn’t within
a mile of saying anything like that. I just thought it was a beautiful thing that he didn’t. There
was some ugliness with his associates who said I was keeping him from being Vice President by
standing with the Freedom party. The time was for them to cave in, and so forth. I said we never
will and there has been an historical dispute about what, whether we won or lost. I think history
will someday make perfectly clear there was a great victory and that’s one of the reasons why
you’ve got the ’64, ’65 and ’68 Jaws. But Hubert’s conduct there I thought was, in fact, I had have
many fights with the Humphrey people. I never had a fight, really, with Hubert. I just have the
highest respecl for him We did disagree during the war period there from ’64 to ’68. But, I think
Hubert’s heart was with us even while he was so scared of Johnson, he did some things that he
shouldn’t have. He was a beautiful human being.
Mr. Peck: Before we leave the ’60 convention, you considered trying to do
some sort of floor fight over the Vice Presidency. You chose not to do that.
Mr. Rauh: Well, it was ridiculous. If you think we made fools of ourselves,
you’d have thought we made real fools of ourselves jf we had gone any farther. I’ll tell how we
were saved. They were having a roll call for nominations, and Hubert was nominated, I can’t
remember which state yielded to who – now wait a minute, I want to get this right. Johnson was
nominated by, I can’t remember, I guess Texas probably did it, although I don’t remember it
exactly. When we got to Massachusetts, John McConnick moved – and it took two-thirds – that
we suspend the rules and nominate Johnson by acclamation. That saved us because it passed, so
there never really was any effort to nominate somebody against Johnson. We were opposed to
Johnson, but I don’t remember anybody saying, “Well, let’s run X,” because I don’t know where
you’d have got X from. You couldn’t run Humphrey anymore, that would have been a negative, I
mean, you couldn’t. I think, like Buchanan, it was a protest vote. It wasn’t even a vote. It was a
protest noise that we were making, but I’m telling you that it would have been going in a cage
with a lion for us to really put anybody up. Who could you put up? There wasn’t anybody there
that was going to stand up and oppose Johnson. So there was never any real fight. There was
temDle disappointment, and a lot of the liberals were quite angry because we had always
promised tbem that it wouldn’t be Johnson, but there it was.
Mr. Peck: Well, also in 1960, you had two D.C. Circuit cases. One was
Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 873 (D.C. 1960), and the other was Shelton v. United States 280 F.2d
701 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Mr. Rauh: Porter v. Herter was a good case. Charlie Porter was a radical
from Oregon, Eugene, Oregon. Lovely guy. And he wanted to go to China Of course, the rules
were you couldn’t get a passport to go to China. So we brought suit and there just wasn’t any
substantial – 1 really thought we had a chance of winning it in the Supreme Court, whether you
won in a court of appeals was who your panel was, I mean, we were still in the stage where you
got the right panel, you can still win a pretty far out case like the Schachtman thing and so forth.
Do you remember who our panel was?
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
I didn’t write it down, bU.t I –
Because I can’t remember it.
Mr. Rauh:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
February 28, 1992
Last time, we were tallcing about the Third Annual Conference on
Civil Liberties. Tiris was before the ACLU was in civil rights. 1bis was the best illustration of
the fact that the ACLU had a separate conference going on civil hberties from that of the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. I don’t know which came first, the chicken or the egg,
but the ACLU moved over to civil rights, too, so they didn’t need the civil liberties clearinghouse
or the civil hberties clearinghouse sort of passed away. Everything went into the Leadership
Conference because now, you know, the Leadership Conference takes an awful lot of positions
that are straight civil liberties positions although they may affect blacks a litt1e bit more than
whites. They are pretty straight examples of what we would in the old days have called a civil
hOerties rather than civil rights position. I really gave you this for two reasons: one was it was
probably the first shot at [J. Edgar] Hoover that came out of anybody that wasn’t a Communist;
and secondly, it evidenced the split inside the ACLU where they were only dealing with civil
bberties matters. I must have been right about the transition period.
Mr. Peck: I think so. Just for purposes of the tape, this was the Third Annual
Conference on Civil Liberties in Washington on February 24, 1950. When we left off last time
we were talking about Porter v. Herter (278 F.2d 280 (DC Cir. 1960)] and one of the questions
you asked me which I didn’t have the answer to then was, “Who was on the panel?” The opinion
was a per curium, with a panel consisting of Judge Burton who was retired at the time and sitting
by designation; Danaher and Bastian were also on the panel.
Mr. Rauh: Boy, as lucky as I was in the Kohler case, how unJucky could you
be? Good God ahnighty. It’s a wonder anybody was talkiag to me after that What a lousy
panel. Anyway, I can’t remember the degree we went into it, but it was a terrible opinion. They
didn’t hit the real issue at all. There’s a great separation of powers issue there, keeping
Congressmen from learning about a foreign country there. There was no real security. Boy it
was murder, but they wouldn’t take cert. Charlie Porter, who was the guy who brought the suit, is
a great guy. I don’t know if you know him, probably ACLU of Eugene, Oregon, he would be
active with. He’s our type. You just couldn’t break through with a man like that. You couldn’t
get cert. But we were right. My God, what extremes can the Executive bar Congress fromwouldn’t
it take something more than the reasons they were putting forward then which rather
escapes my memory right now, something more than that to bar a congressman from going to
Jook up a problem that he considers important. Of course, Charlie was always, rmean he would
have like I was, for letting China into the United Nations and all that kind of thing. So ifhe
wanted to go and discuss that with the Chinese, I didn’t see how they could possibly stop him I
always thought we could have won the case because] reckoned without a) that panel, and b) the
Supreme Court’s willingness to duck that problem at that time. I doubt that you can do that right
now, bar a Congressman from going somewhere ifhe had a legitimate reason for wanting to
investigate a reasonable point.
Mr. Peck: It would seem that it would have to qualify for the kind of
exception of trading with the enemies or something like that to be able to bar it.
Mr. Rauh: But there was nothing there. You could have said something about
this guy’s a Communist and he’s going to do something that would hurt the country. There was
no such suggestion. Charlie was a good radical guy. I don’t even think he was much interested in
the corrnnunist issue at that. He was interested in getting China into world affairs. I guess you
could say he was just about exactly where Nixon was a few years Jater when he went over there
and broke the thing up.
Mr. Peck: The other case that you had that went to the D.C. Circuit that year
was Shelton v. United States [280 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1960)] which of course came back to the
D.C. Circuit again in ’63 [327 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1963)]. When you were there in 1960 your
panel consisted of Warren Burger, Washington and Bastian.
Mr. Rauh: Gee, I wasn’t drawing too hot in those days. Shelton was the guy
who was a mistake. They were ]ooking for a fellow nmned Willard She]ton who was a radical
writer and may have been in some connnunist organization. 1 don’t meao the party. I mean
something that had some communist-tinged contro] or something. I guess when he got to the
Times, they hau1ed him up, and they found out there was something there. But it was by
accident. We fmally had to go the Supreme Court. My memory is weak on that case.
Mr. Peck In 1960, when it came before the D.C. Circuit, the question was
because he was a member of the press whether there was a special innmmity for the press under
the First Amendment. And Burger wrote this opinion saying that there is none, and that
Congress certainly had a right to do that because there were allegations of Communist infiltration
of the press. Then it went back down to the district court, and I’m not sure exactly what the
.intervention of the Supreme Court was. It eventually went back up to the D.C. Circuit in ’63
where, this time, you had Wright and Washington voting with you and Wilbur Miller dissenting.
They reversed the conviction at this point. The issue had been narrowed to refusing to answer
two questions in front of the Internal Security Subcommittee in 1956. The questions being: “Are
you, Sir, a member of the Communist party U.S.A.?” and “Did you ever have any conversations
with Matilda Lansman?” And what they found was that the delegation of respollSlbility in the
statute to the chairman for issuing the subpoenas was just a ministerial duty, and it still required
the entire conmittee to have voted to actually issue the subpoena. Since that did not happen and
since the actual appearance of the Committee at the hearing did not ratify the subpoena, therefore
it had been improperly sought.
Mr. Rauh: They sure wanted to duck the issues in that case. Qaughter)
Mr. Peck: They did.
Mr. Rauh: It’s funny when you remember stuff like that. You know you work
hard to get the court to do something like say there’s a right of free speech, that this has been
violated, and they put it on some asinine ground like that. Isn’t that wonderful! How the court
can run away like that, I don’t know. It reminds me so much of the Miller case, where Arthur
Miller refused to answer. He refused to make any reason for it except his First Amendment
rights, and then they said he hadn’t been ordered to answer. I’m still laughing about that result.
Mr. Peck: Yes, it did remind me of that.
Mr. Rauh: Didn’t it. It sounds almost exactly like it. They just run from,
when you try, that’s part of your job now, it seems to me, it must be, to try to get them to go as far
as you can when they’re trying to go as little as they can and it’s kind of ironic that I’m a
Frankfurter disciple who doesn’t accept Frankfurter’s principle that you never decide anything if
you can put it on a lesser ground.
Mr. Peck: lt certainly was judicial gymnastics for them to do it that way. The
next case in the D.C. Circuit was in 1961 Neisloss v. Bush [293 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1961)). This
was over the New York Central Railroad being acquired by Allegheny.
Mr. Rauh: Oh, yes.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Trying to force an ICC investigation of it.
Who was that guy, Randy Phillips? Rather a nutty investor.
That’s right.
We were talcing on the whole financia1 world in that case. I don’t
know. I wonder what’s ever happened to good old Randy. llis was really a bombshell of some
kind, but I think it exploded in our faces, not in theirs. Didn’t Tom Clark or someone sit on the
Mr. Peck: It was Stanley Reed who sat.
Mr. Rauh: Oh, I knew there was a Supreme Court Judge. Yes, Stanley Reed
sat there. I can’t remember him ever asking anything; he just sat there. Who wrote the opinion
against me?
Mr. Peck: It was Reed.
Mr. Rauh: I don’t remember how we were_ upsetting the financia1 world, but I
do remember Randy kept telling me that I really was not very good at that case. I never have
really felt at borne in a financia1 case or a corporate case. There were sometimes hberal aspects
to it. That’s what gets you into it. But I really didn’t have a capacity for that case. And Phillips
was a lawyer, too. And he used to tell me a lot of things to do but I (]aughter), usually, avoided
his advice. God, I’d forgotten the case – it’s the Allegheny Holding Company he was after.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
That’s right. Tuey bought the railroad, and he was a shareholder –
Shareholder –
– he was trying to get the ICC to look at all this …
We never could get them. The ICC was more monbund than, well,
they were moribund (laughter). Let’s just put it that way.
Mr. Peck: Also· in ’61, Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association
International v. National Mediation Board (294 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1961)]. This was a case
involving whether the airline pilots union could also try and represent the stewards and
Mr.Rauh: Yes, and we claimed that they had used pressure on the leaders of
the stewardesses. (Laughter) A stewardess said on the stand .that the guy from the pilots union
said, “Aw, come on now, sister, don’t get your tits in a wringer.” That was there on the stand. I
was so surprised when that came out. She hadn’t told me she was going to say that. She
probably figured I was an old prude and would have told her she couJdn’t talk that way. But
anyway, they held for the bigger union. The pilots said the stewardesses didn’t have the right to
their own union which seemed to be rather silly. Did I draw as badly again?
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Edgerton, Washington and –
That wasn’t so bad.
– let’s see, I’m trying to read my own handwriting here, Danaher.
Danaher was a conservative Republican from Connecticut. He was
a Senator from Connecticut. Washington was middle of the road. That was a fairly good panel
but I guess I couldn’t persuade that one. We’d shown enough – enough pressure on the
stewardesses that the vote was unfair.
Mr. Peck: The following ye ar in a case – Local 883, VA WIAFL-CTO v. NLRB,
in which Louis Pollak [300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962)] was your co-counsel –
Mr. Rauh: That’s a big case. That’s Kohler. That’s a very big case. That went
on for years. There were two issues in front of the court of appeals there. Ifl remember, and
here I remember a lot better becauSe it went on longer. One was whether there bad been an
unfair labor practice and that was Pollak’s side of it. I argued what was harder- that the violence
done by the union people that they wouldn’t reinstate was violence against Kohler’s outrageous
conduct and shouldn’t have prevented them from ordering reinstatement with back pay. Tuey did
order the reinstatement of almost all the strikers, including those who had been guilty of some
form of violence, but not the extreme where they couldn’t order them. It was a total victory.
Then we got more and more people reinstated and I lhink. I showed you the check, or I told you
about the check because we have another check there [on the wall]. I thought the checks were
mixed up. That’s right. That was an exciting period. I think that argument was on Rosh
Hashanah, whichever year it was . What’s the year you said that it was?
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
’62 was when the decision was made.
Well, it could have been ’61.
The people said, “I’ve got to work on Rosh Hashanah.” I said,
“Yes,” and they said, “Well, what are we going to do?” I said, “Well, I was going to go to
Temple the night before and pray for Bazelon as my chief judge.” I don’t know whether my
prayers were heard, but Bazelon was the chief judge there. I think there was — he had Edgerton
Mr. Peck: That’s right.
Mr. Rauh: My prayers were really answered there. They wrote a wonderful
decision in which they not oDly gave us the unfair labor practice part that Pollak had argued, but
they set up a really changed rule that you have to weigh the wrongdoing of the company against
the wrongdoing of the employee in the violence field. They’d adjust atitomatically some
violences – not keep them- give them the right to refuse to give you your job back. No, I’m very
proud of that result. We ultimately did settle that strike. There was a rather humorous aspect of
that. That was that after everybody’s back at work, apparently the union and Kobler got so
dubby that the Labor Board went after them for mistreatment of soinebody who was against the
union. I mean it got rather clubby after awhile there.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
The third member of the panel that time was Miller who dissented –
He dissented. It was two to one.
Well, in 1963, I understand you were instrumental in getting the
UAW to help put up bail money for Martin Luther King in Birmingham
Mr. Rauh: I was part of that. I would say I was not the most important factor.
The most important factor was the telephone call from Bobby Kennedy to Walter Reuther.
Kennedy and I were playing the same side of that. Reuther then raised – we needed $160,000, I
believe, to get bail for the remaining people. In other words, a lot of them were out. A lot of the
people that Bull Connor had put in jail were out, but there were bail requirements that amounted
to $160,000 to get everybody else out. King said he wouldn’t settle while there were any people
still in confinement. So between Bobby Kennedy and me, we persuaded Reuther to arrange for
the money. I would say that I was the minor factor in that. The major factor was Bobby
Kennedy, of course .. Reuther got promises from- he, tumself, put up one-quarter of it – the
Steelworkers put up one-quarter- the AFL-CIO put up one-quarter, and I can’t recall who put up
the last fowth. It’s in one of those books – Garrow or the otber one, Hoehling. We had to
move the money down there, and it was pretty hard. There was a man, Erskine Smith, who was
acting as lawyer for the blacks who were in confinement, and for King and the others, and we
talked pretty much through the night about the ways of getting it through. And I remember
during the conversation he said, “Are you who I think you are?” I said, “Well, I’m a civil rights
lawyer.” He said, “Yeah, I better not tell who I’m negotiating with up in Washington. It may
make things a little more strained” And I said, “Wouldn’t they be pleased to know that the
money is coming from Walter?” He said, “Oh, God, no, don’t say that!” Anyway, Smith and I
became telephone friends that night when we were figuring out how to get the dough down there
in the morning. Anyway, we did get the money there, and they were let out on bail. And we got
all the money back. It took a couple years, but we did get all the money back. I think all they
lost was the interest on the money. Credit really should go most of all to Walter Reuther and a
degree to Bobby Kennedy. They wanted it settled and they got it settled. To King too, because
King could have said, “Oh w?ll, we’ll call it off.” King’s role in that was very honorable, very
Mr. Peck: Well, I think that talces us to 1964. That was a busy year. The
debate on the Civil Rights Act began January 31st and after the debate began, I’ve read that you
were seated in the House Gallery with Nicholas Katzenbach, Burke Marshall and Clarence
Mitchell to watch it begin.
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
‘This is in the House of Representatives?
That’s right.
I don’t know if you’re interested in any of these things, but there’s a
very good account of this thing in a lx>ok that’s just come out. It’s called Calculated Visions –
Kennedy, Johnson And Civil Rights. It’s written by a man named Mark Stern. a professor at
Central Aorida, published by the Rutgers University Press just about two weeks ago. The
university presses don’t seem to get much coverage in the press. The best account so far of the
three bills, the ’64, ’65 and ’68, and what went into them is in this book. I’ll tell you anything you
want about it, but I just want to say there’s a better account there than my memory, because this
guy really did a lot of work. He interviewed a lot of people.
We did get it through the House unscathed. Toe bill that had come out of the
committee got through the House really unscathed. Toe fact is, I think, it was actually
strengthened on the House floor. It passed quite unanimously. I say there were 150 votes against
it, but those are voles that you could have counted against us at the very beginning. They were
Southerners mostly. I can’t remember the exact number, but it was quite a one•sided affair.
There were many interesting sidelights to that debate. Number ot?e, the only real ugly part of the
debate was put on by Howard Smith of Virginia, the head of the Rules Committee, who said, “I
go into a hotel and” – I don’t know what he ca11ed it, a black something, – “goes into a hotel, and
the chiropodist in the hotel has got to deal with these smelly feet.” Now remember, if you were
to look that up you might not fmd it, because of the re·write of the Congressional Record by the
person who spoke. But I heard that.
However, it was rat her a decent debate- it was rather well done and I didn’t get
much feeling of hatred out of either side. Toe most interesting thing that happened was Howard
Smith moved to amend Title VIl to put in the word .§g. If you looked around out at our crowd,
you’d have thought we were about to be castrated. Everybody was scared to death The women
on the floor were wonderful. They took it up and said how great it was, and those poor bastards
bad put that in for the way it was going to hurt the bill. It only strengthened the bill. All we had
to do was to keep our own mouths shut for a few hours and the women on the floor took care of
that guy. Anyway it passed and, in my book, it’s a good example, of which there are many, of
where the black fight for legal rights rubbed off on others – women, Hispanics, ethnics.
Just to quickly give you two other examples of this same thing: In 1941, I was
working at the Office for Emergency Management and the Lend-Lease Administration. These
were both “prepare-for-war” organizations. One day I went down there to my office and my
secretary said, “Mr. [Wayne] Coy,” who was head of the Office for Emergency Management,
“wants you right away.” His office was in a different building but I ran over there. He said, “Can
you write an Executive Order?” I said, “Any jackass could write an Executive Order, what do
you want-in it, Wayne?” He said, “Well, the President wants by tomorrow morning an Executive
Order barring discrimination in the new war plants. There’s a fellow nained A. Philip Randolph
that’s threatened to march on Washington ifhe doesn’t get this. And the President doesn’t want a
march on Washington. He doesn’t want an Executive Order either, but as between those two, he
wants an Executive Order.” I said, “It so happens that this is a cinch to do because we have been
– I’ve been working with some of the White House people, like Ben Cohen, on an Executive
Order that would do that for violators of the National Labor Relations Act. That if you were a
violator of the National Labor Relations Act, even while you were in the court of appeals, you
couldn’t have a new contract with the government.” And so I said, “It’s really quite easy. Toe
lega1 theory is if you’re .buying goods, by God, you could put some conditions on it.” So he said,
“Oh, that’s great. Toe Budget Bureau,” which was in the same building as be was, “is waiting for
you because they’ve got some samples of Executive Orders and they can help you look up stuff if
you need it, but I’ve got to have the thing in the morning.” I said, “Well, it won’t be hard.” So I
was going out the door, and I had just shut the door when I heard Wayne shout, “Come on back.”
And I went back, and he said, “Don’t forget the Poles.” I said, “What do you mean?” He said,
“Well, the President has had a couple of calls from Buffalo about Poles not getting jobs in the
new war plants and,” he says, “as long as he’s caving in to A. Philip Randolph, we might as well
take care of the Poles.” So that’s where it used to read in the state statutes that we were working
with: “no discrimination on account of race, creed or color.” This was the first time it said “no
discriminating on account of race, creed, color, or national origin.”
Historians galore have asked me where did I get “national origin” from. I don’t
know, but if I had to try to guess where it comes from, it must ·be from the irmnigration statutes.
But I can’t swear so. I’ve had historians galore wanting to know where national origin came
from. It’s not a bad word for it, though …
Mr. Peck: No. Not at all.
Mr. Rauh: So that’s your ethnic discrimination where the blacks in ’41 did it.
Theo, you have the sex one in the 1964 statute. Then you have other cases – the Voting Rights
Act was broadened in ’82 to include the Hispanics. The blacks have never fully had the credit
they deserve for what they did to this country on the legal revolution because it applied not only
to themselves, but to ethnics, women, other minorities, aged, and disabled. I a1ways like to tell
the sex story on Howard Smith, what he did for his country unknowingly and unwittingly
(laughter) and UDintentionally.
Mr. Peck: Well, as the House was debating the Civil Rights Act, on February
10th with the end of the debate in sight, you got a call from the White House asking about the
Mr. Rauh: A young roan – then 14 – nained Sandy Newman, who now runs a
thing called Project Vote where he registers people to vote in food lines, unemployment lines,
and people who would naturally vote Democratic – he registers them, and he was our go-fer
young man, and he came to the Gallery with a message that the White House was trying to reach
Clarence and me. I got a hold of Clarence and we went to the pay-phone down in the House and
called the White House. Toe·President said, “What are you guys doing down there?” “Well,” we
said, “it’s about to end, 1\1r. President.” He says, “\Vell, this is what you’ve gotta do. You’ve
gotta go over and see Mansfield (the Majority Leader) and tell him that we’ve got to take it up
just as soon as we can and that I don’t want any legislatiori to interfere with this. We are going to
let th.em fihDuster until they’re tired and then we’re going to get the bill.” I don’t know whether
Mansfield really liked getting those orders from a dark fellow named Clarence Mitchell and a
radical fellow named Joe Rauh, but it all worked out exactly the way the President had instructed
us. I don’t know why, to this day I’ve never figured out why he sent Clarence and me as
messenger boys when he could have used the telephone or sent somebody a lot higher up in the
hierarchy but we did have that conversation with Mansfield that afternoon.
M,_ Peck: Now LBJ didn’t want the bill strengthened, but he did promise not
to buckle under to a filibuster.
Mr. Raub: That’s exactly right. In one of the meetings with Johnson, Clarence
and I asked about whether it would be good strategy to try to get some more. He said no, but he
said in the same breath, that he wouldn’t allow and that he was against any cloture vote ‘1Iltil we
had the two-thirds. That was the strategy. A couple of times they were mentioning – we used to
have meetings every Thursday with the Senate leadership on the bill in Hwnpbrey’s office. Toe
liberals on both sides of the aisle, l:iecause there were some liberals then on the Republican side –
Cliff Case, Jack Javicz, and some others – we used to have meetings. Somebody brought up,
“Let’s see what – let’s inquire what they want in return for votes on the cloture.” Clarence hit the
ceiling be was so mad. Because up until then we’d had no trouble and he said, ‘The blacks have
been waiting for three hundred years for this moment and you” – I don’t remember who he was
pointing to but me Oaughter) – “and now you say that we shou1d compromise. We’re not going
to compromise, and you’re not going to go out – . ” Hubert said, “Corne on, Clarence, you’re three
feet off your chair. Cahn down. We’re not going to go for cloture until we’ve got the votes.” We·
didn’t go for cloture unt? they had the votes. We actually had more votes than we needed. Not
only did we have more than 67 on the record, but we had one vote that — I’ll never forget this
vote. Jolmson – we were reporting to Jolm.son all the time and he was telling us what he’d do.
This was that old guy from Arizona, what’s his name? Carl Hayden! Carl Hayden of Arizona
He was older than God, and he had never voted for cloture, and he never would vote for cloture.
He promised Johnson that if his vote was needed he wou.Jd vote for cloture. Well, he sat in the
cloak room and waited and when we went over the 67, he came in and the Clerk shouts out, “The
Senator from Arizona?” and Hayden says, “No.” And we were always indebted to Hayden. Well
he’d promised Johnson that he would say yes, so we had actually more than we did – the
percentage worked so well that we were able to wait not only until we not only had the 67, but
we had- I’m not exactly right – but there may have been 71 who voted for cloture that day. And
then, of course, after cloture, they can bring up amendments, but we didn’t lose any of them
Mr. Peck: Now, Hwnphrey told you the secret of passage was in the prayer
groups. What did he mean by that?
Mr. Rauh: I think he meant the religious connnunity. I forgot that he said
that, but I would have said that back then. The real change that occurred in that year – ’64, ’63 –
the real change was in the religious connnunity. I like to tell the story that in ’63, after [President
John] Kennedy sent up the bill, and the bill was pending in the full [Judiciary] Connnittee,
Clarence and I used to stand outside of the full committee and urge people to vote in our favor. I
think I may be wrong; it may have been pending in the subcommittee – subcommittee five which
gave us everything we wanted – it may have been pending there. At aDY rate, Ciarence and I
always stood outside there and as people walked in, we got to know the Congressmen and
Senators in their meetings, and we urged them to vote our way. I’ve always said that the time I
knew that America was changing was when 21 of the most beautiful Episcopal ministers lined up
outside. That was a very, very telling moment. It wasn’t a radical white and a black guy urging
them to vote with us. It was the Establishment, and I’ll never forget those guys. Let’s see, that’s
’63. It’s ahnost 30 years ago. They were about 30; they are about in their ’50s or ’60s now. I
don’t know where they are, but that was one of the most touching scenes that I have ever seen.
As these Congressmen cmne in, they didn’t know what was hitting them They’d never seen
anything like this. Th.is was the Establishment speaking to them You know, a guy would say,
‘Tm a minister from your district.” He’d say, “Well, what church are you?” and somebody would
say, “Episcopal,” and so and so. This guy began to wake up and if that’s what you meant – that’s
what I would have meant by the same thing. I usually say it was the religious community, but he
might have called them the prayer committee. I just don’t remember that word exactly.
Mr. Peck: Now, I understand not everything was harmonious at the signing
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Oh, l think you may have two of the bills mixed uj,.
I can’t think of anything that happened at the signing of the ’64 Jaw.
Everybody was treated very nicely. Johnson gave me a pen and said something very flattering,
“It couldn’t have been done without me.” I didn’t get any such feeling. If you are referring to the
Voting Rights Act of’65, a thing that happened there was Johnson turned the signing over to the
House. The preparations were made by the House Sergeant at .Arms and that was that crazy
bastard who used to shout out, “Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States.” I can’t
remember his name but he was famous. And he arranged the seating for the signing, and that
was in a big room and we were all invited in. He also arranged for the signing in front of a very
few people. I don’t know why that h appened. Clarence’s name wasn’t on the list and Andy
Biemiller’s [of the AFL-CIO] name wasn’t on it. I wasn’t surprised [to be Jeft out] when I
represented a lot less people than Andy Bierniller and Clarence Mitchell. It never occurred to me
that there was anything bad about it. But Clarence ahnost died. That he shouldn’t be there at that
moment just shook him Andy Biemiller was so mad be cou1d taste it, and he wrote a letter to
complain. I don’t know whether it was to Larry O’Brien, or the President. But I went up to
Katzenbach right there in the middle while people were going in the room and said, “You can’t
do this to Clarence. You’ve got to straighten this out.” And I came pretty close to – I tried to
bold back. Katzenbach had a say in this thing – he was in there giving it – I guess Bobby bad
resigned as Attorney General. I just went up to him and said, “You can’t do this to Clarence.” I
didn’t for Andy or for myself or for anybody else, but I said, “You can’t do this to Clarence.”
Well, I don’t know bow it was, but there is a picture in this book of – that I saw – showing the
actual signing. A picture in Marge Stem’s book of the actual signing, and it shows Clarence very
dose to the President. So that’s the first time I actually knew how close he’d gotten inside, but
that may be what you are referring to. I know nothing about any ill feeling during the ’64 signing.
Mr. Peck: I’m not sure where I got that.
Mr. Rauh: I think it could be this. Andy did write a hot letter, and he got an
apology. Oh, and we all got pens in the mail with a letter from the President, or from Larry
O’Brien, I’m not sure who it was. I do n’t think there was anything to it. I just think-what’s that
crazy fellow’s name that was the doorman and –
Mr. Peck: This wasn’t Fishbait Miller, was it?
Mr. Rauh: Yes. That’s the guy. I was trying to think of his name. Fishbait
really had that thing screwed up. But I don’t think there was any venality in it. Fishbait probably
would have thought Clarence was another doorman or something. He doesn’t know what the
beck was going on there. So that was the real thing. Anyway, Andy couldn’t get over it. I never
thought anything of it, but Clarence was the one who never would have gotten over it.
Mr. Peck:
party delegates.
Mr. Rauh:
This brings us to the ’64 convention and the Mississippi Freedom
Why don’t you take this?
Mr. Peck: Okay.
Mr. Rauh: Use any part of it you think is relevant. I’ll tell you the story as I
know it, but that may help you. Will you mail that back to me when you’re finished with it?
‘Cause it’s the first time I’ve seen someone sort of take exactly my side of the story. Many have
given me more than my due and then there are some – . What happened in the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic party – I have a half-an-hour if you have.
Mr. Peck: I’ve got whatever time you need.
Mr.Rauh It was the Civil Liberties Clearinghouse. Was it still going on in
1963? I can’t make sure now whether it was a meeting of the Oearingbouse on Civil Liberties or
the Leadership Conference. At any rate, I was the head of a panel to talk on politics and civil
hberties. After they all spoke, Bob Moses arose from the audience and told about the plan to
bring in a challenging delegation from Mississippi, and what did the panel think of it? Well, I
was deliriously happy, thinking that we could make some progress here. I responded and said, “I
think it’s the greatest idea you could possibly have. It’s going to be a lousy convention. There
isn’t going to be any fights at the convention. Johnson’s going to be renominated automatically.
This is wonderful. It gives us a chance to air civil rights.” So Bob came around and asked me to
be their counsel; that’s how I happened to be their counsel And we wrote the brief. It’s a Jong
[Side BJ
Mr. Rauh: It [ the idea of a freedom delegation] catches fire. People line up in
support of us. But Johnson doesn’t want a fight at the convention. He’s got the black vote on this
bill he signed on Ju]y 2nd. He doesn’t want to lose the South, so he’s on the other side. There
was still some feeling over at the White House that -for us. Kenny O’Donnell was very
sympathetic. He had to act the other way, but he called up one morning and he said,” _ you,
you don’t know what you’ve done now!” And I said, “What have I done now?” He said, “Toe
Massachusetts delegation came out for you last night. The Massachusetts delegation is going to
vote for your crowd at the convention. You know who was one of those leading the fight? It
was my sister!” (Laughter) I said, “Well, it serves you good and right – you’re on the wrong
side.” We remained very good friends after that. But Johnson didn’t want it. Johnson was a man
who believed every man has his price. I think it was Robert Warrick, the British Parliament
member, who once said that every man has his price and Johnson believed that. So what would
you do if you were trying to have me go in the iank? You would gei my best friend in politics,
Hubert Humphrey, and my best client in the law, Walter Reuther, and have them tell me. Well,
that’s exactly what he did. And whenever I said anything about the thing ihat got in the papers,
I’d get two phone calls. The first one would be from Walter Reuther. Very seriously, Walter
would say, “Joe, the President’s so angry. You’ve got to be more careful,” and he didn’t want me
in it anyway. Because, see, I was Walter’s general counsel Then a few minutes later the girls
would say, “The other one’s calling.” And it would be Hubert. Hubert would say, “Oh, God, Joe,
what am I gonna tell the President? He’s on my ass to get you out of there and to try to settle this
thing. Is there anything you can – what can I tell the President?” He was really quite pitiful.
And I said, “Hubert, just tell him Joe Rauh’s a stubborn son-of-a-__ that can’t be controlled.”
“Oh, the ?resident wouldn’t want to hear that. He doesn’t think there’s anybody that can’t be
controlled.” So we went down to the wire that way with Reuther and Humphrey, the two guys
with the responsibility. Hubert was to1d, in effect, I don’t know the exact words, “Look, you
son-of-a-__ • you won’t be Vice President unless you settle that Mississippi Freedom thing.”
And Reuther was called in at the last minute to try to pressure us. Well, I was not in on the
settlement. I first ]earned of – the fight went on — the convention opened Monday – well, the
hearing of the Credentials Committee was on a Saturday. We got so much publicity and
everybody was on our side.
Fannie Lou Hamer iold her story twice. Once in the afternoon and once on primetime
TV at night. It couldn’t have been going better, but the President didn’t want the thing to bit
the floor. Sunday, there was a meeting of the Credentials Committee. I guess I was entitled to
the floor first, but Governor Lawrence didn’t give it to me. He gave it to some Western delegate
who gave the resolution of Johnson which was that we were to be highly flattered guests of the
convention but not delegates. That was Sunday afternoon. Then I thought I had the right to the
floor next to move to amend. He gives it to Al Uhllman, a Congressman from Oregon, who said,
“I move to amend it by giving two delegates to the Freedom party.” Well after this has sort of
framed the issue, because we had the rules of the House and there was nothing I could do – you
couldn’t amend that. Then he gave me the floor. Of course, I made a speech like I had said. This
is now Tuesday afternoon, and we’ve been fighting and postponing until Tuesday afternoon. No,
no, this is Sunday afternoon. We were still on Sunday afternoon. He gives me the floor and I
make my speech, but the parliamentary situation then is the Administration’s position or nothing.
Al Ulhnan’s amendment or nothing, and we’re just at a deadlock. They could have put that
through, but they knew I had enough votes to go to the floor. I bad always said, and the press
was printing this, RAUH’S TAR GET IS ELEVEN AND SEVEN. That’s eleven members of the
Credentials Committee to go to the floor with a minority report, that’s ten percent, and seven is
delegations that demand a roll call. I had both of those in my pocket. So they didn’t want to go
to the floor on the Sunday afternoon procedure, because they could have adopted Ullman’s
amendment. They could have done the other amendment. They could have done either one they
wanted. They had the votes. But they didn’t want to.
So they set up a committee with Fritz Mondale as the chairman. He was a member
– he was Attorney General of Minnesota- and they set up a committee-Mondale, two of
our crowd, two of theirs. But there was no settlement possible at this stage of the game. There
was to be a Credentials Committee meeting on Monday just to do it that was called off. There
was to be one on Tuesday and they went through with the one on Tuesday, and here we are in the
meeting on Tuesday. Well, I went to the meeting early and was sitting there talking to David
Lawrence, who went early, and in comes Charlie Diggs, one of our members of the committee
and hands me a note that says you are to·call that number. I don’t know ifhe told me who would
be on the other end of the line or not but I called that number. I think Jack Conway answered the
telephone. He was Walter Reuther’s – had been Walter Reuther’s assistant and was at that time in
the Administration. He says, “Joe, Wa1ter wants to talk to you.” Walter gets on the phone and
said, and this was the first I knew of a settlement, he says, “The convention has made its
decision.” I said to myself, “The final decision of the convention? I don’t know who that was.”
Of course, it was Johnson a nd Reuther. Reuther bad been called in that night by Johnson. He
got there late the Monday night, and this is Tuesday, early afternoon. And he says, “And I want
you to take it.” Whether he said this as an or der or not, I can’t be sure. But, there was a peremptory
voice that made me think he intended it as such But I don’t want to say he said it; you
know, it’s a hard thing. Oh, I was in a phone booth taking this thing with a hundred reporters
outside of it. So he said, “This is what it is.” I said, “Yes.” He said, “We are going to make the
regulars take an oath that they’ll support the ticket, which they won’t take, and they’ll go home.
So you have won that. We will give you two at-large seats. You have won that. We will
promise that there will never be another segregated group – discriminatory, segregated group –
seated at a Democratic convention, and we will set up a committee of which you will be a
counsel to bring that about in the Ilext convention.” I said, “Walter, I have to tell you that sounds
like I’m making some progress, and it sounds like something I’d like to think about, but I have to
talk to Aaron Henry, because Aaron Henry is the chairman and we have a blood-oath that neither
of us will accept anything without talking to the other.” I said, “Please find Aaron and get him to
call me.” I gave him the number how they could reach me in the committee meeting and then I’d
call. I am told, but I am not certain, that Aaron Henry was in the room already. I know he went
in the room within minutes, but we never connected. I went into the meeting really knowing I
had no choice but to fight it, knowing that if we were going to negotiate a little bit that I could up
the ante from two to six, that we could really settle it hannoniously. But I had no way of raising
Aaron. I did have someone with me with a walkie-talkie who was trying to get to Aaron but I
think Aaron – I don’t know – whether Aaron was in that room or not, and whether Reuther
deliberately kept us apart. I ?ave no idea. At any rate, we never did it and I fought to the bitter
end, as Radice [?] say? there.
What happened was that Mondale came into the meeting room, or was just outside
when I spotted him and I ran out and said, “Fritz, I can solve this where it’s going to be
helpful to everybody. But I’ve got to talk to Aaron Henry.” I said,” I need a postponement, I need
some more time.” Fritz said, “Okay.” l mean, we were all acting in good faith. Mondale was in
good faith. I was in good faith- some little _____ standing next to Mondale says, “No
further delays. We’re going ahead. We’ve delayed this too long- we’re going ahead right now.”
And Mondale looks at me and – this guy was representing Johnson there. He was from Iowa and
I don’t recall – I’d never known his name. So we went inside. Governor Lawrence properly
called on Mondale to give his report. Mondale gave it and he gave it as though we had won the
moon. The regulars reluctantly accepted. He was really speaking to them We’d won and then I
got up, and asked for a delay and got booted at. This is now his lynch mob. They were shouting,
“VOTE, VOTE, VOTE.” So I tried to think of how to stall it. There was nobody else in the
room that was speaking on our side. I had to do all the speaking myself. No, that’s wrong. Edith
Green did speak and opposed the thing. But most of the speaking – I was trying to stall it until I
could get a call to Aaron Henry. Well, Aaron’s call never came. “VOTE, VOTE, VOTE,” and I
said – then I asked for a roll-call vote. It takes twenty percent under the House Rules that we
were proceeding under, and twenty percent, my_, there wasn’t any votes. Maybe half a
dozen. Tuey voted “aye.” You could have heard the ayes a mile away. Then there were “nos,”
and the nos were myseJf and Mrs. Todd Duncan, the singer’s wife. She was a black woman from
the District. Toe two ofus; two from Colorado; one from the Canal Zone; one, I think, from
Guam It was the sleaziest looking crowd, in.duding me. I’m at this time half-dead and I’m not
being very eloquent. So, it was clear we didn’t have a majority. We didn’t have the eleven which
we needed. So, it was rejected, there was a good deal of recrimination, Bayard (Rustin], King –
there were two meetings on the rejection. One was Tuesday evening, the other was Wednesday
morning. They blur into each other in my mind. But we did have in favor of accepting it was
King and Rustin. But Wilkins didn’t have anybody there. He’d long since said – told the press it
was a great tiring. There were some others in that. Somebody said, it’s the best we could get,
whether you want to take it is up to you. They rejected it. They had an eloquent plea by Fannie
Lou Hamer, and Reuther, who is without any doubt, the best bargainer 1 have ever heard, really
loused that up when he said two and named the two. Can you imagine telling this crowd after all
the sacrifices they had made to get there? To put in a white professor and a black, foreign,
middle-cJass, pharmacist when the majority of the people are sharecroppers. Well, Fannie Lou
had a cinch there, and they rejected the compromise. There were recriminations. I made the
point that we fought on to the end, but we didn’t have the eleven for the floor fight. We might
not have won the floor fight, because Johnson, by this time, had scared off a lot of people.
Furthermore, he had said they’d won! He kept saying, “What are they complaining about? They
won.” Well, two such brilliant negotiators as Johnson and Reuther to have not even asked me, I
cou]d have told ’em, “Put Fannie Lou on the delegation.” She may very well have a little different
viewpoint. But to exclude her – well Johnson had said to somebody, “That black __ is
never going to get on that floor.” Well be was wrong . She did get on the floor with other
credentials and other people, but she never was made a delegate. And Aaron and Ed King, who
was the professor who they sent there, I returned their credentials to Harold Leventhal, the
general counsel to the corrnnittee, with a short note saying that the matter is not satisfactory to the
delegation, and Aaron and Ed King will not accept the delegates.
The next morning, I was called by the Humphrey camp. They were worried about
the vice presidency. “Is there anything that can be done now?” I said, ”Yes,” and they said,
“What?” I said, “Either give us two more votes … ” – see, there weren’t any votes, the voting was
ridiculous. It was just delegates. I said, “Either give us two more votes or cut the two votes in
half and give us four half votes and put Fannie Lou and Virginia Gray,” I think was her name –
another black woman, “in there.” And the guy says, “Oh, no, we can’t reopen it.” l says, “Well,
what the heck did you call me for if you can’t reopen it?” I said, “You asked if there was
anything you could do, I’ve told you something that might work.” And there was never any
further discussion of the thing. The Radice piece really tracks this fairly well, and it will show
you what we had in mind. When the blade/white delegation, exactly as we had it, walked on the
floor in ’68, it demonstrated we had won. Fannie Lou walked on with Aaron Henry and, what’s
his name, Hedding Carter, and his now wife, the Assistant Secretary under Carter for
Intemationa1 Human Rights. Well, anyway it was a straight Mississippi delegation, and it was
50-50, and we didn’t have to give them an inch Tue battle was over and we had won the fight.
From then on, you had to have roughly affirmative action delegations from everywhere and you
had equa1 women’s rights, another case where the black fight resulted in something on women’s
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Rauh: In fact, J think that the historians today are going to take the Radice
position even though there was some, there was a feeling at that moment that they hadn’t won. I
think there was some over-expectation that the delegation had. I think they thought that ?y
changing the delegation — I mean it was really kind of a fantasy that by changing the delegation
from Mississippi to a black one, you were really going to change the face of America. We did
change the face of America in a sense that ’68 was better. At the moment there, they felt let
down and Aaron writes me a ]etter afterwards, which is at the bottom there, in which, he knew
we had won. And Ed King knew we had won. There have been a couple meetings I’ve been at
down there where I’ve been beautifully treated, but there was a minority that was screaming that
they had been sold out, There wasn’t a word of truth in that. We all fought ’til the bitter end and
had lost. I had to vote “no” against the Monda1e operation. Reuther gets a good dea1 of the
Hubert by this time is so crushed that he wonied. I will say for Hubert Humphrey
that his handling of that thing was the most honorable piece of politics of my lifetime. I went to
see him every night before I went to bed, whether it was 3:00, 4:00 or 5:00. We were a1one in a
room and Hubert Humphrey could have said, “Look, Joe, take the last offer. I’ll be Vice
President, we’re friends.” He could have said something, “Do this for me.” Hubert never once
suggested that I give up anything except on the inerits. And we talked the merits, he knew I was
right, and it was beautiful. I think a couple of times he was almost in tears because Johnson was
a brute, and he was telling Hubert to settle it. I think Johnson was telling Hubert he can’t
understand why Hubert can’t handle an old friend on a thing like this. And Hubert couldn’t speak
back. He had to say, “I guess I’m not doing it very well” You know, he tried to propitiate
Johnson and it was not done. So Johnson hauled in Reuther. Reuther comes and OOtches it, and
of course, Reuther’s story is told by saying he handled it very peifectly. Because they did put that
over and from my standpoint, his not ever having asked me what I thought, was so outrageous
because it would have been so obvious. Either to Jet them choose their own delegates or to put
Fannie Lou on there and another sharecropper, so you balance it between the middle class, which
we had, and two sharecroppers, and Fannie Lou had to be on it. I mean, she was the – I guess,
star attraction, you’d say, on our side.
Mr. Peck: I understand that out of this, you once said that Reuther was so
mad at you that you could fry ao egg on his heart.
Mr. Rauh: (Laughter) I sure felt that way aod I’m sure I said it He didn’t talk
to me for awhile. I was general counsel, but …
Mr. Peck: Didn’t talk to you for six months is what] read.
Mr. Rauh: Well, six months may be a little exaggeration but it was a long
time. We bad a negotiation with GM that I attended all night and when I was to say something,
he didn’t call on me, I would speak up automatically when the other lawyers spoke. Other than
that, I wouldn’t speak. But when a guy named Benjamin was general counsel, when he’d say
something, I would rebut it. But Reuther didn’t speak to me that night.
Mr. Peck: When the period was over, all was forgiven?
Mr. Rauh: When Walter died we were friends again. But he assumed when
he was in something, that made it a UAW matter, and nobody could dissent. Whereas I said to
him on this same telephone conversation, “Walter, you can’t tell me what to do because this isn’t
a UAW matter. This is a public matter in which I took a J)rivate position, which I thought you
had agreed to ’cause I did think I had his agreement to go with the Freedom party. Not that I
would go, it was that he wou1d go too. But I was wrong on that, and unless he changed his mind
again. You can’t say which. but Walter had the honest belief- I give him credit for it – that when
he came into something, that made it a UAW matter and that meant nobody else could take a
different position. I think he honestly believed that. I don’t think that was a fair position to have
taken. I’ll tell you, Freud is really right. I came out of that phone booth with Walter and they [the
reporters] said, “Who was that?” And I said, “Aw, some girl- some redhead.” That was the
dumbest thing I cou1d have said. Walter Reuther was the redhead but I – it was Freudian. I was
trying not to say who it was, and I don’t think anybody caught onto it, but I realized when I said
it, “How dumb can you be?” And of course the only answer you can say is that I hadn’t slept for
nights and I guess I was just – I was where Freud made a difference. But anyway, nobody
seemed to have gotten on to that. Someone did ask me – and that was argument for the thing that
there was a conspiracy. That phone.call did come from Reuther, and I don’t know whether he
ever told the President. He }eft right away. He was in negotiations and he was – I don’t think he
was there 24 hours. But he sure got it balled up.
[End of Tape]
Mr. Peck:
Oral History of Joseph L. Raub, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
Mississippi Freedom Tape
1bis is the interview with Joseph Rauh. When we had left off last
time we had been talking about the Mississippi Freedom party delegates and we had basically
finished that, although there were a couple of things that I wanted to ask you about. One is a
report that I read that you told the Credentials Committee during the course of the fight that the
Freedom party delegates were more loyal to the no:mmees than the office holders they were trying
to seek. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Raub: Well, it’s so obvious. It’s not only accurate, it’s almost an
understatement. The regulars there had already passed resolutions like this – we believe in
segregation and will not support a candidate who does not. They shouldn’t have come. Tuey
came to undermine. They CaITie for their local political reasons. They were not National
Democrats in the sense of someone who was on the fence as to whether to support the ticket or
not. They were against the ticket. Here, these other people were for integration, for the civil
rights positions of Lyndon Johnson. I think of all the things 1 said, the simplest is that the
challengers here are the loyal Democrats on the civil rights issue, not the ones who were
incumbent. I think it may have been, ] don’t know of forty or fifty or whatever it was, one or two
of the irregulars would have supported the party. I think there may have been a couple of labor
people in there who probably would have supported the party, but the people who were there as
individuals or as office holders, there were none of them going to support Johnson. So that was a
very definite statement.
Mr. Peck: Now, one of the things that people said was that the seating of
these delegates and their opponents at the convention and all, was crucial to helping the ’65
Voting Rights Act. Do you think that this had an’effect on the passage of the Voting Rights Act
the following year?
Mr. Rauh: Well, I don’t want to pat myself on the back too much. I don’t
know whether it was the seating of the, or what it was, but this was the first time that people
heard that only 6% of the blacks in Mississippi are registered voters, and out of that 6%, probably
only 1 %, jf that many, actually voted. In other words, it did bring that thing to the floor, and it
brought it even, and maybe that was the first time that King really realized what was going on.
I’m not so sure of that, but it was the first major public confrontation that showed the people of
this country bow bad the voting was, how little the voting was. We knew it, maybe I didn’t even
know how bad it was, but I learned all the tricks that were used to keep blacks from voting. They
would advertise the precinct meetings. It worked on the precinct meetings. Then there were
county meetings, I think. There were congressional district meetings, and then there were state
meetings. You got elected from one to another. Well, by shifting around of the thing, by the
time it got to the state meetings, there weren’t any blacks in the thing and the tricks that had been
used were so obvious. I think its not a weighable thing. l can’t tell what weight to give to it. I’ve
always said that I was proud of the fact that we brought the issue to the consciousness of the
nation. I still feel that way. Whether you’d say that it was a major factor or a minor factor, that’s
a debatable point
Mr. Peck: Okay. Well that does bring us to the Voting Rights Act. When did
the fight for that Act really begin? Did it begin ahnost immediately after the election?
Mr. Rauh: Yes. I think the Kennedy-Johnson Administration had decided
way back that they were going to do something serious about voting. In February of 1961, the
ADA leadership had a meeting with President Kennedy. He was very nice about receiving us,
thanked us for our work, and he was an old friend from the civil rights issues. What happened
was that there were four of us, three of us spoke, and the three who spoke were Sam Beer who
was head of the ADA at the time, Bob Nathan, the economist, and myself on civil rights. There
was a fourth. Marvin Rosenberg, but I can’t recollect that he participated other than in the
friendliness discussion. Sam Beer spoke first on how much we supported him, and it was a nice
thing, but he said there were two matters we wanted to talk alx>ut, Nathan to talk on one and I
would talk on the other. Bob Nathan talked on the economics side and said how bad things were,
that there was 7% unemployment – it’s funny when you think of the present situation. Bob gave
him some very good advice on things to be done economically, and the President was very
cordial with Bob. He said, ”I agree with you, but remember 93% of the people are employed and
it’s not so easy. Go out and sell this and sell it and then I can pick it up, but I can’t do that in the
present political climate.” But it was a very warm agreement on principle. Well, when I started
saying something on civil rights, Jack Kennedy tightened up like a drum It was perfectly dear
that something was irritating him. He bad nothing against me, we were not in any way – he was
very nice, we’ve never had a harsh word, but he either had a guilt complex that they weren’t
going to do anything on civil rights, no legislation, or he didn’t like to be pushed in that area.
What he said to me was, ”I can’t go for any legislation, I have too narrow a victory, I don’t want
to upset the Southern guys I’m going to need on the other legislation. What we’re going to do is,
we’re going to make some good appointments,” which he did, and he said it just this way,
”Bobby’s going to bring some Voting Rights Act [suits]. Voting rights is going to be our main
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Who are some examples of the good appointments that he made?
Well, let’s see, there’s Bob Weaver [Secretary of Housing]. I’m
thinking about blacks now. That one I would say was probably the highest ranking black. He
put a black on the Labor Board. There were a great number of blacks. There were also a great
number of ADA’ers. In fact there were some hostile colwnns listing all the ADA’ers. Oh. Carl
Rowan was another one of the blacks. I think that you can truthfully say that he had a great
number of blacks and liberals, more than in any other previous administration. But that he was
going to do, and the voting rights, and it was perfectly clear that they were not going to do what
we wanted. It was even worse in some respects because be had asked Joe Clark, the Senator, and
Manny Seller, the Congressman, to convene a civil rights conference and he came to that
conference at the end, and he knew what we bad resolved because he had people there, and he
adopted them He said, ”I adopt your program.” Well, he adopted it for the campaign but not for
the subsequent administration, so I was ralher bun by it. There was no overt ugliness, but you
could feel a different tension in the room when he was talking about civil rights than when he
was talking about economics. Then when they did make a proposal on legislation in ’62, I
believe it was, it was on voting. It said you couldn’t have a literacy test if a person had a sixth
grade education, remember? – or something like that. Well, it was a lousy minor bill and it got
beat because nobody gave a darn on our side. It wasn’t that good. So, until you get King’s march
in Binni.ngham, you don’t have any activity. Then they tried, in the bill that went up, was always
forgotten, part one was some more on voting rights. You were always stressing the voting rights,
so 1 think the Kennedy-Johnson Administration was really quite attracted to voting rights, and
Johnson was himself very attracted to voting rights. I think this is why you had the upsurge on
voting rights. Whether we touched it off with the Mississippi Freedom party will never be fully
known, unless there is something in Johnson’s writings that I don’t know about.
Mr. Peck: It was an extremely strong bill. lt’s often called the most effective
civil rights statute ever written. Why do you think it was as strong as it was?
Mr. Rauh: Because Johnson took the provision that he had tabled in 1960, and
accepted it and came out for it. That was the federal registrars. We had proposed, in the end of
the ’50s, getting tired as we were of losing, and getting bills that were not having any real effect
on voting. The ’57 one didn’t have any effect on the voting. The ’60 one didn’t have any effect on
the voting. So, at the end of the ’50s we were taJking about federal action. There was a
wonderful man always given a lot of credit, he never got it, he’s gone now. His name was
Vincent Doyle. He was the head of the Congressional Research at the Congressional Library,
and we used to have talks, he and I, and with other people, but we were the active ones, about,
why not have federal elections? I mean, in essence, these are not federal elections, but where the
state refuses to carry out the law and the Constitution, why not have the federal government do
it? Well, we tried that in ’60. Johnson tabled us in ’60. He took us up in ’65, so that we were
able to write our own ticket pretty much in ’65, because what you have was a situation where
there were no holds barred, you didn’t have any longer people saying, “Oh, you can’t do that.”
There was an acceptance by ’65 that the federal government could do anything it must do to
ensure that blacks could vote. That’s what you finally did have. You not only had that, you had
the knocking out of the literacy test, but the Administration had tried to weaken the literacy test
thing before, and that hadn’t go tten through You finally had a situation in ’65 that we could
write our own ticket. And our side did write a bill, some of the liberal Republicans and Paul
Douglas on our side did have a bill that went it there that prodded the Administration, but by this
time, there really wasn’t much argwnent with the Administration. We had temb1e arguments in
’63 on the bill that became the ’64 Act. The Administration didn’t want to go nearly as far on
things as we wanted, but by ’65 on· voting rights, there was quite a parallelism between of our
views and theirs.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
And what effect, if any, did King’s march on Montgomery have?
I think it was less his march than that sheriff in Sehna who wore
the badge, ”never.” I’ve always said- President Kennedy, what be said was more important, in
1963 at the meeting right after his bill went up, Bob you have to get up – it’s right there – that’s the
meeting of June 21, 1963, President Kennedy said there that what’s his name, Bull Connor, did
more for civil rights than anyone in this room. which he said in the presence of King, Wilk.ins,
Reuther, and all the great civil hberties, civil rights people. I always said somewhat similar, but I
think its right, that Martin Luther King deserves bis Nobel prize not for anything he did, but for
his enemies, Bull Connor and Sheriff [Clark].
Mr. Peck: I don’t remember the sheriff’s name, but I remember the incident
took place at the Edmund Pettis Bridge.
Mr. Rauh: That’s right. He was wearing the “never” sign, so that, I think, the
strongest thing we had going for was the public revulsion at Connor and the sheriff. So we had
that going. Besides, there was that incident by the bridge. There was the wonderful women’s
group that went down there, Paul Douglas’s wife, Mrs. Senator Toby, a Republican, Ickes’
second wife, Jane. You really had built this thing up. The ooly thing we lost in that whole fight
was the poll tax. Wf; didn’t get a provision on the poll tax, much to our surprise. The
Administration opposed that, just exactly why I’ve never been sure, but I’ve learned through
experience that at certain times deals are made which you don’t know about, no matter how close
you think you are to the situation. For example, in the ’64 law, the Adarinistration refused to put
in a fall’ employment practices, equal employment opportunities bill. Why was that? Because
[Attorney General] Katzenbach had a deal with Bill McCulloch, the Ohio ranking Republican
who was on the Judiciary Committee on what the bill would be, and that it would not include an
equal employment opportunities provision. He lived up to his deal with McCulloch. and he
never told us about it. I first heard about that deal in the ’70s or ’80s at a conference on the bill
on the Johnson’s civil rights. · I’d always been very critical of Katzenbach, having been our
opponent on Title VTI, which he was, but he never let on about the deal and there may have been
some deal on the poll tax. I can’t say. At any rate, the poll tax thing all became moot when the
Court, the Supreme Court knocked it out in the case for Virginia {Harper v. Virginia Board of
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Ah. another thing that came up in ’65 was D.C. home rule.
FJ!st time Johnson ever lost. Johnson always claimed that our
pushing him into that S!arted the opposition, and in a sense that was true. Johnson did try to get
the home ru.Je bill for us. For example, we had to have a discharge petition. He pushed. We
would tell him who was not on. We had very good relations with the White House, I still did
then, it was later that they started to deteriorate with the war in – Vietnam. He did his best to get
that through. I’ve always thought that there was some deal made there with the liquor interests,
They were all scared that we would have raised the liquor tax, just like right now they want to
raise the liquor tax, !U).d the cigarette tax. I thiok they should. It was easier for the liquor and
cigarette people to get the no taxes on that through the federals and MacMillan and the House
Committees. A man named Congressman Moulter took the lead for us. He grabbed it away from
our more serious friends. I’m not sure what went on there. I’ve never been certain. But that was
Johnson’s first loss on legislation and he always used to say something like, ”You guys got me
into a fight that couldn’t be won.” Well, that was true, but he did want to do that. Then he did
immediately set up a government, which wasn’t a democratic government, because they were
appointed, but it set the basis for a democratic government. Tb.at was in 1968 [August 1967),
Califano and I had a discussion. Califano asked me what I thought of it. I never thought too
much of that, although it inay have helped get the home bill in. ’73, but what we had proposed
was that they make Walter WashiDgton the Chief Conm:rissioner in which case he would be
running the police and fire, but Califano told me at the time that he tried that out on Bob Byrd
who was the Subcormnittee on D.C. Finances of the Appropriations Committee, and that Byrd
had said, “No nigger’s going to run the police department here while l’ml1lllllIDg this thing.” In
fact, he was wrong. Washington ultimately did get it through, but in a more diluted form because
you had a white-controlled City Council. Johnson always felt that it was downhill from the
defeat of the home rule bill. But that could be more a coincidence, because it was also downhill
on the Vietnam war. So it may be that it coincided .in time, but was not in fact as important as
Johnson always made it.
Mr. Peck Right. Also in ’65, you were involved in a few D.C. Circuit cases.
One in which you were on the brief for the petitioner involved Local 155 in the strike in Frasier,
Michigan. This was an unfair labor practices case, an appeal from the NLRB. It was an
unsuccessful appeal in front of Fahey, Miller and Danaher.
Mr. Rauh: Again, we didn’t draw very well Did Fahey not even go for it, so
we couldn’t even get the Labor Board – boy, that must have been a lousy case!
Mr. Peck: Then you had a pair of cases involving Kohler. The first one was a
per curiam decision. It involved 77 strikers who had been denied reinstatement after the strike.
This time you won because you pulled Bazelon, Edgarton and a fellow ____ _
Mr. Rauh: I think I told you about that last time, Bob. You can move the
thing up there. It was perfectly simple. They said you have to weigh the wrong of the company
against the wrong of the employee. They did knock a few off, but the bulk of the people who had
committed wrongdoing did get their jobs back and their big back pay.
Mr. Peck: Right. And in front of the same panel just a little bit later in the
year, you came up with. I guess, you filed a brief on behalf ofl..oca1 833. The NLRB had sued
Kobler for contempt and you had intervened, because the NLRB hadn’t gone as far as you would
have liked.
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
upheld the NLRB.
Mr. Rauh:
That’s right.
They weren’t ready to go as far as you wanted, but they certainly
It was really a prayer that got that panel that won the Kohler fight.
I think they tried to petition for cert. in either or both of those and we had to do oppositions to the
cert., and we were successful. That case, despite its importance, and it is an important case for
the idea of weighing instead of saying an employee commits violence he’s out, which had been
the previous at least implications of the rule, but the Supreme Coun, obviously agreeing with the
court of appeals, left it alone. So they were important cases, but we did have to file oppositions
to cert. on that proposition. Did I ever tell you how we really won the Kohle? fight?
Mr. Peck: No, I don’t think so.
Mr. Rauh: Maybe you could tell me the year, because I’m going back a little
bit. The year that the Kohler decision came down from the Board, the basic decision. It came
down in 1960-something. It was the fundamental thing. Pollak argued on the unfair labor
practice, and] argued on the remedy. What year?
Mr. Peck: 1962 was the year that the D.C. Circuit decision came down.
Mr. Rauh: All right. Now that’s what I want to tell you, that story, because it
is a funny story. In those days, it may still be the law, where there are two circuits with
jurisdiction, you go to the one that’s first filed. In other words, if Kohler had first filed there, why
that would have been everything in the Seventh Circuit.
Mr. Peck: !light.
Mr. Rauh: If we were first, it would be in the D.C. Circuit. So this became
very important and we wrote five appeals. The appeal there is very short, you have to get the
name and address, and a sentence or two about the case. We had five different ones ready to
appeal from part or all of the decision. John Silard, my partner, was stationed at the Labor Board
to receive the opinion. Dan Pollitt who was spendi ng the summer with us there, was at the
courthouse with the five ones. I was on the phone with John at the Board, and somebody was on
the phone with Dan. At 10:30 in the morning, they handed the opinion to Kohler and John Silard
for us. Two minutes later, John told me what that opinion said, and I told Dan to file number
thre.e or whatever it was. So we had filed it within five minutes. Well about just short of an hour
later, Kohler files in the Seventh Circuit. We filed the record here and Kohler moved to move
the case to the Seventh Circuit because the time was earlier because it was an hour earlier on
centra1 time. We argued it wasn’t the particular hour, that time was what it really was and we
were first We won that argument. It really was ahnost a joke, the Kohler case, isn’t that funny?
I don’t know if that is still a law now or what. Is there still a lot of forum shopping?
Mr. Peck: Oh, there’s a Jot of forum shopping. But I think it’s first in time
Mr. Rauh, Well, anyway, we were first in time and that’s why we got Baselon
and Edgerton and tt.18t’s why we changed the law in this country.
Mr. Peck: In 1966, we had a couple cases too. First one was Condo v.
Katzenbach. The issue before the D.C. Circuit was timeliness. 1bis involved bank accounts
seized in WorJd War II.
Mr. Rauh: Oh, that Honda, h-o-n-d-a, did you say Conda?
Mr. Peck, Well, you know, the funny thing is that it is listed in the D.C.
Circuit book, I know that it became Honda v. Clark before the Supreme Court, but in the report
of the D.C. Circuit, it says Condo.
Mr. Rauh, I’ll be damed. Well it may have been that there was a different
Japanese then. At any rate, oh, do I remember that case very well. It’s a cute story. There’s a
man named Mike Masaoka who was the Japanese-American Citizens League representative here.
Mike comes in to see me one day and tells me about this case. What happened was that we
seized the assets of the Yokahama Specie and Swnitoma Banks branches in California, and we
seized them when the war started right after Pear] Harbor. When the war was over, we offered
the depositors the value of the yen at the end of the war which was about l/3·400ths of what it
was worth when they got it, so the question arose, what’s what with these people. Another group
actually filed with the government even for that Jousy little claim that they were getting. They
finally got the full value of the original without interest. That was the compromise. Then our
crowd, who hadn’t filed claims, decided to file, and Mike comes in. He had lost in the district
court, and he comes in to see me and he says, “Will you take t1ris case in the court of appeals?” I
studied it for an hour or two and Mike was waiting. I said I don’t think you have a chance. The
statute of limitations has run by 20-odd years, maybe more, it’s all in the Supreme Court opinion.
He got very tough with me, and we were very good friends because we had worked on civil
rights legislation together. Mike was always our designated hitter with the west coast Senators
and he looks at me and says, “You don’t give a damn about anybody but the blacks.” I said,
‘Well, you son of a ___ , talking about me that way, I’m going to take your case and lose it.”
So, we took the case. The Supreme Court won that case for us. They decided while we were on
the way up. They decided another case where the defendant was responsible for the mistake
made by the plaintiff in choosing a venue that was, but this was the same point. So we’re in the
court of appeals and we got a split decision. There was Skelly Wright who wrote the most
brilliant defense. Skelly Wright’s opinion was so much better than my brief that you could hardly
believe it. It was incredibly beautiful. You know who wrote a good part of it, Abe Sotari [sp?],
who was Skelly Wright’s law clerk at the time, and who became a good friend of mine until he
turned out to be right of Genghis Kahn on this later stuff. Well anyway, we had a 2 to 1 split
decision and we went to the Supreme Court. I think by the time we petitioned for cert. we had
this case in which they had said you couldn’t get away with the statute of limitations or with the
wrong venue if you _were responsible for that as a defendant. We ce rtainly had a pretty good case
for arguing that the defendant had been the one that caused us to make a mistake of not filing,
when they offered 11400th or 300ths of whatever it was worth, so the combination Skelly Wright
and this decision, we got cert. and we won ..
An interesting thing happened at the argument. Ben Cohen had helped us with the
brief J argued it. I’m arguing it, Jolm Silard is sitting next to me, Ben’s sitting next to John. I
got up. I was the petitioner, of course. I don’t even know whether I said ifit may please the court
before Abe Fortas said to me, “This is just a bunch of rich people, isn’t it, I mean, this is not_a big
group or anything?” I .couldn’t understand what was going on. I said, ‘”No, Yoμr Honor. It
seems to me we have several, there are millions of dollars.” “Oh, I know there are miBions of
dollars, but they’re just for some rich Japanese.” I said, ‘”No, sir, their claims are very well
moderated and we will,” I was really getting worried, you know, and Fortas was really berating
me. I said, in order to cut if off, I said .. I give you my word that we will within a week submit to
this Court under oath exac !IY how many plaintiffs, what their average amount is.” Wen, the
argument went very wen after that, but I was rather, but I couldn’t help but be upset having been
attacked by Fortas, an old friend. We go to lunch afterwards, it was getting late then we go to
lunch, and I said, “Why do you think Fortas sort of attacked my integrity?” Vince said, .. Do you
think he was attacking my integrity, too?” He was suddenly afraid that he was being attacked.
Mike finaJJy owned up that he had been over at Arnold & Porter thinking possibly that he would
rather have them than me, his friend. I could understand that. We had a little firm, small firm, 4
or 5 people. Fortas was Arnold, Fortas & Porter. I wasn’t sore that he had gone over there, but he
said they had decided in our favor just because they thought we would give it more of the old
college try. So that was why I got the beating up there. At the time I got it, I didn’t know,
because I didn’t know that Mike bad gone over there. I didn’t know that this was a contest
between us. Especially, it seemed so strange that he was so rough on me for not taking it, when
he had a back-up there over at Arnold, Fortas & Porter. But anyway, we did win in the court of
appeals. That is the only big fee we ever got in our life. I’ve always said to John Douglas, who
was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, who was my opponent in the
case, I always said, “Jol:m, you’re a great man, you’ve made more money for me than anybody
else ever did.” He said, ”How do you figure that?” I said, “Well, don’t you remember when I
came and offered to settle for about a quarter of what we got?” He tu.med the settlement down.
He didn’t think we could win. So anyway, John and I are good friends. He’s a wonderful guy,
but I always kid rum about the fact that he made the biggest fee I ever got. Of course, it was
divided because Al Wlrin’s firm. he was a famous civil liberties lawyer out in Los Angeles, they
had spent an awful lot of time on the case building the record and all of that, so they were entitled
to as much as we were, and Jolm and I, but as I always said, John Douglas was responsible for
the only big fee I ever got in my life. Anyway, if you want for just sheer joy of reading a
dissenting opinion, look at Skelly Wright – it’s so, so brilliant.
Mr. Peck: 0 .. K. Well, also in 1966 there was a labor case against the Arrow
Corporation. TIIis one was over enforcement of an NLRB order and was very similar to the issue
in Kohler. Again, this time the court was Leventhal, Danaher and Wright, and they wouldn’t find
additional violations beyond what NLRB ordered, but they did find that the enforcement of the
order ought to occur. This. was just a bitter strike there. I think this brings us up to the Fair
Housing Act in ’68.
Mr. Rauh: We all felt in the civil rights operation that the hardest law in the
civil rights to deal with in a statute and get through politically was housing. That nobody had
ever been able to deal with that problem You had Martin Luther King’s marches in Cook
County in 1966, 1965, the resentment on black housing was always the worst. Everything was
bad, but that was the hardest. On the other hand, Johnson had made a try at a bill, I think, in ’66
or ’67, and it fai1ed, and we weren’t clear on what we wanted to do, what we wanted to go for.
The civil rights groups fmally decided to go forward with the statute trying to protect the
personal security of the blacks in the South and civil rights workers in the South. You had real
difficulties there with people getting hurt. So that bill was brought up in the Senate and it was
being filibustered. We were having a meeting, and I remember [Senator] Joe Clark being there,
and he was working on it, some of the other senators, and CJarence, he was there of course. We
were talking about what to do. The bill was important that was on the floor of the Senate to
protect personal security of blacks and civil rights workers, but you couldn’t feel that you were
getting the strength to fight the filibuster. So, we’re sitting there and I looked at Clarence and I
said, ”Clarence, should we recommend that we attach the housing bill as an amendment to this,
because then you have worse opposition but do you outweigh that worse opposition by more and
more support?” Well, Clarence thought that was a great idea and the two of us turned to them
and said, ‘We recommend that you do this.” Joe Oark thought it was fine. Whether he made the
actual amendment, I can’t remember, but the amendment was made, and we did in fact ger the
housing bill. lt was pretty watered down by the time you got it, because it wasn’t until the ’80s
that you got the really tougher bill. All the reports show it’s not being very well enforced, even
the new bill. But we did get a fair housing bill. You can say for Johnson that he was able to get
something in all of the different fields. l was not working closely with Jolmson anymore, so that
the role that Johnson played in getting that bill is not one with which [ am tembly familiar except
secondhand, to get it from somebody else what Johnson was doing. We were working on it too.
It sort of completed the trilogy of the Johnson bills. People often ask, ”How do you explain
Johnson as Majority Leader fighting you guys all the time and as President getting all the bills
you couldn’t get when he was Majority Leader.” I said, ”It’s perfectly simple. He’s the
consummate politician. When he was the Majority Leader, he was the Senator from Texas, he
listened to his constituency, when be was President of the United States, he listened to bis
constituency, and they were totally different.” That is my feeling. I will say for Johnson
that I think that he was happier when he was on our side than when he was giving us the
Mr. Peck: Well, ’68 was also an election year, and you signed on pretty early
with Eugene McCarthy. When you did that, did you tbmk that there was any realistic chance of
stopping the Johnson nomination?
Mr. Rauh: That was something that “growed” on people, like Topsy. It
growed. You didn’t immediately have that feeling. I had been in a dispute with Al Lowenstein
during the summer of ’67, right on our porch downstairs, Al and I had an argument The
argument was this. Can you run a dump Johnson movement without a candidate? Al was after
me to get the ADA to come out against Jolmson when you didn’t have a candidate. aud I refused.
We had an argument right on the porch, the only witness was my wife, aud what happened was,
he said, “We’re going to win with none of the above in Wisconsin.” He said, ‘The Wisconsin
primary lists candidates and then there is none of the above. I think they still have that.” Well, I
said, “I think indivi?uals can do that, but you can’t have an organization do that. It doesn’t seem
to me, its too slim a possibility.” Well, within 3 months there was a candidate. There was Gene,
and Al and I were back together and I came out right away and took a post as sort of consultancy
and also fundraiser. I took many of the big fund.raising pitches like in Madison Square Garden
and Fenway Park I think maybe the thing grew as we won, in perception at least, in New
Hampshire. Then Bobby Kennedy came in. I would say that by the time Bobby was in and they
were fighting for the job, why people began to think that there was a real chance that we were
going to win. Then, of course, Johnson pulls out shortly after Bobby comes in. I’d say that I
wasn’t so swe at the beginning, but I really thought there was a chance. ‘Th.en when Bobby is
assassinated, Gene is left alone and Hubert goes in it’s absolutely hopeless. They had the
delegates all lined up. What would have happened if Bobby had lived, I don’t really have any
feeling. I thought Bobby would be a better President than Gene, but I gave Gene my word I was
for him and I wasn’t going to give up. There were a lot of switches on our part. Dick Goodman
was the number one switch because he was writing McCarthy speeches. If McCarthy speeches
and Bobby Kennedy speeches look alike, Dick Goodman had written them all Then he came
back to Gene when Bobby was killed. There were a lot of people who switched. I honestly
believed that Bobby would be a better President, but I just couldn’t do it. l was the credentials
coordinator for McCarthy at the convention. We won some fighls and we lost some. Tuey could
have been more generous to us without risking it. I was surprised at Hubert not being more
generous with the contested delegates because he had the thing locked up.
Mr. Peck: But before McCarthy jumped in, I read that you originally thought
that a peace plank rather than a primary challenge was about the best that could be done.
Mr. Rauh: Well, I thought that if you didn’t have a candidate, the best thing
you could do was to have a peace plank which J wrote, which I showed to McGovern, Church,
and others who all said I was okay. Bobby was the most critical of it. He said, “It was the most
ridiculous thing I ever heard.” Bobby said you can’t start a fight on a plank. I said well, I started
a fight on a plank once in 1948. I did a pretty good job there. He said, “Well this isn’t the same
thing.” Well, be was right and he was wrong. He was right that if we hadn’t had a candidate
there wouldn’t have been much of a fight, he was right. But he was wrong on the fact that be
wou1dn’t go and when that peace plank was largely the result of the fact that he wouldn’t go. In
other words, he was much more responsible for the peace plank than he was letting on. Because
we weren’t going to just do nothing. We had to do something in this terrible war, and this was a
bad substitute for a bad situation.
Mr. Peck: Well, there was a lot of resentment when Bobby jumped into the
Mr. Rauh: Oh boy, and how in our crowd. Especially the kids, oh they went
crazy they were so mad. We had upset the apple cart for him, but Bobby was right in a sense.
He was the last real candidate to appeal to the blue collar worker as a Democrat. Tuey loved
him Exactly why, no other Democrat has ever really appealed to the worker. Bobby wouJd have
gotten into the race, he would have gotten in with Nixon, he would have gotten 80% of the
workers. They loved him So, I did share that for a few days, bis getting in. And then we were
t rying, I was really interested in stopping the war. So I made a speech one day attacking both
Gene McCarthy and Bobby for lighting so hard instead of lighting against Hubert. I think that it
was a good idea, but it didn’t have any effect on any of them
Mr. Peck: Wa. this the speech that I have marked down here, March 26,
where you called upon McCarthy and Kennedy to support the survivor among the two of them
and not to fight each other?
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
If you want that, I have that. I mean I have that among those
copies, but I don’t think you want that. If you decide you do, I could let you go through it.
Mr. Peck: We’ll do that later.
Mr.Rauh: All right.
Mr. Peck: Now, somewhere, I didn’t jot down where, I found that you
descnlJed when the integrated Mississippi delegation was seated at t hat convention was one of
the high points of your lifetime.
Mr. Rauh: Well, that’s exact1y right. I said it in ’64, we have won this fight
now, we have to wait and see if I’m not right. But the integrated delegation, exactly as we had it,
walked on the floor t here. Mrs. Hamer walked on that floor as a delegate. Johnson said that she
never would. Well, be was wrong. There was an effort in the credentials committee to give a
minority of the regulars seats, and there was a real struggle. I finally bad to tell Aaron [Henry]
and Hedding Carter and his present wife, what’s her name, she was the hwnan rights person in
Carter’s Administration, she was the National Committeewoman of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic party, that I would blast them if they gave them an inch. “I know you people are so
anxious to get on the floor, but remember there is a very important principle here. We said that
we were going to be seated next time, we had to promise, and I want to make them live up to th.at
promise.” So there was no compromise. The exact delegation led by Aaron, Rodding, and Mrs.
Hamer was seated as 100%. That was quite a remarkable thing. Then we also had the Georgia
rival delegation under Julian Bond, which finally settled by having them both seated. So we did
pretty well there in the sense of carrying out the promise of 1964.
Mr. Peck: But being in the convention hall, how much were you aware of
what was going on in Chicago at the same time?
Mr. Rauh: Ob. pretty much You knew. Furthermore, J was staying at, what
is the big hotel, Conrad Hilton, I was staying there. It stunk of tear gas. I walked into the lobby
there, wanting a drink, I don’t know what time it was, one of the evenings of those nights wanting
a drink, I walked into Betty Friedan. She and some guy in the same position I was, so I found a
cop, asked where the nearest bar was that would stay open for a while and drank for about three
hours, that’s when I became a great friend of Betty’s. She’s a real pistol, I’ll say that. You knew
what was going on. I was really worn out. I didn’t stay to the bitter end. We did try and Al was
a great hero of that period. Al and J had only one fight in our life, it was right on our porch here,
on whether you could take an organization like the ADA into support for movement without a
candidate. And I still think I was right, but it was mooted by the fact that we got a candidate, not
one that we had expected to get.
Mr. Peck: Then we move to the general election. Hwnphrey, who had the
hardest time winning back people who in another era would have been his natural supponers. He
came within inches. What can you tell us about that?
Mr. Rauh: I can only speak for the ADA. I can speak for some of the others.
The ADA was a problem Immediately after the convention, there was a smaD minority of
people that said we’ve got to immediately endorse Hubert. They would call It was the Labor
Day weekend and I was pretty beat up, in spirit, not physically. I was never beat up physically or
anything. I said, ”No, I think that if you have a meeting now, you’ll just have a roaring
disapproval and I don’t know what will happen. Let’s wait until we’re ready.” About 6 weeks
before the election or about 2 months before the election we realized that we had to start to
move. We called the meeting for about 5 or 6 weeks before the election, and we got pretty nm.ch
unanimity in support for Hubert, and the unanimity came from the intervening time your wounds
heal, and from something else. We put in the truth in the resolution. Maybe there has never been
a resolution that tells the truth about what you’re doing. It said. ‘We disagreed. with Humphrey
on the war. We still do not think he is gone far enough in his opposition of the war, but when, in
a realistic war here, he’s far and away the best candidate, even on the war, and we urge your
support for him” Now, Hubert being of -course a rea1 politician, be is at one of those radio stops,
goes to a pay phone to call me to thank me and he gets my wife. I wasn’t home yet. He gets Olie
and he says, ‘7eil Joe it’s the greatest thing what he did.” He didn’t give a dam about that extra
stuff in there that made hberals feel that they were honorable people and all. He didn’t give a
darn about that, he cared about the bottom line. So he says tell Joe to be at the airport tomorrow
morning to go on a plane with me. I spoke only to McCarthy audiences. That was my job, to
round out McCarthy people. There was a lot of hostility to Hubert. Don’t believe there wasn’t. I
think in the end most people came around. I still find people who voted for third party or wrote
somebody in. I still find them. but I don’t think it was a significant factor that cost Hubert the
election. It may have been that people held back too long, although I mink Leon Scholl judged
his board very well when he decided that we were ready to endorse Hubert, that the scars were
gone enough so that you could do that. It bad an effect. For example, Al [Lowenstein] hadn’t
endorsed Humphrey yet. He was running for Congress up in Long Island and he shonly
thereafter endorsed Humphrey. That was true of O’Dwyer. Wasn’t be running for the Senate?
The ADA wasn’t the detenninant or anything, but I think it helped start pushing people back
towards Hubert. That was a funny day for me. Either that time on the plane or later, we went to
New York and Hubert just had the most wonderful time with Kenny O’Donnell on one side and
me on the other with the Kennedy-McCarthy thing. He just enjoyed praising us and praising
Kennedy who was gone and praising McCarthy, although McCarthy hadn’t come out for him yet.
Then, the next morning we went to Texas and Humphrey’s camp survivors, they didn’t like me.
They wanted to push Hubert to the right and there was quite some bitterness. Tuey were all
saying to Hubert, ‘Tell Joe he’s got to behave when we get to Texas, with Connally.” See
Connally was the head of the delegation. He was the governor. He was head of the delegation,
and I had tried to get the delegation excluded because of racial things. We didn’t have much of a
case, because they had some blacks, they had some Mexicans. Anyway, we get off the plane and
there’s Connally in the receiving line and I went up and couldn’t be more gracious and tried to
befriend him I was working for Hubert then. So there’s a $500 luncheon half way between Ft.
Worth where we landed and Dallas. The staff wasn’t invited to the lunch. I don’t know what we
ate. Then I heard my name saying, “Report to the headquarters.” I went to the headquarters and
on the way I bumped into Tim Dyke, what was his name, he rode on the plane. It’ll come. He
was running the plane. He was the manager. He said, “Joe we have an appointment for you in
Los Angeles tonight to speak to a McCarthy crowd. We have a reservation for you on the 3:00
plane.” I don’t remember what. “You will be met by somebody that will tell you all the details.”
I said, ‘CVou can’t g?t my suitcase, you got it mixed in with everyone else’s.” He said, ‘”No, we
have it at the airport.” Well, I knew something was fishy, but I didn’t know exactly how fishy. I
went. I was not going to blow up anything. I got there and the ADA lady was waiting for me but
there wasn’t any meeting. I subsequently found out that in a meeting with Humphrey, Connally
said be wouldn’t go to the same plane with me because I had tried to exclude him from the
convention, and Hubert had to make a fast decision. I think Hubert made the right decision.
Maybe some people would not have been able to understand. But I understand, by God, if
Connally hadn’t gone on that plane, what were we doing in Texas. So, I’ve never thought that he
had made the wrong decision. I can’t re?mber when I first learned it, but there were a couple of
people in the room who knew. One was Yarborougb’s assistant, Bob Hanis, told me. ‘He was in
the room There was a fellow, the advance man, was in the room, he was from Covington &
Burling. He was the advance man. He subsequently confirmed that Connally had said this and
that Hubert bad turned ashen because he realized the results the danger that this story would get
out about yielding to Connally. He bad to make an on-the-spot decision. They came on to L.A.,
and I got back on the plane. Nothmg ugly was really said. I spoke to the McCarthy delegation
there, assembled in a house, the delegation to the convention, and spoke with Hubert and it was a
pretty rough evening. The guy who led the opposition, the next day came to a McCarthy
fundraiser and told my wife that he was going to help get support for Humphrey. So it does have
some effect to argue . . . . A big black fellow got up at that meeting and he said, ‘CV ou honkies
can talk all you want, but you’re not going to be the ones who suffer under Nixon. We’re going
to be the ones that are going to suffer. By God, you ought to be in there fighting for Hubert.”
That guy said more in one rDDlute than I had said in a half an hour. Anyway, that was my job on
the plane was to talk to McCarthy people.
Mr. Peck: Well, do you think it would have made a difference if Humphrey
had distanced rumself from LBJ earlier?
Mr. Rauh: Yes. I was asked that after the Salt Lake speech what I felt.
Actually, I bad listened to the speech with a class in one of the universities taught by a reporter
named Shirley Elder, a lady reporter. When the speech was over, she asked the young people
what they thought. I said, “It was too little too late.” I said that Hubert’s got to go farther than
this. He did go a little farther, but he sort of was too tentative in going. What you can say for
Hubert, Johnson’s ain’t no beanbag. What he might have done to Hubert, he was a tough guy
there. He didn’t want the party doing anything against what he had tried to do. The answer to
your question is clearly yes.
Mr. Peck:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
[Side A]
This is the 7th, and we’re continuing the oral interview with Joseph
Rauh. When we left off, we were talking about the 1968 presidential campaign. Before we do
that, there were a number of cases that you had in 1967 in the court of appeals and I didn’t want
to just skip over them entirely. Most of these had to do with railroad work rules, and they were
appeals from NLRB decisions, and all very similar kinds of issues comiDg up.
Mr. Rauh: Weren’t they more to do with a special board set up under the
Railway Labor Act, the Arbitration Board under the Railway Labor Act? I think they were. That
was probably the biggest dispute on featherbedding that has occurred in this country. What had
happened, really, was when you had coal-burning engines, there was a real need for a fireman!
The guy had to throw the god dam coal on the fire! But when you had a diesel engine, a fireman
had reaTiy nothing to do. When we got hired by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen, I knew this and I was troubled by it. I was pleased being hired because I was hired
by a guy I broke down in cross-examination in a civil rights case. Gilbert, the head of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, had a union that didn’t admit blacks. In
fact, they discriminated against blacks. We had cases against them. and I really broke him up a
little in cross-examination in that set of cases. He came in to see me one day and he said, “I’d
like you to represent us.” I said, “That’s awful nice of you, aren’t you mad?” He said, “Sure, but
you’re the best lawyer in this country, the way you showed us how wrong we were on the
discrimination thing.” I said, “Is that cleaned up?” and he said “Yeah.” So we went ahead and
represented them
The public interest there was very difficult to find. You had really two competing
thoughts: one was you ought not pay people to do nothing, you can’t justify that; on the other
hand, there were a lot of old firemen who couldn’t be retrained and needed jobs. So I was always
trying to think of a way, what’s the right public interest solution? Obviously it was, don’t hire any
new people, if they were very young and cou1d still be retrained, then maybe we should get rid of
them. but don’t throw an old guy out on the street. We always had that kind of a goal, but it
didn’t work. That was really a union thing where neither side was making any sense. The
railroads’ lawyers were very good lawyers, and they really pummeled us pretty badly. Now, of
course, the fireman, conductor, brakeman, the jobs are all kind of intertwined. The union went
too far in demanding new people on the railroads to do some jobs that weren’t any good. A
fireman might really jusr ride and not work more than 10 minutes on a 6-hour day, 8-hour day, on
a job. that the engineer could have done himself. We had a pretty impossible situation. We really
weren’t listened to by either side. I sympathized more with the workers in that situation, the older
workers. It never really did work out well. In the end, there’s no such union anymore. It’s all
some big united tra nsportation union. I don’t think they have any special firemen or brakemen.
It’s all condensed; where they had three or four in a crew, you can do it now with one or two.
Maybe you need an engineer plus a general man, a f1reman, a brakeman, conductor, everything
on the freight train.
Mr. Peck: One of the cases struck me as pretty interesting. In that case
involving the Firemen and Enginemen, the union and its president had been fined by Judge
Alexander Holtzoff for failing to terminate a strike, despite the fact that they had done a lot of
things to try and do so, inc1uding telegramming the strikers and all Among the issues that came
up to the D.C. Circuit, in which you represented them. was an accusation of bias in the judge.
Mr. Rauh: We did have an accusation of bias, but it was thrown in, I think, a
good deal to temper the – what happened there was that they struck and the other side knew they
were going to strike, so Frank Shea of Shea & Gardner had the papers all ready to go to Holtzoff.
I bad a fever but I handled it. We had a hearing all day. We were in violation, but we kept
saying, “All we want is the normal procedures for protecting the workers, that they’re not going
to be discharged if they go back to work.” Holtzoff was just so rough with us. On Sunday
afternoon, he had put the fine so much on Saturday, Sunday afternoon when we weren’t back at
work, even though we had been ordered back, Shea went to his apartment and they called me
over there, it was in the Broadmoor Hotel, and Holtzoff was livid with rage. “My orders aren’t
being obeyed!” he said. We said, “Your honor, we’re simply-.” I think I got the words “we’re
simply” out. What I would have said, ”trying to get the rights that always go with these returns to
work. He said, “You haven’t any rights at all, I mean, I’ve ordered you to go back.” Well, there’s
a lot in that. It was pretty ugly. Now H9ltzoff is a pretty ugly fellow. He could be quite rough
on you and he was in this instance. I was feeling quite sick that day, but I got sicker as the case
went along [laughing]. Anyway, we fmally did go back and in later life, the Assistant Secretary,
who had really, oh, beaten the heck out of us in the public, by the name of Jim Reynolds, and I
became best friends. Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds and Olie and I used to travel together and spend our
winter vacations together. We used to laugh about bow he cussed us out for not going back to
work, but that was his job. My job was to try to make some sense out of what we were doing.
That was a very bad situation, that featherbedding. I think it’s probably the
worst example of featherbedding in the country. Maybe the other one is just as bad. When the
printers used to make the newspaper, print an ad, set up an ad even though the ad already had
been set up and could be just inserted, they’d have to print it and then they’d throw the new one
they printed away. That was absurd, too. I think we and the printers, the firemen and the printers
really had the worst featherbedding in the country. Maybe we were wrong to do it, but I always
thought we could have some influence in trying to get a sensible way out of protecting older men
who needed jobs. It’s not so different from right now, what Clinton says about making the
submarines. These people need jobs. We didn’t want older people thrown out of their jobs, so
we had this idea that we could persuade people to behave. Neither side had much statesmanship
at that point.
Mr. Peck: Also in 1967, you had a case in which you were appointed by the
coun to handle the appeal for a defendant, Maples, Maples v. United States, who had been
convicted three different times already for a 1958 homicide. In 1967 you were up in front of the
D.C. Circuit one more time. There had been three different confessions in the case and the focus
of this hearing was on the first confession, which at that point had been ru1ed admissible.
Mr. Rauh: Dave Bazelon called me up one day and said, “Joe, we got a real
tough situation here on a possibly, potentially insane defendant. It’s a lot of work. I don’t know
that I want to impose it on you. You always talce whatever we ask.” We’re friends, Dave and I,
and we were always friends. He’s a_great, great, great judge. “Do you want to do this?” I said,
“Well, it is hard right now. Do you really think it’s as important as you made out?” He said,
“Yes.” I said, “I’ll do it.” There were many different ways out of executing that guy. I can’t
remember the uitimate outcome but there was both insanity and there were other ways out of it.
Do you remember exactly what it was?
Mr. Peck: I don’t know the ultimate outcome. The D.C. Circuit decision said
that because in the latest trial there were new and material facts that had emerged since the police
officer had not done the presentment to the magistrate, and took this confession because he didn’t
think they could obtain a conviction on him That was the grounds for throwing out this
confession. The decision came subsequent to Miranda, which had just been decided. It was
decided under pre-Miranda rules. But I don’t know what happened after that. They remanded
him for yet another trial.
Mr. Rauh: I can’t remember exactly what happened there, myself. I do
remember that Dave was very concerned about this guy. He was a very strange character. I
walked into the visitors’ cell there to see him He says, “Gimme a dollar!” I said, “What for, Mr.
Maples?” and he said, “I want to buy some cigarettes! I’m tired of smokin’ this rope!” He had
some string there. I didn’t know what to do. I didn’t know whether I could give him a dollar or
not I didn’t know the rules of the prison there. It was in the courthouse. the prison in the
courthouse, and so I asked for the guard, and the guard says, “Yeah, he always gets a dollar out of
everybody who comes to see him to get a pack of cigarettes!” I gave him a dollar and he got
himself a pack of cigarettes. I don’t know the degree to which he knew what was going on. Dave
was a1ways tembly wonied about the criminal process. I’ve never known a judge to be that
caring on the criminal process. The fact that we were friends and he gave me the option of doing
it, he didn’t say, “Joe, you gotta take this.” He was very nice about it. I know that we won the
particular case of the various Maples cases that I argued, but I can’t remember what the ultimate
outcome was.
We’re not very good criminal lawyers, but the principles here were pretty easy to
defend and 1 think Dave sat. I’ve never been sure how this works in the court of appeals. Lots
are drawn for bow they set panels up. But every time that Dave wanted me to argue something,
he was there. Now I don’t know whether the panel bad already been chosen or what, because
Dave was there in the courtroom and he was giving the prosecution a pretty hard time. I would
say his argument may have been better than mine.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
He ended up writing the op.inion, 1 think.
1 think so, too.
Early in ’68, relating to the election, you represented Eugene
McCarthy in a D.C. Circuit case appealing from an equal-time ruling of the FCC.
Mr. Rauh: I remember that very well. I think [Lyndon] Johnson had a press
conference about New Year’s Eve with all the networks. Toe question was whether they had to
give Gene McCarthy equal time under Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act. The
FCC said that they didn’t have to because he wasn’t an announced candidate.
Mr. Peck: It was Johnson who was not –
Mr. Rauh: Johnson was not an announced candidate. I thought to say that
you’re not a candidate until you announce, when you’re so obviously a candidate, as he was at
that time – strangely enough, he didn’t run – but at that particular moment he was so obviously a
candidate. 1 brought the appea1 from the ruling. It was a funny courtroom The courtroom was
full, because of the election thing. Here’s Gene challenging Johnson. They bad to get extra
tables for the lawyers on the other side. Here was the regular table for the plaintiff and I was
sitting there by myself. Then on the other side they had to bring in extras. Everyone of the
networks bad lawyers there. A very nice guy, you may know him, Roger Wollenberg, I think be
was a CBS lawyer, argued the case. I still think the case was wrong. You can let Johnson go
there with three networks and everything else for nothing, and the guy who was challenging him,
there was no question he’s challenging him, gets nowhere. We lost. Was it 2-1 we lost ?
Mr. Peck: It was per curiam, so without a dissent.
Mr. Rauh: Witl;tout a dissent. I know that Fahy was agamst me. On the oral
argument, I thought that two judges were going to vote for us, and Fahy against us. Who were
the two, do you remember?
Mr. Peck: Wright and McGowan.
Mr. Rauh: I know Wright was with us, and I thought McGowan. I really
thought I had a good chance of winning the case, but Charlie Fahy was a real hawk and thought
Jolmson was absolutely right on the war. He was going to go with Johnson, to heck with what I
was saying! He was quite rough on the questioning, but Wright and McGowan, I thought, might
be with us. Tuey were not. If you wanted to take the technical rule that it’s not until you
announce, but I trunk that’s a temble rule. It so helps the incwnbent, because he doesn’t have to
announce and can have all the benefits of the networks and everything else. I still think that case
is all wrong, but it’s the law of the land. I don’t know if that’s still the rule at the FCC, that it’s the
time of your announcement that makes you a candidate –
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
It’s now that you’re a recognized candidate.
Oh it is? Well I did some good maybe!
But they also exempt if it’s a legitimate news event, and press
conferences are considered legitimate news events and interview programs are also exempted.
Mr. Rauh: This was not really a regular press conference. This was Johnson
sitting around with the reporters for the three networks, a special program If you were a little
radio station trying to get in that room. you would not have gotten in.
Mr. Peck: You had another labor case in 1968 in which you appeared before
Wright, Bazelon and McGowan – Western States Regional Council #3 v. International
Woodworkers of America.
Mr. Rauh: That was for the Woodworkers. They’re a west coast lumber
Mr. Peck: Yes. This involved a lockout against two employees and whether
there was a multiernployer bargaining unit.
Mr. Rauh: If we had won that case, it would have broken some employers. It
was a very big deal. There may only have been a few people involved in the particular case, but
it involved a great sum of money if in fact there had been a lockout. I think that affected them.
that it might have been a bonanza for our side. We did have a lot of difficulty with the case. We
represented the Woodworkers for some years out there. They had a lawyer there who thought we
were pretty good, so we represented them ]t was a good, clean tm.ion – one of the really
democratic ones. 1 was very impressed with the guys.
Mr. Peck: Before we leave this time period, the only other event I wanted to
ask you about was the Fortas nomination for Chief Justice.
Mr. Rauh: That was a kind of a strange tbmg that happened there. In the first
place, people have to realize that none of the things that ultimately got Fortas were the big
events. What you had was a filibuster by the Republicans because of the views of the Justice.
(Sen. S trom] Thurmond said, and I now paraphrase, something like, “Of course we had to use
any method we could -. this man was so bad, so far to the left that we had to do whatever we
could.” And Senator [Robert) Griffin of Michigan led a filibuster. Tuey bad more than the 34
that they needed. The thing was just hopeless.
Paul Porter called me one day and started to cuss out hberals. “Why aren’t you
doing more for Fortas?” I said, “It’.s pretty hard because all they nee.dis 34 votes and you need
67. There’s a big difference there.” Secondly, Fortas had done one thing that be shouldn’t have.
1bis was not the thing that got him. ultimately his relations with that guy, the subway man,
Wolfson, whatever it is, we can get it right – it was not that. Tius was that he was taking $15,000
from American Uillversity here for talks, and money was being put up by outsiders for those.
That was hurting Abe. Essentially that was a battle over whether you could deny the guy a seat
because of his views. I had an argument with one of the loveliest men I’ve ever met in my life,
Phil Hart, Senator from Michigan, who argued with the Republicans that you couldn’t use the
views of the people, that was not relevant, .if they were honest and bright, why, you should
confirm them I said to Phil, “Brother, you’re gonna eat those words someday. Of course you can
consider what the guy’s views are.” When we went after Haynesworth, Phil suffered the tortures
of the damned before he voted with us because of what he had said during the Fortas thing in
trying to say that they couldn’t consider Fortas’s views. Of course, that was the basis of the
filibuster – it was really that. Anyway, I did argue with Paul Porter that they had not made a
very strong case and we were having trouble. The liberal movement tried to get Abe through.
When it was clear that we couldn’t win because of the fihOuster, see they didn’t defeat Abe, they
just filibustered him
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Rauh: A lot of us got word into Johnson, appoint Phil Hart. They’ll
confirm Phil Hart before they go home and you’ll have the Chief Justice. Johnson was in a
temble frame of mind. This was ’68. The Vietnam War is driving him up a wall He really
doesn’t know whether he wants Hubert to win or not. I guess he was sore at everybody, including
us, the liberals who were supporting Fortas, for not doing more. And I don’t think he ever
seriously considered the idea which must have gotten tbrou?h to him There was a way out of
this dilennna and that was the appointment of Phil Hart, who was a good lawyer, beautiful
character of a human being. I don’t even know if Phil wanted it, but he was so perfect a
candidate. You would never have had to consider Burger or anything else. But Johnson was in
no frame of mind to take good ideas from people, and be didn’t appoint Phil Then he had to ask
Warren to go on, and then when Nixon got in, he appointed Burger.
Mr. Peck: We had some more of the Firemen-Enginemen cases in ’69. and
actually Burger was on the Court on a few of those. I think the next thing that I wanted to ask
you about was the Quaker Action Group cases. The first one that you argued – there had been
one in ’69, but in 1970 was the one that you first argued, as the case kept coming back to D.C.
Mr. Rauh, Toe first one, I think, was argued by Bill Dobrovir, who would
later help me when I took it over. We went in front of Judge Hart. He didn’t think much of us,
but they had no case. What it was, I’ve always been told this, I have no proof of this, that
Johnson said to Marvin Watson, his assistant – this may just be a sort of a situation rather than
anything he actually said, “Darn it, get those peace freaks off my front lawn!” What he meant by
that was that we had. the anti-war movement was picketing in front of the White House, both on
the sidewalk on Pennsylvania Avenue and over in Lafayette Park. It went over to Interior, and
they set up a rule that you could only have so many people picket.
Mr. Peck: 100 in front of the White House and 500 in Lafayette Park.
Mr. Rauh: We brought this suit against that I took the chief of the Secret
Service’s deposition for a whole day. He finally admitted that there was no safety aspect. See,
this was on a safety ground. There was no safety aspect. I can’t remember exactly how he put it,
but be finally gave the case away. Hart wouldn’t give us the case. 1 think we had three appeals to
the court of appeals and we won them all. The fourth, finally, Hart gave us 750 in front of the
White House and 3,000 in Lafayette Park, am I right?
Mr. Peck: Yes.
Mr. Rauh: That seemed like a fairly good compromise. Hart sure took it hard.
Hart would always say, “Mr. Rauh, you can go up again and get me overruled! I know that! But
I’m gonna-.” He practically was saying. “I’m gonna do what I think is right, not what the court
of appeals is doing right. He’d say this at oral argument. How could you argue with a guy who
says, “Go ahead, you go upstairs!” He always used to say that! “Look, mister, you can go
upstairs and get me overruled again, but I’m not gonna change my view of this thing! I think the
President ought to have the right to have this the way, he is in the White House, he wants it, not
the way you and your whatever he would refer to us want it.” It was a rather easy win. The
ACLU dined out on that case for quite some time, always winning in the court of appeals and
then having it come back. In the end, it was a victory. I don’t know what the rules are today.
Mr. Peck: I’m not sure what the rules are today, either. lt was interesting,
because, you know, the 1970 appeal was granting swnmary judgment to the government, and that
was reversed saying that there at least had to be a trial on the facts – some fact-fmding. Then he
gave them summary judgment again, which is when you went up to the D.C. Circuit again in 72,
and D.C. Circuit sent it down and said, this time we really mean it! That’s when he came up with
the 750/3000 rule, but you went back to the D.C. Circuit on that one more time, in 1975.
Mr. Rauh: We asked for more- did we ask for unlimited?
Mr. Peck: There were cross-appeals. Because the government appealed, you
appealed as well. In that 1975 decision, Leventhal wrote the opinion, saying that the sidewalk in
front of the White House and in Lafayette Park are unique First Amendment forums, and
therefore while some security may be justified, whatever enforcement there is, the rule has to be
uniform and nondiscriminatory. They found that 3000 was too low, because the park could
accoIIIl110date a lot more people than that, and that the 750, while a reasonable rule, should not be
an absolute rule, either. They also gave the government, said it would be okay to have special
rules as to rush hour and as to the amount of noise that could be made.
Mr. Rauh: I always conceded that they bad every right to a traffic limitation, if
the traffic required it. We felt that they could limit it for security and traffic, and on security,
Rowley [Chief of the Secret Service] bad pretty much given it away because oftbe fence. I don’t
remember what bis title was, director general of the Secret Service or something 1ike that. I’d
say, “General, couldn’t you raise the fence a couple of feet?” I once said, “Couldn’t you electrify
the fence?” He said, “Oh, that would be very undemocratic!” J said, “Not letting people parade
is pretty undemocratic, don’t you think?” He was a pretty good scout, he’d say, “Yes, we had to
weigh a lot of things.” He knew that there was really no security problem. Johnson would come
to the window and look out! I mean, if there was any security problem, that was inviting trouble!
I think by this time Johnson was so tired of the thing. The trial was very interesting. I remember
one day we were going all day and all evening and I fm.ally was pretty tired. I wasn’t as old as I
am now, but I was about 60-odd. I said to the judge, “Don’t you think, sir, we ought to stop until
tomorrow?” He said, “I thought you wanted to get this over with. I thought you have always
been banging on me for no trial” He was realJy pounding on us, because we had so criticized the
fact th at it wo uld take years to get to trial. He said, “I thought you wanted a trial!” 1bis was at
10:00 at night. Finally, be bad to stop. The court attaches were getting a little tired.
Mr. Peck: We know from All the President’s Men and the books from the
Watergate era that Nixon was also very, very disturbed by this thing out there. He had students
who would infiltrate, trying to get information as if this were a conspiracy of the Democrats. On
one occasion, he had his student spies, who were in there, who had been hired by the Committee
to Re-Elect the President, signal when they saw some drugs around, and there were some drug
arrests there. Did that ever come up?
Mr. Rauh: I do not recall that.
Mr. Peck: ]t was during the course of the case that that happened.
Mr. Rauh: 1 do not recall that. l’m not saying it didn’t happen, but I have no
recollection of being told about it. I thought I was out of it by the time that we got the Leventhal
opinion after we got the Hart 3000n50 decision. TIIis could have occurred before that.
Mr. Peck: It occu.rred before that.
Mr. Rauh: I just have no recollection of it.
Mr. Peck: Another case that you were involved in, even though you didn’t
argue, that there were two related cases in 1971 in front the D.C. Circuit in which, it had to do
with malapportionment. of de1egates for the Democratic convention.
Mr. Rauh: The moving figure there is a man who is now a fellow in
television, I think in CNN, Ken Bode. It involved the question of who could vote for delegates.
I do remember what Bode thought, and he was an expert in this, that by limiting the voting for
delegates to the party, you would get a more hberal convention. We fought for that in two cases.
I won one case in the district court and lost it in the court of appeals. Actually I didn’t argue that
because I was away. John Silard argued it and lost in the court of appeals.
Mr. Peck: That was Georgia v. National Democratic Party.
Mr .. Rauh: Those were questionable cases. I think we may have been right
legally, but the court just didn’t want to get involved. They didn’t say there wasn’t standing to
sue, but they weren’t very happy with getting into the political arena there.
Mr. Peck: I guess this is the time to talk about Jock Yablonski and Mine
Mr. Rauh: It was 1969, in May. Ralph Nader came to see me and told me that
they were gonna make a fight for the control of the Mine Workers against a dic tatorial president
named Tony Boyle. He said, “My interest is in union democracy, but primarily it’s in black lung,
that Boyle has done nothing about black lung or about mine safety.” There had been a big blowup,
I think, at Farmington mines. Boyle had gone and said that the company had done everythmg
that it could to save lives. He was a real company whore. Nader took over, pretty much got into
the thing, and he and Jock Yablonski had agreed that they were going ahead. They wanted a
lawyer that would not be co nsidered anti-union – pretty hard to consider me anti-union, since I
was counsel to the Auto Workers, I think, at the time and represented a good deal of unions- so I
was a pretty good guy if I would do it. Nader came and he asked me. We talked for quite a
while about all that was going to happen. I said, “Why don’t you send Yablonski around. We’ll
talk it over.” So Yablonski came over. He said, “I’m gonna make this fight. The Mine Workers
have been good to me. I’ve had enough money to educate my boys – they’re both lawyers – and
my daughter is a professiona1 in the sociologica1 field. I want to do something here. I’m gonna
run.” I’m not exactly certain what words he used then, but it was that there was a danger to his
life. I don’t remember exactly how he put it, but I thought that there was something there. I said,
“Okay.” He couldn’t pay. He did put up some money for expenses, but be cou1dn’t pay us a fee.
But under Landrum-Griffin, you could get paid. I said I’ll take my chances that we’ll win the
various cases that we’ll have to bring.
We announced a press conference, in the sense that we :invited some people to the
Mayflower to a room there. The thing was so rough on Boyle beating up people, that we had
both Chip and Ken Yablonski at the door of this room. and they only let people in who we had
invited. The networks were there, Frank Porter of the Post, and Jock made his announcement.
Nader was there, but he was not sitting, he was not sitting with us. It was just Jock and myself.
Jock, in a scratchy voice that he had, read a statement, most of which Nader had written and I had
modified somewhat. Jock finished that, and then there were questions. Frank Porter, a very fine
reporter for the Post, said, “Well, Mr. Yablonski, there’s one thing I can’t understand-” and he
read him an introduction that Jock had made of Boyle only four months before in beautiful teffilS
about how wonderful Boyle was, and said, “How can you explain ru.nnin.g against this man after
what you said there, a few months ago?” Jock Jocked at him and said, “Well, let me tell you
something, Mr. Porter. This is what John L. Lewis a1ways used to say and I think it’s right –
‘when you be an anvil, be very still; when you be a hammer, strike with all your will,’ and I’m a
hammer.” Boy, I said to myself, I hadn’t said “boo” up until then, I said to myself, “Boy, do we
have a wonderful candidate here.” That was the best answer I have ever heard from a witness.
The press reported it, so they found out, Boyle found out about it the same day. Boyle dismissed
him from his job. He couldn’t dismiss him from being a board member, I don’t think, but board
members had jobs, too, and he was in charge of the political ann, labor’s non-partisan league.
Boyle fired rum and I think the first suit –
[Side BJ
Mr. Rauh: One was to be able to send out literature. There was a statute that
pennitted that. One was because they fired him from bis job. And there were two others. There
were four suits in all We won them all in the district court. I can’t remember exactly how many
of them went to the court of appeals. In one of the cases, the ACLU backed our side of the thing.
There was some debate, I understand, in the Labor Committee of the ACLU. They were a little
worried that we might be too anti-union because we were anti-this guy. In the end, they came
around and they supported our position, I think, in all the cases.
I’ve got the third one now. We asked for equal treatment from the Mine Workers
Journal, and we got that. Then there was a fourth one in front of Judge Hart where we asked for
certain things about the election. So we essentially won everything on the legal front.
It’s too much to go through all that happened. 1bis much I suppose I should say:
We had the election in November and December of ’69. They counted us out. Then the question
was whether we were going to continue to fight. If you’ll look on the wall there, at the left hand
side, the third one down is me and Jock Yablonski. That’s me and Jock Yablonski at the . . . . I
call that the murder picture. We’re at the Labor Department getting ready, or filing, our
complaint under the crooked statute part of the Labor Management Relations Act, the I.MR.DA
That picture apparently was shown to Boyle or it was in the papers and he decided to go ahead,
They had had a contract out for Jock’s murder, but the guys came around one day and lost theix
nerve. Then they withdrew the co:ptract. But after that picture in December of 1969, the contract
was back on, and on New Year’s, I think it’s the day before New Year’s Eve or New Year’s Eve
day, that day or the other, or the first day of the next year, they killed Jock, his wife and bis
daughter. Toe murder was not discovered for several days. There had been some functions that
Jock would ordinarily have been at -political functions – as the head of the Mine Workers in
Pennsylvania; be was a big deal His son Ken noticed that be hadn’t appeared and everything.
He got worried, telephoned, and no answer. Then Ken went to the house. It was about an hour
from where Ken lived. There was a temOle stench. He rushed in, rushed upstairs and there was
his mother, father and sister dead. He, of course, called the police. Chip called me. I was at the
Federal City Club having lunch with Ben Cohen. Chip called me to the telephone and said my
father and mother and sister have been murdered. I said, “Where are you?” I started to run for
his office, it was about three blocks. 1 never even thought of telling Ben I was leaving. He never
knew what happened until he heard it on the radio, I guess, or television that Jock had been
murdered. We got on the plane to Pennsylvania – Pittsburgh – and there were a lot of reporters
and police there. Chip, bis wife and the boy were all together because they were scared to leave.
They didn’t know how widespread this thing was. The press all asked Chip to say something and
Chip was just beyond himself. So they came to me, “Did I have any thoughts about the murder?”
I said, “Well there isn’t any doubt. It’s an el ection-connected murder.” I didn’t say Boyle had him
killed, which we later proved. I said “It’s perfectly clear that this has connection with the
election. There’s no other possibility.” Tuey said, “So you’re saying the union did it? I said, “It’s
an election-connected murder.” I decided to say that on the plane down, and I just stuck to that.
We were driven to the house, the state police were all there, the FBI was there,
and they treated Chip and me, I guess, as almost suspects. I mean, anybody could have done it,
we each had to answer questions, where we were and so forth
The incredible story is that Jock reached up from his grave and caught his
murderer. What happened was that when they had the abortive attempt, when before the election
they came to Jock’s house, there were two of them- they came to the door, they lost their nerve
and said that they were miners and said they wanted to know where they could get employed. So
Jock told them what to do, where you’d go to try to get a job, and they left. Jock said to Ken,
who happened to be there, “Ken, there’s something fishy here. These guys didn’t look like they
wanted a job in the mines. Let’s walk into town and just see if there’s anything we can see.”
They walked into town and they saw an Ohio license. Jock wrote it down and when he got home
he wrote it on a yellow pad that was in the living room. the Ohio license number so and so.
Either the FBI or the state police came across that. They called the Ohio license bureau. They
got the name of the man whose car it was, and that was one of the murderers. They went up the
line to get to Boyle. This was a man named Paul Gilley, in whose name the auto was registered.
His wife was the daughter of a UAW [UMW A] official named Huddleston. Huddleston finally
confessed and brought in the names of the next two in the line up, one of whom was the
secretary/treasurer of District 19, a vio]ent Tennessee district. Then it got to Boyle. They got
confessions each way and they, as it went up, it was a confession by Gilley, bis wife, Huddleston,
Huddleston’s two – no,.then they arrested Huddleston’s two bosses- and then something
happened that I’d say was interesting. These two were indicted for the murder without bail of
Jock and his family. Boyle wanted an opinion from his lawyers in the Mine Workers that he
could continue to pay these two despite the fact that they were in jail without bond on a capital
offense for which they had three lie detector witnesses of their participation. A wonderful
prosecutor, now one of my close friends, Dick Sprague, had these people there. We were
working together. He had taken depositions from Gilley, Mrs. Gilley and Huddleston implicating
the three of them, or at least two of the three had done that, implicating them and telling the
whole story. He was getting ready to pro secute. Well Boyle asked his internal lawyers,
especially a fellow named Harrison Combs – Combs’s family was a big family in the Mine
Workers – to give him an opinion that he could pay these two. The guy said, “I can’t. I don’t
think you can legally pay them under the circumstances.” He went to his lawyers who had been
handling the cases I told you about earlier – Williams & Connolly – and they gave him the
opinion. In the opinion, they analogized the situation to a worker on vacation or on sick leave,
that they could pay a worker on vacation or sick leave, and they could pay him. Boyle gave that
opinion to the head of District 19, who was then playing ball with the enemy, and said take this
to X and Y (their names escape me, but we can put them in), and they will be very happy with the
news. I know they’ll be very happy with the news. Tiris guy took it to the prison where they
were awaiting trial and gave them the news. The reason we know that is when Sprague broke
this fellow, he asked him about when Boyle had given the opinion of Williams & Connolly to
this head of that agency. When the guy made his confession, Sprague knew how much I wanted
to show up Williams & Connelly’s performance, so he asked him about this and put into the
confession what Boyle had done with that opinion in giving it to him to take to the prison where
these people were locked up.
They then convicted these two, turned the head of District 19 around, convicted
Boyle. The first time they reversed the conviction; the second time they didn’t. Boyle went to
jail for life. It’s that opinion, among other things, that led me to say Williams had the ethics of a
pigsty. That’s in the book. When Evan Thomas came around to see me, what he was really
trying to find out was if I had any more that I hadn’t used. I didn’t. I told Thomas exactly what I
just said, that that was the most outrageous thing. In the OOok, which I haven’t read, except
insofar as the pages that cover me, apparently, [Edward Bennett] Williams daims he never knew
that his firm had given that opinion, or something, kind of ridiculous. The guy had a million
dollars, which in those days was a pretty high fee, from the Mine Workers for their work for
them Williams had never answered my charges. What he did say was, his answer to my charges
was, “Nobody ever listens to Joe Rauh!” That was his answer rather than on the merits, and I
pointed that out. I think Thomas, in his biography, was rather fair to our side of that argument.
He knows we were right. I trunk he was not unfair. He apparently says that Mrs. Williams
thinks the biggest mistake she ever made was letting him be the authorized biographer. I don’t
think that’s true. I think he was trying to be as honorable and fair as he could, and I wou1d say
that he was not unfair to me. But that’s roughly the story. If anybody is really interested in the
case, there’s a very fine book by a man named Trevor Annbrister. He is the biographer of-that
ship that was taken by the Communists off of China, I think it’s in the Ford Administration –
Mr. Peck: Right.
Mr. Rauh: The Phoenix, maybe? He came to see me one day while the fight
was going on. He told my secretary, “Tell Mr. Rauh that I’m from the Reader’s Digest but not to
get his hackles up.” He walked in and said, “Look, I’m from the Reader’s Digest but don’t get
sor e until you hear me out.” We became great friends and he covered the thing. He was at the
trials and everything, and it’s a beck of a book.
Mr. Peck: Well, you need to go, so why don’t we stop now. You know, I
think it might have been the Pueblo.
Mr. Rauh: Pueblo! You got it.
Mr. Rauh: Tiris is paean of praise to Dick Sprague, who was the prosecutor in
that case that sent Boyle to jail for life. We used to discuss the various things. I knew more
about the operation of Mine Workers than he did, but he knew more about how to send a guy to
jail for life than I did. One day I made a suggestion to Dick about something he do es. He looked
at me and said, “Joe, which one of us is the civil libertarian?” I had apparently made some
suggestion that was really not civil hberties-minded at all, and, Dick and I, we just roared with
laughter. He’s a wonderful guy. There was some fe eling in Philadelphia that he was a rough
prosecutor. I tell my story in contradiction of that.
[Tape ends]
Mr. Rauh:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
Four Cases (1968-1974)
Interviewed During 1992 [Side A]
So there were four cases. Actually, I just thought of this, the
ACLU issued a press release during the course of those four, taking our side on all four of them
Tuey were all pretty open and shut cases. Then, there was a misappropriation-of-funds case, but
that came, I think, after the election in which they counted us out. Then, of course, we filed a
complaint with the Labor Department against the elections, so in that sense, there were two more
I guess it was in the money case, misappropriation of ftmds, when Jock
[Yablonski] dies, they immediately say that the case is mooted, and we won that. Sometime
dwing the course of this, we also asked for attorneys’ fees. So that’s another case in the-re-.
Possibly the biggest case we ever won from Williams & Connally was in the court
of appeals. We had lost in the lower court on the question of whether they could represent both
[Tony] Boyle and the [United Mine Workers] union. The court of appea1s ru]ed they couldn’t
re present both Boy]e and the union, that that was a conflict. That was quite an important victory
for us because it added to the malevo]eoce of the other side, in addition to being accused of
murder and everythiog else, now their lawyers are accused of wrongdoing.
That got a full column in The New York Times – “Williams Finn Disqualified”
was the headline. It buoyed up our spirits because our spirits were getting pretty ]ow –
remember the fight was all of’70, all of ’71 aod early ’72, I got my shot at Boyle.
What happened there was that the Secretary of Labor had excJusive jurisdiction to
bring a suit to upset the election. We cou]d not bring one to upset the election. After the murder
and all the screaming I was doing, they did in fact bring suit to upset the election. I moved to
intervene. I lost in t]J.e district court. I lost in the court of appeals, and I think Skelly Wright was
the judge. I think, what they did, they didn’t write an opinion; they sort of said that we were out
of our minds, that we didn’t have a case. Well, we were just beside ourselves that we couldn’t be
allowed to intervene because our view of the tenacity of the Labor Department was something
like jello. They were just terrible.· They were on the side of the unions most often; they didn’t
have any great ability; as far as I was concerned, if we weren’t in the case, why it was hopeless,
and it was going nowhere.
Well, Dan Edehnan wrote a draft of a petition for cert. We were pretty low
because here we had Skelly Wright saying that we didn’t have a case worth responding to. I don’t
know what got into Skelly Wright, but we had an argument before the Supreme Court, and we
It really restored our morale, so then the Labor Department let me run the case. It
was February of ’72 that I took Boyle’s deposition for 2 days. I was sick. I had a kidney stone. It
was a very painful thing, but darned if I was going to postpone the thing, so I cross-examined
Boyle for 2 days. I didn’t lmow this, but Clarice Feldman who was working with us went around
and told [Judge] Bryant that I was sick. He couldn’t have been more solicitous ofme.
There were twenty-three times, l think, the newspaper counted them up, that Boyle said be
couldn’t remember or didn’t know, or something. By the end of the second day, Bryant was just
giving Boyle hell. We would ask a question and he would start muttering and Bryant would pick
it up and try to get an answer for us. I think, in a sense, we won the case that day. Bryant was
just convinced that this was a lying son-of-a-bitch. At any rate, Bryant did come down with a
beautiful opinion on all the wrongdoing, all the mistakes, and all the violations oflaw. To get a
new trial you have to prove that the violations would have made a difference and Bryant just
destroyed him with the proof of that kind. Sometime, I think it was in May, Bryant’s decision
came down. Then, he issued an order, really, for short and honest election. He put a monitor in
place, and we did get an honest election the second time. In November or December, still ’72, we
won the election and he [Arnold Miller] was installed.
I remember very well, the problem we had there. Toe UMW A owned the bank,
the United Mineworkers owned the National Bank of Washington. Here, we’re about to take
over with a miner without even a high school education who owns the majority of the stock of
this bank. The bank’s full of big shots in Washington, like you never saw. So one day, between
the time we knew we had won and the time we were installed, why two of the bank directors
waited upon me to discuss the takeover of the bank. One was the present Governor of Rhode
Island, Sundlun, be was one of them. and there was another. I came back to the office late in the
afternoon, and they were sitting in my outer office and I walked by them When I got in my
office, my secretary said they wanted to see me. I said that was pretty obvious. So they came in
and they said, “Look, you own the bank. We’re all going to be out. We know that. Let’s do this
as gentlemen, not throw us out right now. Our terms are up in the spring (this was early
December). What’s the difference? We’ll say that you, in effect, are in charge.” And I said,
“Well, is the President oftbe Bank, who is a man named Davis, will he agree to this?” They said
they thought so. So I said, ‘Well, bow do we get him, how to we get a hold of him?” So they
pulled out a list of cocktail parties that he went to every afternoon, Mr. Davis, and said, well, it
looks like he’ll be at this one about this time. So they called him up at the cocktail party and he
said be would come over. A few minutes later – oh, we had a press release written. Arnold
Miller. the incoming president, and this guy, Davis, what was his first name, I can’t recall it right
now, but I’ll get it, an yway, we were working on a release. It was perfectly all right. We said that
the Board of Directors would stay until the terms were up, but that we would in effect control the
So, there is a knock.at the door, because all the girls had gone home, it was now
7:00 or 8:00 in the evening, and I went to the door, and this guy Davis, who’s got the cheek of,
you’ve never seen chutzpah like this, says “Hello, Joe, how are you? I’m glad to see you.” I
never met the son-of-a-bitch, and I wasn’t buying anything bke that. I said, ”Come in and sit
down,” and he sat down. Sundlun or the other fellow said to him, “We have a press release here
in which Mr. Miller has agreed, and his people, Mr. Rauh and Mr. Yablonski,” that was Chip
Yablonski, the son, “and we would like to read it to you.” So, one of them read the press release.
Davis says, “It’s perfectly satisfactory to me.” We said to our guy doing the press, okay you can
put the release out. So we thought that the party was pretty well over when Davis looks over at
Miller and says, “Mr. Miller, I would like to buy your bank.” Miller didn’t know whether he had
a toy or a hundred million dollars in place. So Arnold says to Davis, “Well, Mr. Davis, I really
don’t think it is for sale. We’d like to be able to help miners with their loans.” Well that was a
pretty ridiculous answer, because the mine fields are a thousand miles away, and the only office
we had, we had a couple offices in the downtown District of Columbia, so this wasn’t much of a
thing. At any rate, we had the bank.
A couple of days later, we have the final hearing in front of [Judge] Bill Bryant. I
presented the order to install Arnold Miller and our whole crowd, and Bill signs it. The clerk
hands it down to me. I handed up a haJf a dozen or more orders. He said, “What are these for
Mr. Rauh?” I said, “Well, I’ve got several people I want to give them to, Your Honor. If the old
crowd tries to draw money, I now have the word of Mr. Davis that be will follow our orders, but
be is insisting that he get an original copy of your order.” Bryant looks at me as if to say “Boy,
am I happy to sign this order.” He signs the order with a big flourish We leave the courthouse
then. There’s a picture up on the wall ofme and Arnold Miller there. Arnold is going back to
the Mineworkers to get installed and I go to the National Banlc of Washington and serve Davis
with tlris order. I said, “Look, brother, if the old crowd draws anything, you’re in real trouble,
because I have your word on a press release and I am now handing you the order that you insisted
on.” He said, “Don’t worry.” Anyway, we never had any trouble, it was our bank, we had the
funds, and we took over.
The problem we bad there, now that we had won the battle, and I think I
mentioned to you the other day that during the course of the day I had this call from [Judge]
George Hart saying that he had just written me a letter, but be had to tear it up, and the letter said,
‘This is the best piece of1awyering that has come into Washington in my lifetime. I want you to
know I believe that even though we are rather political opponents.” He had been Chairman of
the Republican pany when I was Chairman of the Democratic party. He was a pretty
conservative guy. Tb.at was pretty nice ofhim, but he said, I really shouldn’t write the letter, but
boy do I believe it, he said but I tore it up and threw it in the wastebasket.
Naturally I had been offered the general consulship of the union. I said the only
right way to do it is to do it symbolically. Chip should be the general counsel, and Arnold said
okay. He was decent in that respect. He just wasn’t very smart, but he was decent. So Chip
became the general counsel and there was a certain kind of symbolism in Chip’s ability to take
over the union in a sense be the top person or one of the top people in the union after his father
had died for the clean-up of the union.
So I had never had anything to do with the union after that. I didn’t want to
interfere in any way, so I really got out of it. But it was a great experience.
There is a very good book, I think I mentioned it to you, Trevor Armbrister. The
prosecutor called the jail later. You see, Boyle was still the president when this happened. But
because we controlled Arnold Miller in the sense that he was cooperating with us, he helped us.
He got a confession out of the President of that District that was so co.nupt and violent. He really
helped us and we finally bad pretty well made the case. He was moving up the ladder and then
he [Sprague] indicted Boyle. It was a really exciting venture. I think as a civil lawyer, it is
strange that I bad two murdered clients, Bill Remington in the loyalty security business and John
Yablonski. I’ve always been surprised that so much violence could have occurred in the period
of a lifetime of a rather peaceful civil rights lawyer. This was one case where the court of
appeals was not helpful.
Mr. Peck: Well, that period was also the period in which the Haynesworth
nomination occurred. When did you first hear about that and bow did you organize yourself into
the opposition?
Mr. Rauh: I’m groping for whose seat it was. I think I know. I think it was
Goldberg’s seat. Fortas got that.
Mr. Peck: I think it was Fortas’ seat.
Mr. Rauh: Yes. That is what I was groping for. If that’s right, I know what
motivated me first. It was my seat. That was the Cardozo’s seat. Because it went Cardozo,
Frankfurter, Goldberg,.Fortas, Haynesworth, and that seemed to me an obscenity for the seat of
Justice Cordoza to go to Haynesworth In my testimony against Haynesworth, I made that point
that I was not here just as an outside citizen, I had an inside need for their understanding that the
seat of Benjamin Cardoro should not go to Haynesworth We got the Leadership Conference to
go against Haynesworth. Clarence [Mitchell] and I testified for several hours for the Leadership
Conference. We had a trip]e header. There were really three things against Haynesworth.
There was a lot of loose talk about we didn’t have a case against Haynesworth and
that it was a mistake to oppose him That was loose talk. First, there were the civil rights cases.
My testimony really murders Haynesworth on civil rights cases. There were the labor cases and
George Meaney went up and testified against Haynesworth. He sort of had a box score of nine to
nothing. There were nine labor cases on which Haynesworth sat, and on all nine he ruled against
the labor union. Toe third item is the conflict of interest, because he not only ruled against the
labor union, but he made money from the employers of those labor unions by having vending
machines in their plants. Haynesworth actually sat on cases where he had a vending company in
which he owned or had a majority interest, a company which he had that interest, had a contract
to have vending machines in those three. Now that was a big break. Whether we would have
won, even with a good civil rights record, from our standpoint, we really had him there, labor’s
opposition through Meaney, whether we would have won without the conflict, one can’t say. We
did have the conflict. Bill Eaton, a reporter for the, can’t remember which paper, got a Pulitzer
Prize for exposing this vending machine thing. He had a couple of other conflicts, but that was
the big conflict. The combination of the three did it. On my wall up there, I have the vote in the
Senate on Haynesworth It was very close. We did win, and we went to have some rest. Only
we didn’t remember that Nixon had said, ”If they don’t approve this guy, we’ll give them
someone worse.”
Mr. Peck: For the tape, let me just say that the vote is signed by Birch Bayh,
with the words, ‘Thanks so much, Joe, for all your help in defense of the Court.”
Mr. Raub: The Carswell thmg was both better and worse, from our
standpoint. We had already testified, the Leadership Conference, against Carswell for the court
of appeals job. We didn’t have very much in those days. I mean we didn’t know much about him
at that time, but we did testify against him I don’t think I testified. When he gets nominated, I
said to myself, I’m not going to be able to live with this guy if this guy wins. Because he is so
much worse than Haynesworth, that the people who beat Haynesworth are going to get run out of
town. It was well known that Clarence and I and George Meaney had had a big hand in that, and
everybody was saying, “You can’t have two fights, Joe. You won now, now be quiet.” I said,
“You can’t be quiet. If this guy gets in, he is so disgusting a human being, that we are really
going to get crucified here.”
I called up Leon Scholl [?] who was the Executive Director of the ADA and said,
“Leon, you’ve got to come out against Carswell We can’t wait.” Because people started coming
out for him They don’t want two fights. I said, “What is your chance of being able to clear it, so
that we could come out against him?” He says, ”Do you think he’s bad?” I sllld, ”He’s worse
than Haynesworth. We have no choice.” I said, ‘This is not a matter of my being petulant. I am
just telling you we’ve got to do something here.” He said, ”Well all right. Give me an hour.”
He called half a dozen people and they all said go ahead. So he called, and I announced that the
ADA would o ppose rum
This put everybody on the spot. Several of these people, their flacks had said they
didn’t think there would be a fight over it, but they had no choice. If someone in the old thing
who beat Haynesworth was going to oppose it, why they had to, Clarence came out soon for the
NAACP, Tom Harris [for the AFllCIO] had to shift bis position. He had told Newsweek that he
wouldn’t oppose. He told them on Friday and they had this in the paper on Monday. Then on
Tuesday they had to come out agamst him, because the trung was piling up. The Senators were
so mad at me. I really think that Joe Tyclings was going to take a poke at me, he was so mad, He
said, “We’ve just won a great battle. What are you doing here?” I said, “But that’s not the point.
The point is that this is worse and that we are going to look so bad, you’re going to look so bad,
but everybody’s going to look so bad on our side of this fight if you don’t come out agruD.St him”
Slowly it turned around. It got down to a very few Senators that wou1d make the decision. The
Republicans were supponing Nixon, and the Democrats were largely opposing him, but not
completely. On Saturday afternoon at 4:00, I was driving home from our regular tennis game and
I heard on the radio, “John Sherman Cooper announces that he will vote for the confirmation of
Carswell.” Ifmy car didn’t bang into the side, it wasn’t because I was alive. I was just
flabbergasted. 1bis liberal Republican, high standards, everything. So I was just beside myself.
I got on the telephone with Wilson Wyatt who I had worked with in the housing agency. He was
back in Louisville as the head of the biggest finn there, law firm. He said, ”No, there is nothing
we could do with Cooper. We had opposed Carswell. We can’t do anything with Cooper. But,
you will get [Senator] Marlo Cook, who will vote the other way this time, because he hates
Cooper and he wants to show him up.” So, I said, ”Really?” And he says, “Yeah, watch out,
you’re going to get Cooper.” Well, anyway, it comes down to the last day of the vote, we did get
Cooper, and we did win by several votes. But, there were two votes there that the Administration
had, if they c-ould win. One was a fellow named Prouty from New En gland and then there was
one other that they rather controlled the votes. They had Prouty and the other one’s name escapes
me. They weren’t willing to throw their vote for Carswell, if it didn’t make any difference, and it
didn’t make any difference. When Cook finally voted with us, there was sort of a cheer in the
gallery. Whoever was in charge there was banging away to stop the noise, and I was sort of
trying to keep it going. We made it the second time. It has been a useful victory for me
personally because when I tried to persuade people to do it a second time, and they said it’s
hopeless, you can’t win two batt les in a row, we had a case here where w? did.
Of course, Nixon gave up. He appointed Blackmun, who ha d a very good record
in the Eighth Circuit, much better than he showed for a couple of years on the Supreme Court.
My comment when the paper asked for my comment on Blackmun was, “We11, I guess we rea11y
won a victory with Carswel l. Nixo n had to appoint a Harvard Summa Cum Laude to the
Supreme Court.” Blackmun had been a Harvard Summa Cum Laude in college, not in the law
At any r ate, that Carswell thing was a wonderful thing, because it showed you
could win a second time. Sadly, when the thing C8Ille up for its biggest, more recent thing, where
you had Kennedy after Bork, the groups wouldn’t go, and there was nobody against Kennedy
except really Molly Yard and myself. We testified against Kennedy. There were two others
actually on the panel One was an assistant of Molly Yard, or she was in the NOW Legal
Defense Fund. The other w as really a most interesting thing. Joe Biden is ra ther obvious. He
didn’t want us to get anywhere in the Kennedy thing because he wasn’t willing to make a fight.
What he did when our panel was announced, it was announced Molly and me, and that wasn’t
much strength when you come right down to it. I called it the Committee of Septuagenarians
against Kennedy, but there wasn’t much strength in that, and the third person was a NOW person.
He added to the panel at the last minute a gay. What he was really trying to say was Molly Yard,
that strident old lady from NOW, and Joe Rauh, that crackpot, and a gay, were all they’ve got
agamst us. I kept telling everybody, “You’re crazy. We have to fight Kennedy.” I leave it to
history whether I was right or wrong, but we did go in front of it. Biden was very ugly to me
personally. He said, ‘Well you know,” it was sort of, ”you think you’re so smart. You think you
know more than we do. You think that you’re a better civil rights person than Senator Kennedy
here. Do you think that your better than Senator Metzenbaum, and do you think that you’re a
better civil rights person than I am, Joe Biden.” It was really quite ugly, because there was really
no answer to that. Metzenbaum accused me of challenging bis character. I said I’m not
challenging anybody’s character, I’m saying that Kennedy ought not be on the Supreme Court and
the fact that you’ve just beaten Bork doesn’t prove that he should be on the Court. I felt rotten
after the hearing. I felt that the hearing was really temble and nobody could come with us.
There were one or two who wanted to. I don’t know, maybe it was unanimous, I don’t know
what it was. But I know we didn’t get anybody that I remember. It just wasn’t a nice feeling.
You had the feeling the committee had a guilt complex. They knew we were right. They knew
that this guy shouldn’t be on the Supreme Court. They didn’t want a second fight after Bork, so
the best thing to do was to throw a couple of curves at a couple of lobbyists like Molly Yard and
Joe Rauh who don’t amount to much.
Mr. Peck:
want to fight again.
Mr. Raub:
Mr. Peck:
I think that we agree that they basically had given up, they did not
That’s right.
Haynesworth stayed on the Fourth Circuit and some say he
compiled a pretty good record after this. Do you think the fact that he was subjected to such
scrutiny may have improved bis ability as a judge?
Mr. Raub: Yes. I sure do. I trunk that as of the moment we testified, there
was no question that we were right, both on civil rights and on labor and on conflict of interest.
If you examine the record after that, it does seem to have impi-oved. If it had been 1 O years later,
he might have very well been confirmed. But after all. we were dealing with his cases as of the
day in ’69 when he was nominated. There is a book out by John Frank, a former law clerk to
Justice Black in which he takes Haynesworth’ s side of the battle against the labor/civil rights
side. John’s a good friend of mine. He was counsel to Anita Hill. We consulted during that
period. He is a very decent guy. I just think he is wrong ·on Haynesworth. I think what led him
astray was, he didn’t agree with us technically that there was in fact a conflict of interest. He was
an expert on conflict of interest, and although I think he agrees that it would noW be a conflict of
inte?t, as of the moment when Bill Eaton’s pieces came out on the conflict, he didn’t believe at
that moment that there was a conflict. I think, because he thought we were wrong on the conflict,
he sort of defended Haynesworth on the other two items which were there irrespective of the
Mr. Peck: It’s often been speculated that [Senator] Roman Hruska’s defense
of Carswell was more damaging than helpful, that he thought even mediocre people needed
Mr. Rauh: I saw that on the tube that night. I just gave a cheer you could have
heard three blocks away. How a guy could be so stupid as to say mediocre people needed
representation. We had some great breaks in that thing. Hruska was one. I think there was
ahnost a bigger break. James J. Kilpatrick is an honest man. He wrote a colwnn towards the end
in which he discussed the Carswell’ upcoming confinnation vote. He told the truth. He said
Carswell lied about that golf course, the golf course story, of course, is that there was a municipal
golf course in Florida somewhere and when blacks started playing on it, they put it in private
hands so that they could not have blacks playing on it. Carswell had written the incorporation for
the golf course and had been instrumental in getting the blacks off the golf course, and he denied
it. This was a very important point. He denied that that was bis purpose. In bis cohmm, Mr.
Kilpatrick has the decency to say that “everybody in Florida knew that that golf course was
turned into private hands to get rid of the blacks. Everybody knew that, I still think he should be
confinned.” But his opmion that he should be confirmed had no impact; but his calling, he a
southern, former segregationist, called Carswell a liar, that really helped us. I thanked Mr.
Kilpatrick again for helping out on a cause he was not for, but he was a straight shooter, and be
said everybody in Florida knows why this thing was turned into private hands.
Mr. Peck: I think that brings us to the 72 election. You were a McGovern
supporter. How early did you get involved in the campaign?
Mr. Rauh: I was in it before there was a campaign. I was for George for
president before he announced. I never had a big role in the campaign. I took some pitches for
him I’d go and raise the money. I used to be pretty good at that. I don’t know if I could do it
anymore. It was a lot of fun. I really wasn’t a very big part of the campaign. Towards the end, as
it was heating up, I got.more and more involved. I went to Mississippi to speak to the new
delegations that were partly instrumental in helping make the delegation.
Then along comes California. It took a good deal of knowledge of the election
law at that time to deal with the problem What happened was that George beat Hubert
Humphrey and Ed Muskie in a winμer-take-all priinary. It was run as a winner-take-all primary
and he got all the delegates. This put him over the top. If anybody was to beat George, they had
to upset that. So, Humphrey who had announced after McGovern bad won the primary with a
take-all, changed his mind and decided to challenge it. They had a hearing in front of the
credentials committee. Joe Califano argued for Humphrey and I argued for McGovern and on
straight party lines, Califano won. So they took a hundred plus delegates away from George, and
then we weren’t over the top. George called and said, ”What do we do now?” I said, ‘We have
to sue, we really don’t have any choice.” He said, “All right.” I think this is on a Saturday, about
a week before the convention. He said, “Come over to the house tomorrow morning and we’ll
discuss it.” So Sunday morning I went over with about a half a dozen young lawyers who were
helping me. That was the only smart thing I did in the whole thing, the rest of it they did. They
were so appreciative of joining in this conference with the candidate that they just worked their
heart out after the decision was made. Severa] of them have said to me that that was the nicest
thing they ever bad done to them It never occurred to me that I was doing anything, but it was
very ]ucky. Tuey were very appreciative. There was an argument there – there were a couple of
McGovern people who didn’t want to sue. I had to argue with them 1t was really quite a
thoughtful discussion that morning. George said go ahead and sue as fast as you can. I think it
didn’t take us twenty-four hours to have the complaint. It was a straight contract issue. The
contract was that George was running in a winner-take-all.
[Side BJ
Mr. Rauh: We filed the complaint as fast as we could. We took the papers
around to Judge [George] Hart one night and he set it for 10:00 the next morning. Califano and I
argued. Hart ruled against us, but in doing so, he helped us a great deal He called the
perfonnance of the Democrats something like ”rotten pool.” I haven’t got the first word right, it
was something pool, what do you say?
Mr. Peck: Dirty pool?
Mr. Rauh: No, it was like that. It wasn’t exactly dirty pool It was some word
that is used more often with pool I can’t remember what it was. Anyway, we went to the court
of appeals that afternoon. They set the argument for the next day which was the fourth of July.
So Califano and I argued in front of the court of appeals the morning of the fourth of July. It
was perfectly clear that we had Bazelon, and they had the Senator. Do you have the name of the
Mr. Peck: No, I don’t.
Mr. Rauh: Anyway, they had that. So everything was up to MacKinnon who
was the third vote, and MacKinnon had had some experience when he was a political figure in
the Republican party in Minnesota. He mentioned this case to me. Luckily I knew something, I
knew enough about it to sort of embrace him, and we got him So two 10 one, they ruled that
they couldn’t take the delegates away from us. Of course, the next morning Califano’s in the
Supreme Court with a motion to [Chief Justice] Burger to stay the thing. Well, a stay is a
decision on the merits and so we argued, papers flying back and forth for about 36 hours. The
final thing we did was, I thick it was the second night, we were having dinner and we hear a
report that Burger’s going to issue an opinion on a point that’s answerable. I can’t at this minute,
without seeing the papers, say exactly what it was. So we decided to leak the story to the Post,
what Burger was likely to do and then file the answer at 9:00 the next morning in the Supreme
Court. So we leaked the story to the Post. We went home and went to bed. We got up at 3:00 or
4:00 o’clock in the morning. We were down at Arnold & Poner about 5:00 with the Post giving
Burger’s reason. Well, at 9:00, Bill Dobrovir and I show up at the Court with a supplemental
supplement answering this point. Burger obviously, we drove him off of that, but we didn’t drive
him off of the answer. There was dissent and Bill Brennan went along with it, saying there
wasn’t time to deal with it, Which seems to me would also have been time for not upsetting the
lower court. Since I sometimes think of Bill as pretty close to divine, why 1 will forgive him for
this concurrence with Burger. We had through the win in the court of appeals, and maybe it was
“dirty pool,” since we had one judge saying it was dirty pOol, and two other judges and the
majority say that we were right, and the grave doubt about what Burger was doing because the
stay was a decision on the merits. All we asked was for an oral argument if they were thinking of
staying jt and they didn’t give us anything like that. It was a pretty rotten perionnance by Burger
on us. So I went to the convention with George and helped on the floor that night. Of course, we
did win the fight. I think it was helped by George Hart, a Republican Chairman in the District of
Columbia, calling this thing dirty pool and Dave Bazelon and MacK.innon saying that they
couldn’t do this. We, in fact, won.
I’ve onJy one reservation about that case. These wonderful young people who
handled it really with me, there was brilliant writing stuff they were bringing in, and we kept
improving the thing. They were getting leaks from clerks in the Supreme Court. It never
occurred to me that I was doing anything wrong in listening to them They’d coming running in
saying, Joe, so and so, he’s with so and so and he says that your real problem is that Bill Brennan
doesn’t want to come back for an oral argwnent tomorrow or something like that. They kept
coming in with it. It never occurred to me that I shouldn’t have listened, and I did listen. I don’t
know if the information was of any great value or not. I’ve often wondered whether I didn’t
make an ethical breach there in listening to their reports. We were sure getting them I’ll tell you
this, the Supreme Court law clerks were really with George McGovern and I guess the Vietnam
war. It didn’t bother them any. They were leaking their socks off and I was getting the advantage
of it. I’ve thought about it a good deal. I guess if I’d thought more about it, I wouldn’t have let
them do it, but I did. That’s the story of that case.
Mr. Peck: As I remember the campaign, the campaign was full of hope,
George the giant killer was going to knock off Nixon. Although we read complaints about the
Watergate break-in, it wasn’t a story that caught on at that time. Did you have any impressions
about it at that time, whether that was something that would develop into what it did?
Mr. Rauh: No. I really did not, and I don’t think you are right when you said
that it was a campaign that started with a lot of hope. I think George was a hopeful figure, but,
two things happened there that caused the landslide. One was Meaney’s opposition to McGovern
because he hadn’t done everything that Meaney wanted and the other was Tom Eagleton’s
medical problem I think I may be one of the few remaining people who have remained best
friends with George McGovern and Tom Eagleton. I think they’re both terrific human beings
and that it was just a tragedy, an inevitable tragedy. It’s the kind of thing that happens in politics.
George himself now feels that he made a mistake in knocking Tom off the ticket, that he’d have
gonen more sympathy and everything else if he had just hung firm I think that’s right, but at that
time all the money people said, “You’ve got to end the Eagleton vice-presidential nomination,”
and George did it.
I didn’t really fore? the whole thing. I guess it really was inevitable once
Meaney decided to go for Nixon. They say he was neutral. When a Labor man is neutral, he
helps the Republicans. There was no real neutrality there. In fact, the labor movement was very
unfair to George. The worst thing they used against him was something that should never have
been used against him There was a vote on a Taft-Hartley provision that permits states to have
right-to-work laws, and labor was a big effort to repeal that. The Senators were filibustering the
repeal, the Republican Senators, and George bad promised to vote for cloture. When the time
came we were fifteen votes short of cloture and George called a number of people including
Walter Reuther and said, “What do I do?” Tuey said, “Vote what’s best in South Dakota,” which
clearly was against the union, which he did. Meaney kept using that against him, saying he
promised. He did, but the situation had changed. It was hopeless. There were fifteen votes
behind. So in fact the whole campaign was fraught with difficulties and the break-in was just a
small part of that. I think we lost it before we started in that race.
Mr. Peck: 1973 became the year of the Watergate Committee, and the
hearings and just the constant parade of all the things that a lot of people suspected about the
Nixon Administration which was now being confirmed. How were you reacting to this? How
did this figure into the things that you were working on? Certainly Congress seemed re-
Mr. Rauh: There was a strange thing here. I had testified agamst Ford being
confinned as Vice President, and there didn’t seem to me to be any great advantage in Fore!. The
advantage was in bW1ing Nixon who was against us in all the things. In relation to Ford, we
didn’t have any great support for him In fact, his civil rights record bad been miserable.
Everybody was against Nixon. I was against Nixon, but there wasn’t any sort of light at the end
of that tUDDel, as though you were going to have some really first call President come in there. I
did do some work on the impeachment. I wrote a couple of things for different members of the
House Judiciary Committee. I don’t think I had what you call a very major role in that.
Mr. Peck: Did the concern with Watergate and the focus the Congress had on
it have any effect on the other things that you were working on? Was it a distraction from that
work, or was it helpful because the Presidency was weakened?
Mr. Rauh: I’m trying to think whether there was a Supreme Court appointment
in that period and 1 don’t think so. You get the Rehnquist one in the first term, don’t you?
Mr. Peck: Relmquist? Yes, that was still during the first term
Mr. Rauh: l’ve never really related Nixon’s weakness to the civil rights, bberal
things for which we were struggling.
Mr. Peck: Was Lewis Powell in ’73?
Mr. Rauh: No, he was there with Relmquist. There were two of them there
together. We did not, or at least the Congress did not oppose Powell because there were some
good things in Powell’s record, some bad things, but we did not oppose him I guess I never
thought in terms of the effect of Watergate. It had a good effect in one respect and that was the
74 election where you got so many congressman and senators. 1 do remember this, and I guess
this is what you’re thinking of. In 74, after that very Democratic victory, I called Fritz. Mondale.
He had planned a trip to Europe, right after the election and before the ’75 new Senate. I was for
Mondale for President then, and made a suggestion. The suggestion was this, that Mondale
cancel the trip, call together the Democratic party leadership, and ?ea plan for a great liberal
upsurge in ’75. I had had a number of “lead balloons” in this world, and that was just as good as
any. [Laughter] 1 didn’t get anywhere with Fritz. I think he’d have been President of the United
States ifhe had accepted that suggestion. He would have been the leader of the party. There was
no leader at that moment. Carter comes in in ’75. Mo Udall is the best of the announced
candidates, and is a lovely guy, but never really took off for President. Mondale says he doesn’t
like staying in Holiday Inns. lf you ever saw a hole in politics that a person could drive a truck
through, Mondale had a chance right then and there, but he just let it go. Carter started building
up and there were other candidates in the race. You had this really throwing way of a real
chance. If one looks at the political situation as of the end of the year in ’74, the Democrats had
nothing. Mondale, he would have floated up there like anything. I guess I saw in the Nixon
debacle a real hope for a b”beral party, a h”beral candidate and a bbera1 program I had more hope
for Mondale than he did.
Mr. Peck: Since we’re into the year 1974, that was the year that Kelsey v.
Weinberger was before the D.C. Circuit and your pal there Robinson, Tarrnn and Wilkey. Th.is
was the case that challenged under the Emergency School Aid Act the waiver that Weinberger
wanted to give to certain schools about the racially motivated teacher assignments. Originally
the case had been dismissed in the district court and then you argued it in the court of appeals.
Mr. Rauh: J’ve really forgotten most of the things about that case, but I do
remember an incident. .we were meeting with Weinberger, the Leadership Conference, and
Clarence and I were leading the delegation. There was a pause in it for a few minutes. I bad a
doctor’s appointment and I was saying goodby to Clarence and Weinberger. I said, “I have to go
and see the doctor,” and Weinberger said “yes,” mean.mg that I was nuttier than a fruitcake and
the only place for me was with the i:ioctor. I do remember that that was while, I guess, the case
was on or just after. I can’t remember exactly about the case and I don’t remember too much
about it. At this period of time, when do we have Adams v. Weinberger?
Mr. Peck: Adams v. Richardson was 73.
Mr. Rauh: Richardson. That’s what I was tbIDking was the big case of that
period. Were you corning to that?
Mr. Peck
Mr. Rauh:
In my notes here I show that you were on the brief in that.
Elliot [Lichonan] argued it in the court of appeals the first time,
that’s right. That was a very significant victory. That case lasted for ahnost 20 years, 15 years,
and where we were able to push Secretaries of HEW and then Education into doing more on
desegregation than they wanted to do. I remember that case very well I’m having troub le with
Kelsey v. Weinberger.
Mr. Peck In Kelsey v. Weinberger, you won a unanimous decision that
reversed the dismissal with instructions to the district court, and it was Judge William Jones, that
he had to give the relief sought, relying very much on the Green case. But since you bring it up,
Jet’s talk about Adams.
Mr. Rauh: Adnms was a thought of John Silard’s and mine, especially John’s.
Desegregation was going so slowly. It was just heartbreaking how slow it was and how little was
being accomplished. Y-0u never know where ideas come from or whether one person thought of
it or another when you’re having discussions. We had the feeling that you could get the Court to
order the Secretary that he had to, if certain conditions were met, that he had to withdraw funds.
That’s Title VI of the 1964 law, and it meant what it said. We knew we would run into the
argument that the prosecutor decides w hat cases he’s going to prosecute, but contrary to that
argument is the argument that a Cabinet officer has to carry out the law. So we got the suit ready
to go against Elliot Richardson, who was the head of HEW at that particular moment. I knew
Elliot. He was a Frankfurter law clerk some 10 years after I was. He had a good reputation in
the Administration. He was among the best of the Cabinet people. He and Bill Coleman were
great friends. They had been roommates and law clerks of Justice Frankfurter together. We were
bringing suit under the auspices of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, of which Bill Coleman was
the top official, and Elliot made a plea for time that we didn’t sue. We prevailed on the Legal
Defense Fund to say Jet’s go ahead. We don’t want some cosmetic changes, let’s get some real
changes. I don’t remember who filed the papers, Elliot [Lichtman] or I, but we got Judge Pratt. I
thought that this was a disaster, because Judge Pratt and I had had a real run-in at the Harvard
The Harvard Club used to be at the Army Navy Club which didn’t admit blacks. It
was a private club and they didn’t admit blacks. Charles Mason, now the husband of Hilda
Mason, the Councilwoman, is a classmate of mine from Harvard. Charles calls one day and says,
“Do you know that the Harvard Club of Washington doesn’t have any blacks in it?” I said, “Ah,
you’re kidding.” He said, ”No, it doesn’t.” I said, “So what!” I’d had so many battles I was tired.
He said, “You’ve got to join the Harvard Club and lead the fight to let the blacks in.” Well, after
a while I said okay. Our candidate was Frank Snowden, a Professor at Howard of Classics who
became the first black cultural attache in Italy under Clair Booth Luce. At any rate, Charles
Mason and I took Frank Snowden to a Harvard Club luncheon. The eggs really hit the fan. Well,
they finally served him, but it was most unpleasant. They then made clear that he wouldn’t be
welcomed a second time. There w·as a big fight, but we ultimately prevailed, and the Harvard
Club changed its bylaws and admitted blacks.
This was the background against which Pratt was assigned to my case. I thought
it was a disaster. But it turned out not to be at all. He was a very conscientious judge. He made
a great effort to be fair. He got a lot of integration going. He kept the heat on the Secretaries of
HEW and Education. In fact, I’d say, be did a first class job. He didn’t go as far as we wanted,
but I think when you think of the situation, I think that he did a first class job. He kept the
pressure on them. We fought with the heads of the civil rights groups, for example, Elliot
[Lichtman], I think, took Clarence Thomas’s deposition in the case. He was really resisting all
the way. 1 took David Tatel’s deposition when he had that job in the Carter Administration. I
think the case was a big success. What happened was that as the new judges came on that didn’t
believe that you should expand standing to sue, we finally after somewhere, 15 to 18 years, Judge
Pratt threw it out. By that time, 1 don’t think that it was such a temble disaster. We’d gotten as
much out of cbe integration through direction of the Court there as you could get, and I was
perfectly satisfied. 1bis was a real great effort by John Silard, Elliot Lichtman, and myself This
seminal case was argued by Elliot in the court of appeals.
Mr. Peck:
the 1976 election.
Mr. Rauh:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
Re 1976 Elections
This is continuing the Oral History of Joseph Rauh We’re up to
Well, what had happened in 1972 with the McGovern debacle –
I’ve never thought that he did so badly. There were a couple of reasons why be did so badly;
why it turned out that way. One was a good friend of mine, [Senator] Tom Eagleton, and the
other was [AFL-CIO president] George Meany. Between the two of them, they did old
_ McGovern in. So the race then was, I thought, a rather pitiful race for the nomination in 76.
There was only one man in the race who really gave you the feeling that he could be a good
President and that was Mo Udall, but we don’t have a congressman very often getting the nod. I
thought Carter was temble. There bad been an awful lot of material showing that he was fairly
close to a racist, I felt. There was that story on the governorship where they used racist tlrings
like the former Governor – what was his name?
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
The fellow with the axe handle [Maddox], right?
No, no, this is the good guy?
No. I don’t have it exactly, but there was a lot of material there
that the guy was really against blacks. Sanders. Governor Sanders was num.ing against him and
what Carter did was show pictures of Sanders with the black basketball players who had won
some championship or something. lt was quite racist, but Carter and Hamilton Jordan were very
smart. They knew that there were lots of black intellectuals out of Atlanta, Emory and other
schools. They captured the issue and put it away. So, in fact, I have these recollections of the
Carter thing.
First recollection is the opening night of the play at Ford’s Theater on Martin
Luther King. There was a play, a one-man play on Martin Luther King. We were invited, so we
went. My wife and I walked up to the Ford Theater that night and I see clearly that minute as I
do now – that was the spring of ’76, and there is Andy Young standing there. We started
shooting the breeze, Andy and my wife and I. Olie always says, “Well, why are you for Carter?
What’s he for?” And Andy said, and this is fairly close to precise, Andy says, “I don’t know what
he’s for, but I trunk he can be elected. What you people don’t realize is that Atlanta probably has
more influential blacks throughout the country because of its educational institutions than
anyplace else. I think Carter is going to make it, and I’m going to be with him.”
Well, that was so shocking to me that this fine, wonderful assistant of Martin
Luther King was talking that way, but it stuck in my brain ever since.
By then, I had had a run-in with Carter at the ADA convention which is about at
the same time – we used to have them April and May. I think that this year it is lune. We agreed
in the ADA leadership that we would invite all the candidates “to speak on Friday night at a public
forum If they didn’t come and speak Friday night, they couldn’t speak. We weren’t going to
have them sort of dribble in and out. Of course, they always turned to me to get the people. So I
got [Mo] Udall, Fred Harris, Heill)’ Jackson turned us down, oh- [Terry] Sanford. So I got
Sanford, Udall and Harris, and never got a response from Carter. It was Friday night and the
three of them spoke. Boy, was that a dull night; I mean Udall was funny, but it was no
presidential thing. The other two weren’t even funny.
The next night we were having our reception we have before the banquet and in
walks Carter with a retinue of half a dozen of those guys. Don Fraser, who was the Mayor of
Minneapolis, was the chainnan and he had a right to do what he did. I went up and told him he
ought not let the guy speak at the reception because it would have broke my word to the other
three. Well, Don’s a nice guy, he didn’t like to argue, so he says okay. Well, I think Carter got on
a chair or a table or something and started speaking, and I got out of the room with a connnent
that “no George Wallacite was going to tell me what to do, or some such comment. It was
noticed, and I ha”.e always been on the outs with Carter. I thmk that he was a lousy President, I
think he was the most conservative President, really since … well, I guess really the most
conservative Democratic President in this century. I don’t know who you could say that was
more conservative.
Don has subsequently apologized to me. He said that he didn’t realize that when I
make a promise like that to the other three that I try to live up to it.
So then Carter got very rough with me. One night they were on a plane with a Jot
of reporters, and he started in on me. It was night, so they all filed their stories, and all said I
couldn’t be reached. Well, the reason I couldn’t be reached was they were on a plane at midnight,
and they filed their story. There was a big story in The Washington Post about Carter attacking
me. There was nothing I could do to respond, although I did have a lot of friends who wrote
pieces about it afterwards, but the damage had been done.
Well, I voted for Carter, but my wife was for Mondale. She turned the ticket
upside down. I think Jordan really was a genius. He started this business about government can’t
do anything. I mean, that doesn’t start with Reagan. Reagan carried it to its logical conclusion,
but the idea that the government is not able to do for the peopl e what poor people can’t do for
themselves, Carter was.ahead of Reagan on that. Anyway, I did vote for him I think he Was a
temble President. He started this thing rolling about the government isn’t able to carry those who
can’t protect themselves. Anyway, in 1980, I was for Kennedy and then after Kennedy I went for
John Andersen. That was the only time I’ve voted for a President other than a Democrat. My
own view was that John Andersen’s operation there shows how Perot’s going to operate, too. I
don’t want to compare the two human beings. I like John a great deal, but the fact is that he had a
Jot of votes right after the Democratic convention, and they all went up in smoke.
Mr. Peck: My memories of the 76 convention, I had worked for Udall, too, so
obviously his speech to the convention, I thought, was a very important high point for me.
Barbara Jordan’s speech, of course, being magnificent.
Mr. Rauh: Yes, it was a beautiful keynote that she had done.
Mr. Peck: I also recall Carter’s attempt to pay tribute to Hubert Humphrey in
getting his name wrong. Hubert Horatio Hornblower.
Mr. Rauh: Yes, yes, that’s right. I had forgotten that. Jordan must be a genius
to have piloted into the Presidency of the United States a man who was really quite wrong for the
time and the place and the party, and everything else. How he was able to pull it off – there were
very clever things people were sayllg, like be was a George Wallacite, he had been very close to
George Wallace for a while, and then as soon as he gets elected, he puts up a picture of Martin
Luther King, so when people jumped on him: “Well, what about my picture of Martin Luther
King?” It was a brilliant performance, and I guess Perot knows a good thing when he sees one,
and he’s now got the guy [Hamilton Jordan].
Mr. Peck: Well, it’s said of Carter though. that he’s made an excellent expresident.
Mr. Rauh: There are great ex-presidents, there are great ex-attorney generals,
there are great ex-everything, but it is too late to make any real difference. But you are right,
everyone says he’s a fine ex-president. He knows how to hammer a nail in a poor man’s house.
That’s all right with me, but it has nothing to do with the period of his Presidency which preceded
the downhill role of the President of the United States ever since.
Mr. Peck: Well, you did have friends in the Administration, even though …
Mr. Rauh: Ob, yes.
Mr. Peck: … even though you didn’t get along with the President.
Why, other than the fact that the Administration had great difficulty with Congress, which from
the beginning was an adversarial sort of situation, why don’t you think that of all your friends
who made it into the Administration, why he couldn’t get more done?
Mr. Rauh: 111 tell you a stocy. George McGovern became head of the ADA, I
guess in ’76. Carter took office January ’77. We had the ADA convention in the Spring of ’77,
and George wanted to have the usual talk with the President, so we asked for a date. We went
over to the White House. We saw [Vice President Walter] Mondale. Well, it couldn’t have been
a more perfect putdown because Mondale was one of us. We met with (Stuart] Eisenstadt and
Mondale. I don’t know what excuse they used – the President was out of town, or too busy, so
the issue quickly comes up on military expenditures. We wanted to cut to military expenditures,
and divert it to social programs. Our position was perfectly simple. Everybody went around the
room, our crowd, and we find sudden1y we are sitting there, and Mondale is turning the meeting
over to Eisenstadt who is supposed to defend Carter there. I couldn’t believe my ears but I heard
Eisenstadt say, “Well, of course, he promised to cut military expenditures. We did that, we cut
the amount of increase that he was going to ask for.” I could hardly believe my ears that they had
worked out this formula for saying they were carrying out their program, not by cutting last year’s
expenditures, but by cutting what had been progrannned for the following year. I thought Molly
Yard was going to have apoplexy. She said, “I ran in western Pennsylvania. I was for you, and I
really worked my heart out for you guys. If I had known that was yow- position, brother, I would
have been against you hook, line and sinker.” Molly really gave it to Eisenstadt. Molly is no
small potato when she gets wound up, so nobody else has to say anything. George didn’t have to
say anything; Molly Yard had demolished the whole – such a crazy argwnent to say you’re
cutting a thing when you’re cutting the amount of increase, not the acru.al amount. If your top
domestic guy – Eisenstadt – accepts that kind of argument, he isn’t making much of an argwnent
for our side of the case. That’s why I told this story. The story is illustrative of how they were
not going ahead with the b”beral side of the thing, like cutting military expenditures. I guess we
all went out of that room just sort of feeling awful. Among the leaders of the ADA, Arthur
Schlesinger immediately said this is the worst conservative Democratic President since Grover
Cleveland. He said this made them comparable.
Mr. Peck: Well, one place where perhaps bis decisions were not as
conservative was –
Mr. Rauh: Judges. I give him credit for good judges. There’s no bad politics
in appointing libera] judges. Jordan knew his game very well. There were places where you
could do things without hurting yourself politically. And you can say, “Look at what wonderful
judges we appointed.” They did appoint some great judges, no question about it.
Eisenstadt was up here a few months ago. He’s writing a biography of Carter, and
we argued it out. He’s a perfectly pleasant guy, although I must say, having come up with that
nonsense about will we cut the increase. They said they were going to cut the expenditures by
something like $5 million or $10 million, can’t remember what, but they did cut the amount that
had been programmed for an increase, but the total was more than it had been the year before.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Right, right. That’s a cut in the new language.
Toe next time I have you appearing in the D.C. Circuit is 1978, and
the case is against National Right to Work Legal Defense Fund. Do you remember this case?
Mr. Rauh: Yes – I am trying to pull it together. There’s a provision in the
Labor Management Act that seemed to imply that employer money couldn’t be used in some way
that the National Right to Work people were using it.
Mr. Peck: The purpose is not for the employers to essentially fund an antiunion
organization that is trying to undemrine the status of the union.
Mr. Rauh: Well, that’s what our argument was. We had about ten unions
bringing the suit, and we demonstrated that they were getting lots of money from employers.
Well, it was an employer-funded anti-union organization. We had it in front of Judge [Charles]
Richey. Judge Richey is a strange guy. At the beginning of that case, he was so much for us that
nothing I could do was wrong. As the Republicans took more and more hold of the government,
he became less and Jess panial to us, and he finally ruled against us. This occurred at a time in
my life when I had become practically a maverick lawyer, in the sense of taking the cases of
dissidents inside the unions who I thought were fine. I had the case of Jock Yablonski against
Tony Boyle. In this instance, I took up with Ed Sadlowsk.i as a dissident. The labor movement
didn’t start to get terribly angry – although they sided with Boyle largely – they didn’t get tembly
angry at my trying to knock Boyle out. When I went after the Steelworkers to get Sadlowski in
as president, there was a real blacklist. It didn’t matter to me. It [the case) was going on for
years, talcing lots of depositions. i can’t remember the exact time, but I was already getting on, I
was 70 years old. It didn’t bother me the blacklist. I kind of thought it was kind of funny. They
wouldn’t let me argue the case in the comt of appeals, and they lost it. Tuey blew it. And l still
think that it was – Ab Mikva thought it was a violation of their free speech rights, but the case
wasn’t argued to them in a constitutional way and in some ways, I was the perfect attorney to
argue that because I was more known as being for free speech than being for the last ditch of
labor rights. Anyway, they blew the case. Reed Larson, the president of the Right-to-Work, goes
around, and he’s home free. He takes dough from anybody be wants. That was a problem in my
life. l couldn’t go on being a labor lawyer, but it didn’t particularly bother me. I realized there
was a blacklist, when a fellow named Richardson, who is with the Hotel and Restaurant Workers
here, called me up and wanted to hire me. He was in a big fight with somebody .. I don’t kaow if
I can deal with you. He said, “What is it?” I said, ”I’ll take the case if you will clear my taking it
with [AFL-CIO President] Lane Kirkland. Call up and tell Lane Kirkland that you want to hire
me to handle this case for you or this matter or whatever it was, and I’ll do it. But I want to be
sure that I’m not going to have a fight down the road, and Kirkland says that he didn’t know about
it and therefore free to do anything he wants.” That’s the last time I heard from that guy. That’s
my evidence in the case. They’re just as bad as the employers. The employers don’t want
somebody to sue employers. Unions don’t want anybody who sues employees. After all, I
knocked out of the ?abor leadership a murderer. They didn’t think that was such a hot idea
And then there was Eddie, while we didn’t have a murderer, we had all sorts of
violations of law and we lost out. The labor movement wants to have a right to have a lawyer
who is beholden to the incumbent. They can hire the lawyer, and they want the lawyer not to
represent the membership, but the leadership of the union. I just thought that was a temble t:rung.
We took some cases. I enjoyed it. The reason I brought it up now, the right to
work case, and another case were about the same time. They were all based upon the fact that I
was vulnerable,. if you want to say vulnerabie, because I didn’t accept. the p rinciple that if you
_were a labor lawyer you had to do what the boss of the union said. I felt you had a right to do
what you thought was to protect the membership. But that’s not a winnable battle.
There was another case – it was out in the Ninth Circuit – Ellis against the
Brotherhood, well, it’s well known. It went to the Supreme Court, and I was a lawyer in the case.
What happened was the Right-to-Work people sued, I think, the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks
for using dues money for political expenditures. My view was that that was right. You couldn’t.
As a matter of fact, Walter Reuther agreed with that, and that UAW, when I was their general
counsel, put in a plan whereby you could get a rebate of your political expenditures, so that I was
not in any strongly anti-union position, I was carrying out the Reuther theory; my theory,
Reuther’s theory … it was our theory together.
Mr. Rauh:
[Side Bl
I won it, 2 to I. The line was ideologic: you can deduct for
anything coD11ected with bargaining, including organizing. Well, we won. Then the Brotherhood
went to the Supreme Court. This is about the time – it is also mixed up with the blacklist, and
they took the case away, and they blew it. Toe minute I read their brief I knew that it was blown.
Toe reason I knew, I had carefully laid the basis for the Court to say take the ideological line that
if the union could do anything connected with collective bargaining, but when there were
ideological differences like helping the NAACP, or something else, especially Democratic versus
Republican, a worker had a right riot to have his money go to an ideological thing with which he
disagreed. Well, in their brief, in the Ellis case, they said, in a footnote, this is a Railway Labor
case, but it is not under the Wagner Act. We reserve the right to argue under the Wagner Act that
thei-e is no line – that the union has the right to spend the dues money as it determines, and there
is no line. What I spent years working to get was a line between ideological and nonideological,
and in one nice footnote they knocked the heck out of thing. Tuey lost the case. I don’t know if
you saw recently, Bush and the Republicans are making a big thing out of it; they are usiD.g it.
But under our theory, organizing was a perfectly legitimate part of collective bargaining. They
had no theory for arguing that it wasn’t. Once you say, all right, he’s just a lily-livered, h1>eral
intellectual, free First Amendment guy, that’s the only argument you’ve got is that a persoo can’t
have his dues used against him ideologically. Now they’re in an awful mess on this thing.
They’re having a tem”ble time figuring out how to do the accounting for t he thing. Those cases
were really there together. There was the Ellis case on spending dues money for things. There
was the right-to-work case, and there was my representing of dissidents. It all fit into one pot and
then there were some rough times.
What would have happened if I had been younger and fought back? We had
plenty of business, that wasn’t our problem. Our problem was that we had probably as good a
]aOOr practice as there was, and that was now gone. What the heck, I never went around saying
there was a blacklist against me. If you asked me a question, I’d say that there was a blacklist, I
don’t know what’s going to happen. A lot of the people in there were my friends, some of them
acted quite ugly. It got much rougher with the Steelworkers and the Mineworkers, but the
Mineworkers, the labor movement was a little bit careful aOOut how they would dump on a guy
who had tried to oust a murderer from bis job as the head of a union. They didn’t have to worry_
about that, there were no murderers in the Steelworkers, but there were black and white
violations. You know Leon Wtlli.ams is head of the Steelworkers now, and people talk about
what a fine guy he _is. Well, I don’t doubt that he is a fine.guy. He’s a socialist, hberal, socialist,
the fact is that as far as union democracy is concerned, there ain’t none. And they were the worst,
the Canadian locals out of which Williams comes, he’s Canadian, they were the most repressive.
They were just violent in their fighting back against us and, of course, we lost. He still works for
the Steelworkers, Sadlowski, and he’s a decent guy, a good guy, but he’s crushed. He’s out of the
politica1 life of the union anymore.
Mr. Peck: The next time I have you in the D.C. Circuit is Brown v. Califano
which was companion to Adams v. Richardson, in 1980. This was the challenge to the
neighborhood schools plan, in which the D.C. Circuit ruled against you. There was no
opportunity to make a facial challenge to the plan.
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
I’m confused now a little bit, Bob.
Well, maybe I’ve got it wrong.
Well, let me tell you what I think, and maybe we can straighten it
out. This is a rather more complicated thing now. It starts as Adams v. Richardson. Richardson
is Elliot Richardson.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Dwing the Nixon Administration, he was HEW Secretary.
All right, that would have been …
72; in 73, he moved to Justice.
All right, early ?O’s. He is the Secretary. We had decided, Jack
Greenberg and I, that we were going to force enforcement of desegregation of the schools.
There’s a day certain there, July 3rd. 1 haven’t gotten the year yet, when [Robert] Finch and
Richardson issued a statement that they don’t believe in withdrawing federal funds as a way of
forcing integration. They were against that; you don’t do it that way; you bring suits that require
them to integrate, but you don’t take their money away. That makes things worse. That’s July
3rd, but of what year but ]’ma little confused. So, we bad the suit ready to go. We filed it, and
it’s assigned to John Pratt. When I saw that, ] felt pretty blue because John Pratt had – small
world department – John Pratt had been our opponent in the Harvard integration case. 1 figured,
my God. But it didn’t work out that way at all. John Pratt was perfectly straight with us, he held
the case for ten years, he ruled with us most of the time. But, when you talk about Brown, you’re
getting ahead of the story. We got ow injunction from Pratt ordering Richardson that he had to
enforce the Title VI of the ’64 law. We got ow injunction from him They went to the court of
appeals, and the court of appeals had an en bane hearing, and we won. They affinned that order,
so that that was really the law of the case. So, when you say that we lost in Brown, you are
getting too much ahead of the story here.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Well, that decision, the en bane decision, was ’73.
Yes. \Vhen was your Brown decision?
Mr. Peck: This is I 980.
Mr. Rauh: I’ll get into that in just a second. I treat Brown and Adams as on the
same point, so that we did establish the proposition, which may have been unestablished by later
decisions, because in the end, Pratt, having held it for 10, 11 years and given us all sorts of help
in integrating the schools, said we didn’t have standing. Standing changed this time. Burger was
less on standing. So, if you take Adams through all the Secretaries that we had, Adams was all
right. That was the case of the – oh, I’ve got it now – that was the case of the southern and border
states that Adams applied in, and the NAACP was a little pissed off because we had this case for
the Legal Defens e Fund. They wanted a case, so what we did was to sue for the rest of the
country. We brought the same Ada.ms suit against the rest of the country with a plaintiff named
Brown, I guess it was. I’m having trouble remembering, what’s his name, the Watergate judge.
Mr. Peck: [John] Sirica.
Mr. Raub: Re membering what Sirica did in Brown and the court of appeals to
cause you to think that we lost Brown. What I’m now seeing is Brown as the northern Adams,
and Adams as the southern and border one. But I’m not clear on how we could have lost Brown
while we were still winning in Adams.
Mr. Peck: By the time it got to the D.C. Circuit, I think the standing had
turned around.
Mr. Raub: Ob, standing.
Mr. Peck: So that what the court ruled was that you didn’t have standing for a
facial challenge which was what this was at this point.
Mr. Raub: Yes. That may be – that kind of straightens it out. Then it got
more and more difficult; Clarence Thomas comes into the picture. We took his deposition in
those days, but I consider that Adams/Brown litigation a victory in the sense that we were able to
get a good deal of integration out of it. ff you want to say that it was ultimately dismissed after
about 10 years, well, that’s true, but how many cases do you hold onto with injunctions ready for
action like this. So I’ve always thought, and I think the civil rights movement thinks, that we did
a heck of a good job with getting sb much on the integration out of this, but I now see why you’re
right about Brown. I should say a word that John Pratt who was not an advocate of the civil
rights movement, but as a judge, John Pratt really struggled to be fajr .in that case, and we were
able to get a lot of integration out of it. I do think that you can say that that helped with the
integration. We were like everything else. We were part of the problem on the school
desegregation. Busing was brought into the cases. It got to where we won some and lost some.
Toe big thing was we did win in the first affinnance of the Pratt order which the Court said made
clear that this was not a case of telling the U.S. Attorney be had to indict someOOdy, this was a
case where you could tell the government they had to enforce the law.
(End of Tape)
Mr. Peck:
Oral History of Joseph L. Rallll, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
July 3, 1992 [Side A]
We are going back from where we had reached at this point. The
Alvarez•Machain case caused us to talk a little bit about kidnapping and that reminded you about
the kidnapping of the Rosenbergs.
Mr. Raub: Well, what I remember is this. At some time on or about the
Rosenberg case, which I think itself was 1950 something –
Mr. Peck: Early 50’s.
Mr. Raub: Early SO’s when Mrs. Sobe] asked to see me. Sobel was the third
person in the Rosenberg case with the two, Julius and Ethel. I can’t remember if this was before
or after his death That’s a matter of public record. After the Rosenbergs were executed, she said
that they had been in Mexico and were kidnapped. I thought that was an outrage. I didn’t think
of it .in the terms of the law, that there was an extradition treaty. I thought it was just terms of
outrage that if somebody was outside your jurisdiction, to go and get them physically. I said to
.Mrs. Sobe), I’m not without interest in this. I think this ought to be stopped. Obviously, other
lawyers had already suggested that a motion should be made to quash the indiconent in this
country or quash whatever proceedings were in this country because of Sobel’s being kidnapped.
I said, “‘\Vhy don’t you start at the beginning and tell me why you had to flee to Mexico, and what
happened there.” She didn’t want to tell me why they went. I’ve had in my life very often
approaches by peop1e who wanted the fact that you were a civil hberties lawyer or antiCommunist,
I’ve been in on starting the Americans for Democratic Action, they always wanted
some part of your public record, but they didn’t want to give you the facts. This has happened to
me a great many times. They really didn’t trust you. They didn’t trust you the way they would
some person. Toe Communists generally wouldn’t trust you because you were anti-Communist
publicly. Very often people didn’t trust you just because they thought you’d think they were
guilty and wouldn’t put your heart into it. At any rate, I never saw Mrs. Sobel since I insisted on
getting the facts.
Mr. Peck: When we left off last time, we had reached 1980, and one of the
cases that you had in the D.C. Circuit at that time was the Wimpisinger v. Watson case, involving
the Kennedy supporters’ challenge to President Carter’s use of federal monies to promote his
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck,
Ivlr. Rauh:
I remember that very well. This was in 1980?
I was for John Andersen at that time. I guess that’s what interested
me was that Carter was using his position as President to help with the election, not that I am so
naive that I think that’s unusual. Certainly, it’s being followed up right now. I didn ‘t think it was
right, and we went through an awful lot – it was mostly newspaper stuff — we didn’t have any
great research capacity. John Andersen didn’t have any money. There was no research. It was
newspaper stuff I guess we had a couple of volunteers reading newspapers, and we put the
complaJDt together. I still think there was more to the complaint than the courts gave us. On the
other hand, I would be the first to admit that if there was ever the perfect what you’d call political
case – and J didn’t know then and I don’t know now whether there really is a bar to the courts
taking political cases – it seemed to me that they took them when they felt it was temDly
important and didn’t take them when they were so politicized as was this effort to stop Carter
from spending money, money that was duly appropriated. The mere fact was that his purpose
was to get some votes .. I remember we had the different Secretaries who were spending the
money and who also on occasion, I think the complaint does show, often in doing it were not
very good at hiding their motivations. We had some political motivations stated, and we thought
that that was enough I can’t remember who the district judge was, but I thought maybe it was
June Green.
Mr. Peck: I don’t have that down.
Mr. Rauh: It doesn’t matter. We didn’t get anywhere. We didn’t get anywhere
with the court of appeals. We didn’t get anywhere on certiorari. It was a failure. I think that the _
political doctrine cases are so mixed up that you never know what the court is going to do. I
thiDk it depends in part on how they feel a’bout the President. In 19-, I can’t remember when it
was, but I think we probably discussed the case where we asked for equal time against [Lyndon]
Johnson for Gene McCarthy. Did we discuss that case?
Mr. Peck: I thmk we did.
Mr. Rauh: We probably did. There you had two judges I think ruled for me
who hated the war, and one judge ruled the other way because he thought the war was necessary.
That was Judge Fahy. On this political doctrine stuff there’s an awful lot of the resul t oriented
from bow you felt about the President, and we got beat in this case. I never had any great
bitterness over it. It just seemed to me it was worth the shot.
Mr. Peck: Right, that was 1968, McCarthy v. FCC.
Mr. Rauh: That’s right. I mention that as another thing that was really decided
on how you felt about Johnson and his war.
Mr. Peck: You started out the year as a Kennedy supporter and when
Kennedy failed to wrest the nomination away from Carter, that’s when you made your decision
when Andersen announced bis independent candidacy. Now, this is the first time, I think, that
you’ve not supported the Democratic candidate.
Mr. Rauh: There’s no question about that. I just thought something was
wrong in nominating a man because he had won the primaries when there had been so much
change since the primaries, including, especially, that Kennedy had entered the race. I certainly
admitted then to myself that Kennedy had not been the candidate that the polls showed he was
going to be. Ifwe had won the motion at the convention that people were free to vote their
consciences at the convention months after they bad been elected, I think Kennedy would_ have
probably won. We lost that, without any great thought, we lost it on the simple ground that
everybody who had been elected for Carter voted against the motion, and everybody who was
elected for Kennedy voted for the motion. There wasn’t any real discussion of to what extent is
this a fluid situation, where there is a change because of the change in our politics because of the
issue, namely the war, and because of the new person who felt he wasn’t exactly new but he
hadn’t been a challenge to an incumbent which in our second tenn philosophy was very unusual.
Yet the polls had showed that he was a candidate that lots of people wanted. I didn’t like the
situation where you were, l thought, going down to defeat with a man who wasn’t the choice that
moment of the party and who I had spoken against so often. I thought the Americans for
Democratic Action were just going through the motions when they supported him because God
knows the ADA day-in-and-day-out berated Carter. It seemed if you were going to berate him
day-in-and-day-out, the right answer was neutrality. Actually, I didn’t propose at the ADA
meeting endorsement of John Andersen. I simply said. “How can you endorse the man you_have
berated everyda y for so long? The best thmg to do is to simply tell the truth. There is no
candidate who totally meets our standards.” I lost that. It was much closer at the ADA meeting
than peuple now remember. We did lose Arthur Schlesinger, and l did lose that argument. Bill
•Winpsinger· was with us. We had a lot of support there, but we didn’t urge that we do this – no
endorsement – because we thought that we could endorse Jolm Andersen. We simply thought an
organizationa1 act ought to be somewhat consistent with the organizational position.. We didn’t
win that, so they went ahead, and then Arthur and I made very clear that we were not using our
ADA connections, of which we were maybe the leaders, but we did feel that personally we would
prefer to vote for the protest – not often that you think a protest vote makes any sense. In this ,·
instance I thought a protest vote did make sense, because I thought Carter was going to be beat
anyway. It was perfectly clear that John Andersen did not cost Carter the election. I guess as I
loo k back I’m somewhat proud of that because I think the degree of hostility that I would have
gotten in this world may be more than my body can take. Anyway I’ve never thought that
through. I do know that Reagan won as Reagan, not because of John AD.dersen.
Mr. Peck: The election must have been extremely disappointing to you,
especially with bringing in a Republican Senate with him
Mr. Rauh: Not only was it disappointing, but it has taught me the absolute
hopelessness of third parties and made me think that Perot is going to fizzle before long. If I bad
to bet today, I’ll put this prediction on the record: Perot’s not going to get any electoral votes and
it’s not going to the Congress.
Mr. Peck: In 1981, this was after Reagan had already taken office, you told
the NatuJnal Law Journal in an interview that “Liberalism has won and the welfare state is here
to stay.” It seems pretty clear that the welfare state is here to stay. The question that remains is:
Has hberalism really won?
Mr. Rauh: If you say welfare state is the creation of hberalism, which I
believe, then the answer is: “Yes.” · I meant that as a conjunctive thought, that liberalism
produced the welfare state – the New Deal, and that the welfare state is here to stay, so that was a
great victory of liberalism If you say that the country is today, or was then in ’81, less hberal
because they elected Reagan, J wou1dn’t argue with that proposition. I believe in the welfare
state. I believe in democracy as the best form of government. Capitalism helps protect
democracy and therefore what has to be, and the only way we can protect democracy is through
the welfare state. 1 said practically that at Phil Stern’s Quaker memorial the day before yesterday
in praising Phil. 1 said that 1 thought those in a capitalist society, especially those of wealth, who
forsake polo, jet setting, and I added something that’s always galled me – that Tangier who went
to the Tangier party of Forbes – that those who forsake that wealth such as Phil were serving the
welfare state, and that that’s a very important thing. l guess I’m devoted to the welfare state
beyond everything, and I thought that was hberalism’s victory in the Roosevelt period, and why I
guess I am still a New Dealer without any regrets.
Mr. Peck: In 1981, you were up in the D.C. Circuit again. This time it was
also out of something from the 1980 election – the FEC bad investigated the Machinists’ nonpartisan
coalition. You were defending them against the FCC, claiming that it bad no
jurisdiction to investigate, and you won.
Mr. Rauh: Yes, that was Pat Wald’s decision, I think. We were successful
On attorney-client privilege, I can’t talk about the facts of that election, whether it was in fact as
pure a draft – . I have no public view on that. I thought the best defense was that there was no
:-‘ jurisdiction in the FEC. We had some pretty heate.d depositions over there, and my clients were
not what you called pliant people. I don’t know if you can picture Bill Winpsinger? at a
deposition, but he does not take questions that are hostile lightly. I would sit there and I’d object,
and they’d put the question on the record, and we’d go outside, and I say, “Bill, you’d better
answer it, it’s better to answer it.” “Oh, it’s an insult, this whole thing’s an insult.” I said, “Well,
we’ll win ultimately. There’s nothing you can do. They have the right to a deposition.” The case
was a lot of fun; in that sense, we won. I don’t think they went forcen, did they, the Government
go for cert?
Mr. Peck: They didn’t.
Mr. Rauh: I have no recollection of they’re going for cen. That was quite a
victory. I don’t know, is that still a law? I don’t follow these things – I’m unable really to follow
most of the cases I’ve been in on what the law is today. I don’t know on that subject.
Mr. Peck: Now actually it falls under the category of whether tbis amounts to
express advocacy, and there was a case involving one of the Right-to-Life committees up in
Massachusetts in which they were .involved in advocating that certain candidates were on their
side of the issue and others weren’t. The question was whether this transformed them into a
campaign committee. They won. As a matter of fact to this day – this was I think in ’86 – the
FEC is still trying to come up with regulations that allow express advocacy but still, when they’ve
stepped over the line and established essentially a campaign committee, that they’ve become part
of the FEC’s jurisdiction. Indeed, it is still the case. The next case I have is the 1983 decision in
Adams v. Bell. This was an en bane decision, where Wilkey wrote the decision and the dissenters
were Wright, Robinson, Wald and Mikva, having to do with enforcement of Title Vil against
North Carolina’s Higher Education System. Eventually that was settled.
Mr. Rauh: What I rem ember is that there were two cas es, an appeal to the
Court of Appeals here and a case in the District Court in Ra leigh-Durham brought by the
University of North Carolina to restrain the Government from withdrawing funds. J can’t
remember the exact relationship of those two cases. J know I went to North Carolina and tried to
intervene in the case there. The judge denied that effort. I can’t quite remember the time and
sequence of the two cases and what happened.
This much I do remember of what happened. I get a call one mornmg in the
office. I was there early. I was the first person there and I took the call ] answered the phone
and the man said, “Would you like to see a letter from Secretary Bell saying that he doesn’t
believe in what he bas do in the Adams case?” I said, “Of course, I’d like to see that.” He said,
“Well, I can’t show it to you, but I’ll read you a couple of paragraphs.” And he read them Then,
he sort of thought be had done his job. I said, “You haven’t done anything.” I said, “I wouldn’t
possibly consider repeating what yo u have said, not kno wing who you are or what your
credentials are.” I said, “I’m going to forget this whole thing, unless I get the letter.” “Well, I
couldn’t do that.” “So,” l said, “All right.” “Don’t,” I said, “I didn’t start this conversation, you
did.” “If you wan t to slip me the Jetter, I’ll take it.” He called- be said, “I don’t know.” The next
morning I came in, and the letter was on the floor through the transom. The letter said exactly
what he said it said. So, I called up Roger Wilkins, who was then working for the Star, and said,
“Do you want this letter?” Oh, boy. The last edition of the Star has the story on that letter.
That’s the day they went out of business. Toe front page was going out of business, and we were
the lead story on the second page written by Roger Wilkins on that. So, that I do remember. I
remember an argument. We got four votes.
Mr. Peck: Yes.
Mr. Rauh: We didn’t get Ginsburg, and there was somebody else I guess we
didn’t get that we could have won 6-5 or 7-4. I do remember that case. I’m now confused on the
confluence of the two cases.
Mr. Peck: The next thing I have down here is the representation of Jolm
Jenrette in the Abscam investigation. He was convicted in ’83, and that was confirmed by the
D.C. Circuit in ’84, and cert denied in ’85 by the Supreme Coun. How did you come to represent
Mr. Rauh: I was shocked by the Abscam cases. I still am shocked by the
Abscam cases. I am quite upset by the Abscam cases. I find in those cases dangerous situations
of FBI setup for Congressmen. With people as dangerous as Hoover, I was just tenibly upset.
Jenrette had a criminal lawyer, J guess a perfectly good criminal lawyer, but I don’t know that he
had the constitutional background that I had. I think he went to Dan Pollitt, who had represented
Frank Thompson Dan came to me and said, “I didn’t have any luck with Thompson. I was just
as shocked by it as you are. Would you do this with me?” I said, “Yes.” We really took over
pretty much handling it because of several things. One is, Dan is the most lovely man that ever
lived, but he can’t think anybody that he likes ever did anything wrong. In fact, I have written in
the North Carolina Law Review that’s coming out in September, there’s a memorial to Dan – not
a memorial- he’s alive, but I mean he’s retiring, and I’ve written in there a piece about Dail in
which I say that he wouldn’t have been satisfied in the Thompson case unless he got him the
Nobel Peace Prize. Anyway we took it pretty much over, stated the facts in Jenrette’s case very
clearly. Toe FBI had nothing to go on when they went after him We made our pitch. I think jt’s
one of the best briefs I ever worked on. My problem with it is that it was hopeless, because they
had denied so many certs by then. We were last. It was hopeless. I am very proud of that brief
and very sad that I couldn’t even get Bill Brennan to go and dissent, or Thurgood Marshall, or
anyone else. I’ve thought often about the fact we couldn’t get dissents. It could be one of many
reasons. First, I don’t think they like to dissent on· cert. It’s only in extreme cases. I kept telling
them this is an extreme case. That was one possibility. Tuey don’t like to dissent from cert.
Secondly, I thought they may not have wanted cert. They may have felt that the Court by then
was narrowed to a stage where they might have had an affinnance.
[Side BJ
Mr. Rauh: I don’t know whether it was either of those reasons. If I ever do, I’ll
tell you.
Mr. Peck: The next event that I have in here, in which you were heavily
involved, is when Rehnquist was nominated to become Chief Justice in ’86. You worked bard to
try to convince the Senate to look at that much more seriously than they ended up doing.
Mr. Rauh: That’s correct. If I bad any contnbution there, it was helping to
prove that Relmquist did not tell the truth in his earlier hearing. I worked on that. I think
[Senator] Howard Metzenbaum knew I had, because he asked me a leading question on the
veracity of the earlier testimony. I told rum, “No, there were two instances in the earlier
testimony where Rehnquist did not tell the truth. First, of course, was about the Jackson
memorandum which Relmquist had written in which Relmquist said that he came out for Plessy
against Ferguson because Jackson had asked him to write the best argument for coming out for
Plessy against Ferguson and it was not his view. That is not true. An affidavit from the secretary
that that had never happened – there is a footnote in Simple Justice by Kugler that makes hash of
that argument. There have been several more recent statements to that effect. l think I helped
straighten that out in the testimony and through the secretary’s affidavit. I have no doubt that that
was Relmquist’s memorandum for himself. Secondly, there was the event in Phoenix of trying to
keep blacks from voting. I remember discussing the problem of getting someone currently, and I
don’t remember all the details but the Assistant U. S. Attorney at that time in Phoenix showed up.
Can you help me with the naine?
Mr. Peck: I don’t remember –
Mr. Rauh: James – well, it’s right there in the hearing there. He was a big San
Francisco lawyer.
Mr. Peck: James Brasnahan.
Mr. Rauh: James Brasnahan. Thank you. Jim and I became overnight
friends. We discussed the testimony. He got on the stand. He was magnificent. His memory
was clear, exactly what he saw. l guess it was either, Secretary of the Senate from Utah. on the
Judiciary Committee –
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
lt must have been Steve Markman, then.
No, this is the Senator.
Mr. Peck: Senator Hatch.
Mr. Rauh: Hatch or someone, probably Hatch, asked him why he came and all
that as though he had volunteered. I remember his answer because it was so credible. He said, “I
didn’t volunteer. I’m here under request of the Committee that has a right to my testimony” He
said, “Today’s Friday, and I alw ays have lunch on Friday at Jack’s Restaurant in San Francisco,
and I wish I were there.” Brasnahan was so obviously a credible witness that you could not not
believe him You had two counts there that went to the veracity. It’s sad thing for me who
started in this city pretty much as a law clerk to two such honorable people as Cardozo and
Frankfurter to realize that the Chief Justice of that Court didn’t tell the truth when he testified on
his own behalf when he was appointed and who later reaffirmed the mistakes he had made
earlier. I feel blue about that for our country. I thought that couldn’t happen here. I thiok
Metzenbaum and the others who fought against it were right, that there’s something disconcerting
about having such a man as Chief Justice. Are you going to bring up Scalia?
Mr. Peck: No.
Mr. Rauh: O.K. I want to make sure we didn’t forget it.
Mr. Peck: Right. Right. Well, why don’t we go right to it, now.
Mr. Rauh: I testified and made a point that it didn’t seem to have much
viability that there was no vacancy for Scalia until Rehnquist was approved or not approved. If
he was not approved, there was no vacancy. This was rejected. Tuey went right from the
Relmquist hearings to the Scalia hearings. People were exhausted. I was exhausted. A lot of
people didn’t testify who had planned to testify. I remember one lady from one of the women’s
organizations. I got angry with her. I said, “You’re not going to testify?” She said, “No, I’m
tired.” That was the general thing. Ellie Smee! of NOW and I and someone else did testify, but
the heart was out of the fight after the Rehnquist hearings, and it was clear that they were going
to confum The heart went out of the fight. I did testify. We were all still exhausted, and Scalia
really rode in on Rehnqui.st’s shoulders.
Mr. Peck: You know Rehnquist had what was the closest vote in modern
history for his confirmation as Chief Justice, but Scalia sailed in with only a couple of votes
against him
Mr. Rauh: There was just notbiug left after the Rehnquist Chief Justice
hearing. I thought you bad to testify against him I dragged myself in there. We only had a few
hours notice we were going on. I remember E11ie Smeel and I and a third person – must be in
there – trying to change our notes and everything we had to for the five-minute thing – and then
we presented our thing in writing. We did have five minutes, I think. He went through without
Mr. Peck: Did this process te?Ch you anything that you used the followi.ug
year in fighting the Bork nomination?
Mr. Rauh: Yes. You see I was sick in January and february of 1987. I almost
croaked. I had a hip operation and that went fine, but then I had three days later in the hospital a
heart attack, internal bleeding, and I did have a close call. I get out of my sick bed to receive an
award – well, I was recovering still when I accepted an award in May or June from the Alliance
for Justice. They had a big luncheon and … spoke and I responded. I said, “Lewis Po.well is
going to resign at the end of this term, and you’d better get your act in order against Hatch.”
Everybody said you know Joe’s pretty close to over the hill. He hasn’t any basis for that They’d
say, “What’s your basis on Powell?” I said, “The fact that the Administration persuaded Burger
as a good Republican to give up the Chief Justiceship so the Republicans would have the choice.
They are going to persuade Powell. Two things happened. One, I was right as could be on
Powell, and I was wrong on Hatch. I was wrong on Hatch because I didn’t know something. I
had been in the hospital in intensive care when they raised the salaries, so I didn’t realize that the
Constitution prevented Hatch from: having it. The minute Powell resigned, I think everybody
knew it was Bork There was no argument on who the next one would be. I felt a strong
inclination to get in the fight, and my wife has always said that the Bork nomination was the
adrenaline that made me well. I worked on that Bork case. I think at first [Antlx>ny] Kennedy
appeared as bad as Bork, but if you’re here today on the 3rd of July, one gets the feeling that
Kennedy was better than Bork, although he has bad some temble decisions, too.
What we learned from earlier battles was you have tc have a bigger fight than
inside the beltway. The Leadership Conference raised a lot of money, had a grassroots operation
going, working on Senators. People for the American Way had lots of television and radio and
publicity generally. It was a fight that bad to be won not only inside the beltway but had a great
deal outside the beltway through the grassroots. I still think there was one factor that was more
important than the grassroots, than the testimony inside the beltway, and that was the 1986
election. I think the blacks coming in and he]ping the Democrats take the Senate back was
probab]y the number one factor in winning that particular fight. The way I sometimes put it in
writing is that Martin Luther Kmg reached up from the grave and beat Bork with the Southern
Democrats who had been elected in ’86 with the blacks who had been registered by the ’65
Voting Rights Law.
Mr. Peck: Did you think when Bork was first nominated that you’d be
Mr. Rauh: I’ve trained myself to believe what I want to believe in that kind of
a fight. When we beat Haynesworth, and Nixon in a pique set up Carswell, I knew we had to
beat Carswell or we’d be laughingstock, because Carswell was worse than Haynesworth.
Haynesworth was a very wrong judge on labor, civil rights and ethics, but Carswell made him
look like Abraham Lincoln. So, I knew we had to fight. Everybody said, “You can’t do it,
twice.” Well, that was a time I guess I had my belief that you had to think you were going to win
because the press was so awful They said, “Joe, you don’t have any votes. Tell me a vote you
got.” Well, we didn’t have any votes at that time. They said, “You sti ll thiDk you’re going to
win?” And, I said, “Yes.” That cou1d be called dissembling, but on the other hand, I think you
have to believe in that lcind of a thing. Suppose I had said, “No, we don’t have any votes.” The
fight would have been over. After all, I did get permission to come out in front of the ADA I
think the day afterwards against him, and that forced other people out, and we did finally build
up a situation. I guess I’m not exactly clear in my own mind what I mean, but I think I mean that
you have to train yourself when you’re going into a fight like that to believe in yourself and
therefore you never really consider whether you think you have a chance. You just start arguing
you have a chance, and that makes you think you have a chance.
Mr. Peck:
Douglas Ginsburg is –
Mr. Rauh:
What was your reaction then after you’d beaten Bork and now
Oh, I have a speech I made on Ginsburg. I went to St. Louis to
speak at a forum that Barbara Eagleton was running. Tom had quit the Senate in ’86, and she set
up a sort of like the Women’s National Democratic Club, and she asked me to speak. The speech
was ordered 6 months,-but it was an opportunity to go after Ginsburg. I had no doubt that we had
to go after Ginsburg, as Ginsburg said quite truthfully, “I’m the most conservative man in the
Department of Justice.” I knew all sorts of stuff on antitrust cases, and that was an easy speech to
give. Luckily the St. Louis Post Dispatch covered it. There’s quite a story in the Post Dispatch
about opposing Ginsburg. I may De one of the few people that said that the grass he smoked
didn’t have anything to do with my opposition to him. In fact, I think that was not grounds for
beating him, but it was the ground on which be was beat.
Mr. Peck: He was beaten because bis supporters deserted him after the White
House bad decided to try and portray him as the law-and-order candidate.
Mr. Rauh: Bill Bennett, I guess, is the guy who finally did the coup de grace
to him. He told him to get out. I guess that was with Reagan’s 0.K.
Mr. Peck: Then Tony Kennedy gets nominated. Now, you’ve just beaten two
nominations in a row. You’re duplicating the Haynesworth-Carswell situation, and now what do
you do?
Mr. Rauh: Well, you have to fight Kennedy if you’re a guy with the record I’ve
had in the case, Haynesworth, Carswell, Bork, Ginsburg. You have to fight it. I read all the civil
rights cases, and they are a pattern of the court of appeals changing the facts just enough so that
they can uphold the state action. I tried to get the Leadership Conference to go agamst him
Peop]e were tired again. Nobody would do it except Molly Yard. She had with her the NOW
Defense Fund. So, it was really NOW. I couldn’t get the Leadership Conference, so the ADA
said I could testify for them. Molly and I and the NOW Legal Defense Fund, the three of us were
a panel to testify. Joe Biden, who didn’t brook any opposition on this point – he wanted him
through and through fast, Joe Biden put us down where we would hav.e testified just about when
nobody was listening. We raised some hell, Molly and I, about testifying then. Joe announced
that even though these witnesses had wanted to testify after everybody had finished, they have
changed their mind and they want to testify now, and so we’ll put them on now. That was alx>ut
2:00 in the afternoon. He also pulled a little game on us. He added a gay. I didn’t mind that, but
his motivations were so clearly to say: Ic’s that nutty woman, that crazy guy and a gay is what’s
against us. All I can say, he was one of the best witnesses I have ever heard because he was so
levelheaded, unextreme. He was just perfect. I really went up to him. It was wonderful Molly
was at her best. TIIis lady who was testifying for the NOW Lega1 Defense Fund was absolutely
superb. She’s a professor of the stuff, and she was wonderful. I dubbed Molly and me, the
”Committee of Septuagenarians agamBt Kennedy”; and we did the best we could but we didn’t
get any votes.
Biden was rough. Eiden asked me what I think is unforgivable. He said, ”You’re
here opposing someone. Do you think you know more about civil rights and care more deeply
than Teddy Kennedy?” That is dirty shot, I thought. He also said it about someone else, and then
be said it about himself. I had answered it, “Yes.” ] said, “On reflection, Senator, I’d like to
change my whole testimony. I don’t say I care more than they do. I think you all care. I think
you’re just making a teml>le mistake. I just do not care to go beyond that, and I give you my
reasons, and I hope you’ll treat them fairly.” Something like that. 1 think I made a mistake when
I answered the first time yes. I don’t know what I think today, but I don’t think that was a fair
way to put it. I was not questioning Kennedy or Metzenbaum’s feelings. Metzenbaum thought I
had challenged his integrity. He said that he thought I had challenged his integrity, and I told him
absolutely not. So I’m glad that I made that clear. I didn’t mean to challenge anybody’s integrity.
I just felt so deeply that I guess I gave initially the incorrect answer.
Mr. Peck: One thing we skipped over was the ’84 election, Mondale’s attempt
to win the White House away from Reagan. How much of a role did you play in the election?
Mr. Rauh: I did ·make a couple of talks for Mondale. I was 100% for
Mondale. Tb.ere wasn’t any question. I thoug ht bis tax thing was absolutely correct, that he’d
have been beaten worse if be hadn’t done that. The idea that you say you’re going to spend $90
billion – or whatever it was, the figure – and not have any way of getting was just corrupt. I
think Mondale was absolutely right. I didn’t have any major role in the campaign. I did whatever
they asked for. I felt strongly he had won. I had been in the primaries for George McGovern.
Mondale had come by that time to take much more conservative positions, other than the quite
brave tax position. I did speak to the ADA for McGovern. George had called and said, “There’s
to be one speaker each at the ADA convention, and then they’re going to discuss it and vote.
Would you represent me?” You know I felt for George, my God, you’re so wonderful on the war
and we had stopped the war by then, and I couldn’t say no. l said yes and I went there and I spoke
for George. I said, “You are planning to nominate the third or fowth most conservative man in
the race. The most bDCral, of course, was Jesse Jackson. The second most bDCral was Alan
Cranston.” I can’t remember if there was another one I mentioned, or whether I said, “And then
there was George.” Monda1e was possibly the most conservative in the race. For George’s sake,
I waited ’til all the discussion was over and then I said, “I move to defer this to the next meeting
in June.” Tiris meeting was quite early in the campaign, and I had a majority of – [Tape ends]
Mr. Rauh:
Oral History of Joseph L Raub, Jr.
Conducted by Robert S. Peck
1984 ADA Meeting and Thereafter to 1992
[Side A)
I remembered that ’84 meeting of the ADA because it was strange
thing to have happened that George McGovern whom we’d supported once and who’d lost very
badly, so politicians kind of shun people who’ve lost once. George did call me and said, “Would
I nominate him? Would I make the case for him at the ADA?” I hadn’t been active in the ADA
since 1980. I haven’t been active in it now since ’84 either. I couldn’t turn George down, an old
friend and great warrior. So, we went. I think the rule was they had to get 60% for a nomination
support. What they did was eliminate somebody each time. The first time Jackson got
eliminated, on the second ballot Cranston got eliminated. Hart took bis name out. His pollster
was there and asked that he not be considered. That’s because he would have been fifth So,
we’re down to George and Fritz [Mondale]. George was fighting that, and Fritz got one more, I
think, than 60, because he didn’t pick up the Jackson votes, but whoever was running the
Cranston thing wanted to eliminat e George, wanted it to come down to a battle between Cranston
and Mondale. So, they went for Mondale against McGovern even though their views were much
closer to McGovern’s. Anyway, by, I think, one vote they were able to get their 60%. Well, then
I moved to defer the tlring until much later because it’s early in the campaign. Maybe Mondale
will be too conservative, and why don’t we just defer it.
I got the votes of the non-labor people, the majority of those, but that wasn’t
enough The labor people who voted as a phalanx, plus the minority of the individuals, were able
to defeat my motion to defer. That was a perfectly legitimate way of dealing with the problem I
tell you what happened now that l think of it. J made that motion. The man in the chair, J think,
was Marvin Rich. I’m not sure. He consulted Leon Scholl, who ruled me out of order, which is
pretty strange to do to the guy running the organization for so long. I stood there while he ruled
me out of order, and thought, what the heck – shall I appeal the ruliDg of the chair or should I
not? 1 decided, what the heck, 1 might as well as get trounced as a man than as a mouse. So, I
said, “1 appeal the ruling of the chair.” They didn’t even know what the procedure was for an
appeal ruling of the chair, but I explained it to them: that I got a right to speak and then one
person speaks and then the chair speaks, but the chair wouldn’t be in the chair anymore if all that
happened. I argued against being out of order. You know I’ve been around a long time. I had
Roberts Rules in my pocket, and that’s what the ADA is goveriled by. I read them Roberts Rules
– motion to defer is appropriate at any time, and then somebody said something, “Well, we called
the meeting for this pl.lJl)ose, and therefore you can’t have motion to defer.” Well, Roberts
doesn’t an exception. That’s the vote we bad. They beat me. They sustained the ruling of the
chair that I was out of order. So, Mondale got the nomination. Jt would have helped George a
little bit, but Mondale would have been nominated. I happened to think maybe the only person in
America, I happened to think Mondale was right, politically as well as substantively, when he
said that he had to raise taxes because you couldn’t do all the things that people were saying
without raising twces. J thought he was right. He would look like a bigger jackass saying he can
spend all this money but not saying how you get it. That was murder I gather, and it’s been
murder ever since to say the truth which is you’ve got to raise taxes. There was a campaign. I
was for Mondale. I think he was right in what he was doing. He was a lot more hberal than
Reagan, and J he)ped a little bit, as much as I could. I was already then 73. I did make
arrangements for Jolm Andersen, to whom 1 have remained close, to-campaign. for George. We
had to make some financial arrangement guaranteeing those who might, because he was
campaigning, might cancel his speeches. I think only one speech was canceled. I don’t think
George ever asked for that, so it turned out all right. They bad a big Illinois reception for George
speaking for Mondale, 1 think it was in Champaign, and Andersen was the big supporter. 1 think
Andersen’s been sort of for the Democrats ever since ’80. I’m glad to see that. What he would
have done with Perot, who was the only one who supports Jolm’s belief in a third party, I don’t
know. That’s over, so I imagine he11 support Clinton very strongly. The tax q?estion turned out
to be a disaster politically, and nobody will ever know whether it would have been just bad or
worse the other way.
Mr. Peck: · We bad actually come back after talking about the Bork, Ginsburg
and Kennedy nominations to that convention. which means that, I think, brings us to the ’88
Presidential election at this point.
Mr. Rauh: In ’87, I bad a hip transplant, in l anuary of ’87, and that went
beautifully, swimmingly well, and three days later I had a heart attack, internal bleeding, and 1
came pretty close to dying. I was in intensive care for a couple of weeks; I was in the hospital for
almost two months. No, it wasn’t quite that long. I think it was five weeks. I got home on
Valentine’s Day. I went over on the 5111 of January and got home on Valentine’s Day. They
brought me home in an ambulance from Jolms Hopkins. While I was recuperating, a couple of
things happened.
In the first place, my wife, was an incredible advocate for me in the hospital. I
would tell anybody with a bright, loving wife, to have her by your side in the hospital. They’re
about to do 95,000 things wrong, and each time she would catch it. She was just incredibly
helpful. She lived in a hotel across the street from Jolms Hopkins, spent her time there, and she
is really the reason I didn’t go, I believe. At any rate, I think that certain things happened as I was
One of them was the D.C. Law School had persuaded me to help with the saving
of Antioch, which was really the creation of the D.C. School of Law. I did that, but Olie thinks,
and I guess it’s true, that the rea1 adrenaline came from the Bork case. I went to work on the Bork
thing and we did succeed in defeating him
In the campaign I helped Duk:akis. I had gone to a fund.raiser for him in
Washington, and he recalled, or I recalled, we recalled together, a meeting at American
University in 1953 or ’54 when he was at Swathmore. I had made a speech against Joe McCarthy
to what was called the Washington Semester. That’s a couple of months of attendance at
American U. of students from all over the country, college students. When I finished, a young
Swathmore junior or senior got up and made another speech against McCarthy, Joe McCarthy. It
was great, absolutely great, and that was Mike Dukakis. I was very impressed with hhn. Here’s a
young Greek, ethnic politician, wanting to make his career in politics, and in the ethnic State of
Massachusetts took on Joe McCarthy. I thought that was absolutely great.
During the course of the speech at the fundraiser, he referred to that. I started
doing things, but I never did, I was by that time 77, and wasn’t terribly active, but I helped him all
I could. I thought he was going to run a good campaign. I thought anybody who could make an
eloquent speech against McCarthy as a junior or senior in college could be a good campaigner. I
was wrong. He was not a good campaigner. I cringed the night of the debate when Bernard
Shaw asked him what he would do if his wife was raped, and he gave such a pallid answer that it
was temDle. I think that was a very bad turning point in the thing. I hapPened to hear that in the
company of about fifty hberals in New York City. It was an so• birthday party for Ken
Galbraith. Kay Graham had Newsweek send over the tape, because the press conference was
during dinner for Galbraith. They had a place s et up in the Century Club where you could hear
the press conference. It was just heartbreaking. I never saw a happier crowd go into a room to
bear a speech and a more dejected crowd come out of that room. People weren’t even talking to
each other. They were trying to get their wraps, or whatever it was, and get away from
everybody else. It was the most disastrous thing I ever heard. He got slaughtered. It was a
shame. It was a Bush victory, and I couldn’t have been sadder about it. In the meantime, you had
Kennedy approved, and then Bush went on to complete the job.
Now we’re in the middJe_ of the second Bush campaign and the first Clint on
campaign. Last Monday, Dave Rosenbaum of the New York Times called and asked, “Where are
the hDerals at this convention’? Why aren’t you here?” I said because I’m physically incapable of
getting around Madison Square Garden. What are you – I mean – crazy? I can hardly walk. It’s
not a boycott. We have to try and win with Clinton and Gore. We talked for a while. Vlbat be
printed was – I did say this – he said, “Aren’t you saddened by the fact that it’s the more moderate
group who now has controJ of the party?” I said – and he quoted this – “Of course, I feel
disappointed in the move of the party to the right.” And then I said, “But, they are so much better
than Perot and Bush, Perot still being in, but I can only say I’m for them. and I’m for them•with
enthusiasm, at least enthusiasm ag ainst the other two.” Well, he onl y printed the thing to the
“but.” Well, that’s all right. He was making a point that that saddened the hberals. Then he put
in a couple of sentences very laudatory ofme which he was trying to be nice and friendly. I am
disappointed, but I s.tillthink we have to win. I do think there’s a good chance. I don’t know ifl
told you but – I guess I did in some interview I had recently. I said Perot’s not going to get an
electoral vote. Did I say it to you?
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
We talked about this before the tape was on.
Ob, really.
I think you also said that you had done it in an interview, too.
Now everybody can say, “Oh, well, you made it up after tbe event.”
But, I do think I said it on tape a couple of times before. Anyway, it doesn’t matter. I never
thought Perot was a serious candidate. It just happened a lot swifter than one would have
predicted. You would have predicted he’d let it go downhill a little while before he got it. He got
out when he had enough people still for him that there are people who are sore that be got out. If
had waited another week or two, he probably would have gotten out with people less angry at bis
getting out.
Mr. Peck: Would you have ever imagined that Clinton would have been as
successful campaigner as be was this year after his ’88 convention speech?
Mr. Rauh: No, and I thought it was cute the way he started bis speech last
night, saying that he wanted to get the nomination, he wanted to be able to continue his speech of
four years ago. I thought that was a deft touch. I thought it was a good speech; although the best
speech of the convention was Cuomo’s without any doubt. I thought Clinton and Gore both made
good speeches. I think they will run credible campaigns. How far Clinton goes to the right I
think has yet to be seen. I just don’t know.
Mr. Peck: One of the big events of ’89, of course, was the Court’s flag burning
decision. It inspired the President to go out to the Iwo Jima memoria1 and call for a
constitutional amendment. Had you ever seen a President do something like that?
Mr. Rauh: I can’t quite recall the equivalent of that. He’s loose with
constitutional amendments. He has no feel for the greamess of the document, that you don’t
screw around the edges of that document. He ought to be more careful. He’s veto happy. He’s
constitutional amendment happy. Abortion – be wants one; balanced budget, flag burning.
They’re not things that one makes amendments out of. Our Constitution is too great a document.
Why Ben Franklin was so much smarter than George Bush. I don’t know, because he lived two
hundred years earlier. Those guys were smarter because they bad the essential principles that
have stood the time. There’s nothing in the kind of amendments – I think there are two more that
Bush is for. At least the three are so obvious. So I am really quite shocked. I think Brennan was
the great leader there, and I think he still is. What’s going to happen with Brennan as a
spokesman for bberalism remains to be seen. He’s in the hospital today for tests, is what the
hospital says. When an 86-year old frail man with a stroke and throat cancer goes to the hospital,
all you can do is pray.
Mr. Peck: I actually saw him last week. This was a dinner at fonner Senator
Mathias’s home. He was sort of taJking about how his replacement on the Court, David Souter,
was someone that be thought would be capable of growing into the job. Now, he’s always been
an optimist about these things, and he frequently says he has lunch with him What was your
reaction when first, Justice Brennan announced bis retirement and, then, later when we had what
was called the stealth candidate, David Souter, nominated?
Mr. Rauh: My reaction when Brennan got off was one of absolute desolation.
He was a great, great judge. Before we finish with your question, may I ask you if w e have ever
discussed his reaction to the Rehnquist elevation?
Mr. Peck: No, we haven’t.
Mr. Rauh: You may want to insert it back there, because I want to put it right
on the record that I hope you will do the first editing, taking out when I’ve repeated and when I’ve
screwed up something. Since it’s you, just feel totally free to do that. Then give it to me, because
I really don’t feel up to do the whole job. You can also move stuff around in a way that helps you
What happened was that Brennan made a statement that Rehnquist would be all
right as Chief Justice, a pro-Rehnquist statement. I went to the office and I wrote a handwritten
letter, with no copies, to Brennan. I said something like, “Dear Bill: You have every right to say
what you did, but I just want you to know that the people who believe the most in you and in
what you are, are fighting this, and this was a temDle blow to us .in the morning paper. You don’t
have to respond. You don’t have to write me anything. You don’t have to call me. I just feel like
I want you to know how it’s being interpreted, and how much it hurts the people who love you
the most.” The next morning I hadn’t gotten in the office, I walk in, my secretary says Justice
Brennan has called twice. I called him back, of course, irrnnediately. He said that was a very
fine Jetter, “but you don’t lrnow how bad Burger’s been. You don’t know, you don’t understand
what this Court has gone through with Burger.” He must have tom Burger limb from limb. I
said, “Just look, that doesn’t mean we should give up our fight against Relmquist.” “Of course,
you shouldn’t give up the fight.” He never said another word. He had a vengeance about Burger.
There are two letters I’m referring to. I sent him a copy of my piece in the North Carolina Law
Review about an unabashed hbera1 looks at a half century of the Supreme Court. He wrote me
the most lyrical letter. That’s what I was looking for, but I don’t have it. It may be in my papers.
I don’t know where it is, but I just couldn’t locate it. The letter I did locate was one where he
thanked me he says for getting him the Four Freedoms nomination. I didn’t get it for him
Nobody has to get anything for Bill Brennan. He’s the most revered guy by liberals in the world.
It’s a lovely, beautiful, modest letter and I treasure it. In the letter he wrote me on the North
Carolina piece, he was lyrical on bow good it was, and so I put it away somewhere. When I saw
him the next time, I said, “Bill, I guess you wrote me that letter in confidence, to say a piece is
wonderful that dumps all over Burger.” He said, “I didn’t write you that in confidence, I don’t
care what you do with it.” If you ever come across it, it’s not confidential. I could hardly believe
it. He said, “For Christ’s sake, l mean it.” He didn’t mention Burger in the letter, but those pieces
are very anti-Burger. Also, he had really blown that morning when he had gotten my letter about
Rehnquist. I believe him He never said another word after that, but the damage had been done.
Rehnquist bad gotten the benefit of Bill Brennan.
I interrupted to go back to the Relmquist appointment. You had me on Bill
Brennan’s resignation where I said I was really desolate. You asked how I felt about Souter. I
thought there was a trick, having a stealth candidate for th e Court, where you don’t know. You
remain stealthlike during the nomination process, and he was tem”ble. Then, two weeks before, I
guess, the end of his second term, he makes quite a shift. I’m happy with the shift. Nothing
would please me more than to have tum out as Benjamin N. Cardozo, but I think two weeks is
not a summer. I have to see what it ultimately comes to.
There was a question, you may have asked me. I’ve been asked by several people
whether there had ever.been an opinion quite like this where it is attributed to three people, and
not just one person plus other people – what do they do – consent?
Mr. Peck: Concur.
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Right. There is such a case. Do you know the case?
Well, there’s Cooper v. Aaron.
Yes, that’s the one. Maybe we discussed this.
No we haven’t. On that very day I got a call from a reporter, of
course, asking the same question.
Mr. Rauh: I didn’t remember it. I remembered it only in reading something of
Brennan’s from this lecture I have to give .in which it not only said Brennan had written it but it
made that point in Cooper v. Aaron, so maybe you remembered it. I didn’t.
Mr. Peck: I remembered it because I had written aOOut it.
[Side BJ
Mr. Rauh: I had no memory ofit. It made perfectly good sense. That would
have been a Frankfurter touch, although I have no way of knowing. Do you know whose idea it
Mr. Peck: I don’t. Tue evidence was that somebody raised it first and almost
immediately everyone agreed that it made perfect sense. It never quite revealed whose idea it
really was.
Mr. Rauh: Well, it’s wonderful. When I read it in here, I can’t remember if
they were implying that Brennan did it, or what. Brennan was pretty new on the Coun then, in
’57. Hhe got on in ’56, this was ’57. Brennan is frail. I had 1unch with him a few weeks ago,
and he made the point that he was sorry he got off. I don’t know that I really think that makes any
sense. He’s so frail. Ifhe can’t give a lecture, he can’t go through all the terrible, temb1e strain
that the Court was. When I went to see him to ask him to make a speech, he said he gets there at
7:30. The one thing about when you’re old and frail, and I’m only getting there but rm pretty
close, it’s so hard to get going in the morning. I waste all morning; I can’t help it; I am just so
slow. I do feel he’s one of the great people in my life, and I’ve had a lucky life.
Mr. Peck: I know that I guess I had seen him in April, and he actually looked
like he was more vigorous than he had been about a year earlier.
Mr. Rauh: I think you told me that.
Mr. Peck: I was very pleased to see that. When I saw him last week, he was
looking considerably weaker than he bad just in April. You could tell he was having difficulty.
!Ylr. Rauh. As late as this, within maybe – certainly – 60 days, he told me he
was sorry be resigned. I think that’s good for his morale, and I hope he enjoys saymg that. It’s
not true.
Mr. Peck:
and he clearly did.
Mr. Rauh:
I remember when he got off. He was looking like he needed a rest
Clearly, he couldn’t have gone on. They’re still planning to go to
Maine, Bill and Mary. They’re getting his plane tickets together, and he’s planning that. I don’t
believe he’s going to make it, and I don’t believe he should. God knows, if he’s going on any part
because of me, I don’t want him to go. I want him to live as long as possible. I’m sure Frank
Coffin feels the same way. We don’t know how to get him not to go.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Well, I think Mary’s the only one who co uld do that.
She will do that if it’s possible. She’s quite fine.
After, of course, his departure from the Court, one year later
Thurgood Marshall leaves the Court, and that had to be almost like a devastating second body
Mr. Rauh: We had opposed – this was no SUiprise. Whether anybody actually
testified for the Leadership Conference, I don’t think they did. There was a temOle feeling
against Thomas when he was confirmed for the court of appeals. We had – Elliott Lichtman, my
partner, had taken Thomas’ deposition in our Adams v. Richardson and all successors’ case. We
knew how bad he was from his Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education. We knew
bow bad this guy was. We were in a sense ready for it. I testified for the Leadership Conference
against him I didn’t know at that time about Anita Hill, although some other people did. I did
not know of Anita Hill until the Sunday morning when it was in Newsday by Phelps and on the
air by Nina [Totenberg]. It was only a coincidence I even knew that, because Floyd [Haskell,
Nina Totenberg’s husband] called about lunch that next week. We had a date. Floyd called, and
when we finished tallcing, Nina got on the phone and said, “Did you hear the program I just did?”
I said, ”No.” She said, “Well, it’s going to be again on such-and-such a station at 11 o’clock.
That’s the first time I knew anything about it. My son Carl was the lawyer for the Leadership
Conference on the leak question. I was very proud of him He worked for Skadden, Arps that
charges such absurd fees. He did this as a pro bono thing for Ralph [Neas] and he got a little
thing in the report about clearing us. It wasn’t just not mentioned negatively, he got an
affirmative thing in the report. I’m very proud of the family perlonnance there. Is there anything
on the wires on that French bill?
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
I didn’t hear anything before I left the office, so I’m not aware of it.
A lot of people say that Thomas is going to act today, because
tomorrow is the end of the period. They say it’s a good bill.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Now, you heard from the Justice Department on their position?
No, what was that?
That they supported Customs.
Ifbe asked them, I would think he’s going to follow it.
I would think so, too, but I’ve not heard anything yet. But he’s
turned out to be everything and worse.
Mr. Rauh: Incredibly bad. I think, and I really believe this, if Clinton wins,
the Court is going to be a minor factor in the future. We’ll get a young Brennan for Blackmun,
whose going to resign at the end of this year or before, at the end of June of ’93 or before. I think
we’ll get that, and some of the ones who are apparently not well, we’ll resign, we’ll get hberals.
There’ll be problems still, but the spectrum won’t go further the other way. I think we’ve got a
good shot now, if we can elect Clinton. I don’t know how much they are going to make of the
Supreme Court. I, myself, find it an impo rtant part of the election.
Mr. Peck: Prospects are not nearly as good, of course, if Bush wins
Mr. Rauh: If Bush wins, oh it really would be tenible. If he can appoint
Blackmun’s successor, that will just break everybody’s heart. The Administration is still pushing
bad judges. They’re pushing a hanging judge from the 11 lh Circuit, Carnes, is that bis name?
Mr. Peck: Yes.
Mr. Rauh: Oh, say that reminds me, there’s that big ad in the Post about
Monis Dees and his Center for Poverty Law, saying he is for Carnes.
Mr. Peck: So is Frank Jobnson.
Mr. Rauh: I guess there is a certain noblesse oblige there. At any rate, I wish
the Democrats would say no more until after the election.
Mr. Peck:
been scheduled on the floor.
at the moment.
Mr. Peck:
Mr. Rauh:
Mr. Peck:
Carnes was reported out of the Committee, but so far no vote has
Biden has refused all our entreaties to say no more votes.
Yes, that’s right. He’s been holding up the nomination for women
For women?
The Adnrinistration in an election year has rediscovered that there
is another gender. He’s been holding that up until there’s been action on a few other things, but
he’s promised if he gets action on voting rights and a few other things that he’s anxious about he
will act on this, so obviously he’s not going to put a stop to nominations yet.
Mr. Rauh: I’m not c1ear on that, Bob. What is the position on the four
Mr. Peck: He’s just basically held them up until he gets action on several
pieces of legislation that have been held up by the Republicans,
Mr. Peck:
It’s legislation?
Mr.Rauh: Well, why doesn’t be put Carnes in that Group?
Mr. Peck: Apparently, he imposed this rule after they voted on Carnes. I
think he was receiving a lot of pressure from Hal Heflin who’s a big Carnes supporter.
Mr. Rauh: Heflin, Dees, Johnson-there’s a lot of power there.
Mr. Peck: We’ve kind of run through the history as rve been able to put it
together. You’ve reminded me ofthings that I’ve left out. Is there anything else?
Mr. Rauh: One thing I want to say. If you ever want to be my friend for life,
you’ll do the editing.
Mr. Peck: Absolutely.
Mr. Rauh: I don’t know what to say, but I just don’t feel I can do it. I will read
it after you’ve edited it because you might have missed a little nuance here or there, but I don’t
want the bulk of it. Please do it, Bob.
Mr. Peck: I will do it.
Mr. Rauh: I never hesitated when you called and said you wanted to do this,
because I don’t mind doing it. What really would kill me would be having to do the editing. It’s
going to be a tough job on you. Take your time. There’s no rush. Ifl’m gone, if.I should get sick
or something and caD’t even read it afterwards; it’s right on tlle record because the record is still
running, you have my full authority to make the changes. I think that if there are ever two guys
who have similar views, it’s you and me; a.Dd if I misstated something, just please fix it. There’s
so much duplication and so much “ohs” and “ahs” that I just hope you’ll take your pencil, blue
pencil, and really do what has to be done.
Mr. Peck: I will do that.
Mr. Rauh: Thank you, Bob. I just don’t fee1 up to it. I’m getting more tired.
Note: Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. is referred to in the index entries as J.L.R.
Abortion, 2S3
Affinnative action, 143
Ailcen,Sen.George, 78
Air Force, U.S., 43
Alabama, S6
Alice in Wonderland (Lewis Carroll), 60
Allegheny Holding Compaoy, 123
Alliance for Justice, 241
All the President’s Men (Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein), 183
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 106, 119-120, 181, 186, 192
American Federation of Labor (AFL), 43, 127, 134,200, 21S, 222
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 134, 200,
see also individual union entries
American Legion, 56
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), 8, 24-28, 75-76, 110-112, 149-150, 162, 166-169,
216, 219-220, 229, 232-233, 243-244, 246-248
American University, 179, 250
Anderson, Sen. Clifford, 78
Anderson-Aiken Motion to Delete Pan Three, 78
Anti-Semitism, 9-10, 34
Antioch Law School, 250
“An Unabashed Libera] Looks at a HaJf-Century of the Supreme Court” (JLR article), 17
Anzio, Italy, 57
Arizona, 132
Armbrister, Trevor (author), 190, 197
Anny, U.S., 43-45, 49
Anny-Navy Club (D.C.), 213
Arnold & Porter (D.C. law finn), 159, 207
Arnold, Fortas & Porter (D.C. law firm), 60-61, 159-160
Arnold, Thunnao (D.C. attorney), 61, 108-109, 196
Arrow Corporation, 160
Atlaota, 215-216
Atlantic Charter, 42
Australia, 44-45
Bailey, Dorothy (defendaot), 60
Bailey, Judge Thomas Jennings, 31
Ballot oath, 5S
Barkley, Sen. Alben, 28
Stanley (Asst. Attorney General), 99
Barth, Alan (writer), 85
Bastian, Judge Walter M., 119, 121
Baumberg, Bavaria, 1
Bayh,Sen.Birch, 199
Bazelon, Judge David, 85, 96,125, 155,157, 174-176, 178, 206-207
Beale, Joseph (prof.-Harvard Law School), 10
Beck, David (“Dave”) (union leader), 92
Beer, Samuel (“Sam”) (head-ADA), 149
Bell, Griffin (Secy.-Education Dept.), 236
Bender, Sen. George, 77
Bennett, William (“Bill”) (conservative), 244
Bentley, Elizabeth (spy queen), 61-62, 63
Bereuffy, Carl (D.C. attorney), 61
Berlin, Gennany, 5
Biden, Sen. Joseph (“Joe”), 201-202, 245,260
Biemiller, Andrew (“Andy”) (AFL-CJO), 134
Bingham, Bany (editor-Louisville Courier Journal), 41
Birmingham, AL, 126, 150
Black(s), 27, 28, 29, 76, 102-103, 129-130, 133, 14 1-143, 148, 150-151, 158,161, 169,
Black, Justice Hugo, 64-65, 87, 89, 203
Blacklist , 222, 224-225
Blackmun, Justice Harry A., 201, 259
Block, Herbert (“Herblock”) (political cartoonist), 57, 59, 60
Bode, Kenneth (“Ken”) (reporter-CNN), 184
Bond, Julian (civil rights activist), 166
Bork, Judge Robert, 201-202, 241-244, 249-250
Boston, MA, 5, 49, 107
Bowles, Sen. Chester (“Chet”), 116
Boyle, Anthony (“Tony”) (union leader), 30, 184-193, 187,222
Brandeis, Justice Louis, 13, 16, 18-19, 22, 34, 36-37
Brandeis, Mrs. A1ice (wife-Justice Brandeis), 37
Brasnahan, James (San Francisco attorney), 239-240
Brennan, Justice William (“Bill”), 207-208, 238, 253-259
Brennan, Mrs. Mary (wife-Justice Brennan), 257-258
Britain, 43
see also England
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 171-172
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 104, 223-224
Broyles Bill, 53
Bryan, Sen. William Jennings, 4
Bryant, Judge William (“Bill”), 193-196
Buchanan, Patrick (“Pat”) (presidential candidate), 117
Buckley. William (“Bill”) (conservative activist), 67
Budd Wheel Co., 42
Budget Bureau, 102, 130
Buffalo, NY, I 02, 130
Bunker, Lawrence (aide•Gen. MacArthur), 49
Burger, Chief Justice Warren, 108, 121, 180, 206-207, 227,242, 254-255
Burton, Judge Harold H., 119
Bush, President George H.W., 224,251,253,259
Busing, 228
Butler, Justice Pierce, 33-34
Byrd, Sen. Robert (“Bobby”), I 17, 154
Cable News Network (CNN), 184
Carnes, Judge Edward Earl, 259-261
Califano, Joseph (aide-Pres. Johnson), 154, 205-206
California,26,39, 157,205
Calculated Visions•Kennedy, Johnson and Civil Rights (Mark Stern), 128
Canada (ian), 42, 225
Canal Zone, 141
Capitalism, 234
Cardozo, Justice Benjamin, 1, 12-22, 31, 33, 37-39, 198,240,255
Carswell, Judge G. Harold, 199-201, 203-204, 243, 244
Carter, Hodding (aide-Pres. Carter), 143, 165-166
Carter, Judge Robert, 79
Carter, Mrs. Hodding, 143, 165
Carter, President Jimmy, 143, 165, 211, 214-221, 230-231, 33
Case, Sen. Clifford, 132
Catholic Church, 94-95. 111-112
Center for Poverty Law, 260
Central Florida University, 128
Century Club (NY), 25 I
Champaign, IL, 249
Charlottesville, VA, 48
Chicago, IL, I 66
China, 118, 120-121, 190
Chinese, 28
Church, Sen. Frank, 164
Cincinnati, OH, I, 12
Civil liberties, 24, 43, 61, 68, 88, 94-95, 106, 108, 119, 136, 152, 160, 191,229
Civil rights, 25-28, 54-56, 74, 77, 79-80, 85, 94, 100, 110, 116, I 19, 127, 147, 149-150,
152-153, 158,161,171, 197-198, 203,210,214,228,243
Clark, Justice Thomas (“Tom”), 123
Clark, Sen. Joseph (“Joe”), 150, 161
Clark, Sheriff James, 152
Clark, Thomas (“Tom”) (Attorney General), 109
Cleveland, President Grover, 220
Clifford, Clark (D.C. attorney), 51
Clinton, President William J., 174,249, 251-252, 259
Coffin, Judge Frank, 257
Cohen, Benjamin (“Ben”) (New Dealer), 12-13, 17-18, 30-31, 35,129,169, 187
Coleman, William (“Bill”) (law c1erk-Justice Frankfurter), 213
Collective bargaining, 224
Colorado, 141
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 41, 177
Combs, Harrison (attorney-T. Boyle), 189
Commerce Department. U.S., 61
“Committee of Septuagenarians,” 202, 245
Committee to Re-Elect the President, 183
Common Sense Campaign (Adlai Stevenson) ( 1952), 77
Communist(s), 7, 8, 24-25, 43-44, 62-63, 65-66, 85, 109, I 19, 120-121, 190, 229-230
Fifth Amendment, 83
Communist Party, 57, 60, 63, 122
Conder, Lyman (attorney-Kohler Co.), 94
Confucius (Chinese philosopher), 79
Congress, U.S., 61, 69, 79; 120-121, 168, 209-210, 219,233
Contempt of, 84
see also Representatives, House of, U.S.; Senate, U.S.
Congressional Medal of Honor, 49
Congressional Record, 128
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 42-43, 88, 90, 127,134,200,215,222
Connally, Gov. John, I 68-I 69
Connecticut, 124
Connor, Sheriff Theophilus Eugene (“Bull”), 126,152
Constitutional Commentary, 82
Conway, Jack (aide-Walter Reuther), 139
Cook, Sen. Marlo, 200-201
Cook County, IL, 161
Coolidge, President Calvin, 4
Cooper, Sen. John Sherman, 200-201
Corcoran, Thomas (“Tom”) (New Dealer), 12-13, 17-18, 30-31
Covington & Burling (D.C. law firm), 169
Cox, Oscar (general counsel-Off. Emerg. Mgmt. & Lend-Lease), 42
Coy, Wayne (Off. ofEmerg. Mgmt.), 42, 101, 129-130
Craigfield, Harold (D.C. attorney), 89-90
Cranston, Sen. Alan, 246-247
Cummings, Attorney General Homer, 17, 30-31, 35
Cuomo, Gov. Mario, 252
Curran, Judge Edward (“Eddie”), 57, 58
Curtis, Sen. Carl, 92
Customs Service, U.S., 259
Dallas, TX, 168
Danaher, Judge John A., 119, 124, 155, 160
Dartmouth College, 63
Davis, Mr. (president-Nat'( Bank of Washington), 194-196
Davis, John W. (presidential nominee), 4
Dees, Morris (Center for Poverty Law), 260-261
Democratic National Committee, 55
Democratic National Party, Credentials Committee, 138-139, 147, 165
Democratic Party, 25, 26, 27, 28, 196,211
National Convention (1948), 25-28, 55
National Convention (1952), 31
National Convention (1956), 82, 98
National Convention (1960), 110, 113, 140
National Convention (1968), 163, 165-167
National Convention (1976), 218
Resolutions Committee, 75
Detroit, MI, 25
Detroit Free Press, 90
Devon Adair (publishing house), 63
Diggs, Charles (“Charlie”) (Dem. Party comm. member), 139
Discrimination, racial, JOO, 101, 102, 171
Distinguished Service Star, 49
District of Columbia, II, 12, 49, 53-54, 95, 101, 106-107, 111, 114, 129,141, 154, 195-196,
Bar, 51
City Council, 154
Home Rule, 153
District of Columbia School of Law, 250
Dobrivir, William (“Bill”) (D.C. attorney), 180,207
Douglas, John (Asst. Attorney General-Civil Div.), 160
Douglas, Justice William 0., 64, 89
Douglas, Mrs. Paul, 152
Douglas, Sen. Paul, 52, 77-78, 152
Doyle, Vincent (researcher-Library of Congress), 151
Due process, 12
Duff, Sen. James Henderson, 77
Dukakis, Gov. Michael, 250-251
Duncan, Mrs. Todd (singer’s wife), 141
Dyke, Tim (manager), 168
Eagleton, Barbara (wife-Sen. Eagleton), 243-44
Eagleton, Sen. Thomas (“Tom”), 208-209, 215,243
Eaton, William (“Bill”) (newspaper reporter), 198,203
Economic Warfare Program, 42
Edelman, Daniel (“Dan”) (D.C. attorney), 193
Edgerton, Judge Henry W., 85, 124, 125, 155, 157
Education Department, U.S., 212, 214
Edwards, George (chainnan•Detroit city council), 25
Eisenhower, President Dwight D. (“Ike”), 53, 56-57, 77, 88
Eisenstad? Stuart (aide-President Carter), 219-221
Elder, Shirley (newspaper reporter), 170
Electric Bond and Share Co., 31.
Emory University, 215
Equal opportunity, 153
England, 24, 44
Episcopal, 133-134
Ervin, Sen. Samuel (“Sam”), 92
Eugene, OR, 118, 120
Europe, 211
Fahy, Judge Charles, 155,177,231
Featherbedding, 103, 171-174
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 106-107, 188, 237-238
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 31, 39-40, 176-177, 234
Federal Election Commission (FEC), 234-235
Federal Power Commission, 29
Feldman, Clarice (JLR associate), 193
Feldman, Myer (Kennedy staffer), 113
Finch, Robert (HEW), 226
Fitzpatrick, Daniel R. (St. Louis Post Dispatch), 85
Flag burning, 253
Florida, 204
Forbes, Malcolm (entrepreneur), 234
Ford, President Gerald, 190,210
Fortas, Justice Abe, 159, 178-180, 197
D.C. attorney, 29, 60-61, 65
Fort Worth, TX, 168
Forum shopping, 157
Four Freedoms, 255
Frank, John (law clerk-Justice Black), 203
Frankfurter, Justice Felix, 2, 9, 13, 20, 22-23, 34-36, 64-65, 81-82, 87, 89-90, 107, 108-109,
Harvard Law School professor, 2, 10-12, 35,198,213
Franlclin, Benjamin (“Ben”) (American patriot), 253
Fraser, Mayor Donald (“Don”), 217
Frasier, MI, 154-155
Freeman, Gov. Orville, 114-115
Free speech, 8, 86, 122, 222
see also U.S. Constitution-First Amendment
Freud, Sigmund (psychiatrist), 145-146
Friedan, Betty (feminist), 166
Friendly, Al (vote counter), 54
Galbraith, Kenneth (“Ken”) (economist), 251
Gardner. Warner (aide-Attorney General Cummings). 17
Garrow, David (author), 127
General Motors Corp., 145
Genghis Kahn (Mongol ruler), 158
Georgia, 166
German(s), 1-2, 6-9, 33, 44
Germany, I, 9
Gilbert, H.E. (union leader), 171
Gilley, Paul (suspect-Yablonski case), 188-189
Ginsburg, Judge Douglas, 237, 243-244, 249
Goldberg, Justice Arthur, 89, 197-198
Goldwater, Sen. Barry, 92-93
Goodman, Richard (“Dick”) (speechwriter), 163
Gore, Albert(” Al”) (Vice President), 251-252
Gore, Sen. Albert, Sr., 77
Graham, Katherine (“Kay”) (owner-The Washington Post), 251
Graham, Philip (owner-The Washington Post), 15, 79, 81-82, 106
Gray, Virginia (civil rights activist), 143
Greek(s), 250
Green, Judge June, 231
Green, Sen. Edith, 141
Green, William (“Bill”) (Dem. Party boss), 27
Greenberg, Jack (D.C. attorney), 226
Griffin, Sen. Robert, 179
Guam, 141
Haig, Frank (Dem. Party boss), 27
Hamer, Fannie Lou (civil rights activist), 138, 142-143, 165-166
Hamlet (Shakespeare character), 25, 53
see also Stevenson, Adlai
Hand, Judge Augustus (“Gus”), 64
Hand, Judge Learned, 64
Harriman, Gov. W. Averill, 53-54
Harris, Robert (“Bob”) (asst.-Rep. Yarborough), 169
Harris, Sen. Fred, 216
Harris, Thomas (“Tom”) (AFL-CIO), 200
Harrision, George (union leader), 104
Hart, Judge George L., 180-181, 183, 186, 196, 206-207
Hart, Sen. Philip (“Phil”), 179-180
Harvard Club (D.C.), 213-214
Harvard Law School, 2-3, 5, 9-10, 21-22, 35, 83,201,213
Federal Jurisdiction course, 10-11, 35
Public Utilities course, 10, 188
Harvard University, 2-3, 5,201
Harvey, J. (Dem. Party boss), 27
Haskell, Floyd (husband-N. Totenberg), 258
Hatch, Sen. Orrin, 240-242
Hayden, Sen. Carl, 132
Haynesworth, Judge Clement. 179, 197-200, 203, 243-244
Head tax, 16
Heflin, Sen. Hal, 261
Helhnan, George (author), 15
Hellman, Jeffrey (writer), 15
Hellman, Lillian (playwright), 65-67, 68, 83
Hennings, Sen. Thomas (“Tom”), 77
Henry, Aaron (chair-Dem. Party), 140-143, 165-166
Hersey, John (author), 47-49
Hesburgh, Father Theodore M. (pres.-Notre Dame Univ.), 99,100
Hickenlooper, Sen. Bourke, 107-108
Hill, Anita (professor), 203, 258
Hindenburg, Baron Paul von (Gennan president) 7, 8
Hispanic(s), 28, 129, 130
Hiss, Alger (spy), 64
Hitler, Adolph (German dictator), 5-9
Roehling, A.A. (author), 127
Hoffa, James (union leader-Teamsters), 92
“HoJlywood Ten,” 71
Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell, 85
Holtzoff, Judge Alexander, 30, 172-173
Homicide, 174
Hoover, J. Edgar (head-FBI), 106-109, 119,237
“Hornblower, Hubert Horatio,” 218
see also Humphrey, Hubert H.
Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union, 222
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), see House of Representatives, U.S.
Housing, Education and Welfare Department (HEW), U.S., 212,214,226
Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD), 150
Houston, Charles (“Charlie”) (D.C. attorney), 103
Hruska, Sen. Roman, 203
Hughes, Chief Justice Charles Evans, 14, 19, 37
Hughes, Paul, 67
Human rights, 27, 95
see also civil rights
Humphrey, Muriel (wife-Sen. Humphrey), I 13
Humphrey, Sen. HubettH., 25-27, 76-77, 95,110,117, 132-133, 137, 142-143
Presidential candidate 163-164, 166-170, 180,205,218
Hurst, WiJlard (law clerk-Justice Brandeis), 16
Ickes, Jane (wife-Sen. Harold Ickes), 152-153
Ickes, Sen. Harold, 152
Illinois, 27, 52-53
Internal Security Subcommittee. 122
International Human Rights, 143
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 123-124
Italy, 214
Ives, Sen. Irving, 92
Jwo Jima Memorial. 253
Jackson, Justice Robert H., 64-65, 239
Jackson, Rev. Jesse (civil rights activist), 246-247
Jackson, Sen. Henry, 216
Japan(ese), 45-48, 157, 159
Japanese-American Citizens league, 157
Javitz, Sen. Jacob (“Jack”), 132
Jenrette, Rep. John, 237-238
Eastern, 1
Gennan, 1
Sephardic, 1
John Birch Society, 49
Johnson, Frank, 260-261
Johnson, President Lyndon B.
135-139, 142, 146-147, 153-154, 161-163, 165, 170, 176-178, 180-183, 231
Senator, 29, 77-79, 81-82, 112, 115-117
Vice President, 149, 151
Jones, Judge William, 212
Jordan, Hamilton (aide-President Carter), 215, 217-218, 220
Jordan, Rep. Barbara, 218
Justice Department, U.S., 63, 226, 244, 259
Antitrust Division, 99
Assistant Attorney Genera), 99
Assistant U.S. Attorney, 239
Attorney General, 57, 78
Civil Division, 160
U.S. Attorney, 57,228
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB. (Attorney General), 127, 134-135, 153
Kaufman, Andrew (biographer), 21-23
Kefauver, Sen. Estes, 53-54, 76-77
Kelly, Katie (writer), 15
Kennedy, Justice Anthony (“Tony”), 201-202, 242,244,249
Kennedy, President John F., 133, 149, 151-152, 218
Senator, 35, 77, 92-93, 110-115
Kennedy, Rohen (“Bobby”), 94, 112-113, 116, 126-127, 163, 164-165, 168
Attorney General, 135, 150
Counsel-Senate Rackets Comm .• 93
Kennedy, Sen. Edward (“Ted”), 202, 230, 232, 245
Kentucky, 28
Kilpatrick, James J. (newspaper reporter), 204
King, Edward (“Ed”) (professor), 142-143
King, Rev. Martin Luther (civil rights activist), 78-79, 126-127, 141, 148,150,152,
Kirkland, Lane (pres. AFL-CIO), 222
Kluger, Richard (author), 239
Kohler Company, 91-94, 96-97, 126, 155, 157
Kramer, Ray (JLR army buddy), 48
Kramer, Victor (Justice Dept.), 99
Kutcher, James (plaintiff), 59
Labor Departtnent, U.S., 103,187, 192-193
Wage and Hour Division, 12
LaFollette, Sen. Robert, 4
Landis, James M. (legal author), 11
Langer, Sen. William, 77
Lansman, Matilda (radical), 122
Lanion, Reed (pres.-R.ight to Work), 222
Lautenberg, 35-36
Antitrust, 98
Criminal, 12
Law firms
Anti-Semitism in, 9-10
Jewish, 12
Lawrence, Gov. David (Dem. Party boss), 27, 138-139, 141
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 74, 78, 119, 136, 198-199, 212,242,244,258
of Merit, 49
Lehman, Gov. Herbert, 53-54, 77
Lend-Lease Administration, 41-42, 44, 129
Leventhal, Judge Harold, I 82- I 83
General Counsel-Dem. Comm., 142, 160
Levy, Herbert (“Herb”) (JLR law partner), 109-110
Lewis, John L. (union leader), 186
Lewisburg Penitentiary, 64
Libel, 62
Library of Congress, 16, 67, 151
Lichtman, Elliot (JLR partner), 212-214, 258
Limitations, Statute of, 159
Lincoln, President Abraham, 243
Linder, Robert Mitchell (The Fifty Minute Hour), 73
Lions C1ub. 5
Literacy tests, 151
Loeb, James (“Jim”) (co-founder-ADA), 8, 24-26, 53, I 12
Long Island, N.Y., 168
Los Angeles, CA, I 60, 168-169
Louisville, KY, 50, 200
Louisvillle Coun”er Journal, 40-41
Lowenstein, Rep. Allard K. (“Al”), 162-163, 166,168
Lowenthal, Max (New Dealer), 106-108
Loyalty oaths, 54-56
Loyalty Review Board, 60
Luce, Clair Booth (ambassador-Italy), 214
Machinists Union, 234
MacKinnon, Judge George E., 206-207
Maddox, Gov. Lester, 215
Magellan, Ferdinand (explorer), 46
Maine, 257
Manila, Philippines, 45-46
Mansfield, Sen. Michael (“Mike”), 131
Markman, Rep. Steven (“Steve”), 239
Marshall, Burke (Asst. Attorney General), 127
Marshall, Justice Thurgood, 238, 258
Martin, John Frederick (author), 55
Masaoka, Michael (“Mike”) (Japanese-Americitizens League), 157-160
Mason, Alpheus Thomas (biographer), 22
Mason, Charles (JLR Harvard classmate), 213-214
Mason, Hilda (D.C. councilwoman), 213
Massachussetts, 117,137,235,259
Mata Hari (spy), 61
-Al IMathias,
Sen. Charles C., 253
Mazey, Emile (JLR client), 91, 93-95, 97
McArthur, General Douglas, 44, 47-49
McCarthy, Sen. Eugene (“Gene”), 162-165, 167-170, 176,231
McCarthy, Sen. Joseph (“Joe”), 44, 50, 53, 56, 65, 67-68, 82-83, 86
McClellan, Sen. John L., 91-92
McCormack, Rep. John, 117
McCulloch, Rep. William (“BilJ”), 153
McGovern, Sen. George, 114, 164, 204-209, 215, 219-220, 246-249
McGowan, Judge Carl, 177-178
McGrath, James Howard (chair-Rhode Island Dem. Party), 28
McGrory, Mary (newspaper reporter), 113
McKinley, President William, 4
McKinley Gold March (I 896), 4
McNamara, Sen. Patrick, 78, 88, 92
McReynolds, Justice James, 19, 33-34
Meany, George (unlon leader), 198-199, 208-209, 215
“Meet the Press” (TV program), 62
Metzenbaum, Sen. Howard, 202, 238, 240, 245
Mexican(s), 168
Mexico, 229
Michigan, 76, 179
Mikva, Judge Abner (“Ab”), 222,236
Miller, Arnold (union leader), 194-195, 197
Miller, Arthur (playwight), 68-72, 86-87, 122
Miller, Judge Wilbur K., 59, 126, 155
Miller, William (“Fishbait”) (House doorkeeper), 135
Milwaukee, WI, 111
Mine Workers Journal, 186
Minimum wage, 18
Minneapolis, MN, 25,217
Minnesota, I 11, 139,206
Mississippi, 55, 136, 143, 148, 165,205
Mississippi Freedom Party, 75, 135-143, 145, 147, 151, 165
Missouri, 28
Mitchell, Clarence (Justice Dept.), 78, 127, 131-135, 161, 198-200, 212
Mondale, Walter (“Fritz”)
Attorney General-MN, 139-141, 144
Vice Presiden? 21 I, 217, 219, 246-249
Monroe, Marilyn (actress), 68, 71-73
Montgomery, AL, I 52
Morse, Sen. Wayne, 78
Moses, Robert (“Bob”) (NY politician), 136
Moulter, Rep., 154
Ms. (magazine), 72-73
Mundt, Sen. Karl, 91-93
Murphy, Charles (“Charlie”) (White House aide), 53
Murray, Philip (“Phil”) (union leader), 88
Muskie, Sen. Edward (“Ed”), 205
Nader, Ralph ( consumer activist), I 84-185
Nathan, Robert (“Bob”) (economist), 149
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 26, 78, 200, 224
Legal Defense Fund, 213,227
see also Wilkins, Roy
National Bank of Washington, 194,196
National Broadcasting Company (NBC), 40-41, 62
National Civi1 Liberties CJearing House, 106
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), 98-100
National Defense Advisory Council, 41
National Law Journal, 234
National Organization for Women (NOW), 201,241,244
Nation Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 95-96, 126, 150, 155-156, 160, 171
Nazi(s), 7
Nazi-Soviet Pact, 24, 44
Nees, Ralph (NY attorney), 258
Newark, NJ, 58
New Deal, 3-4, 11-13, 34-35, 38, 40, 60, 106
New England, 201
New Hampshire, 54, 163
Newman, Sandy (go-fer), 131
New Mexico, J 4
New Republic, 24
Newsday, 258
Newsweek, 200, 251
New York Central Railroad, 123
New York City, 14, 23, 26, 27, 48, 61, 63,168,251
New Yorker, 15
New York State, 14
New York University Law School, JO
Nichols, Louis (“Lou”) (Hoover public relations aide), 106
Niebuhr, Reinhold (“Reinnie”) (ADA leader), 24
Niles, David (“Dave”) (aide-Dem. Nat’!. Conv.), 27
Nixon, President Richard M.
180,183, 200-201, 208-211, 226, 243
Senator, 93, I 64, I 69
Nobel Peace Prize, 238
North Carolina, 236
North Carolina Higher Educational System, 236
North Carolina Law Review, 17, 20,237,255
North Korea, 58-59
O’Brien, Lawrence (“Larry”) (Kennedy aide), 134-135
O’Donnell, Kenneth (“Kenny”) (Kennedy associate), 95, 137, 168
O’Dwyer, Mayor William (“Bill”), 26
O’Dwyer, Sen. Paul, 168
O’Mahoney, Sen. Joseph C., 78
Office of Emergency Management (OEM), 41. 100-101, 129
Office of Production Management, 41
Ohio, 153
Olds, Leland (Federal Power Comm.), 29
Oppenheimer, J. Robert (atomic scientist), 2
Oregon, 138
Oxford University (England), JO
Palmer Red Raids, 107
Parliament (British), 137
Paxton & Seasongood (Cincinnati law firm). 12
Pearl Harbor, 158
Pearson, Drew (newspaper columnist), 106
Pennsylvania, 99, 187,220
People for the American Way, 242
Perot, H. Ross (presidential candidate), 218,233,249, 251-252
Peters, Dr. (JLR client), 108-109
Phelps, Timothy (newspaper reporter). 258
Philadelphia, PA, 27, 191
Philippine Islands, 45-46, 49
Phillips, Randy (investor), 123
Phoenix, AZ. 239
Pittsburgh, PA, 187
Plaut, James (“Jimmy”) (JLR friend), 5
Poland, 50, I 02, 130
Polish Supply Mission, 50, 107
Pollak, Louis (JLR co-counsel), 125-126, 156
Pollitt, Daniel (“Dan”) (JLR associate), 66-67, 156, 237-238
Poll tax, 153
Porter, Charles (“Charlie”) (radical-plaintiff), II 8, 120-121
Porter, Frank (newspaper reporter), 185-186
Porter, Paul (D.C. attorney), 26, 60-61, 179
Powell, Justice Lewis, 210, 241-242
Pratt, Judge John H., 213-214, 226-228
Presidential campaign (1952), 52-57
Presidential campaign (1956), 74-79
Presidential campaign (1968), 147-171
Presidential election (1960), 110-117
Pressman, Lee (General Counsel-CIO), 42-43
Prettyman, Judge E. Barrett, 59-60
Pritchard, Kenneth (“Ken”), 38
Proctor, Judge James M., 60
Progressive Party, 4
Project Vote, 131
Protestant(s), 112
Prouty, Sen. Winston L., 201
Pueblo (American ship), 191
Pulitzer Prize, 198
Quaker(s), 234
Racine, WI, 111
Railway Labor Executives Union, 100, 103-104
Randolph, A. Philip (union leader), 100-105, 129-130
Rauh, Joseph L., Jr.-PERSONAL
Brother, 2-3
Childhood, 1-2
Education, Harvard Law School, 2-3, 5, 9-10
European travels, 5-7
Father, 1-4, 33
Grandmother, 2
Health of, 249-250
Judiasm of, 1, 6
Mother, 1,3,4
Rauh, Carl (son), 51, 71-72, 258
Rauh, Olie (wife), 10, 56, 71-73, 81, 90, 107, 162, 167,173,216,217,242, 249-251
Sister, 2-4
Rauh, Joseph L., Jr.-PROFESSIONAL
Chairman-Americans for Democratic Action, 75
Co-founder-Americans for Democratic Action, 229
D.C. Bar, admitted to, 51
Democrat ic Party chainnan, 196
Democratic Party National Convention (1948), 25-28
Deputy Director-Veterans Emergency Housing Program, 50, 200
Deputy General Counsel-FCC, 40
Deputy General Counsel-Lend-Lease Program, 42, 129
Deputy General Counsel-Office of Emergency Management , 42, 100-101, 129
General Deputy Housing Expediter, 50
Humphrey, Hubert, association with, 25-27, JIO-lll
Labor Dept. (Wage and Hour Divis ion), 13
Law clerk-Justice Cardozo, I, 12-22, 31, 33, 240
Law clerk-Justice Frankfurter, 13, 20, 81-82, 240
Mil itary service, 44-49
New De alers, work with, 12, 17-18
Office of Emergency Management (OEM), 41-42, 100
Polish Supply Mission, attorney for, 50, 107
Private Practice, 50
Supreme Court c1erkships, 33-40
see also Justice Cardozo, Justice; Frankfurter
Reader’s Digest, 191
Reagan, Nancy (First Lady), 15
Reag an, President Ronald, 217-218, 233-234, 244,246,248
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), 50
Red Sea, 113
Reed, Justice Stanley, 123
Rehnquist, Chief Justice William, 210, 238-241, 254-255
Re illy, Judge Gerard D. (“Gerry”), 37-38
Remington, Mrs. William, 63
Remington, William (“Bill”) (JLR cl ient), 60-62, 63-65, 197
House of Representatives, U.S., 77, 81, 127-128, 134,138, 154
Judiciary Comminee, 41, 133,153,210, 239,260
Rules Committee, 128
Un-American Activities Commillee (HUAC), 61, 63, 65-69, 71, 85-86
Representatives, House of, U.S., see also Con gress, U.S.
Republican Party, 196,206
Reuther, Walter (union leader-VA W), 75-76, 82-83, 88-90, 92, 95, 109, 126-127, 137-140,
142,144-146, 152,209,223
Reynolds, James (“Jim”) (Asst. Secy. of Labor), 173
Rhode Island, 28, 194
Rich, Marvin (ADA), 248
Richardson, Ron (Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union), 222
Richardson, Elliot (Secy.-HEW), 213, 225-226
Richey, Judge Charles, 221
Ri ght-to-Life, 235
Right-to-Work, 222-223
Robert’s Rules of Order, 248
Robens, Justice Owen, 18·19
Robinson, Judge Spottswood, 211, 236
Rome, Italy, 49
Roosevel? Eleanor (First Lady), 75
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 9, 17-18, 25, 35, 36-37, 41-43, 50, 88, 101-102, 129,
Roosevelt, James (“Jimmy”) (chair-Calif. Democratic Party), 26
Rosenbaum, David (“Dave”)(The New York Times), 251
Rosenberg, Ethel (convicted spy), 229
Rosenberg, Julius (convicted spy), 229
Rosenberg, Marvin (ADA), 112, 149
Rowan, Carl (newspaper columnist), 150
Rowley, James (chief-Secret Service), 182
Russell, Sen. lochard R., 79
Russia(ns), 24, 42, 44
Russian-Nazi Pact. 44
Rustin, Bayard (civil rights activist), 105, 141
Rutgers University Press. 128
Sabou Islands, 46
Sadlowski, Edward (“Ed”) (JLR client), 105, 222, 225
Salt Lake City, UT, !70
Sanders, Gov. Carl, 215
Sanford, Gov. Terry, 216
San Francisco, CA, 45, 239, 240
Scalia, Justice Antonin, 240-241
Schlesinger, Arthur (historian), 28, 34-36, 220, 233
Scholl, Leon (Exec. Dir.-ADA), 167, 199-200, 248
School desegregation, 78,213,226,228
School integration, 54, 226-228
Scoundrel Time (Lillian Hellman), 67
Secret Service, U,S., 181-182
Self-incrimination, 66, 82
see also U.S. Constitution-Fifth Amendment
Seller, Rep. Emanuel (“Manny”), 150
Selma, AL, 152
Senate, U.S., 77, 80, 85, 107, 114, 132, 161, 168, 199, 21 I, 233, 238-239, 242-243
Senate , U.S., see also Congress, U.S.
Senate. U.S.
Internal Security Committee, 60
Investigating Committee, 61
Select Committee on the Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field (Rackets
Committee), 90-94, 98
Subcommittee on D.C. Finances of the Appropriations Committee, 154
Shaw, Bernard (CNN anchorman), 250-251
Shea & Gardner (D.C. law firm), 173
Shea, Frank (Shea & Garnder), 173
Shelton, Willard (radical writer), 121
Sbennan, General William Tecumseh, 53, 72
Silard, John (JLR partner), 156, 159, 184,212,214
Simple Justice (Richard Kluger), 239
Sirica, Judge John, 227
Skadden, Alps (N.Y. Iaw firm), 258
Sleeping Car Porters, 100, 103-104
Smee!, Eleanor (“Ellie”) (NOW), 241
Smith, Rep. Howard, 128-130
Snowden, Frank (prof.-Howard University), 214
Sobel, Morton (convicted spy), 229
Sobel, Mrs. Morton (wife-Morton Sobel), 229-230
Soboloff, Simeon E. (D.C. attorney), 108
Socialist(s), 8, 24, 225
Socialist Party, 24
Socialist Workers Party, 57-58
Social Security, 16, 19
Solarz, Rep. Steven (“Steve”). 36
Sorensen, Theodore (“Ted”) (Kennedy aide), I 13
Sotari, Abraham (“Abe”) (law clerk-Judge Wright), 158
Souter, Justice David, 253
South Dakota, 114, 209
Southeastern Carriers Agreement. 29-30
South Korea, 58
Soviet(s), 61
Spanish loyalists, 24
Sparkman, Sen. John, 56
Sprague, Richard (“Dick”) (JLR friend), 189, 191, 197
Springfield, IL, 53
St. Louis, MO, 243
Stalinism (ists), 24, 58
Stassen, Gov. Harold, 99
Steelworkers Union, 105,127,222
Stephens, Judge Harold M., 30
Stem, Mark (author), 128, 135
Stem, Philip (“Phil”), 234
Stevenson, Gov. Adlai, 25, 52-54, 55-57, 75-76, 115-116
Stewart, Milton (speechwriter), 27
Stone, Justice Harlan Fiske. 19-21, 34
Straits of Magellan, 46
Strop, William (“Bill”) (law clerk-Justice Cardozo), 12
Sundlun, Gov. Bruce, 194
Sunitoma Bank, 157
Sutherland, General Richard K. (Army chief of staff), 46-47,
Sutherland, Justice George, 33-34
Swan, Judge Thomas (“Tom”), 64
Swathmore College, 250
-A l8-
Taft, Sen. Robert, 53
Tamm, Judge Edward Allen, 211
Tangiers, Morocco, 234
Tatel, David (depositionee), 214
Tavenner, Frank (chief counsel-HUAC), 67
Teamsters Union. 92
Tennessee, 188
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 63
Texas,80,117, 162,168
The Fifty Minute Hour (Robert Mitchell Linder), 73
The New York Times, 49, 67, 72, 80, 91, 93-94, 121,192,251
The St. Louis Post Dispatch, 85
The Wall Street Journal, 51
The Washington Post, 25, 54, 67, 75, 106,185,207,217,260
Third Annual Conference on Civil Liberties, 119
Thomas, Evan (author), 190
Thomas, Judge Clarence, 214,228, 258-259
Thomas, Nonnan (American socialist), 24
Thompson, Frank (defendant), 237
Thurmond, Sen. Strom, 55, 179
Toby, Mrs. Charles, 152
“Topsy” (Uncle Tom’s Cabin character), 162
Totenberg, Nina (reporter-NPR), 258
Treason, 44
Truman, President Harry S., 25-27, 51-52, 54-56, 108
Tydings, Sen. Joseph (“Joe”), 200
U.S. Circuit Courts
D.C. Circuit, 30, 31, 32, 38, 39, 57-58, 60-61, 69, 70-71, 86, 92, 95-97, 117, 121, 123, 154,
156-157, 171, 173-176,180, 181, 182, 184, 192,197,211,214,221,225,227,230,234,236,
Eighth Circuit, 74, 201
Eleventh Circuit, 259
Founh Circuit, 203
Ninth Circuit, 99,223
Second Circuit, 63-64
Seventh Circuit, 156-157
Sixth Circuit, 25
U.S. Constitution, 52, 78,151,242, 253
Fifth Amendment, 66-67, 83-84, 88, 92
First Amendment, 7, 69-71, 84, 86-87, 121-122, 182,224
Fourteenth Amendment, 12
U.S. Court of Claims, 20
U.S. District Court
District of Columbia, 31-32, 57, 69-70, 89, 121
Raleigh-Durham, NC, 236
U.S. Supreme Court, 11, 13-14, 16, 18-20, 22, 29-31, 32, 35, 39, 61, 66, 70-71, 74, 77,
80-83, 88-89, 108-109, 118, 120-121, 123, 153, 156, 158-159, 180, 199, 201-202,
Jackson, Justice Robert H., 64-65
Black, Justice Hugo, 64-65, 87, 89,203
Blackmun, Justice Harry A., 201,259
Brandeis, Justice Louis, 13, 16, 18-19, 22, 34, 36-37
Brennan, Justice William (“Bil)”), 207-208, 238, 253-259
Burger, Chief Justice Warren, 108, 121, 180, 206-207, 227, 242, 254-255
Butler, Justice Pierce, 33-34
Cardozo, Justice Benjamin, 1, 12-22, 31, 34, 37-39, 198,240,255
Clark, Justice Thomas (“Tom”), 123
Conference, 64
Court-packing plan, 16-18, 35, 37
Douglas, Justice William 0., 64, 89
Fortas, Justice Abe, 29, 159, 178-180, 197-198
Frankfurter, Justice Felix, 2, 9, 13, 20, 22-23, 34-36, 64, 65, 81-82, 87, 89-90,
107-109, 122,240,256
Goldberg, Justice Arthur, 89, 197-198
Historical Society, 17
Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell, 85
Hughes, Chief Justice Charles Evans, 14, 19, 37
JLR clerkships at, 33-40
JLR c1erkships at, see also Justice Cardozo, Justice Frankfurter
Kennedy, Justice Anthony (“Tony”), 201-202, 242, 244, 249
Library, 16
Marshall, Justice Thurgood, 238, 258
McReynolds, Justice James, 19, 33-34
Powell, Justice Lewis, 210, 241-242
Reed, Justice Stanley, 123
Rehnquist, Chief Justice William, 210, 238-241, 254-255
Roberts, Justice Owen, 18-19
Scalia, Justice Antonin, 240-241
Souter, Justice David, 253
Stone, Justice Harlan Fiske, 19-21, 34
Sutherland, Justice George, 33-34
Thomas, Justice Clarence, 214,228, 258-259
Van Devanter, Justice Willis, 19, 33-37
Warren, Chief Justice Earl, 70, 86-89
Udall, Sen. Morris (“Mo”), 211, 215-216, 218
Uhllman, Rep. Al, 138-139
United Auto Workers (UAW), 88, 90, 93-94, 97, 109, 111, 126, 145, 185, 188,223
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), 184-185, 187-192, 194, 196,225
United Nations, I 20
University of North Carolina. 236
University of Notre Dame, 99-100
Urban League, 26
Utah, 239
Van Devanter, Justice Willis, 19, 33-37
Veterans Administration, 57-58, 59, 60
Veterans Emergency Housing Program, 50
Vietnam, 153
Vietnam War, 154, 164, 167,180,208, 231-232
Virginia, 128, 153
Voting rights, 78, 81, 150-152, 260
Wald, Judge Patricia (“Pat”), 235-236
Wallace, Gov. George, 217-218
Wallace, Henry (presidential candidate), 27
Wansee, Germany, 6
War Production Board, 41, 61
Warren, Chief Justice Earl: 70, 86-89
Warrick, Robert (rnember-Par1iament), 137
Washington, Judge George T., 121, 124
Washington, Walter (chief commissioner), 154
Washington Star, 236-237
Watergate scandal, 183, 208-210, 227
Watkins, Johu (JLR client), 83
Watson, Marvin (aide-Pres. Johnson), 180
Weaver, Robert (“Bob”) (Secy.-HUD), ISO
Wechsler, James (“Jimmy”) (author), 3, 83, 114
Weinberger, Casper (Secy. of State), 211-212
West Virginia, Ill-112
WHAS (radio station). 40
Wheeler, Edward (“Ed”) (son-Sen. Wheeler), 37-38
Wheeler, Sen. Burton K., 37
White, William S. (author), 80
White House, 27, 53, 56, 129-130, 153, 181-182, 219,244,246
Wilkey, Judge Malcolm Richard, 211,236
Wilkins, Roger (reporter-Star), 236, 237
Wilkins, Roy (NAACP), 26, 79, 152
William, Edward Bennett (“Ed”) (D.C. attorney), 92,190
Williams & Connolly (D.C. law firm), 189-190, 192
Williams, Leon (pres.-Steelworkers union), 25
President Woodrow, 11, 31
Winpsinger, William (“Bill”) (plaintiff), 233,235
Wiretapping, I 06
Wirin, Al (D.C. attorney), 160
Wisconsin, 111, I 62
Wollenberg, Roger (CBS attorney), 177
Women’s National Democratic Club, 244
Women, 129-130, 141,143,260
Woodcock, Leonard (president-DAW), 94
World War I, 2
World War II, 24, 157
Wright, Judge J. Skelly, 121, 158-160, 177-178, 193
Wyatt, Wilson (Dir.-Veterans Emerg. Housing Prog.), 50-51, 200
Wyoming, 78
Yablonski, Chip (son-J. Yablonski), 185, 187-188, 195-196, 197
Yablonski, Jock (union leader), 184-185, 187-190, 192, 195,197,222
Yablonski, Kenneth (“Ken”) (son-J. Yablonski), 185, 187-188
Yarborough, Rep. Ralph, 169
Yard, Molly (NOW), 201-202, 220, 244-245
Yokahama Specie Bank, 157
Young, Andrew (“Andy”) (civil rights activist), 216
Abscam cases, 237
Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 236
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), 212,225, 227-228, 258
Adams v. Weinberger, 212
Airline Stewards & S1ewardesses Ass’n lnt’l v. National Mediation Bd., 294 F.2d 910
(D.C. Cir. 1961), 124
Anderson case, 107
Barenblatt v. U.S., 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957), 87
Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46,238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956), 74
Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireinen v. Graham, 175F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev’d.,
338U.S. 232 (1949), 29, 30, 32
Brown v. Board of Education ofTopekLJ, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 7 4, 81
Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 225-228
Caner v. Caner Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936), 19
Colorado Radio Corp. v. FCC, 118 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1941), 40
Cooperv. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), 80,256
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938), 31
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984), 224
FCC v. Machinists’ Non-partisan Coalition, 234
Firemen & Enginemen cases, 180
Flax case, 38
Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 441 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 184
Gold clause case, 39
Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), 108,212
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 667 (1966), 153
Harvard integration case, 226
Honda v. Clark, 157
Kelsey v. Weinberger, 211,212
Kohler case,68, 120,125, 155-157, 160
Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1952), 57-60
Landis v. NonhAmericon Co., 85 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir.), rev’d, 299 U.S. 248 (1936), 30, 32
local 883, UAWIAFL-C/0 v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962), 129
Maples case, 174, 175
McCarthy v. FCC case, 231
McGovern case, 39
Miller case, 70, I 22
Minersville School Dis t. v. Gobitis, 3!0 U.S. 586 (1940), 20
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), !75
Mooney v. Hollahand case, 11-12
National Right to Work Legal Defense Fund, 221
Neisloss v. Bush, 293 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 196!), 123
NLRB v. Jones & laugh/in Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937), 18-19, 36
Peters case, 108
Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), 239
Poner v. Hener, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1960), 117-118, 119
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), 12
Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 180-181
Quaker Action Group v. Monon, 460 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 180-181
Remington case, 107
Rosenberg case, 229
Schactman v. Dulles,225 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1955), 118
Scottsboro case, see Powell v. Alabama, 12
Shelton v. United States, 280 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1960), 117-118, 121
Social Security case, 36
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), 29-30, 103
Swayze case, 85
Taylor case, 108
Thompson case, 238
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 655 (1992),
United States v. Congress of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106 (1948), 88
United States v. Intemalional Union of United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), 89
Walkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), 70, 82, 84-88
Western Slates Reg’l Council #3 v. International Woodworkers, _F.2d _ (1968) 178
Williams case, 64
Winpsinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cen. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980), 230
Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634, 82
Civil Rights Act of I 964, Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 80, 127, 130-131, 213
Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 211
Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. 90-284, Title vm, 82 Stat. 81 (I 968), I 60- I 61
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (18 U.S.C. § 602), 88
Federal Communications Act (Section 315), 176
Griffin-Landrum Act, see Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
Holding Company Regulation Act, ch. 687, Title I, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 30-31
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Griffin-Landrum Act),
Pub.L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, 185, 187
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 88,209,221
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 499 (1935), IOI, 129,187
Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, Sec. I, 44 Stat. 577 ( 1926), 171
Smith Act of 1940, ch. 439. 54 Stat. 670, 66
Taft-Hartley Act, see Labor Management Relations Act
Title VII, 606 F. Supp. 1082 (1985), 129, 153,236
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 432, 148-152, 242
Wagner-Connery Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 224
Rauh, Joseph L. Jr.
SOURCE: Who Was Who In America, loth Edition; Who’s Who in America, 47th Edition, 46th
Edition; Who’s Who in American Law, 4th Edition; Who’s Who in America, 44th Edition, 45th
LENGTH: 386 words
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * PERSONAL INFORMATION * * * * ” * * * * * * * * * *
Son of Joseph L. and Sara (Weiler) R.; Married to Olie Westhelmer, Sept. 1, 1935; children:
B.- Michael? Carl S.
BIRTH-DATE January 3, 1911
DIED September 3, 1992
ADDRESS Home, Washington, D.?.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * ,i: CAREER INFOR.MATION * * * * * • ·•··• * * * * • * *
OCCUPATION 4230 – lawyer
CAREER Wayne Morse chair U. Oreg., 1989; regents’ lectr. U. Callf.-San Diego, 1990.
POSmONS HELD gen. counsel, Miners for Democracy, 1970-72; .emeritus, 1992-;
gen.counsel, leadership Cont, an Civil Rights, 1940-92; gen. caunsel, UAW, 1963-66;
Washington counsel, UAW, 1951-63,; mem., Rauh & Silard anOsuccessor firms, 1961-87;
mem., Ri:iuh & Levy, Washington, 1947.-61; gen. dep. housing expediter, Vets. Emergency
Housing Prcigram, 1946·47; sir:ice practiced in, Washington; counsel various govt. agys.,
1935-42; Law sec. supreme ct.justices, cardozo and Frankfurter, 1936-39
LAW Civil rights; Federal civil litigation; Labor
* * * * * “‘ * * * * * ” * EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION * * * * * * * * * * • • * *
BS, Harvard U., 1932; LLB, Harvard U., 1935; LHD (hon.), Hebrew Union Coll., 1978; LLD
(hon.), Georgetown U., 1990
• * * * * * * * t< * * * * * * * OTHER INFORMATION * * * * * * * * * * * * * * •
CREATIVE WORK.S Author articles civil rights and liberties.
CIVIC/MILITARY Trustee Antioch Law Sch. and successor D.C. Sch. Law, 1980-; nat. bd. dirs.
NAACP; vice chmn. D.C. Dem. Com., 1952-64, chmn., 1964-67, del. Dem. Nat. Conv., 1948,
52, 60, 64, 80. Lt. col. AUS, 1942-45.
AWARDS Decorated Legion of Mf?rlt, Disting. Service Star P.I.: recloient Civil Riohts award
Am. Jewish Congress, 1963, Florina LaskE!r Civil Liberties award, 1965, Oliver Wendell
Holmes award ACLU, 1967, Isaiah award Am. Jewish Com., 1972, Nat. Cangress Hispanic
Citizens awari:1, 1976,Four freedoms award, 1983, Leadership Conf. Humphrey Civll Rights
award, 1984, Bearer of Light award Union Am. Hebrew Congregations, 1985, Eugene V. Debs
Found. award, 1986, Marshall-Wythe medallion Wllliamand Mary Coll., 1987, Common Cause
award, 1987, Alliance for Justrceaward, 1987, ACLU Medal of liberty, 1987, Antioch Law Sch.
award, 1988, Mass. Sr. Action Council award, 1988. Cln. ACLU award, 1988, LDF award
NAACP, 1989, Am, Assn. for Affirmative Action award, 1990, Pro Bono award NAACPLDF,
1990, Martin Luther King award B’nai B’rith, 1991; fellow Brandeis U., 1969-; hon. fellow U.
Pa. Law Sch., 1970; JohnF. Kennedy Meml. fellow N.Z., 1974.
MEMBERSHIPS Mem. Ams. for Dem. Action (chmn. exec. com. 1947-52, vice chmn. 1952-55,
57, nat. chmn. 1955-57) -BlROBERT
7916 Bressingham Drive
Fairfax Station, Virginia 22039
h: (703) 690-6006
o: (202) 944-2874
YALE LAW SCHOOL, Master of Laws, June 1990.
Graduate Fellow.
Teaching Fellow, with Professor Jerry Mashaw, ttLegislatures, Legislation, and
the Interpretation of Statutes.”
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL SCHOOL OF LAW, Cleveland St. University, 1975-
Editor, Law Review.
Chief Justice, Student Bar Association Court.
President, Phi Alpha Delea Law Fraternity.
GEORGE WASHJNGTON UNNERSITY, Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, 1975.
Student member, University Board of Trustees, 1974-75.
D.C. 2001-
Chief Executive Officer and senior litigator for a law finn engaged in constitutional
litigation throughout the country and providing legal policy analysis and counsel. Current
constitutional challenges, handled by Mr. Peck, include Florida’s 1999 omnibus tort reform
bill (FCANv. Bush (Ra. 2d Cir.), appeal pending) and to North Carolina’s 1996 punitive
damage cap (Rhyne v. Kman (N.C. Ct. App.)). In 2001, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
awarded Mr. Peck and the lawyers in his law firm their Public Justice Achievement Award
during their annual meeting in Montreal. The American Bar Association’s Tort and Insurance
Law Section recognized Mr. Peck during its 2001 Annual Meeting in Chicago with its Pursuit
of Justice award ..
Director of Legal Affairs and Policy Research, 1995-98.
Architect of successful state constitutional litigation program that produced four straight
victories over tort refonn laws Ollinois, Oregon, Indiana, and Ohio). PersonaJly handled the
preparation and argument of State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial lawyers v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062 (Oh. 1999). In addi1ionto participating as a member of the senior management
team for lhe entire association, specific responsibilities include oversight of the association’s
legal affairs and public policy research departments, including its constitutional litigation and
amicus curiae programs, as well as its liaison functions with the Judiciary, American Law
Institute, bar associations and academia. Testifies before Congress on the constitutiollal import
of pending legislation. Serves as media spok-esperson on U.S. Supreme Court cases and other
co nstitutional matters. Chairs research coordinating committee, supervises staff of and
provides academic support for related think tank, Roscoe Pound Institute, and serves as
designated liaison to the American Bar Association and other legal policy organizations.
Teaches state constitmional law seminar at both law schools during alternate semesters.
Washington, D.C. 1991·1995.
Served as national First Amendment Counsel, providing legislative analysis and
lobbying on First Amendment issues and assisting state affiliates in cutting.edge constitutional
litigation. Served as principal spokesperson on First Amendment issues, before Congress,
federal administrative and regulatory agencies, and the news media. Delivered testimony on
pending legislation before congressional committees; drafted new legislation; lobbied members
of Congress and staff; developed cooperating ,coalitions; participated in ACLU national
Supreme Court and appellate litigation, including merit and amicus briefs; advised affiliate
offices on iitigatlon and legislation; chaited ACLU Church•State Task Force; supervised
ACLU volunteers, William Brennan fellow and interns on First Amendment issues.
Co-authored n:onthly column previewing significant upcoming U.S. Supreme Court
arguments in 450,000 circulation magazine of the American Bar Association.
11.J.S. SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL FELLOW, Washington, D.C. 1990·91.
Appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States to conduct research and develop
programs in connection with the work of the comminees of the Judicial Conference of the
United States and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; assisted in developing report
and legis1ative proposal for the Conference’s Ad Hoc Comminee on Asbestos Litigation;
assisted in developing programs for new committees on long-range planning and comparative
judicial systems and .for implementation of the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act.
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE LAW, Chic ago/Washington, D.C. 1982·89.
Created and managed the ABA ‘s project to commemorate the U.S. Constitution’s
bicentennial, including: four•part, prime-time public television series, companion mass-market
book, complementary newspaper series, nationwide series of community-level activities,
scholarly conferences and symposia throughout the United States and in Brazil and the
Philippines (as part of a team of U.S. scholars assisting in drafting new constitutions), and a
wide range of publica1ions. Du1ies included administration, fundraising, creative development,
– 83-
government relations, legal representation and scholarship. Project won White House citation,
and television series won numerous broadcasting and journalism awards. Also supervised all
ABA activities aimed at educating the general pubJic about the law and JegaJ system.
ASSOCIATION, New York, 1978-82.
SuperYised legal staff and initiated federaJ class action litigation on educational policy
issues, as weli-‘as directed JegiSlative and administrative lobbying. Handled major issues
including special education, employment discrimination, educational financing and srudent
EDITOR, MATTIIEW BENDER & CO., New York, 1977-78.
Wrote and edited new supplements for a variety of legal publications covering
procedural and· evidentiary rules and substantive legal topics.
Provided legal research and wrote opinions, memoranda, and case sunuiiaries;
conducted pre-trial conferences.
Washington, D.C. 1972-74.
Wrote speeches, repons on upcoming legislation and responses to. constiruent mail in
three different congressional offices: Rep. Wayne Owens (D-UT)(1974); Rep·. H. John Heinz
Ill (R-PA); and Del. Walter E. Fauntroy (D-DC)(1972-73).
Libraries, Cyberspace and the First Amendment: a practical guide to the legal issues,
ALA Editions (2000).
“School Library Censorship and the Couns: After Hazelwood, ” Intellectual Freedom
Manual, American Library Association Press (1996)(update of earlier work published in
“Religious Liberty,” Human Rights Violations in the United States, Human Rights
Watch/ACLU (1994).
The Bill of Rights and the Politi.cs of Interpretation, West Publishing Co. (1992).
“The Bill of Righ1s,” The Guide to American Law? 1991 Supplement, West
Publishing Co. (1991).
– 84 –
“The Ninth Amendment and the Rights Not Enumerated,” Readings on the Bill of
Rights, First Amendment Congress (1991).
To Govern a Changing Society: Constitutionalism and the Challenge of New
Technology, editor, Smithsonian Institution Press (1990).
We the People: The .Constitution in American Life, companion volume to the PBS
teJev·ision series, Harry N. Abrams, Inc. (1987).
The Blessings of Liberty: Bicentennful Lectures at the National Archives, co-editor
· with Ralph Pollock, and author of “The Constitution and American Values,” ABA Press
Speaking & Writing Truth: Community Forums on the First Amendment, co?author
with Mary Manemann, ABA Press (1985).
Understanding the I.Aw: A Handbook on Educating the Public, principal author and
co-editor with Charles J. White (1983).
“Women and the Law,” The Good Housekeeping Woman’s Almanac, Doubleday/NEA
Children, Medin Violence and the First Amendment, forthcoming.
In Defense of Fundamental Principles: The Unconstitutionality of I:o_rt Reform, _
Seton Hall L. Rev. 101 (2001).
Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 Florida St. L. Rev. 397
(2000)(with Rkhard Marshall and Kenneth D. Kranz).
Free Speech and Political Refonn, 2J Oklahoma City U. L. Rev. 53 (1996).
The ThreQ/ to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1123
Defining American CulJure: a panel discussion, Liberty, Life and Family 196 (Spring
Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Refonn, 8 Admin. L. Rev. 161
Deciding When Speech Isn’t Speech: “Speech Acts” and the First Amendment (Book
Review), 20 NYU Rev. of Law and Soc. Change 667 (1994).
– BS –
Tashjian v. Republican Party: A Conflict between Party Rules and Election Laws1 18
Urb. Law. 1005 (1986)(witb Martin B. Hunter).
Davis v. Bandemer: Political Gerrymandering Challenged on Equal Protection
Grounds, 17 Urb. Law. 945 (1985)(with Andrew P. MilJer, Mark A. Packman, and Kenneth
Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12
Hofstra L. Rev. 893 (1985).
Recent Developments in Election Law, 16 Urb. Law. 765 (1984)(with Barbara
Dollar Democracy: An Analysis of Public Financing of State Politics, 15 Urb. Law.
921 (1983)(with Barbara McDowell).
The Voting Rights Act: Reporl of the N.Y. State Bar Association, N.Y.L.1. (Feb.
I982)(with Michael Brody).
Note, Nuclear Power and Preemption: Opportunities for State Regulation, 27 Cleve.
St. L. Rev. 117 (1978).
nWinning Increased. Punitive Damage Awards after Cooper v. Letterman, n 1’riid
(forthcoming October 2001).
“The Law of Unintended Consequences, n JURIST, Books on Law (Book Review of To
an Unknown God: Religious Freedom on Trial)(July 2001), found at
http: //jurist. Jaw. pitt. edu/lawbooks/ceviews . htm#Peck.
“Defending the American System of Justice,” Trial 18 (Apr. 2001).
“The Cooked Books Behind the nTort Tax,” Trial 18 (Aug. 2000)(with Richard
Marshall and Keilfleth D. Kranz).
“The Trouble with Politicians,” JURJST, Books on Law (Book Review of Reckless
Legislation: How Lawmakers ignore the Constitution)(May 2000), found at
http://j urist. law. pitt .edu/lawbooks/reviews. htm#Peck.
nOhio Tort ‘Reform’ Measure Overturned,” Trial 66 (Nov. 1999).
n An Enigma Wrapped in a Mystery,” JURJST, Books on Law (Book Review of The
Man Who Was Whiezer Whire: A Ponrait of Justice Byron White)(Nov. 1998), found at
– 86 –
http:/ /jurist. law. pitt .edu/Jawbooks/reviews. btm#Peck.
Book Review, Ashes ro Ashes, Trial 84 (May 1998).
“Roundtable on Products Liability Litigation,” Trial 22 (Nov. 1997).
Book ·Review, “Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten our Legal System?,”
Trial 89 (November 1997)(book review).
“Kids Have First Amendment Rights, Too,” American Libraries 64 (Sept. 1997)(with
Ann K. Symons).
“Supreme Court Review: States Win, Juries Lose in Recent Court Tenn,” ·Tn.aJ 18
(Aug. 1996).
“Gerald Gunther: Crusader for the Constitutional Scheme,” California Lawyer (Apr.
“Is Cigarette Advertising Protected by the Constitution?” Priorities magazine (Summer
1993)[reprinted in Scripps•Howard newspapers).
“A Wrenching Reversal [the Flag.Salute Cases]/ Constitution magazine (Winter
“Jurist Before the Bench,” ABA Journal (Feb. 1993).
“Celebrating the Bill of Rights and its Application,” Judges’ Journal (Fall 1991).
“The Foundations of Dissent,” Dialogue (Feb. 1990).
“The Right to be Left Alone,” Human Rights (Fall 1987).
“When tlle Constitution Isn’t Enough,” Student Lawyer (Dec. 1987).
“Statutorx Limits on Campaign Financing: A Boon or a Boondoggle?” Preview of U.S.
Supreme Court Cases (Dec. 21, 1984).
“Can Presidents Pack the Supreme Coun? Changing the Court’s Constitutional
Perspective,” Update on Law•Relaled Education (Spring 1984).
“Is Big Business Big Brother?” Student Lawyer (Dec. 1983)[a1so served as guest editor
for this special issue on George Orwell’s 1984].
“The ‘Betamax’ Case: What Constitutes Fair Use?” Preview of U.S. Supreme Court
Cases (Sep1. 30, 1983).
– 87 –
Numerous television and radio appearances, including ABC WorJd News Tonight, CBS
Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Nightline, Crossfire, Lany King Live, TODAY, Fox
Morning News, Court TV’s Washington Watch, and Legal Notebook.
Scriptwriter, “Criminal Justice in Crisis/ ABA Section on Criminal Justice (1991).
Executive produce!, co-author, and director, “A Journalist’s Guide to Federal Criminal
Procedure, n AHA/Society of Professional Journalists (1989).
Project Director and senior script consultant, “We the People,” Public Broadcasting
Service (1987). Winner of Alexander Hamilton/Ohio State Journalism Award (1988); First
Place, National Headliner Awards (1988); Best Documentary (Western Region), Associated
Press (1988); 1988 CINE Golden Eagle Award; Silver Medal, 1988 International Film &
Television Festival of New York; 1988 White House Citation for Public-Private Partnerships.
American Arts Alliance, First Amendment Counsel (pro bono)(1992-95).
American Bar Assn. (1979- ): Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section: CoChair,
First Amendment Committe_e (1999- )Co-Chair, Equal Access to Justice Committee
(1998-99); Vice Chair (1997-98); Litigation Section: Program Chair, Consumer and Personal
Rights Litigation Committee (1997-99); Torts and Insurance Practice Section: Chair, Appellate
Advocacy Committee (2001-02); Vice Chair and Associate Newsletter Editor, (1998-01);
member, Task Force on Plaintiffs’ Involvement (1998- ); member, Emerging Issues Comm.
(1999- ); Urban, State & Local Government Law Section: Chair, Public Election Law Comm.
(1983-86, 1987-90); Vice Chair (1981-83); Task Force on Federalism (1985-87).
Americans for Religious Liberty: Bd. of Dirs. (1996-2001).
Americans Uni1ed for Separation of Church and State: Nat’l Advisory Council (1992-
Citizens Infonnation Service of Illinois: Bd. of Dirs. (1985-87).
Civil Justice Digest: Editorial Bd. (1995- ).
Ci1izens for Independent Courts: Working Group member (1998-00).
Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution: Consultant (1989-91).
Constitution magazine: Editorial Advisory Bd. (1988-95).
District of·Columbia Bar Assn. (1989- ).
Don Edwards 1996 Bill of Rights Award: National Board of Judges (1996).
Emergency Committee to Pro1ec1 the First Amendment: Legal and legislative adviser
Freedom to Read Foundation: Special Counsel (1997- ); Bd. of Trustees (1985-91, 93-
97); President (1988-90); Vice Presidem (1995-97); Exec. Comm. (1986-90, 95-97).
First Amendmenl Working Group: Legal adviser (1995-99).
Lawyers for Libraries: National Chair (1996- ).
Media Jns1inne: First Amendment Advisory Council (1996- ).
– 88 –
National Center for Science Education: Chair, Legal Advisory Committee (1995-99).
NationaJ Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty: Bd. of Dirs. (1995-97).
National Constitution Center: Bd. ofDirs. (1990-93); Exec. Comm. (1991-93).
National Governors Assn.: Constitutional law advisor (1987-88).
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Oral History Committee,
1992-00; COJ1Jpleted oral history of Joseph Rauh.
U.S. Information Agency: Constitutional Consultant (1985-91, 1993-94); Editor,
“Freedom Papers” (1993-94); American Participant; India (1991); Yugoslavia, West Gennany,
and Spain (1987).
Who’s Who: in American Law (1985- ); among Emerging Leaders (1987- ); in the
East (1989- ); in America (1995-. ); in the World (1996- ).
Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation: Visiting Fellow, various
universities (1993- ): Ripon College (Feb. 2002); Wabash College (Oct. 2000); Ohio Wesleyan
University (Sept. 2000); Pacific University (Oct. 1998); St. Thomas University {Mar. 1998);
Warren Wilson Co1lege (Apr. 1996); Wittenberg Univ. (Jan. 1995); Funnan Univ. (Oct.
1994); Grinnell College (Feb. 1993).
– B9 –
Attachment 1
Oral History Interview of Joseph L Rauh, Jr., published June 21, 1989,
Truman Presidential Museum & Library
• CI •

:Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh ? , Jr. Oral History Interview Page I of38
Meet the president who
proposed Amerlco’s rht
–, ? national heaffh core plan
Oral History Interview with
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
U.S. Anny officer on Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s staff, 194245; officer of the Americans for
Democratic Action
June 21, 1989
Niel M. Johnson
[Notices and Restrictions I Interview Transcript)
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft
of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but on1y minor emendations were made; therefore,
the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written
As an electronic publication of the Truman Library, users should note that features of the original,
hardcopy version of the oral history interview, such a s pagination and indexing, could not be
replicated for this on1ine version of the Rauh transcript.
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of
research. lt may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.
Opened January, 1992
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri
[Top of the Page I Notices and Restrictions I 1nterview Transcript]
Oral History Interview with
Joseph L. Rauh, JR.
Washington D.C.
June 21, 1989
Niel M. Johnson
JOHNSON: J\1r. Rauh, I’m going to start by asking you to tell us where you were born, when you
were born and what your parents’ names were.
hnp:l/www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htrn 9/4/01
:Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 2 of38
RAUH: I was born in Cincinnati, Ohio on January 3, 1911, making me 78 now. My father’s name
was Joseph Rauh; I’m a junior. My father was born in Bamberg, Bavaria, Gennany; he was an
immigrant. My mother’s name was Sarah Weiler. She was born in this country, but her ancestors
came from Germany. We were German Jews; Cincinnati was quite a home for Gennan Jews and
still is.
JOHNSON: That’s where you got your education?
RAUH: Yes. Actually my father was an education nut. He was a small businessman, but he anted to
make enough money to give his kids the best education. Of course, in those days, and maybe it’s
still true, the prestige lay with Harvard, and the happiest thing in my father’s life was that he had
enough money to send both my brother and me to Haivard. So we got the best education possible.
JOHNSON: You had one brother. Did you have any sisters?
RAUH: Yes. My brother’s dead. My sister is alive; she is 87 years old. She’s a pediatrician. She
doesn’t practice anymore, but she was a very wonderful, successful pediatrician in Cincinnati,
setting up her office in the poor districts. She was a liberal, a Truman liberal, all the time.
JOHNSON: So there were three children.
RAUH: Three children.
JOHNSON: And you’re what, the oldest, youngest?
RAUH: I’m the youngest of the three.
JOHNSON: What was your brother’s name?
RAUH: Carl. He went into my father’s business, but the business folded. It was a shirt business and
you couldn’t make apparel in the north after a while because of the southern competition in wages.
So my brother so)d out. He got out of the business rather young, and he died rather young. He was
just 67 when he died.
JOHNSON: Your father’s occupation then was …
RAUH: A small shirt manufacturer. He was a died-in-the-wool Republican who marched in the
1896 gold parade of McKinley in Cincinnati. He was a died-in-the-wool, conservative Republican,
and all three children were Democrats.
JOHNSON: Did he mellow as he got older?
RAUH: Well, the joke in our house always was, and my mother would tell the joke; he would
denounce Roosevelt, and then say to my mother, “Sarah, go upstairs and get that clipping about
Joseph and the New Deal.” I mean he was proud of his kids even ifhe disagreed with them. We had
a happy family.
JOHNSON: What was your major in college?
RAUH: Economics, although I don’t know a damn thing about it. 1 don’t know why I did that.
When I went into college it was before the Depression; I matriculated in 1928, September of ’28.
October of’29 is Black Monday, and that’s when people started worrying and that’s when I went
http://www. trumanlibrary .org/oralhi st/rauh. htm 914101
.1 roman L1ora,y – Josepn L. Kaun, Jr. Ural History Interview Page 3 0138
into law. So I went into law school rather than anything else. There was no room in this little
[family] business for anybody else, so my father said, “Why don’t you go to law school?” I was son
of treading water, going to law school.
JOHNSON: Are you saying now that your father was probably the most important influence on you
in these years?
RAUH: Up to the time I went to college, there’s no question, he was the most important influence.
College and law school changed all that.
JOHNSON: Okay, what influences did you come under there?
RAUH: Well, the most important influence, of course, was Felix Frankfurter. I am what they called
back in the thirties one of the Frankfurter “happy hot dogs.” I don’t think there were terribly many
influences that I had in college. I did fairly well; I was not a bad student. But going to law school,
the chief influence was Felix Frankfurter and that’s how I came here to Washington.
One day in my third year in law school, he stopped me and said, “What are you going to do next
year?” I said, “Well, I’ve been hired by the best Jewish law firm in Cincinnati.” And he said, “Well,
you’re not going there.” I said, “What do you mean, sir?” He said, “Well, you’re going to
Washington. You’d just be silly not to.” And he got me a job; he got me the law clerkship to Justice
[Benjamin) Cardozo, and the law clerkship of himself when he took Cardozo’s spot three years
later. So, yes, that was the greatest influence in my career.
JOHNSON: And Frankfurter was a reformist.
RAUH: He was a reformist. Hugh Johnson, the head of NRA [National Recovery Administration]
hated Frankfurter, but he said–and this wasn’t necessarily right–“He is the single most important
person in Washington after the President.” There’s some truth in that. I mean that’s obviously an
overstatement, but it wasn’t so ridicul ously an overstatement. He was a tremendous figure down
here. Well, there weren’t many people that were closer to Roosevelt than Frankfurter.
So, my father1s belief in the prestige of Harvard and my going to Harvard Law School affected my
life. I mean it changed it completely. I always say ifit wasn’t for Felix Frankfurter, I’d be an
overstuffed corporate lawyer like most everybody else.
JOHNSON: So you came into Washington and became a law cJerk …
RAUH: To Justice Benjamin Cardozo. There are some pictures there, and there [pointing to the
wall]. Then when Cardozo died, Frankfurter got the job. I actually volunteered for law clerk
because it was in the middle of the year that he was appointed to Cardozo’s seat, and it’s hard to get
a law clerk right in the middle of the year, so 1 just volunteered. Of course, Frankfurter took up the
volunteer offer, because he knew me. Also he said, “You’ve got more experience on the Supreme
Coon than I do,” because I’d been there for two years with Cardozo. So I went back for a few
months with Frankfurter, and then I went back into the Government.
JOHNSON: In what year did you start with Cardozo?
RAUH: I came here in ’35 and I would have been Cardozo’s law clerk that year, starting in the fall
of’35, but Cardozo decided for the first time to keep his then-law derk, a fellow named Alan
Stroock. His father was a big Jewish lawyer in New York. Since Alan was staying an extra year,
Felix told me, “You go work for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran for the year while you’re waiting to
be the Jaw clerk to Justice Cardozo.” So I worked for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran; it’s described
a little bit in Joe Lash’s book on Dealers and Dreamers. I worked there for a year. Then in ’36 I
http://www.trurnanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.hun 9/4/0]
:rruman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 4 of38
went to work for Justice Cardozo, and I was there until ’38. Then there were a few months, after
Cardozo died, when there were no appointees. Roosevelt then appointed Frankfurter in December
of’38, and he took the seat in January of’39. I was his law clerk for a few months, and then I went
back to the New Deal and was there until the war.
JOHNSON: Were you involved in drafting any of the arguments, as in 1937, to defend the New
Deal legislation?
RAUH: No. I was working for Cardozo, for example, when he had the Social Security decision to
· write; that was in 1937, but I was working for the Court. not for the outside. Cardozo wrote the
· decision upholding Social Security. There was a big attack on Social Security. There was an attack
on everything the New Deal was doing, but after the Court packing plan, why the Court made quite
a shift.
JOHNSON: Of course, one of those conservative justices retired at a propitious time.
RAUH: Yes, that was in May of 1937.
JOHNSON: Yes, I think they taJk about ’37 as the time of revolution in the Supreme Court.
RAUH: That’s right.
JOHNSON: A.nd Cohen was one of the drafters of the Social Security Act, was he not?
RAUH: Cohen had been drafter of a lot of the legislation: the Securities Act, the Securities and
Exchange Act, the Holding Company Act, the Minimum Wage Act, he drafted all those, and he
helped with some of the others, including Social Security. But as far as the Court packing plan was
concerned, he and Tommy Corcoran were not consulted on the Court packing plan until it went up
to Congress. Then they were consulted and they changed the whole strategy. those two. What
happened was that Roosevelt had this ridiculous strategy that Homer Cummings the Attorney
General had worked out, saying, “The Court’s too old, and they can’t do their work. We’re going to
appoint one new judge for every judge on the bench over 70 who doesn’t resign.”
That was ridiculous because there wasn’t anything wrong with these guys’ brains, what was wrong
was their goddamn views. They were knocking statutes out right and left. Cohen really was the
architect of this, but he and Corcoran always worked together. They said, and they persuaded the
President, that the age of the Justices was not the way to get the packing plan adopted. What you
had to do is just say, “We need minimum wages now. The only way to get them is this way. We
need a maximum hours law now. We’ve got to stop child labor now. We’ve got to have a labor
relations act now.” So the emphasis was on the word”?.” If you wanted to have these things that
people wanted, you had to change the Court. The Court changed and then, of course, interestingly
enough, the Court not only changed but then Roosevelt’s plan got defeated. I think that was divine
inteivention; this was the perfect outcome. The New Deal was saved by the Court changing its
views,, but there’s no precedent for the furure of packing the Court by increasing the numbers. You
may say that Reagan packed the Court, but he packed it by the people he put on; he didn’t add
people. So, I think the result in 1937 was perfect. The New Deal was saved, and Roosevelt’s Court
packing bill was defeated. See my article in the November, I 990, North Carolina Law Review.
JOHNSON: So, it didn’t set a bad precedent.
RAUH: That’s right.
JOHNSON: You know, l think that Truman was critical of that Court packing bill. He was about 98
percent in line with New Deal legislation, but I think he was a critic of that approach too.
http://www.trumanl ibrary .org/oralhist/rauh.htm 914101
:Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 5 of38
RAUH: Burton Wheeler was the leader of the negative approach. I don’t know what Truman’s
relations with Wheeler were.
JOHNSON: Well, he felt favorable towards Wheeler because Wheeler really helped him take a role
in the transportat ion fie]d, you know. Truman’s the one that heJped rewrite the rules on railroads
and made that famous statement about Jesse James being a “piker” in holding up raihoads, in
comparison with holding companies that were “looting” them.
RAUH: Yes.
JOHNSON: So you were a clerk on the Supreme Court to these people; and you were very well
acquainted with New Deal legislation as a result. Then you take up private practice?
RAUH: At the end of’45, the beginning of’46, I did.
JOHNSON: Not until after the war?
RAUH: Not until after the war did I go into private practice.
JOHNSON: Were you with Frankfurter then when the war came?
RAUH: No, I was at the Lend-Lease Administration and the Office for Emergency Management.
Of all the times in the New Deal, that was the most exciting period. You have to rea1iz.e that there
was a lot of anti-Semitism in those days-Pelley’s Silver Shirts, and Father Coughlin’s Social Justice
movement, and all of that. Anti-Semitism resulted in part because many thought the Jews were
trying to get us into the war. I plead guilty. I felt that Hitler was going to try to conquer the world,
and the sooner we prepared for war and got into it, the safer this country would be.
So in 1941 I worked in two agencies. I was the Deputy General Counsel of the Lend-Lease
Administration under a wonderful man named Oscar Cox, whose papers are at Yale. Then I also
was the Deputy General Counsel of the Office for Emergency Management, of which Cox was also
the General Counsel. Wayne Coy was the head of that agency. He was assistant to the President,
running sort of a holding company for all the war preparation agencies.
Here are some things that may be worth recording, not because they are important as recording my
feelings, but I think they happen to be right. In ’40 and ’41 when we were supposed to be preparing
for war against Hitler, and most Americans thought we would ultimately have to fight Hitler, we
did a bad job of preparing for war. Big business didn’t want to prepare for war. Big business was
making so much money with civilian production they didn’t want to talk about it. The auto
companies, for example, made more cars in 1941 than ever before, when they should have been
making airplanes. The interesting thing there, affecting President Truman, was that at that time as a
Senator he was chairman of the committee to oversee war production for Congress.
The committee made a terrible mistake, I think, and I’ve given a talk on this. I gave a lecture on this
at a convocation on the Holocaust at the Harvard Divinity School last year. Here was my point. I
was not here during the Holocaust; I was overseas. When they asked me ifl’d speak, I said, ”No, I
really don’t know that much about the Holocaust. The only thing I have to offer is that in the two
years before Pearl Harbor we didn’t get prepared; we lengthened the Holocaust by the fact that
victory took much longer to achieve than it otherwise would have.”
Well the relevance of Truman to all this, in my judgment, is that they set up this committee for
ov ersight, the so-called Truman Committee; 1 can’t remember its exact name.
hnp://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 914/01
:Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 6of38
JOHNSON: It was the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.
RAUH: That committee, which we can call the Truman Committee, did a good job on the
unimportant things. They did a good job expnsing waste and fraud, but they did nothing about why
the Armed Setvices weren’t getting any guns and planes and tanks. I really made a study of this. I
got every book out of the Georgetown University Library that dealt with the Truman Committee,
and every book shows that the first time they criticized the failure of production was after Pearl
Harbor. The Truman Committee had an opportunity there to have hastened preparation for war and
didn’t do it. When I say the committee dealt with the minor things, I’m not saying it was minor
politically, but to me the important event was getting ready to fight Hitler and to get enough planes
and tanks and trucks and guns and ammunition and all of the rest of the things that go with the
preparation for war, and they didn’t. The Truman Committee didn’t press business for more military
and less civilian production. Truman was not part of the group that was trying to do more about
that. He limited the work of his committee–that is until after Pearl Harbor–he limited the work of
that committee to waste and fraud and things like that.
Well, I’m not saying that those are unimportant. I’m say ing though that compared to the importance
of our getting read y to fight, getting the munitions, I consider them unimportant. That was the …
JOHNSON: Yes, the committee had actually started, I believe, because of reports of fraud and
mismanagement, during the construction of camps like Fort Leonard Wood.
RAUH: Sure , right.
JOHNSON: Truman kind of justified the thing ori ginally on the need to investigate how they were
building these new Ann y camps. training camps, some of the early construction of buildings.
RAUH: What they could do was shown wh en the war finally came, and Truman held hearings on
why Genera1 Electric was still making all of this civilian stuff like refrigerators and all of their other
wonderful civilian thing s when they could have been making war materiel. There was tremendous
conversion to war production once Pearl Harbor happened, but prior to Pearl Harbor, there’s not one
line y ou’ll find in any Truman report or statement criticizing the failure to produce for war. Yet
eve rybody knew that industry wasn’t pr oducing adequately for war.
JOHNSON: So you went with the lend-lease program as soon as it started?
RAUH: Yes, I was there right at the beginning.
JOHNSON: You left Frankfurter?
RAUH: Well , I had had a year in between at the Wage and Hour Division in the Labor Department,
and at the Federal Communications Commission, but my heart was in getting prepared t o fight
Hitler. That’s why I feel so deeply about the Truman Committee; they did one of their two jobs and
they did that one ve ry well. But the other jo? that I think was so important–speeding up production
for war–that was not done at all At least I tried to make sure before I said that at this meeting in
Cambridge, at this convocation on the Holocaust, I tried to make sure 1 had read everything that had
been written on or by the Truman Committee prior to Pearl Harbor. I haven’t read everything since
then. They exposed a lot of inaction after Pearl Harbor, but if they had done more before Pearl
Harbor I think we would have saved a lot of soldiers lives and a lot of Jewish lives.
For example, take something like Walter Reuther’s plan to build 500 planes a day in auto factories.
That plan was floated in the winter of’40. There’s no reference to it anywhere in these books on the
Truman Committee. Now, I don’t want to say I’ve done more than 1 have. I never went through the
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
:rruman Library• Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 7 of38
files of the Truman Committee, so I can’t say that there’s not something in the files somewhere
there, but as far as the books on the subject of the Truman Committee, there’s no reference to the
Reuther Plan.
I would have thought somebody that supervised war preparation would have wanted to see whether
Walter Reuther was right. Ifwe could have made the Reuther Plan work, we could have won the
war sooner and all the American boys’ Jives, and the Jews’ lives, a lot more could have been saved.
So, I’m critical of President Truman in that respect, but I’m not able to say what’s in their files about
why they did and didn’t do what.
JOHNSON: After your work with lend-lease, what did you do?
RAUH: I went in the Anny.
JOHNSON: What month and year was that’?
RAUH: Well, Phil Graham, later the publisher of the Washington Post, and I tried to enlist in the
Air Corps the day after Pearl Harbor. I thought the guy was going to die laughing at the two of us.
I’ll tell you exactly what my motivations were.
We had been trying to get this country into war. We thought we had to go to war ultimately, we had
to stop Hitler ultimately, and the sooner you stopped him, the better. I believed you couldn’t just let
him conquer more and more and more, and then try to beat him. So I felt once war was declared •especially
being Jewish–that I couldn’t possibly not go into the military. It took a while, but by
spring I was on my way to Australia in the Army.
JOHNSON: The spring of’42?
RAUH: By the spring of’42, I was on my way to Australia on a ship. In the war I had different
posts. I had no military training, but there were things you could do that were valuable. The most
important job I had was planning and assisting the military government operation in the
Philippines. You have a military battle plan, and then there are appendices to that battle plan, and
there’s an appendix on supply and an appendix on this, and an appendix on that. Then the last
appendix is on what we called civil affairs, but what they called at the Pentagon, Military
Government. Our final plan for civil affairs was completed in Hollandia just before we shoved off
for the Philippines.
MacArthur wouldn’t take Military Government people from the States. He refused to accept any of
them. You know, the military commander in the area can bar people, and he barred any Military
Government troops. He wanted to do it out of his own people. Since I was a lawyer, the deputy
chief of staff put me in G-1 which was where we had the civil affairs section before we made it into
a G-5. I was to draft how you dealt with Military Government problems. Jeez. maybe I was a good
lawyer. but I didn’t know anything about that.
So, what happened was this. A friend of mine had gotten a trip back home to work on some supply
side problem in the invasion. He brought a book back with him. It was John Hersey’s A Bell/or
Adano, a story of the invasion of Italy. It had al) of the problems in civil affairs. like roads being
clogged by peasants when soldiers wanted to move to the front and so forth. I’ve always said I
helped write the banJe plan on civil affairs for the Leyte invasion out of John Hersey’s A Bell for
Adano. I read it three times; I read it and read it. A marvelous book; it taught you how to do it. So I
was in civil affairs from, say, the summer of’43 until after V-J Day when I left in August of’45.
JOHNSON: What was your rank?
http://www.uurnanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
:Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview
RAUH: I ended up as lieutenant colonel. They offered me the moon to go to Japan, but …
JOHNSON: Were you one of these 90-day commissions when you went in?
RAUH: No, I had a regular lieutenant’s commission when I went in.
JOHNSON: Was this attached to the headquarters, to MacArthur’s headquarters, the civil
. government section?
RAUH: Oh, yes.
JOHNSON: That’s where you met Richard Bolling I suppose.
Page 8 of38
RAUH: Yes, that’s exactly where I met Dick–first at our Hollandia headquarters and then Dick and
I were on the same LST from Hollandia to Leyte; that’s six days at sea, weaving back and forth.
Dick was the adjutant and I was more or less in charge of civil affairs. It was damn nice to have
somebody who could write an order when you needed an order fast. Dick and I weren’t quite
military, you know; we didn1t follow routines too much. Anyway, Dick and I were on the same LST
together, but we never talked politics or ideology. I guess you’re a little scared you’re going to die
on the beach. Even though I wasn’t a shooter, you were on the same beach with the shooting. So we
never talked about anything serious.
That’s 1944. Three years later, in March in Chicago, I bumped into Dick at an ADA organizational
meeting and both ofus exploded at each other, “What the hell are you doing here?” We didn’t know
all we had in common.
JOHNSON: You didn’t talk politics.
RAUH: Not on that LST. I have no recollection of any politics on that LST.
JOHNSON: Did you share any of your feelings about MacArthur, the two of you?
RAUH: I don’t think so. As a matter of fact, both ofus had fared rather well. Dick was the head
adjutant for the invasion. Even though only a Captain, he was the Adjutant on the invasion.
MacArthur got pissed off, I think, with his regular Adjutant General and he wanted somebody else.
Somebody suggested, “Well, that young Bolling is pretty good.” So Dick was the Adjutant there,
and he fared pretty well. I was in genera] charge of Civil Affairs, and that’s a pretty good job, too.
So I don’t know that we were really that hostile to MacArthur at the time.
My wife says that I’ve changed. She says, “Your letters were a lot downer on MacArthur than you
are now.” I said, “Well, I did get home didn’t I?” So, anyway …
JOHNSON: And Bolling was rather critical too of what he saw, especially those around
RAUH: Well, we both felt that, Dick and I.
JOHNSON: Sycophants?
RAUH: Yes, sycophants they were.
JOHNSON: And those were the only ones he’d have around him, rubber stampers?
http://www. trumanli brary .o rg/o ral hist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
. 1 ruman Library – Joseph L. Kaun. Jr. UraJ History Jnterv1ew Page 9 of38
RAUH: I can’t think of anybody that wasn’t a rubber stamper.
JOHNSON: Was [Major General Charles A.] Willoughby then with them?
RAUH: Willoughby was G-2; [Major General Stephen A.] Chamberlain was G-3, that’s for
operations; [Brigadier General] Bonner Fellers, who later was a public right-winger, one of those
Birchers, was G-1. He was my boss, but he gave me pretty much a free hand. And then Courtney
Whitney, who was MacArthur’s speechwriter, took Fellers’ place and was my boss in the Civil
Affairs. Courtney just said, “Keep them out ofmy hair. I don’t care what you do, but keep those
guys away from me.” We were finally in Manila. Courtney had lived in Manila and MacArthur had
lived in Manila, so a lot of these Manila businessmen would demand to see us and say something
like, “I need three trucks to start my business up.” All Whitney would say was, “Goddamn it,
Colonel, get that thing settled. 1 don•, want to be bothered; I’m writing speeches for the General;”
there was, of course, only one general there–MacArthur.
One of the most interesting things for me from that period, historically, I think, happened when my
father died. I had been overseas by tha”t time for more than a year and a half, and I was entitled to a
trip home, to see my wife and children. I got the trip home in December of’43 after my father died.
I was on this plane going to the States and so was Phil Lafollette. You know, you’re sitting there all
night on a plane and going home, and you get kind of emotional and talk to the guy you’re sitting
next to. I also had some booze which we shared. Phil says, “I’ve got something here pretty
important.” I said, “What is it?” He said, “It’s a letter from Genera) MacArthur that I’m to deliver to
Tom Dewey.” I said, “Well, what’s it say?” He said, “Well, I don’t know,” but he said it in a way
that I thought he did know. He said, “I think; I think it asks Dewey what he, MacArthur, could do to
help in the upcoming election.”
You know, it’s funny, that’s what, 45 years ago. I don’t know ifhe read me that. I can’t remember; I
just remember the clear feeling that he was telling me something, or he showed me something. I
can’t remember that. but I do know that he was saying, “I got a letter from the General to next year’s
Presidential candidate. 11 I’ve never seen Phil Lafollette since that night on the plane.
JOHNSON: It seems that MacArthur was sticking his neck out. He is a general under the
Commander-in-Chief and he’s offering to help the future political adversary of his Comrnander-inChief
in the ’44 election.
RAUH: Oh, but he hated Roosevelt with a passion, indeed.
JOHNSON: Did you ever hear him talk about Roosevelt?
RAUH: Oh, I wouldn’t know big stuff like that. I wouldn’t have heard MacArthur talk about
anything important. I would hear Bonner Fellers talk pretty loosely. There wasn’t any question that
he, Bonner Fellers, was interpreting MacArthur’s views, that MacArthur hated Roosevelt. Of
course, there was that big argument, I guess it was in Honolulu, where FDR, [Admiral Chester]
Nimitz and MacArthur met, and Nimitz wanted to go to Fonnosa.
JOHNSON: In fact, I think that was during the convention in ’44.
RAUH: Nimitz wanted to go to Fonnosa. And MacArthur wanted to go to the Philippines, and they
both argued their case in front of Roosevelt.
RAUH: And MacArthur won the battle. The witness was Fellers. I don’t know what the hell
http://www. trumanlibrary .org/oralhistlra uh .htm 9/4/01
:Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 10 of38
MacArthur took Fellers along for, but he did take Fellers along …
JOHNSON: He was there with the President and the General and the Admiral?
RAUH: In that meeting, yes. There was terrible ill-feeling between Washington and MacArthur.
Every time a division went to Europe, to Eisenhower, boy there was grumbling in our headquarters:
“Roosevelt has screwed it up again.” “Why do we want to let the Communists win in Europe and
then we lose in Asia. Why don’t we win in Asia, and to hell with the other side. 11
JOHNSON: But MacArthur did get his way on that one.
RAUH: Yes, he did.
JOHNSON: And he fina1ly did convince Roosevelt that it would be a betrayal of the Philippines if
he didn’t return like be said he was going to.
RAUH: Oh, yes. Oh yes, no question about it, MacArthur won that battle. You should have seen
FelJer’s face when he walked in to report to his staff, in G-1, what had happened there. Boy, you
would have thought that he inherited a million bucks. He was so excited that MacArthur had talked
down Nimitz, and Roosevelt had ruled for MacArthur.
JOHNSON: Roosevelt was on his way to this meeting, when he stopped in Chicago.
RAUH: Is that right?
JOHNSON: During the convention. And they got this letter from him in which he said that either
[William O.] Douglas or Truman would be fine as Vice-Presidential candidates. Apparently,
Truman’s friends included some of the city Bosses, and they influenced Roosevelt.
RAUH: Who was it that was chairman of the party.
JOHNSON: [Robert] Hannegan.
RAUH: I was always told that Hannegan went on that railroad car and got the Jetter with a
reverse draft of that.
JOHNSON: With Truman mentioned first.
RAUH: That’s right.
JOHNSON: And Douglas second.
RAUH: Then Hannegan leaped on that, that the President’s real preference was the first one-Truman.
JOHNSON: Yes, they worked that pretty smoothly. That was a very eventful month, there is no
question about it, with the convention and then the meeting with MacArthur and Nimitz. That
would have been July of’44.
RAUH: The Democrats being in, they had their convention second. The ins always have it second,
because they need less time to work.
http://www. trumanl ibrary .org/oral hist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
:Truman Library-Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 11 of38
JOHNSON: Well, you were released from the Anny when?
RAUH: Early September. I got home on the first of September [I 945 ]. MacArthur had promised
me. You know about the point system? After V .£ Da y in Europe, they set up a point system of
getting out. You could go home, depending on the number of months you were overseas, if you had
a family, a good record. I had enough points coming out of my ears after Europe surrendered, and I
wanted to come home. I put in for my points, and they didn’t want me to go. They wanted me to
finish the job of setting up the civil government there. They gave me MacArthur’s word that they’d
get me home by the first of September which was also my tenth wedding anniversary.
JOHNSON: In ’45, just before the signing of the surrender terms.
RAUH: So I’m getting ready about August to go home, and along comes the [atomic] bomb and the
surrender. My superiors said, “Won’t you come to Japan,” and I said, ”No, everybody has promised
I can go home for staying this extra couple of months.” They took it to MacArthur and he signed
the order, and gave me an “A” Travel Priority, which was the earliest plane you could get. I got
home on the first of September, my tenth anniversary. MacArthur lived up to the promises made to
JOHNSON: You came back here to Washington , D.C.
RAUH: That’s right.
JOHNSON: And to your family. Did you take up where you’d left off, in the Government?
RAUH: No, I didn’t go back. I started to practice law, but within a few months, Wilson Wyatt, the
President’s Housing Expediter, called up and said, “You’ve got to come over here and help run this
place; it’s a mess.” What this place was, was
the …
JOHNSON: Veterans Emergency Housing program?
RAUH: Yes, the Veterans Emergency Housing Program. He says, “The place is a mess and
everybody says you’re a great guy, and we’ll get along fine, and why don’t you come over and run
this thing for me. I can deal with the problems that I have, with the Congress and the
Administration, and all that, and wiH you come over?” Oh, hell, I was still young, see, I was 35, and
I said, “sure.” So I went and worked with Wilson until Wilson got canned, and then I left with him.
The housing program was ve ry difficult. We were past the war. There was no fear of war. There
were only very sma11 areas of controls left from the war. I used to put it , “We’re an island of control
in a sea awash without any co ntrols whatever.” There were some controls. Price controls were still
on, on most things. There was still some controls on supplies , but they were ve ry weak.
So, on the housing thing, we were pretty much alone, and we just had no way of getting housing
built. We weren’t getting the houses, let’s face it. There wasn’t much being bui1t. There weren’t any
nails, there wasn’t any plaster, there wasn’t any anything, because you had to get it all going and we
tried to do it too fast. Hell, there were 15 million new families that you had to get places for. Wyatt
was a dynamo, and he’s a great guy, but the obstacles were overwhelming.
JOHNSON: Did you get involved with the Lustron Corporation?
RAUH: Oh, yes. Sure.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
:Truman Library • Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 12 of38
JOHNSON: And that was going to be a prefab alwninwn type
of home.
RAUH: Oh, boy did I gel involved. I’ll tell you about that. We decided that the veterans housing
program just was n’t going to work unJess something new and drastic was inserted in it. So, what we
tried to do was to get RFC to give 100 percent loans to companies who could really offer something
new•-either on•site mass production or like Lustron, who we thought could offer off•site
: prefabrication out of steel.
Well, several things were going forth at the same time. We were trying to get 100 percent loans
from Jesse Jones at RFC. That was one of the things we wanted. We also needed a factory for
Lustron, and the available factory was the big surplus engine factory, Pratt and Whitney, in
Chicago. A guy named [Preston] TuCker, who wanted to build a rear.engine car, got an option on
Pratt and Whitney. It was an engine place in Chicago; that is my recoJlection now. And Lustron
came in and said, “That’s the perfect factory to build prefabricated housing, the perfect place, and
we want it. 11
There was no need for automobiles, for Christ sake; there were plenty of companies who could
build automobiles, but there was only one company that said they could buiJd prefabricated houses
en mass. Wilson was out of town, so I signed the order taking Pratt & Whitney away from Tucker
and giving it to, I think the man’s name was Strandlund, of Lustron.
Then we Jose the election. All of this happens about the same time; and then we lose the ’46
election. Then, Wyatt wrote a Jetter to Truman saying what had to be done to save the housing
program. We were pretty well admitting we were not building the number of houses that we
needed. And so Wyatt wrote this letter outlining everything that needed to be done. We all worked
on it all night, and the letter was delivered to the White House in the morning. I don’t know the
sonofabitch that leaked that letter, but somebody showed Truman the outlines of that letter in the
Wall Street Journal, and he went through the roof. Wil son got a letter back. I got a call from his
Secretary. “Get in here.” Wilson handed me a letter from Truman. He was ashen. It said something
like, “I do not like to read my mail in the Wall Street Journal.” I can’t quote the exact language but
you probably have it anyway. You’ve probably got that letter.
JOHNSON: You got this letter from Harry Truman, President Truman.
RAUH: Right.
JOHNSON: Complaining about reading this letter in the Wall Street Journal.
RAUH: Reading the letter in the Wall Street Journal. I think it was the Wall Street Journal.
JOHNSON: And that letter concerned …
RAUH: It was our new program; what had to be done if the program was to be saved. Jt had 100
percent loans in it; we had to have the right to cut off sending nails to any place except housing
people. It was really
a …
JOHNSON: Somebody leaked that letter to the …
RAUH: Yes.
http://www. trumanl ibrary .org/oralhist/rauh.htrn 9/4/01
.·1·ruman Library- Joseph L. Kaub. Jr. Ural History Interview Page 13 of38
JOHNSON: And you have no idea who it was?
RAUH: I have no idea. I’m a big leaker, but I didn’t leak that one. I engaged in a lot of leaks
because I believe that the only way you ever get anything done in the Government is to get the
problem out in the open. So, I’m not saying I wouldn’t have leaked it, but I’m saying before I even
thought about leaking it, Goddamn if Truman doesn’t see it in, I think, the Wall Street Journal. At
any rate, from there on it was pretty clear we were going to have to get out.
JOHNSON: And that was not his favorite newspaper, either, of course.
RAUH: I guess that’s right. At any rate, Wilson came into my office one day early in December I
guess, and said, “Joe, we’re going over to the White House.” I said, “What are we going to do over
there?” ”Well, we’re going to negotiate my withdrawal, my resignation.” I said, “What do you
mean?” He said, “Oh, I’d like to give them a nice letter, and get a nice letter back, and so we’re
going over.” 1 said, “Who are you going to deal with?” He said, “Clark Clifford.”
So, we went over and we were seated in some room or other. I’ve been in most of the executive
rooms there. It wasn’t the one the President uses; it was some small room. Clifford and Wilson and
I were the only ones there, and Wilson says to Clifford that he’s ready to resign if that’s what the
President wants. Clifford made clear in that oily fashion of his, that the President wanted Wilson’s
resignation. They were talking about that, and everything was going very reasonably. Wilson was
trying to work out the language, why he’s resigning and so forth; that’s always the hard problem
when you’re really being fired. I hadn’t said boo, but then I said something to Clifford such as, “I
don’t think that’s fair to Wilson,” something concerning what Clifford had written. Clifford said to
me, “I don’t know what you’re doing here anyway.” Boy, I will love Wilson to the day I die for this;
Wilson said, “Clark, I’m packing up, and we’re leaving unless you apologize to Joe.”
Oh, boy, that oiliness went out the window. I got such a fast apology. So I’ll love Wilson until the
day I die for that one.
At any rate, Charlie Ross soon came in. He was then, I guess, the press secretary. He came in and
said, “How’s it going, boys?” I guess the press people were on his ass for news. I think both said,
“It’ll be all right; it will just take a little while.” So, he resigned that afternoon. I resigned the next
day, with a fellow named Norton Long, who was the program director. Long has never been the
same since because he made a crack that was much quoted then: “The greatest disaster in American
history is when Jacobson’s haberdashery went broke.” Long got drunk and went to New York after
he made that crack, and he saw it in the New York Times and in lights on Times Square. It’s got this
thing, that Norton Long said, “The greatest disaster in American history is the Jacobson
haberdashery going broke.” I don’t think Long was ever the same after he saw that. That headline
was on the Times Square building.
I resigned the next day and went on a vacation, but I did get out to see the Strandlund house, and it
was a very interesting thing. I don’t say it was economically feasible, but it was a very interesting
experience. We took some vacation, and then I went back into law practice.
Wilson and I remained great fiiends. I love him; I can’t understand his book, but I love him. He’s a
wonderful guy, but his book is rather strange on the issue of whether we were canned or not. I have
never felt as sure that I was being canned in all my life. You’d have to judge for yourself.
JOHNSON: He wrote his autobiography and it was published?
RAt;H: About 200 pages, very short. But this thing I just couldn’t understand. Anyway, Wilson and
I became great friends.
hnp://www.trwnanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 14 of38
Now, on January 4, 1947, the ADA is fonned. That’s less than a month of our being canned, of Paul
Porter and the OPA going out, and everything happening.
JOHNSON: Did they dissolve that emergency housing, or was he replaced?
RAUH: No. He was replaced and the thing was cut to almost nothing. It was not dissolved, but it
was cut. They pretended like we’re still going to have the program, but it was all cut to nothing.
: JOHNSON: So you went back into private practice. Were you by yourself, here in Washington?
RAUH: Yes.
JOHNSON: Your own office. Did you decide to orient yourself toward certain cases?
RAUH: No, I didn’t. I was just waiting to see what would happen, and many things happened fast.
There was the ADA [Americans for Democratic Action].
JOHNSON: How did you get interested in the ADA? Were you in the UDA [Union for Democratic
RAUH: Well, I was not in the UDA because that was during the war.
JOHNSON: That was [Reinhold] Niebuhr’s and [James] Loeb’s organization.
RAUH: Yes.
JOHNSON: Had you met them, or did you know them before ’44?
RAUH: No. Not before ’46. I met Jim in ’46. Well, Jim sought me out in ’46 to go into the planning
sessions for the ADA, and into the UDA, which was to move over into ADA. Jim sought me out
and we became fast friends. Jim Loeb is one hell of a guy.
JOHNSON: But he knew you were interested in civil liberties, apparently.
RAUH: Well, I was just starting out. My interests weren’t so obvious yet.
JOHNSON: You had worked for Frankfurter, though.
RAUH: Oh, yes, I would be known as a liberal because of Frankfurter. But I guess if you’d take my
interest in the Government. I always felt that the greatest contribution, ifl made any in the·
Government, was in trying to get preparation for war in ’40 and ’41. At any rate, I did start to
practice and we did start the ADA. There was an all day meeting at the Willard Hotel on January 4,
1947, and then two months later there was a two-day meeting at the Washington Hotel, and that’s
when Wilson was elected chairman of the Board of the ADA. All of these things were happening at
once. Truman was at a very conservative, unpopular stage, under the Clifford regime, which was
getting out of price controls, and we’re going to be tough on labor, and he had the strikes you know.
JOHNSON: A record number of strikes in ’46.
RAUH: And they were very tough.
JOHNSON: But he had a fact-finding board to try to work out agreements.
http://www. trumanlibrary .org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
. 1 ruman Library – Joseph L. Ka Uh, Jr. urat History Interview Page 15 of38
RAUH: That’s right. And he threatened to draft the railroad strikers–all of this. There was this
period–and everything’s going forward at the same time. Wyatt’s out, (Paul A.] Porter is out, the
ADA is being fonned, there are strikes and labor is angry; so you get all that in this period.
JOHNSON: Anti-Communism was starting too because of …
RAUH: J don’t know what you would call the dominant motivation of the ADAers in ’46 and ’47. In
’46 we had a steering committee. It was Loeb, Jimmy Wechsler of the New York Post; Arthur
Schlesinger (Jr.], the historian; myself, I guess; and somebody from the AFL, Boris Shiskin. There
was also somebody from the CJO, George Weaver. So that was sort of a steering committee that put
the thing together for the Willard Hotel meeting on the fourth of January and the Washington Hotel
in March or April. That’s how the ADA started. The motivations were clearly two-fold. One was
Truman’s movement towards the conservative side, after the ’46 election, the disaster to the
Democrats there. The other was the effort to separate the Commies from the liberals, and the antiWallace
feeling on our side, and the anti-liberal feeling on the Wallace side.
JOHNSON: You were trying to restore the respectability ofliberaJism after the Republican
victories in ’46?
RAUH: Well, it wasn’t just the Republican victories, although that helped in what we were trying to
do, but we also had a nwnber of the issues there regarding the Communists. There was no question
that in the PCA, Progressive Citizens of America, the Communists had control. Indeed, Wallace
wrote a piece in 1950 flatly stating that he had not realized that the Communists had control of the
group then. That was a real watershed in American liberalism.
JOHNSON: How about the American Veterans Committee? Had you been a member?
RAUH: Yes, I was a member of that.
JOHNSON: As soon as you came back, after you came back here?
RAUH: I have a 1945 card in the AVC. It’s pretty frayed; I’ve kept it in my pocket.
JOHNSON: And that kept you identified with the liberal veterans didn’t it?
RAUH: Yes. And [Charles] Bolte, the chainnan of the AVC, was at the ADA founding. Those
things were going forward in ’46 and ’47, together.
JOHNSON: Did the American Veterans Committee ever have any links to the White House, or any
correspondence with any staff people at the White House? Or any support of any kind?
RAUH: I don’t have any remembrance of it.
JOHNSON: But the White House did give support to ADA, did it not?
RAUH: In other words, there were people in the Administration who were members of ADA.
JOHNSON: David Lloyd, of course.
RA UH: Yes. I’m trying to think of other people who were there. There were people in the
Administration that were in the ADA. I mean, basically, we were pushing from the left on Truman.
We had many disagreements. For example, there was Truman’s loyalty program in 1947. ADA was
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 16 of38
screaming about the loyalty program, and I was working a great deal defending loyalty cases. When
you say, “How did your practice get set up?”, well, your practice gets made for you. That was the
pre-McCarthy period, but you already had all of the loyalty cases. It’s very hard making a living on
that, but I did have a little …
JOHNSON: They gravitated toward your office?
RAUH: Well, probably the most famous loyalty case for that entire period was in my office. It was
WiJliarn Remington. Some people did contribute to the cause, and you could eke out a living.
JOHNSON: Okay, so you were pronouncing a strong anti-Communist position, and at the same
time you were promoting a strong pro-civil liberties position, and I suppose that created some
perception problems.
RAUH: Precisely, or presumptive prOblems. The Communists would say, “You don’t believe in
civil liberties, because you’re against us,” and then we’d say, “Well, we’re not against you, and we’ll
defend your civil liberties to the extreme, but we don’t think we have to have your crowd wreck our
organization for us.”
So there our ADA is started, basically on civil liberties grounds, even though we didn’t want the
Communists in our organization to wreck it. They had pretty close to wrecked the A VC, and we
had the benefit of that experience.
JOHNSON: Civil rights maybe was secondary at this time. In other words, civil liberties comes
first, and then civil rights entered the picture and becomes more common?
RA.UH: Civil rights takes over pretty fast.
JOHNSON: By ’48.
RAUH: By ’48, because by July of’48, when the Democratic Party had its convention, we were
able to win with our minority plank. Now, that story has been told many times.
JOHNSON: Before we get to that, of course, Truman set up Presidential commissions on civil
RAUH: Yes. To Secure These Rights. A fine report. That’s right, and so Truman had a pro-civil
rights aura, from that event of setting up that commission, a very liberal commission, which made a
very liberal report. But, when we came to talking about the party platform, Truman was not for a
strong civil-rights platform.
Incidentally, in his memoirs he says he wrote our civil rights dissent. That can only be called a
monumental mistake of fact. Truman was on the wrong side of that fight. We beat the whole
machinery of that convention in ’48. The Missouri delegation voted unanimously against us; that
was the President’s delegation. The Kentucky delegation of Alben Barkley, the nominee for Vice
President, voted unanimously against it. The Rhode Island delegation of Democratic chairman (J.
Howard] McGrath voted unanimously against us. So Truman’s story is just not correct. Mr. Truman
must have had a blur in his memory.
JOHNSON: Before that, many ADAers had said, “Well, we like your programs for the most part,
but we don’t think you win, and we need a winner.” So they started talking about [Dwight D.]
Eisenhower and [William O.] Douglas.
RAUH: And/or Douglas.
http://www. trumanlibrary .org/oralhist/rauh .htm 9/4/01
. Truman Library -Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 17 of38
JOHNSON: What were you doing at this point? Were you trying to …
RAUH: I wasn’t for any of them. I mean I was against Truman. I don’t think you’re quite accurate
when you say that the ADA was satisfied with the pJatform,
or …
JOHNSON: Let us say, before the convention.
RAUH: Or, I mean was satisfied with Trwnan’s actions, and the only ground for opposition was
that he couldn’t win. There was great dissatisfaction with Truman’s actions. There was the loyaJty
program which was violently opposed. There was no civil rights legislation. I mean he had helped
with To Secure These Rights, but he didn’t do anything to follow up that report. There was a great
feeling that he was wrong on Israel at this particular time. Later, he changed, but at the time of the
ADA convention in February of’48, he was alJ wrong on the Jewish crisis, and you couldn’t get him
to change.
JOHNSON: Was he going for a mandate again, or a trusteeship by the U.N.?
RAUH: All that I remember now, over forty years later, is that he was getting hell from every side.
I know I was against him on Palestine, but I don’t remember exactly what the position was.
JOHNSON: Maybe, at about ?at point he was suggesting a trusteeship under the U.N.
RAUH: Well, whatever it was, what you had then was a great resentment against Truman on the
merits. Also there’s this tremendous change in personnel away from the New Dea] people. Take, for
example, the situation involving [Francis] Biddie. I heard this from Biddle; this is Biddle’s side of
the story: Biddle was the Attorney General when Truman became President. A few weeks or maybe
a month maybe before Roosevelt’s death, BiddJe had told Tom Clark to look for another job. Tom
Clark had some moderately top spot in the Justice Department, but Tom wasn’t so hot, and Biddle
thought he ought to look for another job.
Roosevelt dies, and Tom Clark goes to [Robert] Hannegan and says, “Do you want a pliant Justice
Department?” “Sure, how do I get one?” Clark replies, “Make me Attorney General.” Truman fired
Biddle and made Tom Clark Attorney General. Truman said in his memoirs that BiddJe had
resigned and had recommended Tom Clark. BiddJe wrote a letter to the [Washington, D.C.] Star–1
think it was the Star–saying, “That is an utter fabrication. I didn’t recommend Tom Clark. Mr.
Truman asked for my resignation, which I, of course gave him.” There was a lot of feeling about
this sort of action. Almost all of the Roosevelt New Deal people were out under the new President.
There was a piece in the New York Post, either just before or just after the ADA was founded,
about all the New Deal people who had left the administration.
JOHNSON: [Herny) Morgenthau, of course, was succeeded by [Fred] Vinson, as Secretary of the
Treasury, and then by [John W.] Snyder.
RAUH: There was a lot of that, you know. And so all of this created the Eisenhower and/or
Douglas movement, and I was part of that Eisenhower and/or Douglas movement. I am not the least
bit sorry about it. I think, if Eisenhower had been elected President in 1948, he probably would
have been a liberal President on the Democratic side. But he was a goddamn reactionary on the …
JOHNSON: He didn’t have a record at that point, did he?
RAUH: Yes, the record that we were going on were his speeches, which were very internationalist
hnp://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 18 of38
in substance and tone. In fact, we used to say, 11 Well, it’s all right with us, that the Chicago Tribune
calls Ike ‘FDR in uniform’.” We said, “That’s exactly what we’re looking for.”
At any rate, we did have that position and Paul A. Porter, who was for Truman at this time in 1948-
-he was back being an adviser to the President–said to me, “I’ve got a message for you, Joe.” I said,
“What’s the message.” He says, “It’s from President Truman.” Truman says to tell you that
“Anybody, any shit behind his desk, can get himself renominated and I want the ADA crowd to
know it.” That was the message that Porter gave us. I didn’t hear Truman give Porter that message
for us. And he proved to be right, although in [Lyndon B.J Johnson’s case twenty years later, that
didn’t prove to be right, that anybody behind that desk could get renominated. But there were more
primaries by the time Johnson came in.
JOHNSON: Well, at the convention, I guess by that time the ADA had decided to be more or less
RAUH: Well, by convention time, it was all over. We endorsed Truman. I mean, “what the hell.”
Even dumb liberals like me could see, when it’s hopeless,
and …
JOHNSON: So that kind of patched things up to a large extent, with Truman, your endorsement,
the ADA endorsement?
RAUH: Everybody worked in the campaign for Truman. That was the 1ast campaign where you
could say “lib-Jab” won–Jiberals and labor. That was the last of the lib-lab successes.
JOHNSON: I suppose that’s been a paradox, or a tension, or whatever, in trying to match labor,
labor unions, especially labor union membership, with liberal causes.
RAUH: I think that’s the last time. I gave a lecture on it. I -can send you a copy sometime.
JOHNSON: That was the last time, you say, that you had a,real co!Jaboration between liberals and
RAUH: I think it was the last big lib-labor coJlaboration. Stevenson didn’t arouse the labor people
very much the way Truman had done. Then you get into the ’60s: Meany was for the war in
Vietnam; liberals opposed the war. That [the 1948 election] was a real lib-lab, liberal-labor, victory.
As a matter of fact, the term “l ib-lab” was used over and over again in the ’48 campaign.
JOHNSON: And, of course, fanners contributed to that.
RAUH: Well, sure, but people could treat them as labor.
JOHNSON: And the Black vote wasn’t all that much?
RAUH: Oh, you didn’t have that much of a Black vote. That would have been lib-lab, but you didn’t
have any real big Black vote.
JOHNSON: But you had a switch coming now, in party loyalties by the Blacks that did vote? That
is, they were switching to the Democrats?
RAUH: Well, they shifted rea11y under Roosevelt. But there weren’t so many voting.
h ttp://www . trumanli brary .o rg/o ralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 19 of38
JOHNSON: I notice Niebuhr was skeptical oflke and of his military background, having a military
man possibly.
RAUH: We had a lot of skepticism, and that’s where the Douglas thing came in, “and/or.” Bill
Douglas wanted it–bad. I was on the phone with him from the convention. The call was put in by
Leon Henderson Sunday afternoon, but Leon asked me to sit in with him. I heard that whole
conversation. Douglas still thought he had a chance, but he was wrong. We were there and we knew
it was over. We knew it was over from the time Truman got there. It proved Truman had it under
There is one thing about the convention I want to say. In this book by Hamby [Alonzo L. Hamby,
Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1973.)–J looked at it this morning for a minute …
JOHNSON: I’ve used that for some references too.
RAUH: Hamby says that after Eisenhower and Douglas were out, I went for [Claude] Pepper. That
is an absolute mistake of fact; and he had interviewed me. 1 didn’t remember he had interviewed
me, but I looked in the notes and he said he interviewed me. He said I had been for Pepper at the
convention. That is absolutely a falsehood. 1 agreed with Leon Henderson’s wonderful remark, “I’ve
had two horses shot out from under me and I’m not getting on any red roan.” I mean it was
ridiculous. I don’t know if Pepper ever endorsed Wallace, but he agreed with the Wallace view, and
there was no way any ADAer could have been for Pepper against Trwnan. The story is just not true.
The other person he mentions is Ted Thackrey, and that is true. Thackrey tried to keep going
against Truman. He was editor of the New York Post at the moment, and I believe he made Jimmy
Wechsler write a column for Pepper. The poor guy almost died; be wasn’t for Pepper at all. he was
for Truman.
JOHNSON: It is clear that ADA did have a positive effect in this election, for the Democratic
candidate, for Truman. Do you think the ADA ever had as much influence in subsequent elections
as it had in ’48?
RAUH: I think probably not.
JOHNSON: That was the high point of ADA’s influence on Presidential campaign politics?
RAUH: Things are a little hard to measure, but there was a good deal of influence in 1960. After
Hubert [Humphrey] got trounced by [John F.] Kennedy in ’60, in Wisconsin and then in West
Virginia, the ADA leadership swung to Kennedy. Walter Reuther and I helped swing ADA to
Kennedy. That, I think, may have prevented the Stevenson movement from getting strong enough
not to win, but to block Kennedy and give the nomination to Johnson. You know, the galleries were
packed with Stevenson people; someway or other they got the tickets. I don1t know who the hell’s
brainstorm that was. Letting the tickets out of hand was the way [Wendell] Willkie got nominated
and that’s the way Stevenson had the gallery in 1960; there’s no question about that. But I think the
ADA’s role there really was to block Johnson, and I think that’s what happened.
JOHNSON: You still had [Walter] Reuther and the CIO backing the ADA in ’60?
RAUH: Yes. And what 1 considered the “Stevenson Movement” was really a “Stop Kennedy
Movement.” And Truman was in on stopping Kennedy; he didn’t want Kennedy.
JOHNSON: He wouldn’t go out there; he said the convention was being rigged by the Kennedys.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 914101
.’ Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 20 of38
But he patched it up afterwards with the Kennedy people and party leaders.
RAUH: Oh, yes, he patched it up. But he made a statement one Saturday afternoon before the
Convention, and I remember listening to it on the radio and television. It was a statement against
Kennedy, that he hadn’t been tested enough to be President. I don’t think Truman wanted
Stevenson, for God’s sake, but he didn’t want Kennedy either.
JOHNSON: No. He was supporting [Stuart] Symington in ’60.
RAUH: Symington? But that would require stopping Kennedy, too. I think the ADA pulled the
roots out from under the stop Kennedy movement, and I think if you say, “Where did we have a
real input?’1 I think it was on that. You see, there was a letter from the ADA leadership, liberal
leadership, to Kennedy, that we support you and that really cut into the Stevenson support. I mean
the Stevenson campaign was a dichotomy. It had [Senator A.S. Mike] Monroney and the Johnson
people running it in large part, but it also had some damn good liberal support, I mean true general,
liberal support. But it was a dichotomy and nobody ever thought Stevenson would get the
I think Monroney was running it out of Johnson’s pocket. At any rate, I think the ADA influence
there, to hold the liberals for Kennedy as against Stevenson, not as against Humphrey. The ADA
had endorsed Humphrey; I mean we were all for Humphrey, but he just got slaughtered in the
JOHNSON: In 1948 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. and James Roosevelt were among those who were
promoting Eisenhower for President, and this rea11y irritated Harry Truman. I think Truman says
that when he got to Los AngeJes, in that ’48 campaign, why he just read James Roosevelt the riot
act, that his father would have been ashamed of him for doing this. Did you talk to James Roosevelt
or Franklin, Jr. during that time?
RAUH: Sure, to Franklin Roosevelt, Jr.
JOHNSON: And do you recall some of his comments, or statements about why he was promoting
Eisenhower so strongly?
RAUH: I think it was anti-Truman.
JOHNSON: Because he was really anti-Truman?
RAUH: 1 think so.
JOHNSON: Would you venture an opinion as to why he felt so strongly about that? Didn’t he think
Truman was upholding his father’s programs?
RAUH: I think that’s right. I think that’s true of Mrs. Roosevelt too. Why did the two of them come
on January 4, 1947, to the first ADA meeting? They knew what it was going to be. And what did
Elmer Davis say when he opened the meeting? “This is the New Deal Government in exile.”
JOHNSON: And this loyalty program that you said ADA was very critical about. Wasn’t that in
response to terrific public pressure?
RAUH: Sure.
JOHNSON: In a way, then, could it have been a safety valve to vent some of that pressure which
could have resulted perhaps in something worse? You didn’t see it as a pragmatic response?
http://www.trUmanlibrary.org/oraJhist/rauh.htrn 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 21 of38
RAUH: We didn’t see it that way. Now, if you’re saying this 45 years later, for gosh sake, to think
about that, you’re raising a different point. Would it have been worse if Truman had not done the
loyalty program? That requires some thought. I don’t want to swear one way or the other off-thecuff.
Right then, I thought not. I mean, I thought you had to fight it. The worse thing about it was
his yielding to [J. Edgar] Hoover, because generally Truman was pretty tough on Hoover; but on
this one instance, he yielded to Hoover.
The Loyalty Review Board wanted to let the employee face his accuser, and Hoover said, “I will
not agree to have my infonnants identified where they don’t want to be.” And Truman’s crowd
backed down.
I’m going to get ahead of the story, but I’m going to do that if you’ll let me. Th.is is in Bob
Donovan’s book, because I gave it to.him, but I wouJd like to put it in my oral history now.
One day in ’51 I got a call from Lloyd or Charlie Murphy or someone over there. Truman is living
in Blair House. It was early in the morning and they said, “The President would like to meet with
the leadership of the ADA this evening. Will you roWld it up?” I said, “Sure.” I roWlded up ten
people. There were several labor people. I remember one Al Hayes, of the machinists, and there
were a couple of others. Jim Carey, I think, was there. And there was Biddle and me; we were the
officers then. And there were four or five others. There were ten of us. We were sitting around the
table there in Blair House, and Truman said, “I am considering whether to run again in 1952, and I
want your honest appraisal of the situation.”
We had not been prepared for this, so there was no collaboration. Each ofus gave our individual
views. But the views were quite similar in the statement that we don’t know for sure, but there was
no Republican on the horizon that would get much ADA support. We went aroWld the room to the
different people. Everybody had their say, and since I had arranged the meeting, I was last. I called
on the different people; Biddle was second to last.
My time came, and I went after the loyalty program. I gave him case after case where there were
terrible blunders and Truman didn’t seem to know that the employee couldn’t face his accusers. I
told him of one case where I foWld the accuser by accident. We had called the landlord to testify on
something or other and we didn’t know he was the accuser. We called him as a favorable witness,
and I asked him some question. He made clear that he told the investigator that this guy was a
Communist, my client. I said, “WeH, how did you know he was a Communist.” He said, “Well, it’s
the literature he got.” I said, “Well, did you read it?” “Oh, no. I simply saw the word ‘Communist’
repeated there.” I said, “Well, could it have been statements that were anti-Communist?” And he
said, “Oh yeah, Communist, anti-Communist. This had happened in a hearing under his loyalty
program and I was able to tell this to the President of the United States. I was up to my ass in these
kinds of cases and I gave him two or three of the worst horror stories.
The President turned to Charlie and Dave, who were not at the table, but a few feet behind it at the
end of the room. And he said, “Is Joe right, is this stuff going on? Is it like this?” Dave and CharJie
vowed as how this kind of stuff was going on. And Truman said, “We’ve got to do something about
that. Damn it, we’re going to do something about that. 11
Three weeks later, Truman tightened the screws on the program. To me, that is, of all things of the
Truman days, that I find incomprehensible, that is to me the most incomprehensible. The tightening
of the screw as I remember it, that occurred a few weeks after the meeting with Truman, was an
Executive Order. I think it changed the finding of reasonable grounds that the employee? disloyal
to reasonable grounds that he may be disloyal. That was the tightening of the screw if] remember
correctly. Never, to this day, can I tell you what happened inside the White House. You may know.
JOHNSON: Well, yes. It involved the review board, and there was a hardliner that changed the
http ://www. trumanli brary .org/oralhist/rauh .htrn 9/4/01
. Truman Library – Joseph L. Kauh, Jr. Ural History interview Page 22 of38
RAUH: From reason to believe he? to reason to believe he may be. I was going around town
telling everybody that the President really had his mind set against this type of thing, this kind of an
unfair program and we’re going to see something better. And the next thing I read is the news story,
“President Tightens Loyalty Program. 11 I couldn’t believe it; but I read the story, and it was
absolutely true. I called Dave Lloyd, and Dave knew nothing about it.
JOHNSON: I wonder if that slipped around them somehow.
RAUH: Yes. Dave didn’t know about it. Now, whether Charlie knew, I can’t say. I didn’t talk to
Charlie. I talked to Dave and he did not know about it. That is in Donovan’s book, that story I just
told you. I told it to Bob.
JOHN-SON: Yes, it does seem a little out of character.
RAUH: I mean, how much does the President understand. Did he realize that he had said to this
group that he was going one general direction and that signing that Executive Order was going the
other direction? Did he realize that, do you think?
JOHNSON: I’m trying to recall what he had to say on that, but yes, it does seem somewhat out of
Andrew Biemil1er, apparently, was a labor official and Congressman from Wisconsin.
RAUH: Yes, and he also was in the ADA. He would win his race for Congress one time and then
lose the next time and work with ADA.
JOHNSON: He claims he broke with ADA when some of their people promoted Eisenhower.
RAUH: No, he stayed at ADA; that’s not correct.
JOHNSON: He made this claim in an interview the Truman Library did with him in 1977. [oral
history interview iwth Andrew J. Biemiller, July 29, 1977, p.75, Harry S. Truman Library]
RAUH: No. He worked on the political side of ADA after 1948.
RAUH: Look, even though the majority of the ADAers were for Eisenhower and/or Douglas, the
majority wilJ tell you they weren’t. You’ll get as many views as you want on that, Niel.
I got ahead of the story, but I’ll tell you when we were working the closest with the Truman
administration; that was on the Marshall Plan. The ADA was very much for the Marshall Plan and
we were working on it all the time, providing speakers and material on the Marshall Plan. In some
respects there was a close relationship with Truman, and in some, there was not.
JOHNSON: Well, maybe we can get back to that civil rights issue in 1948 at the convention
because that is one of the big issues and interesting events of that whole period.
On the civil rights question, James Loeb in an interview that we have comments about a meeting of
the ADA board in March J 948 in which the decision was made to campaign for a strong civil rights
plank on the Democratic party’s platform. Among those involved in this decision, that he identifies,
http://W\V\v.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
. Truman Library. Josepn L. K.a.W1, Jr. vra1 .t11story 1merv1ew rage L:, 01 .,o
is Edward Prichard. Do you recall anything about that, about Prichard’s role? [oral history interview
with James Loeb, June 26, 1970, pp.28-30, Harry S. Truman Library]
RAUH: I do not. Prich was a brilliant strategist until he put those goddamn crooked ballots in the
box in November 1948, one of the dumbest things that ever was done. I love Prich; he was one of
my best friends. My recollection is that the 1948 civil rights fight sort of evolved out of the failure
of the Presidential fight. We had gone out to get a lot of delegates and there wasn’t going to be
much to do. I had the feeling that the only fight we were going to have at the Convention was over
the platfonn as it got clearer and clearer Truman was going to be renominated. As the opposition to
Truman went down, the desire for some action in the civil rights field went up. That’s really when it
started. Then you had this letter from Jimmy Roosevelt, Hubert Humphrey, and Mayor [William]
O’Dwyer to all of the delegates, saying that we’re going to make the fight on the civil rights plank.
JOHNSON: Well, let me say, too, that Jim Loeb mentions Eugenie Moore Anderson and yourself,
as well as Milton Stuart, providing important support. Eugenie Anderson, he says, had the “genius
of putting in that minority plank, [the statement] ‘We support President Truman’s civil rights
program,’ in so many words …. ” [Loeb interview, p.36]
RAUH: That’s right.
JOHNSON: So that’s your recollection, too? By the way, Eugenie Anderson became the first
woman ambassador in American history.
RAUH: Well, she was the first woman minister and then the first woman Ambassador.
JOHNSON: She was Ambassador to Denmark [1949-1953].
RAUH: Yes. We11, anyway, I had written the plank.
JOHNSON: You wrote the plank?
RAUH: Yes, but you see, our plank was developed over several days because we were fighting to
get something into the Platfonn Committee’s report to the Convention.
JOHNSON: You were on the Platform Committee?
RAUH: No, I was outside, but Hubert kept coming out to confer.
JOHNSON: Okay, so you were feeding Hubert.
RAUH: Oh, yes. But the point I want to make was that Hubert, between about 4 and 5 in the
morning, was shaky on whether he was going forward. The ADA had had a meeting that might in
their rented fraternity house near the convention center and decided to go forward, but we didn’t
have a decision from Hubert. The final decision was with Hubert. The ADA was pushing him to go
forward, but he was really shaky because of pressure coming in from the Truman regulars not to
take the issue to the floor. Dave Niles, Truman’s civil rights advisor, was pressuring him
JOHNSON: He was an ADA man, was he, Dave Niles?
RAUH: I can’t swear he was a member.
JOHNSON: Philleo Nash; was Nash another one?
http://www.trumanlibrary .orgioral hist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
.· Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 24 of38
RAUH: I can’t swear who had an ADA card, you know, an ADA card in their pocket. But Dave
Niles was telling people to call Hubert and tell him not to do it. The genius of Eugenie An derson
was to offset Administration opposition to our minority plank. She said, “Well, Jet’s add a sentence
saying, ‘We commend President Truman for the report of his Commission on CiviJ Rights,”‘ or
words to that effect. That was put into plank and Hubert said, “I’ll do it.” So, there is no question
about Eugenie’s tremendous contribution to that fight.
JOHNSON: I think ADA was saying too, wasn’t it, that we’re trying to get Truman to live up to his
, statements that he’s made in the past in regard to anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, pro-voting rights, and
· pro-FEPC [Fair Employment Practices Committee]?
RAUH: We were saying that in public. But you know what we were saying on the floor? And do
you know who bought it? We were saying on the floor, “Goddamn it, if you want to beat Henry
Wallace, you sure better go for our plank.” And who did we get with that argument? Jake Arvey,
Ed Flynn, David Lawrence, and what’s that guy’s name in Philadelphia? Green? Anyway, all of the
big Democratic bosses. Strange bedfellows: ADA and all the bosses. What people generally forget
about the ’48 fight is that Truman could not control the bosses on the civil rights issue. They took
our side ofit and the argument that got them was sort of, “Well, maybe we will lose this election,
but we don’t want to lose the whole ticket. If we want Blacks to support the ticket, we better adopt
this minority plank.” They bought that argument hook, line and sinker, and that was more important
than all the goddamn rhetoric used on the floor.
JOHNSON: So what role did you play in the campaign, then?
RAUH: Oh, we went out and talked, wrote speeches, argued–tried to get organizations to support
JOHNSON: So you went all out for Truman in ’48?
RAUH: Yes. I can’t remember if there was any particular fight about what we should do for
Truman. Christ, who could be for Dewey? I don’t remember any argument about what we were
going to do for Truman. We endorsed him right there at the Democratic Convention–not happily,
but then once he had the nomination, he made a good speech that night, his acceptance speech.
JOHNSON: Were you there, then, about two or three in the morning when he finally got to give his
acceptance speech?
RAUH: No, what happened was that we were up all the night before, and we won the platfonn fight
in late afternoon. We had to talk to reporters until oh, late in the evening. And then we sat around
the fraternity house and watched the floor action on TV. I never went back to the Convention. I
couldn’t stand up, I had been on my feet for so long.
JOHNSON: But he was on TV then?
RAUH: Oh he was on TV. Yes, and we watched it from the fraternity house.
JOHNSON: When did you first meet President Truman?
RAUH: I may have met him someplace else, but the first time I ever talked to him was in earl y
1942, when he had his first hearing on why the country hadn’t converted to war production. This
was his committee’s first hearing on conversion despite our complaints of the year before prodding
business for more war preparations. It was in connection with those hearings that 1 first spoke to
Senator Truman. There was a guy whose name I’m having trouble remembering who worked for
http://www. trumanl ibrary. org/oral hist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
– Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 25 of 38
General Electric and the Committee had him come and tell about his efforts to get conversion to
war production which didn’t work.
JOHNSON: Way back in ’42?
RAUH: Oh, yes.
JOHNSON: How about after the war? When did you first meet him again then after the war?
RAUH: I’m trying to recollect if there was any meeting before Wilson and I saw him on the
housing program one day.
JOHNSON: Well, when you went over there for that resignation ..
RAUH: No, I didn’t see him then. I can’t swear where it was; it may not have even been in the
White House, it may have been that he was somewhere else and we got a chance to talk to him
about the housing program.
JOHNSON: But he was acquainted with you and your background, by the time of the ’48
RAUH: Well, I think he would have had reports. I had made an awful lot of pub1ic statements about
the loyalty program. Now, if Truman thought he was cutting off worse deprivations of civil
freedom by his loyalty program, well, he may have thought so. I can’t challenge that position; it’s a
possibiJity. But I brought several law cases trying to knock out the principle that you could be
found disloya1 without facing your accusers.
JOHNSON: In other words, hearsay evidence could get …
RAUH: Well, what could be more hearsay than an FBI report that says, “Confidential Informant
TX says, quote.” You know. oh, boy.
JOHNSON: Steven Gillon in his book Politics and Vision [New York: Oxford University Press,
1987] says you argued for flexibility in regard to whether ADA should work within or outside the
Democratic party. Trying to obtain or retain labor support was one big problem you had to work
with, and another was what kind of relationship, or connections, you should have with the
Democratic Party itself. What was your position? Would you care to describe your position?
RAUH: My feeling always was that we had to have both working relations with the Party and
independence from the Party. By independence from the Party, we meant the freedom to criticize
when we thought they were wrong, and even to back somebody else when the Democrats put forth
a bad candidate. There weren’t too many non-Democrats you could find to back, but there were a
few Senators that you could find, such as Cliff [Clifford] Case and Jack [Jacob] Javits. I mean there
are a few but not too many outside the Democrats.
JOHNSON: Gillon says, “You remained faithful to this view but the organization did not.” I
wonder what he means by that?
RAUH: Well, I’ll tell you what my present view of the organization is. It is too much tied to both
the labor movement and the Democratic Party. It’s reluctant to criticize either the Democratic Party
or the labor movement where a Jot of money comes from. So my feeling is that now, 40 odd years
after ADA was founded, it’s awful hard for a general liberal organization not to build up a lot of
resentments and so forth. I’m not sure ADA wouldn’t do better starting a new liberal organization
from scratch, but at 78 I’m not capable of starting one.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page26 of38
JOHNSON: Is it blle that the word “liberal” has been corrupted by modem political campaigns?
RAUH: No, I don’t think so. Well, they try to make “liberal” a dirty word, but I don’t think it has
worked. I think [Michael] Dukakis played right into their hands when he denied he was a liberal.
He should have said, “I’m a liberal and proud ofit.”
JOHNSON: And not let the other party define liberal for him?
RAUH: That’s right. Why didn’t he define it?
JOHNSON: That’s what I mean.
RAUH: He Jet the other party define.it. I think he should have said I’m proud of it, and said what it
was. I think what we have to do is make clear we’re the only idealistic party. How can it be
idealistic to help the rich get richer? We’ve got a built-in idealism–to help those who’ve got too
little. We get the idealistic side of politics without even having to try. Why we blow it is beyond
me. I don’t know.
Take Truman as an example. He was at his lowest ebb in 1946 and ’47 when he was most
conservative. When he won in 1948 it was “look out for your neighbor,” and it was a real lib-lab
campaign that he put on. You never had better proof that the Democratic Party thrives on liberalism
than you had in Truman’s 1948 campaign. Also, a Democratic President goes down when he takes
the conservative side, as Truman was doing in ’46 and ’47, and early ’48. It’s when he shifted his
position that he won out. There is a debate, I gather, whether [James] Rowe wrote the memorandum
or [Clark] Clifford wrote it proposing the shift for the ’48 campaign.
JOHNSON: Strategy, yes.
RAUH: I don’t care. It was a goddamn good memorandum whoever wrote it.
JOHNSON: I think Clifford’s given credit for it, but James Rowe wrote the original draft.
RAUH: A professor at the University of California in San Diego told me that he had been through
the papers and it looked to him like Rowe had written the memorandum and given it to Clifford and
Clifford had given it to Truman as his own.
JOHNSON: Yes, I think Rowe was the originator really, but it was edited or changed at least
RAUH: Clifford defended having given it to Mr. Truman as his own, that the reason that he did that
was that if you told Truman it was written by Rowe, Tommy Corcoran’s partner, Truman wouldn’t
have paid any attention to it. I don’t know whether that’s true or not.
Oh, that reminds me of one thing that I wanted to mention. Why did Truman allow Hoover to tap
the wire of Tommy Corcoran?
JOHNSON: That’s a good question, and I should ask you that. Do you know anything about the
wiretapping of Corcoran by the FBI? We don’t know really the background for it. This is something
we would like to know.
RAUH: The first I ever heard of the tapping was when two guys came to see me, or called me, I
can’t remember which. They said that they had been out at the Truman Library and had asked what
http://www. trumanlibrary .org/oral hist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 27 of38
a stack of papers in a corridor was, and one of the staff said, “It’s not important; they are taps on
Tom Corcoran.” They went through them, and the reason they were calling me was they asked ifl
objected to their using one tap that’s about me. There’s one about me in 1946 I think. A
conversation was tapped between Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran, and Tom is criticizing me for
trying to run the ADA and be a lawyer at the same time. He said something like “You’ve got to
represent the interests if you’re going to be a successful lawyer in Washington.” And Ben is
defending me, and they have this wonderful conversation about being a lawyer. Tom says, “It’s
impossible to be a liberal and do what Joe’s trying to do here. He’s trying to do good for the ADA
and practice Jaw; you can’t do it, the law’s all negative.” He’s mad because he got me a client or
something, and I went to an ADA meeting instead of taJcing care of it, or something like that.
Anyway, I’ve read that tap and enjoyed it.
JOHNSON: Do they imply that Truman had authorized the FBI to do the tapping?
RAUH: Oh, yes. And they implied that Hoover was trying to ingratiate himself with Truman, and
thought that Truman probably didn’t care much for Tommy. [See Kai Bird and Max Holland, “The
Tapping of’Tommy the Cork,”‘ The Nation, February 8, 1986, pp. 129, 142-145. Also see “Tommy
the Cork: The Secret World of Washington’s First Modem Lobbyist,” The Washington Monthly,
February 1987, pp. 41–49.]
JOHNSON: He apparently was lobbying for the United Fruit Company and other special interests.
RAUH: Yes, that’s right.
JOHNSON: And there was some concern about what he might be telling his clients how he might
be trying to influence officials in the Government.
RAUH: Yes, that’s right. Well, also, wasn’t Truman a little concerned that the old Roosevelt people
really didn’t want him, and might start a counter-movement? There was a counter-movement but it
didn’t result from what these two guys who originally broke the story uncovered. Actually, I think
they were out there writing a book on John McCloy.
JOHNSON: Yes, I remember them being there, and I know they aroused some controversy with
these transcripts. But we still do not really have information, solid information, about how and why
that was started. There is nothing in our files at the Library that reveals clearly how it started.
RAUH: WeH, they must have surmised something. In the Nation article about this, they say that
Truman started it.
JOHNSON: We don’t have records how it started, so if you find anything out, let us know.
RAUH: I will indeed. These two are the only people I’ve ever talked to about it. Ben and Torn were
dead when I heard about it.
JOHNSON: WeJI, J. Edgar [Hoover], of course, is no longer around, and Corcoran’s not. Of course,
I don’t know when he found out about it.
RAUH: I understand he was informed of the wiretaps, but that he died before he had a chance to
read the transcripts.
JOHNSON: Yes, that’s one of those strange episodes.
In March 1950 from Key West, Truman wrote to [Hubert] Humphrey, saying, “I’m glad as always
to send my greetings to the National Convention of Americans for Democratic Action. I’m sorry
http://www. trumanl i brary. org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 28 of38
that my schedule prevents my being with you in person to talk over our mutual interest.” Was it
common at these national conventions for a letter from Truman to be read praising ADA?
RAUH: It was, whenever we had a Democratic President, up until the Carter days. Whenever we
had a Democratic President. I don’t think we very often got something from the Republicans.
JOHNSON: Okay, but Truman was using the word “liberal” without any fear?
RAUH: Oh, yes, he always did. I don’t think that word bothered him one bit.
JOHNSON: Because he said here in this last paragraph, “Your meeting will show that the forces of
liberalism would be martiaJed in full strength. This 1950 campaign may well be one of the most
crucial tests of liberalism in this century.”
RAUH: Oh, I think Truman never had any trouble with that word. I never had the slightest thought
that he did.
JOHNSON: Well, unfortunately for Truman, Democratic seats were lost in 1950. Democrats did
Jose seats. It was an off-year election.
RAUH: [William] Benton lost in a victory for Joe McCarthy.
JOHNSON: The Korean war had started by this time. Yes, I think that’s when Biemiller was
defeated, and Millard Tydings, I believe, was defeated. McCarthyism was in the air.
RAUH: Biemiller came back to the ADA in ’50.
JOHNSON: Yes. There are quite a few glittering generalities in that statement, but it certainly is
clear that Truman did not back off from liberalism.
RAUH: No, you are right on that.
JOHNSON: Well, that 1950 election, as I say, did result in some losses of Democratic seats, but
they still retain control. But then you have the conservative Democrats always, you know, in that
equation, from the South.
RAUH: Sure, that’s why you couldn’t get any civil rights legislation through.
JOHNSON: So ADA certainly must have been disappointed in the election.
RAUH: Oh, yes.
JOHNSON: And through this period, 1947 to 1952, civil rights and civil liberties remained, of
course, major issues. The loyalty program, the presidential commissions, desegregation of the
Anned Forces did start. Desegregation was accelerated apparently during the Korean war.
RAUH: Oh, and you got the Executive Order by Truman on the Anned Forces. [EO 9981, July 26,
1948, established the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Oppornmity in the
Anned Forces.]
RAUH: I’ve never been sure why Truman did want to beat us on civil rights at the ’48 convention. I
http://www. trumanlibrary .org/oral hist/rauh. bun 914101
. Truman Library – Josepn L. Kaun, Jr. UraJ History Interview .rage 2′:J ot JIS
have never quite figured that out. We won, and we won because we were right politically and it did
help him; and Wallace didn’t get any Black votes at all.
JOHNSON: It’s a little ironic. I think they were lifting that so-called soft plank from the ’44
Democratic platform.
RAUH: Sure. Oh, absolutely. You didn’t have a civil rights movement during the war.
JOHNSON: And of course, the Roosevelt New Dealers had to recognize the fact that Roosevelt had
not done as much as Truman up to this point.
RAUH: No question about it.
JOHNSON: It is said that ADA generalJy favored Truman’s approach to the loya1ty issue, but you
were critical of the Smith Act.
RAUH: Well, ADA was against disloyal people being in high positions, but that’s just loose talk.
Of course, you’re against that. But the question is how are you going to ensure that? And the ADA
violently opposed the idea that you couldn’t face your accuser. I had a majority of the ADA on that;
don’t let anybody tell you otherwise.
JOHNSON: So that was the crux, right there.
RAUH: That’s really what it was all about. You wouldn’t want a guy in on atomic bomb secrets and
have doubts about his loyalty. What are you going to do? Are you going to say he’s disloyal without
ever his knowing who said he was disloyaJ or what facts he had to base that on?
JOHNSON: Now, you were critical of the Smith Act, under ·which the Communist leaders were
RAUH: I wrote an article in the New Leader attacking the Smith Act.
JOHNSON: You bad a statement ready to praise the reversal of the conviction of the Communist
leaders, if that would happen. You had a statement ready, but a poll of the chapters caused you to
change your mind.
RAUH: My mind didn’t change; I just lost the vote. I didn’t change my mind. The Smith Act was
wrong. ActuaJly, we ultimately pretty much prevailed. In the Yates case, the Smith Act was really
JOHNSON: Okay, the ADA remained consistent in chaUenging the constitutionality of the Smith
RAUH: They did.
JOHNSON: 1s it correct that the ADA was defending the advocacy of ideas versus advocacy of
violent overthrow of the Government? 1n other words, the Smith Act made it criminal to advocate
the violent overthrow of the Government.
RAUH: My view is that you may advocate anything you want, as long as you’re not making clear
and present advocacy of violence. I wouldn’t want to say you had a right to shout “fire” in a theater
if there was a clear and present danger of violence. But my God, the Communists, they had nothing
there. Where the Communists were a danger was on espionage or sabotage. Their goddamn
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 30 of 38
performance over here–they couldn’t overthrow yow Aunt Tillie. They were wreckers, not doers.
JOHNSON: So it had to be more or less an overt act?
RAUH: It had to be the way [Wendell] Holmes always put it, that you can’t advocate the overthrow
of the Government by violent actions, when that advocacy would bring a clear and present danger
of that violence.
JOHNSON: Did the Korean war, which was not legally a war, but in fact was a war, create a
situation in which the “clear and present danger” doctrine could be applied, whereas later, after the
· war, wasn’t it in ’54 that the Supreme Court did declare W1constitutional certain portions of the
Smith Act?
RAUH: In ’57. Well, I think the real change wasn’t the Korean war, as much as the composition of
the Court wider Warren and Brennan.
JOHNSON: Okay, when the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the Communist party leaders
under the clear and present danger doctrine, you and James Wexler prepared a statement criticizing
the decision for making free speech into “a political football.” But the majority on the board,
including Schlesinger and Biddle, felt that was too harsh. It sounds like maybe the majority on the
board of ADA was being very cautious and rather conservative on this issue and you were more
toward the liberal side on this. Were you in the minority position then on that?
RAUH: It’s hard to remember exactly. But ifl had to try to put it now in some context, I would say
something like this:] think everybody, or almost everybody in the ADA–a great majority at least-favored
repealing the Smith Act. But the degree to which, when you have the Act on the books, the
ADA should be the one to say you shouldn’t prosecute Communists under the Act is another matter.
I think these people didn’t want the Act, but they also didn’t want to bear all the burden of public
obloquy like the Communists did. If you could get rid of the Smith Act, then you didn’t have that
problem. In other words, the ADA was against the Smith Act, but it wasn’t prepared to put all its
po]itical marbles in that basket.
One of the reasons. I think, was that I got terrible hell for what I said right after the conviction of
the Dennis crowd, the first group of Communist leaders tried. What I said was that [Judge Harold]
Medina was wrong in not giving them bail. You don’t repeal the Constitution because there are
some communists here. But my statement was very, very ill received. People just felt it was proCommunist
JOHNSON: Felt they didn’t deserve bail. The majority of the Americans felt they should put them
in jail and throw away the key?
RAUH: Right. I think that probably was true. Many of the political leaders of the ADA, or people
in Congress like Hubert Humphrey and others, didn’t like the idea that the ADA was talking about
you giving bail to convicted Communists.
JOHNSON: On the other hand, here was Acheson saying that he would not tum his back on Alger
Hiss, and then Truman getting all that flak because of the “red herring” remark in a press
RAUH: Sure you had a great deal of that. 1 think almost all ADAers were against the Smith Act,
but they just realized there was an awful lot of heat there, politically. This was the McCarthy
period. By ’57, when Warren’s in charge and with some of the ugliness of the Communist feeling
having been drained a little bit, you get an end to the situation. Indeed, by a few years after ’57 there
weren’t any Communists in jail under the Smith Act.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 31 of38
JOHNSON: You had a kind of a restoration of a traditional view of civil liberties, the rights of free
speech, first amendment rights?
RAUH: Right. There was a good free speech case today; we won 5 to 4. The Court overruled a
conviction for flag desecration.
JOHNSON: Yes, I saw that on TV.
This kind of raised the problem again with the labor unions. Labor union members had this kind of
gut feeling about Communists by this time, didn’t they? You were having a problem, I imagine,
with the labor union membership if you were perceived as a little soft on Communism, even though
you ..
RAUH: Well, there was no doubt that we were perceived as soft on Communism.
JOHNSON: By labor union members.
RAUH: By some labor union members, but I don’t know that there was much of the union
leadership that believed that. Walter Reuther for example-.I was UAW general counsel and
Washington counsel for many years and Reuther always let me vnite UA W’s civil liberties
JOHNSON: Well, was he the exception rather than the ru1e? You had the teamsters, for instance.
RAUH: I don’t know how much they knew about these matters. Jim Carey ofl.U.E. was a civil
libertarian, and Walter was, and there were others.
JOHNSON: Were David Dubinsky and Reuther the most consistent labor leaders who were
supporters of ADA on these matters?
RAUH: Yes. They disagreed on foreign policy. Dubinsky was very conservative on foreign policy,
but he let us have our head. Dubinsky was a great man, I always thought. He never tried to throw
his weight around, or his money around, and control the ADA. On domestic affairs we didn’t have
much difficulty; on foreign affairs there were some differences, and he was in the minority. But he
never used his money and strength to force ADA to his position.
JOHNSON: He had the garment workers, and didn’t they provide much of the income?
RAUH: The I.L.G.W.U. was the largest single donor. As a matter of fact, on AD A’s opening day at
the Willard Hotel on January 4, 1947, Mrs. Roosevelt got up towards the end of the meeting and
asked for the floor. I was in the chair at that moment when she asked for the floor. She said, “We’re
about to adjourn. This has been a wonderful day, and we’re going to do something fine here. But I
don’t believe you should adjourn without having some finances for the organization as it starts out
tomorrow.” And she said, “1’11 raise $1,000. I’ll give you $100 right now, and I’ll raise the remaining
money.” And Dave Dubinsky said, ”I’ll give five thousand,” and that started ADA off.
JOHNSON: In ’52 we have the Stevenson campaign. You have ADA apparently backing Stevenson
in ’52.
RAUH: Oh, no question.
JOHNSON: He’s known to be strong on civil liberties but soft on civil rights.
http://www. trumanl ibrary .org/oralhi st/rauh .htm 9/4/01
: T rwnan Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 32 of38
RAUH: Soft may be too tough a word, but he was not a passionate civil rights advocate. I will
admit that. I wouldn’t have used the word “soft.” I would have said that he was–l’m trying to find a
word to describe him.
JOHNSON: Lukewarm?
RAUH: Lukewann is even too tough on him. I think he believed in civil rights, but he was going to
take it slow and wasn’t going to allow it to interfere with the nation’s politics.
· JOHNSON: He wasn’t going to revive that ’48 plank on civil rights was he? He wasn’t going to let
that in the platform?
RAUH: Well, the issue in ’52 was dij;ferent.
JOHNSON: You’ve got “Korea, Communism, and coITUption,” the three big issues used by the
RAUH: I’ll tell you the things we didn’t get in ’52 that we wanted. We didn’t get, for example, a
provision to legalize sit-ins and things like that, but those were pretty far-out provisions. I’d say on
one•to-ten on civil rights, Stevenson would be about six or seven, and if you want to call that soft,
JOHNSON: Where would you put Truman on that scale?
RAUH: Oh, eight.
JOHNSON: Apparently, Stevenson was no great supporter of Federal aid to education, or national
health insurance.
RAUH: He was the most conservatJve of the three candidates: [Estes] Kefauver, [W. Averell]
Harriman, and Stevenson. If that’s what you mean, I agree with that. He was more conservative than
Kefauver or Harriman.
JOHNSON: Did ADA give any support to Harriman in ’52 or ’56?
RAUH: Not really. I’U try and tell you what happened on Harriman. ADA didn’t take a position
between Harriman, Kefauver, and Stevenson in 1952. During the summer [of’52] Stevenson was
acting like Hamlet; “J don’t want to run. Maybe yes; maybe no.” The question arose, “What are we
going to do?” Most ADAers were for Stevenson and were scared that Kefauver would Jock it up.
He had won a11 the primaries. It looked like Stevenson might not get it. Herbert Lehman called me
up and said that Harriman was going to run in the District of Columbia primary in May and he
wanted me to be the campaign manager. I said, “But I’m for Stevenson.” He said, “If you’re really
for Stevenson, in a Kefauver-Harriman fight you better see that Kefauver is licked.” He said, “The
best thing you can do for Stevenson is to win for Harriman.”
I thought about it for a few hours. I asked a couple of people, including Jim Loeb, who went for
Harriman too. I asked Jim what he was going to do. He wasn’t working at ADA any more; he wasn’t
running the ADA at that time. I said. 11What are you going to do?” He said he bought the Lehman
argument. A couple of other people bought it, too.
JOHNSON: Yes, FDR, Jr. and Reuther apparently …
http://www.trumanli brary .orgloralhi st/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 33 of 38
RAUH: Well, they bought the Lehman argument. FDR, Jr. went for Harriman. I don’t think Reuther
ever did.
JOHNSON: Well, Gillon puts Reuther in that group.
RAUH: Does he? Maybe he does it because ofme; I don’t think it’s right. Anyway, you’re certainly
right on FDR, and you’re right on Loeb. Harriman, to win, had to beat Kefauver, and some bright
analyst saw that there would be a lot of Black votes here. So in my talk with Harriman on whether
I’d do it or not, I said, “We have worked out a civil rights position for you which is far to the left of
Kefauver and Stevenson.” He said, “Okay.” We won four to one here. That1s the only time in my
life I ever had more money than I needed.
JOHNSON: Harriman then was behind a strong civil rights plank.
RAUH: He didn’t know exactly what it was when we started. But he stayed with it.
JOHNSON: But of course, he lost. In ’56 Truman was backing Harriman’s candidacy. Did you
support him in ’56?
RAUH: No, I was for Stevenson.
JOHNSON: You were for Stevenson the second time around.
RAUH: I was for Stevenson the first time around.
JOHNSON: Were you being a little more pragmatic?
RAUH: Well, you know, we sort of favored Stevenson because of his candor, eloquence and civil
liberties stands. Harriman was the most liberal of the three; there wasn’t any question about that.
JOHNSON: Why didn’t the ADA support him instead of Stevenson then?
RAUH: Well, all J can tell you is, I used to introduce Harriman, and when I would finish, and when
Harriman would finish, people would come up to me and say, “Joe, why don’t you run for that
office. That guy can’t make a speech if it killed him.” Averell Harriman was tongue-tied. He got a
little better as he went along, but gosh, he couldn’t have been elected dog catcher. He just couldn’t
speak to an audience. The poor guy; I mean he just didn’t have it on a platform.
JOHNSON: Despite his great wealth, do you think he was a true liberal?
RAUH: I think, yes. He worshipped Roosevelt. My answer to that question is yes.
JOHNSON: The Republicans apparently painted the ADA as socialist, “popular?fronters,” and that
sort of thing.
What could you do about that?
RAUH: Well, we worked with the press as best we could. I remember talking to different people. I
remember one night Eric Severeid got on CBS News and just blew the whistle on the Republicans,
giving our positions and the whole history of how we fought as liberals for everything.
JOHNSON: Do you agree with Gillon when he says that the ADA’s influence on the Democratic
hnp://www. trumanl ibrary .org/oralhi st/rauh. htm 9/4/01
.’ Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 34 of38
Party reached a new low between 1952 and ’56 when Stephen Mitchell, for instance, was DNC
director. He was Stevenson’s choice. Do you remember Stephen Mitchell?
RAUH: Oh, I was about to tell you about that. He made a mistake in attacking the ADA. Jim Doyle
and I went to see him. Jim was a Wisconsin politician, who became a Federal judge. Johnson
appointed him a District judge. Jim and I went to see Steve Mitchell, and we said to him, “Come
on, what’s going on here. You say you’re a liberal; we’re libera1s. Why can’t we live together? We
have a right to criticize you; you can criticize us, too. But don’t make it out as though we were
doing something venal.” He said, “Well, you are.” And I said, “Well, what is it?” He said, “Every
time I’m about to say something or have a new idea, and I’ve told our people let’s say this or say
that, they have said, ‘Well, last month, the ADA said that,’ and I’m tired of hearing all this stuff.” I
mean there was a fight fot turf on the liberal side and he really didn’t want that. I became friends
with Steve in ’68 when we worked for Gene McCarthy on his anti-war campaign.
JOHNSON: Truman didn’t like Mitchell. McKinney, Frank McKinney had been, 1 think, Director
of the DNC, and he liked McKinney, but he didn’t like Mitchell.
RAUH: Well, Mitchell wasn’t really an old-line political hand, was he?
JOHNSON: Was he a pragmatist really, a political pragmatist?
RAUH: I think so. I was quite surprised when Mitchell called me up one day in 1968 and said,
“Will you be the credentials coordinator for Eugene McCarthy at the convention?” We hadn’t been
fiiends but I would have done anything for McCarthy. I was that much against the war. I wasn’t
particularly close to Gene McCarthy, before 1967-68, but he was the only one standing up against
the war until Bobby Kennedy got in later, and then Bobby got shot.
JOHNSON: Tiris is a letter, dated May 7, 1956, that was written to you by Truman, to you as
NationaJ Chairman of the ADA. It is really kind of a quintessential statement of liberalism.
RAUH: Well, was this the letter for the convention?
JOHNSON: Yes. It says, “Please extend my good wishes to the delegates of the ADA, meeting in
their ninth annual convention.”
RAUH: I’m sure I would have given the original to the ADA for its files. I wouldn’t usurp
something like that.
JOHNSON: But he’s certainly still promoting support for ADA, that is Harry Truman is.
RAUH: For liberalism.
JOHNSON: Yes. Well, he says, “The country has unfilled needs for education, health, roads, and
expanded community services of all kinds. Civil rights and civil liberties must be high on any
liberal agenda. But I would invite your special consideration on three major problems.” Then he
goes into foreign policy, into agriculture …
RAUH: Who would have helped him with that letter? He was out of office.
JOHNSON: David Lloyd, I suspect. Do you remember when he died? I wonder ifhe didn’t have
some authorship of this. Maybe it was David Noyes. Did you know David Noyes, who was
working there?
RAUH: Yes, I knew him. Yes, he was a nice fellow.
http://www. trumanlibrary .org/oralhist/rauh. htm 9/4/01
.’Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 35 of 38
JOHNSON: He wrote a lot of post-Presidential correspondence.
RAUH: That may have been his.
JOHNSON: Was he a liberal?
RAUH: I really don’t know.
JOHNSON: He came out of big business. He came out of advertising.
RAUH: I don’t remember him too well, actually.
JOHNSON: The third point that TfUIIlan makes in this letter is probably kind of traditional
liberalism. I’m quoting: “Third–the growth of a new feudalism. Centers of private power, beyond
democratic control, are exerting greater and greater influence over our national life, driving small
business to the walJ, and strangling individual enterprise. This curse of bigness dominates our press,
our airways, our amusement industries, and is beginning to shape our thoughts and beliefs. We
must oppose the socialism of corporate power quite as much as socialism by Government. Liberals
can serve their country by devising means to reverse this trend.” Does that kind of represent to you
the basic philosophy of the ADA, at least in that period?
RAUH: I think that letter could have been written by an ADAer. That reminds me now; I wonder
what Truman would think of all these take-overs. He probably would have had a hemorrhage,
wouldn’t he?
JOHNSON: Yes, I think so.
On another topic: Stephen Spingam, you’re acquainted with Stephen Spingam?
RAUH: Oh, sure. He tried to move into local politics, which you haven’t gotten into.
JOHNSON: We have an 1100-page transcript with Stephen Spingam. He had something to say
about a lot of different things. In 1956 he was special activities director for the Vice-Presidential
campaign of Estes Kefauver. Spingam was on Kefauver’s side, and a little irritated by ADA, which
he called “An excellent organization, but one which I have found often too ‘Ivory-towered’ and
RAUH: Well, there may have been something to that.
JOHNSON: “Who insists on going down to defeat with perfection rather than winning on an
effective compcomise.” Oh, he mentions an episode in which he needled you and you referred to
him as a “dirty, yellow-beJlied, sonofabitch.11 You invited him outside to beat him up.
RAUH: Oh, I might have said that. He gave that story to Drew Pearson. That quote is directly out
of Pearson’s column.
JOHNSON: He says that occurred at a housewanning at the National Capital Democratic Club. I
think that was in ’56. Well, there isn’t too much that’s significant here, but in ’64 you were
Democratic Chainnan of the Washington, D.C. city committee. And Spingarn does mention
splinter slates.
RAUH: Well, at one point he ran a slate against us without much success.
http://www.trumanl ibrary .org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
: Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 36 of38
JOHNSON: That’s right••What he called the Reeves-Lanahan slate against the Rauh-JacksonShackleton
RAUH: That’s right. Steve came out and got himself what do you call them, a truck, a campaign
JOHNSON: One of these sound trucks?
: RAUH: Yes. He got a sound truck, and he came up our street on the sound truck. He was shouting
about me and so forth. My son, Carl, that’s in ’56; Carl would have been …
JOHNSON: He said your son had a little confrontation with him.
RAUH: That’s right. Carl went out there and said, “You get out of here.” Let’s see, in ’56, he was 15
I think, and he ran Steve off the block.
JOHNSON: Spingam also says that you were against LBJ in ’60 but you loved him in ’64.
RAUH: That’s true. The civil rights law of 1964, whose 25th anniversary we celebrate this year, is
my reason for that.
JOHNSON: Apparently, Polly Shackleton held a grudge against Spingam for some time, but then
he wrote a letter, I think to you. He sent a letter to you and you forwarded it on to Polly and things
got patched up. He said that you were a “good politician” who can differ politically but still remain
friendly after all that. He does say at one time you insisted on perfection, and also in reference to
you, Spingam says, “He was too quick to denounce in very intemperate terms the people who were
against him, which is a mistake.” He said one should be selective on this. He adds, “I think that Joe
has moderated with the years.” Do you have any response to that?
RAUH: I think Steve’s probably right.
JOHNSON: How would you characterize Spingam very briefly?
RAUH: Oh , I have this recollection of him at the Federal Trade Commission.
JOHNSON: Yes. He was on the FTC.
RAUH: And I would say he was a very valuable guy there. He was always on the side of the angels,
as far as I can remember, at the Federal Trade Commission. I didn’t see him in enough political
situations to be able to tell much about him as a politician. What I do remember is that anybody that
he should have seen that in the 1964 local election he was throwing his weight into something
which he didn’t know anything about
For another example, getting on a sound truck back in 1956 and going in front of our house was
crazy. I don’t think anybody on the street knew there was a primary election or gave a goddamn
about it. But after Steve got done, I had so many supporters I didn’t know what the hell to do. It was
a slaughter. He may have felt that I used language sometimes that J shouldn’t have, and that’s quite
possibly true. But I would say he had no understanding of the political forces of the city, how Black
it was and things like that. I had the advantage of having been the first white civi] rights activist
around town, and all of that. So I had all sorts of advantages. There was just no chance that we were
going to lose an election. Why he wanted to jump in, I don’t know.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Page 37 of38
I would say that, with the exception of two or three incidents of the kind that we’ve discussed here,
we were perfectly good friends. I think he did a hell of a job on the Federal Trade Commission. 1
think that was the important part of his life. And he was very good at publicity. He had Drew
Pearson’s ear, and naturally that was very important for the muckraking that the Federal Trade
Commission wanted to do.
JOHNSON: That letter to you in ‘1956, from Harry Truman, was that the last correspondence as far
as you know with the President?
RAUH: What was the date of his death?
JOHNSON: December 1972. Did you have any personal correspondence other than this sort of
thing where he was corresponding with the ADA after he left the Presidency?
RAUH: Well, I did talk to him the night, I believe it was in ’59, when he presided over a beauty
contest of all the possible Democratic candidates for 1960. It was in New York City, and Truman
was the master of ceremonies. Kennedy, Hwnphrey, Symington, Jackson, Stevenson, Johnson all
spoke that night. I can’t remember what was said, but it was a beauty contest at a big dinner in New
York. At the cocktail hour I did have a talk with Truman. Maybe that was the last talk. I guess I
said something nice about Humphrey, because I and most of my friends were all for Humphrey at
that time. Truman, a good politician, said, “Oh, we’ve got wonderful people; we’ve got a lot of
wonderful candidates.” I don’t know who his candidate was at that moment, maybe it was
JOHNSON: I think he always was very respectful of Humphrey, wasn’t he?
RAUH: Well, not at the beginning. When Hubert got to Washington in 1949, they were very hard
on him because of the ’48 fight.
JOHNSON: But, of course, he won the election, and you say he takes credit for that strong plank, in
his memoirs.
RAUH: Yes, I know; I told you that. But that was the most ridiculous thing I ever heard.
JOHNSON: When Hubert Hwnphrey, you think, and the ADA s hould have gotten the credit?
RAUH: And Eugenie Anderson. I mean there’s enough credit to go around. You don’t have to grab
credit there. There’s plenty of credit to go around. But Truman did write in his memoirs that he
wrote the minority plank and that’s a joke.
I think the Truman story that seems almost the worst was the one on Francis Biddle, and Biddle felt
he had to correct it. I don’t know if you have Biddle’s letter in your files. Biddle wrote a letter to the
[Washington D.C.] Star or the Post in which he set the record straight on the Tom Clark matter and
it wasn’t at all the way Truman had written about it. The incident shows how smart Tom Clark is;
he parlayed getting fired by Biddle into becoming Attorney General and a Supreme Court Justice.
Now, you can’t do much better than that.
What happened, as I recall, was this: Clark had a job at Justice. Biddle was dissatisfied and asked
him to look for a job elsewhere. FDR died. Clark went to Bob Hannegan, head of the Democratic
Party, and asked Hannegan ifhe wou)dn’t like a “cooperative” Attorney General. Hannegan got
Truman to fire Biddle and appoint Clark. Truman wrote that Biddle had wanted to resign and
recommended Clark. Biddle contradicted this in the letter to which I referred.
http:/iwww.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm 9/4/01
_, Truman Library – Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview Pag e 38 of38
JOHNSON: But Clark was on the Supreme Court when the Brown vs. School Board came down in
’54. He was on the side of Brown , wasn’t he?
RAUH: It was unanimous.
JOHNSON: It was unanimous, yes. So that perhaps helped prepare the ground for desegregation
and what followed.
What grade would you give to the Truman administration after all these years on sa y civil rights,
and civil liberties?
RAUH: It would take a little more thought than we have tonight. There were some terrible breaches
of civil rights and civil liberties and there were some good things. The record is mixed.
JOHNSON: Well, thank you.
[Top ofthe Page I Notices and Restrictions I Interview Transcript}
• For questions, e-mail trurnan.reference@nara.gov
• Return to Truman Library OraJ History Finding Aid
• Return to Archival Reference at the Truman